Photo courtesy of Advocata
The presidential election scheduled to be held on September 21 is likely to mark a significant milestone in Sri Lankan political history. The popular sentiment that dominates the public psyche during the election run up clearly shows that the NPP has emerged as a leading force during the election campaign. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the southern parts of the country, the most energetic and enthusiastic campaign has been Anura Dissanayake’s.
It is still too early to say whether Anura Dissanayake will emerge as the winner. However, there is a strong indication that the NPP has at least become one of the two leading parties fighting for the presidency. Although the election campaign started as a three cornered contest, with the unfolding of the campaign, it has increasingly assumed the character of a battle between the center-right SJB and the left-leaning NPP.
The two party system
An interesting consequence of the dramatic rise of the NPP from a party that only polled three percent of votes in 2019 to a leading contender in the presidential elections would be the possible collapse of the traditional two party system that dominated Sri Lankan politics after independence. Since the formation of the SLFP in 1951, the two-party system, polarized between the center-right UNP and centrist SLFP has been a structural feature of the political scene.
The recent transformation of these parties respectively into SJB and SLPP did not alter this composition. Apart from the two main parties, other smaller ones based on minority communities generally revolved around the two main parties forming alliances. The only exemption was Tamil nationalist politics, which preferred to stay independent while bargaining for regional autonomy.
Before the emergence of the SLFP in the 1950s, Sri Lankan politics was a battle between the left and the right. The LSSP, the first political party founded in Sri Lanka, had a considerable influence among the urban working class and rural masses in certain areas. In the 1947 general elections, the combined left vote distributed among the LSSP, the Communist Party and the Bolshevik Leninist Party (both the latter were breakaways from the LSSP) stood at around 20 percent as opposed to 39 percent the UNP obtained.
However, the formation of the SLFP changed the course of history. SLFP founder S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike claimed that he offers a “middle path” between capitalism and socialism – a centrist platform that articulated Sinhala ethno-nationalist demands, anti-imperialist sentiments and certain socialist-oriented demands the left championed. The old left faced a difficult terrain with the co-option of socialist demands by the SLFP and increased ethnicization of politics. By the 1960s, both Samasamajists and Communists sought an alliance with SLFP as it became increasingly evident that it was difficult if not impossible to surpass the dominance the latter held in rural areas. Due to certain anti-imperialist traits the SLFP demonstrated at the time, despite its ethnic-nationalist agenda, the old left preferred to align with the SLFP to prevent the UNP from coming into power whom they saw as the greater evil. Since entering into coalitions in the 1960s, the trajectory of the old left became a long walk towards obsoletion, ending up as a mere auxiliary of the SLFP.
JVP factor
After the decline of the old left, there had been no serious contender to the traditional two party dominance in the country. Occurrences like the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party led by Vijaya Kumaratunga in the 1980s and the Democratic United National Front formed by the Lalith-Gamini faction against UNP leader Ranasinghe Premadasa were short lived experiments. Sinhala nationalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in the early 2000s showed an initial militant rise but then was absorbed into coalition politics. It is in this context that the politics of the JVP becomes an intriguing phenomenon.
Similar to many radical leftwing splinter groups that emerged in the 1960s, the JVP was formed in opposition to the coalition politics of the old left. After two unsuccessful insurrections to capture state power in 1971 and 1987-89, the JVP entered into mainstream, parliamentary politics in the 1990s. However, the party struggled to consolidate a firm base within the framework of a well-entrenched two party system. In the 1990s, the JVP appealed to those who were disappointed with the two mainstream parties, advancing the slogan that UNP and SLFP are the same in terms of corruption and nepotism.
However, in the 2000s, amidst the Norwegian brokered peace process between the government and the LTTE, the JVP shifted towards adopting a more nationalist popular discourse, attempting to capitalize on the resentment among the Sinhala masses. Consequently, they entered into a coalition with the SLFP in 2004 and supported Mahinda Rajapaksa’s candidacy in the 2005 presidential elections.
Although the Sinhala nationalist mass line proved to be beneficial for some time, in the long run, the strategy backfired with Rajapaksa becoming popular in the south, forcing the JVP into the political periphery. With the ascendency of the Rajapaksa project, the JVP saw a rapid decline of its support base and also faced two splits; one to the rightwards (Wimal Weerawansa and the National Freedom Front) that was followed by a leftwards split in 2011 (Kumar Gunarathnam and the Frontline Socialist Party).
General elections held in 2010, 2015, and 2020 were disastrous for the party, which ended up with only a handful of MPs. Considering the isolation and the humiliation the JVP had to endure after the defeat in the 2020 general elections, the present comeback seems quite astonishing. After 30 years of parliamentary politics, the JVP has finally managed to break through the traditional two party system.
Collapse of SLPP and status quo ante
What amounted to the current popular support the JVP-led NPP benefit from? Among others, four reasons can be outlined.
First, the rupture brought by the 2022 economic crisis and the mass uprising that followed laid down the objective conditions for the current scenario. As I have argued in a previous piece, the aragalaya protest movement encompassed two intertwined mass sentiments – the demand for stability through putting an end to economic chaos and the desire for a change in how politics is done. The demand for change flowed from the deep resentment the people had about the political establishment that they saw as responsible for the economic collapse.
While the Rajapaksa dynasty became the immediate subject of mass anger, a general dissatisfaction about mainstream politics grew among the masses, conceiving them as a self-interested, corrupt clique that did not care about ordinary people. Today, the disappointment towards the status quo has grown into a powerful mass sentiment that has provided fertile ground for anti-establishment politics.
Second, the economic crisis and the aragalaya devastated the Rajapaksa dynasty and the SLPP. The consequences of this devastation should not be underestimated. The centrist political line introduced by Bandaranaike in the 1950s evolved with time and the SLPP can be considered as the political successor of that project. Terms like left, right and center have a relative meaning, relative to the historical and political context that is under discussion. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, political discourse in general shifted towards the right and formerly centrist parties like the SLFP adapted to the new circumstances by becoming more market friendly parties. But at the same time, they were careful not to abandon welfarism altogether.
During the Rajapaksa era (2005-2022), the former SLFP largely retained its centrist character in terms of socio-economic matters but also aligned the party with a more militant ethno-nationalist platform. The toxic militant nationalism of the SLPP era that entailed rightwing populist traits is qualitatively different from the Sinhala nationalism of the traditional SLFP. Despite this metamorphosis, SLPP remained as the heir of the historic centrist line. As explained earlier, the entry of the SLFP into politics was the factor that sidelined the old left, laying the foundations for the traditional two party system. Centrist SLFP was a pillar of that system. We are witnessing the collapse of this pillar, which has created a great power vacuum in southern constituencies.
Anti-establishment discourse
Nevertheless, the above reasons alone are not sufficient for NPP to become the force that fills in the vacuum. A political crisis is a contingent moment. There can be multiple possibilities and politics could have shifted either way. This brings us to the third reason – the nature of the popular discourse the JVP (and later the NPP) had been advancing since their departure from the nationalist mass line.
The JVP abandoned its nationalistic mass appeal after the end of the civil war and re-adopted the anti-establishment/anti-corruption message that the party was championing in the mid 1990s. Unlike many other left parties in Sri Lanka, the discursive strategy of the JVP always had a populist dimension. From populism, I refer to the strategy of invoking a popular plea – a cross-cutting message that appeals to diverse constituencies and social groups. Populism creates a political frontier between the elite and the “people” and calls upon the people to unite to regain power from the hands of the elite. This differs from the practice of most orthodox leftist parties that aim to mobilize people in terms of class.
Comparing the JVP with the Nava Samasamaja Party (NSSP) which was the only other sizable leftwing party that survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and entered the 1990s will give an idea about the difference between the two strategies. Parties like the NSSP appealed to the “working class” and were economistic in understanding the popular psyche. The JVP discourse on the other hand encompassed a dual character. While socialist ideas were rooted among inner party circles, the party from the days of Rohana Wijeweera tended to invoke a popular discourse when reaching out to the broader public. For instance, during 1987-89, the popular appeal was the opposition to Indian intervention. In the mid 1990s, it was anti-corruption and antipathy towards establishment politics which later was replaced by the anti-LTTE, nationalistic mass line.
After re-adopting the popular discourse of anti-establishment politics after 2010, the JVP invested in constructing a new political antagonism between the corrupt political class and the common people. This framing competed against the narrative of the Rajapaksa bloc that pitted the Sinhala people against minorities and the elites that allegedly favored anti-Sinhala elements. After the fall of Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015, the JVP continued with its discourse, attacking the Yahapalana government for continuing corrupt political practices.
The idea that became common sense during the 2022 aragalaya – the conception that the suffering of the people was brought by the corrupt conduct of politicians did not emerge out of thin air. This was a discursive construction the JVP has been nurturing for decades. For the people in the south, the economic crisis and the collapse of the Rajapaksa hegemony presented an existentialist moment – the narrative that provided meaning to their political thinking so far suddenly appeared as an illusion. A new language, a new imagination was needed to explain the everyday experiences they were going through. People, anxious for a change, found that narrative in the anti-establishment discourse the NPP has been fostering. Indeed, the JVP did not lead the aragalaya but the popular sentiment that dominated the aragalaya atmosphere resembled what the JVP/NPP has been repeating for a long time.
The independent line
Fourth, despite the discourse against traditional politics, the NPP could never have become the choice of the people radicalized by the aragalaya experience if they had not practiced what they preached. After 2010, and especially after indirectly supporting Maithripala Sirisena in the 2015 presidential elections, the JVP adopted a staunch stance against aligning with any mainstream party. The strong attitude towards an independent line can be seen in many events such as the refusal to support Sajith Premadasa in the 2019 presidential elections despite the call from many left-liberal quarters and fielding its candidate for the presidential contest when Gotabaya Rajapaksa resigned in July 2022.
Political analyst Dr. Dayan Jayatilleke in a recent piece criticized NPP for not forming a broader alliance with figures like Dullas Alahapperuma or Charitha Herath who now have joined with the SJB. Jayatilleke seems to be underestimating the change of attitude that has occurred in the popular psyche about mainstream politicians after the aragalaya. While figures like Alahapperuma can be genuine people at the individual level, their long term association with regimes the people now eschew would have been a liability for the NPP if they had decided to accommodate them. The fierce insistence of party independence and not collaborating with mainstream politicians has proven to be an advantage for the NPP. If the NPP had collaborated with those whom they denounced, that would have undermined the legitimacy of the NPP before the public eyes.
Instead of building coalitions at the top, the party invested in bringing people together who were previously affiliated with different parties at the ground level. The NPP was meant to be a platform for the masses who did not necessarily identify with JVP politics. After the defeat in 2019, the NPP focused on building Kottasha Sabhas (constituency councils) in each Grama Seva division aiming to attract individuals at the grassroots level who have supported other parties in the past but have become vary of traditional politics. At the popular level, the creation of NPP helped to attract a new layer comprising of middle class professionals, businessmen and academics – an intellectual stratum that previously showed some reservations about JVP politics.
Regardless of whether Anura Dissanayake becomes president on September 21 or not, after this election Sri Lankan politics hardly would be the same. Most probably there would be a reconfiguration of the balance of forces with a center-left led by NPP becoming a main axis. How would the center-right, now divided into two parties, respond to this reconfiguration? What would be the future of the centrist line, now facing a tremendous setback? Can we expect a reorganized SLPP under Namal Rajapaksa to invoke militant Sinhala nationalism to derail the support base of the NPP? How would NPP address that challenge while retaining its character as a non-communal party? These are some of the questions that we will have to ask after the September 21 election.