Bloody anniversaries: Indepedence, pogroms, war and peace

The decisive year with terrible beginnings is also a year of anniversaries — 60 years of independence and 25 since the horrific pogrom of July 1983. It may be the case that the crucial push into the Wanni will begin in deadly earnest to coincide with the anniversary of independence, whilst if the pronouncements of the defence establishment are to be realised, it will be approaching final victory around the time of the anniversary of July 1983. There is some irony in this. Both these events are landmarks in the botched and bloody nation and state building exercise we have been engaging in.

Sixty years later in the one case and 25 in the other, on the key issues of national unity and reconciliation, it is still a case of back to the future. The factors that militated against the constitutional framework and compact of 1947 preventing the carnage of 1983, still persist. Key amongst them — majoritarian democracy, is set to be reinforced and consolidated as the continuing and defining characteristic of the polity. The protagonists on both sides of the main ethnic divide remain the mirror image of the other. Neither is looking for a win/win solution but rather a zero sum one. And as long as there are winners and losers there will be conflict. And with conflict there is every prospect of war.

The regime assumes that it will plant the lion flag in Killinochchi and announce the full implementation of the 13th Amendment within the confines of the unitary state. End of story. Not so. End of another blood soaked chapter. Is it conceivable that this regime will devolve power any more effectively and honestly than the Premadasa regime for instance? Is there any reasonable assurance that the finances to underpin meaningful devolution will be released by a centre occupied by this regime? With the mounting debt and inflation it has incurred and fuelled, it is as diligent and determined in the systematic destruction of the economy as it is with the elimination of the LTTE. Monies intended for devolved units are unlikely to be disbursed to them. And there will be the not inconsiderable expectation of a peace dividend in the north and in the south which is unlikely to be met, and the challenge of commensurate disappointment to be politically managed. The regime is too short-sighted to realise it, but its self entrapment on the war front has opened up another, equally or more challenging one on the economy. According to Minister Bandula Gunewardene we have a choice between the country and inflation. Has he heard of Weimar Germany?

There is also the likelihood of a scramble for supremacy amongst anti LTTE Tamil groups in the east, with the January local elections there constituting a first test. Already there are signs of division with all but the TMVP in favour of a re-merger with the north. As a consequence the TMVP has left the alliance. Be it victory, defeat or stalemate, these are issues that will not fade away and therefore not ones the regime can afford the luxury of ignoring. Accordingly, the contest between the anti-LTTE alliance and the TMVP standing on its own, in the local government elections in the east, will be of particular interest.

The regime has yet to plant the lion flag in Killinochchi. Its single, singular gamble has yet to pay off and the fate of the country hinges on what happens. As indicated in an earlier column, the economic considerations may determine the mode of attack. The regime may be alive to the possibility of being stalled in its tracks by a liquidity crisis. In such an event it will have to inch towards its objective. This will clearly take longer and tax its propaganda machine to the hilt in producing “feel good” news about LTTE losses to sustain popular support. Having torn up a torn up the CFA and got rid of the reviled SLMM, there will be fewer friends around to help. A single, singular LTTE military success could be militarily significant but politically, disproportionately more so in terms of its impact on popular support. The fate of the country and indeed of itself, is being decided in the casino of war on one throw of the dice by the Rajapakse regime. It is as scary as that.

There is no turning back now and it is very doubtful as to whether, as some have suggested, the international community can do anything to stop the momentum towards a Wanni offensive. Neither the will or the ability to do so can be detected. They are expecting a stalemate and in the circumstances of one to press the two sides to return to the table once more. In the meantime, there is the prospect of more concrete action in respect of the regime’s imperviousness to human rights, continuing violations and the culture of impunity. And on this score, the regime should be alive to the possibility that there could be serious consequences beyond rhetorical censure, if violations were to continue.

The regime believes and has evidence to back this, that the majority of the majority community are behind it and that is all that matters. Will this be the case till August and will it continue to be the case beyond that if needs be, are the questions. Answers in the affirmative cannot be taken for granted, indefinitely.

Article also published in The Morning Leader, 9th January 2008.