Photo courtesy of The Morning
In November 2012 a massacre took place at Welikada Closed Prison in Colombo during which 27 imprisoned persons were killed. On January 13, 2022 one of the three persons charged, Emil Ranjan Lamahewa former Superintendent of the Magazine Remand Prison, was held accountable for the murder of one person, Dewamullage Malith Sameera Perera alias Konda Amila.
The judgment is critical to the struggle for truth and justice for the victims of the massacre as it confirms that the massacre took place with the involvement of many state officials from multiple state institutions. In doing so, the judgment sets out the lack of accountability in decision making, which was driven by individuals and institutions acting and exercising powers outside their legally prescribed mandates. Despite judicial confirmation that state officials carried out pre-planned extrajudicial killings of incarcerated persons, there is no public outcry, and not surprisingly, no government action.
“Unknown/unidentified” men: the omnipresent perpetrators
The court found that imprisoned persons were taken away by men in civilian clothing and or army personnel and were later found dead. The court concluded there is strong evidence to deduce that those who took them away had acted as one with the intention of committing murder. Dispelling any doubt that the imprisoned persons were killed in a targeted manner, the court states, “Medical evidence has made strong revelations to confirm that shots had been fired targeting the head, neck, chest, places where a death would be immediate; the blood spatter pattern in the place where they were shot to death show that this was not caused by a random shooting, but a targeted shooting at close range, causing the deaths of these prisoners. Accordingly, strong evidence confirms that the deaths of these 8 deceased persons had happened as mentioned in the charges.”
The court accepted the prosecution’s case that, based on photographs of the killed persons taken at two different times, the dead bodies did not have firearms next to them when they were photographed at around 7.30 am. However, in the second set of photographs taken after 9.00 am, four T 56 weapons are found next to the bodies. This substantiates the pre-planned and targeted nature of the killings and the attempt by the perpetrators to create the appearance the persons who were killed were armed aggressors.
Although the court found Lamahewa had committed the murder of Konda Amila with the support of an army major, to date the identity of this major has not been revealed nor any investigation conducted into his involvement in the murder. Nor do we know those responsible for the murder of seven persons listed in the indictment or the 19 others who were killed. For instance, the judgment states that the three accused persons are alleged to have committed the offences set out in the indictment “with others, whom the prosecution is unaware of” and are “not known to the prosecution”.
State impunity: the untamable monster
The judgment confirms that several individuals and institutions that had no authority to make decisions with regard to prisons were key players in the incidents that took place at Welikada Prison. These persons seemed to hold and exercise extra-legal authority which superseded that of prison officials, who were rendered disempowered spectators.
Even during Yahapalana, the focus was only on individual responsibility for the murders. The extra-legal authority exercised by entities such as the military and the Special Task Force (STF) and the gross abuse of power by individuals who made extra-legal decisions with impunity seem to have escaped the investigation. Issues such as command responsibility and the lack of institutional checks and balances were disregarded probably due to the normalization and public acceptance of the abuse of power by persons in authority, and the absence of a culture of holding state/government officials accountable.
The then Commissioner General of Prisons (CGP) P.W. Kodippili gave evidence that the decision to conduct the search operation led by the STF, which was the beginning of a series of events that culminated in the massacre, was made at a meeting held under the leadership of the then Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Although an officer from the Prisons Intelligence Unit participated in the meeting, the CGP had no prior knowledge of the officer’s participation and assumed the officer must have been directly summoned without the CGP being informed of his participation.
During cross examination the CGP said that the letter he had submitted requesting the support of STF personnel was prepared at the Ministry (likely the ministry in charge of prisons as it is referred to elsewhere as such) using his letterhead. The letter wasforwarded to the Inspector General of the Police upon the instructions of the Minister. The CGP hence appears to have been more a figurehead than the decision maker.
Despite evidence establishing there was no agreement about which wards would be searched or the manner in which the search would be conducted, on November 9 at around 1.30 pm a STF contingent arrived at Welikada. The CGP stated he was at ameeting when he received information STF personnel had entered prison, indicating he was unaware of the exact time the search was to be conducted. Kuda Banda, a key witness in the case, who was the acting chief jailor of Welikada Prison at the time, was also unaware the STF was due to arrive to conduct a search.
The Court says the CGP’s evidence revealed he was displeased about outsiders coming inside prison to conduct a search operation and had not agreed to the chapel section, which houses persons on death row and those with long sentences, being searched. Furthermore the letter, which listed the places proposed for the search, did not include the chapel section. The reason for excluding chapel was because persons were housed in separate prison cells in the chapel section, either on their own or with only a couple of others and hence it was not difficult for prison officers to conduct the search of the section on their own.
When tensions mounted between the STF and the imprisoned persons, the CGP had requested a couple of hours to control the situation, but he informed Court his request was disregarded by “persons in charge of the army” who deployed the army insidethe prison. The CGP also stated that when he tried to enter the prison around 5.30 am on November 10 the army did not allow him to do so.
The judgment establishes that decisions regarding the search were made at a meeting which was led by someone whose portfolio did not include prisons. The Commissioner General of Prisons, the senior most official in the prison administration, appears to have had little power in relation to the decision making and did not appear to have even known when the search was supposed to be conducted. He, who had primary responsibility for the management of the prison and is legally accountable, was rendered powerless and was even prevented from entering the prison by the army, who had no authority to do so.
The judgment lays bare the failure to undertake credible investigation into the massacre, which was confirmed by several police officers. Chief Inspector of Police Mahinda Balasuriya, OIC of the Borella Police Station, said that even though his police station began the investigation, the death inquiry and reporting to the magistrate were not done and the investigation was not concluded. He was unable to give a reason for the delay in conducting the death inquest but acknowledged that a proper investigation had not been done. Another police officer, Superintendent of Police Adhikari, too acknowledged that the investigation was not conducted properly.
The court stated that investigations were not conducted to find the persons responsible given the involvement of prison officials, the army, the STF and officials of the relevant ministry. Instead, an investigation was conducted for the sake of appearance. It goes on to state that the fact the death inquests took several years to conclude confirms this. The court acknowledged that while investigations were not conducted properly, those who witnessed the incident had also not revealed details about it, probably due to fear of reprisals since senior officials were involved in the incident.
Several witnesses told court the investigation picked up pace after the change of government in 2015.
More questions than answers
The flawed and dysfunctional penal as well as governance systems that enabled the Welikada Prison massacre to take place remain intact. Since the Welikada massacre, two other incidents of violence have taken place; one at Anuradhapura Remand Prison in March 2020 and the other at Mahara Closed Prison in November 2020. To date, no one has been held accountable for the deaths or injuries resulting from these incidents. In August 2021, the then minister responsible for prisons, Lohan Ratwatte, allegedly entered Anuradhapura Remand Prison, sought out persons detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), held them at gunpoint and subjected them to degrading treatment. He still holds a ministerial portfolio.
All this demonstrates the vulnerability of incarcerated persons and the impunity with which elected and appointed public officials abuse power. Most importantly, while the judgment demonstrates there is a need to look beyond the three persons who were indicted to hold those responsible for the Welikada massacre accountable, the context as well as entrenched impunity tell us that the likelihood of this happening is slim to none.
