Photo courtesy of Kumanan
Last year, I studied in some depth perceptions of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) and the National People’s Power (NPP) after the consequential presidential election and again after the even more significant general election.
In Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s origin story in Tamil and Sinhala: What the stresses, and silences showcase, published soon after the presidential election, Tamil sentiments towards AKD, based on YouTube comments against viral videos featuring his hometown, reflected a complex mixture of admiration and cautious optimism. Tamil comments featured a strong appreciation for what was perceived as AKD’s simplicity and humble origins while viewing him as a potentially unifying figure who could bridge Sri Lanka’s ethno-political divides. Tamil comments were notably more detailed and policy-focused than the ones in Sinhala, specifically calling for AKD to address Tamil grievances, implement constitutional reforms including power sharing arrangements, promote bilingualism, improve infrastructure in the North and East and pursue transitional justice initiatives including investigations into past human rights abuses. While expressing hope and electoral support for AKD in the parliamentary elections (which at the time were yet to be held), Tamil comments featured a pragmatic caution, emphasising that the new president still needed to prove himself regarding specific Tamil concerns. This sentiment was in sharp contrast to Sinhala comments in the main, which focused more on AKD’s personal qualities and general aspirations for national development rather than addressing ethnic reconciliation issues.
I wrote Tamil sentiment on NPP’s electoral sweep of Jaffna, and Northern Province in 2024 general election after the historic win by the NPP in the general election, ending with a super-majority in parliament. The study of YouTube comments against two viral Tamil videos highlighted widespread optimism about political change, with many celebrating the potential for national unity and economic development under AKD’s leadership and government. However, this enthusiasm was tempered by concerns about Tamil rights and cultural preservation, with some warning that a shift away from traditional Tamil nationalist politics might represent vulnerability rather than reconciliation. A clear difference from post-presidential election discourse was a reduced emphasis on federalism and constitutional reforms, with a stronger stress on practical governance, administrative efficiency and immediate economic or existential concerns. The predominant emotional register was celebratory, with many expressing hope that the unprecedented electoral outcome might help in transcending historical ethnic divisions, although a significant minority remained wary of potential broken promises, citing previous disappointments with Southern politics and politicians.
Parenthetically, my study of social media commentary during 2022’s aragalaya, at scale, saw the platforming of robust debates in Sinhala – to a degree never seen before, and in public pages, groups on Facebook alone – on the end of war in May 2009, including references to war crimes and crimes against humanity. This robust debate that was central to the core narratives of the aragalaya’s interrogation of history and the Rajapaksas was reflected offline too, especially at GotaGoGama in Galle Face. Commemorating the end of war in May that year, GGG witnessed the memorialisation of Tamil victims who were killed. In one reading, AKD and NPP won both elections in 2024 as the candidate and political party respectively who were entrusted with and perceived to be the best custodians of the “system change” narrative of the aragalaya, which among other issues embraced a fuller, more honest reckoning, recognition and interrogation of the end of war.
All this plays into a critique of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s (MFA) response to the sanctioning of four individuals by the British.
On Monday, the UK government sanctioned four Sri Lankans “…responsible for serious human rights abuses and violations during the Sri Lanka civil war, including extrajudicial killings, torture and/or perpetration of sexual violence”. Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in response to the British sanctions on the four individuals.
Diplomatically, the MFA’s (and by extension the Sri Lankan government’s) response is understandable as an assertion of sovereignty and a rejection of external pressure. Nothing new here, especially when compared to similar rhetoric by the Rajapaksas and even former presidents Ranil Wickremesinghe and Maithripala Sirisena in the past. However, when placed against the backdrop of the specific Tamil sentiments emerging after the NPP’s electoral victories characterised by unprecedented hope, pragmatic expectations for development, a desire for unity, yet underscored by historical scepticism and unresolved issues of accountability, the government’s framing presents potential and significant dissonances. It risks being perceived by segments of the Tamil community, particularly the more sceptical voices identified in the studies above, as prioritising procedural arguments over substantive engagement with (war crimes) accountability concerns that, for many, remain inextricably entwined with meaningful reconciliation.
For example, the assertion that unilateral sanctions “complicate the national reconciliation process” is diplomatically significant. However, it sits uneasily with the nuanced Tamil sentiments observed. While many Tamil commenters expressed hope for national unity and moving beyond past ethnic strife under the NPP, a significant undercurrent remained concerned about accountability for past violations and the historical failures of domestic mechanisms. For those harbouring scepticism or feeling vulnerable, the government’s dismissal of external accountability measures (even unilateral ones) as mere “complications” could risk reinforcing fears that genuine accountability might be sidelined in the pursuit of a state defined unity or development agenda. The government response does not explicitly acknowledge the perspective that accountability might be seen by some, particularly victim communities, as a prerequisite for, rather than a complication of, reconciliation.
My study of thousands of comments highlighted an extraordinary hope placed in the AKD/NPP government by many Tamils in Sri Lanka, viewing it as a potential break from corrupt, ethnically divisive politics as usual, defined by the divisive rhetoric of the Rajapaksas. They anticipate transformative change, better governance and economic development. Yet, the MFA’s response, focused on the procedural aspects of the sanctions and invoking established diplomatic arguments, risks considerable dissonance with this forward looking, hopeful “new chapter” narrative. The MFA’s tone arguably reflects a traditional state-centric stance rather than overtly aligning with the specific sense of potential transformation associated with the NPP’s unprecedented and historic mandate, which attracted significant Tamil support.
The British sanctions relate to serious alleged human rights violations during the war, i.e., the past (which is not the past for many). Tamil sentiments in the comments studied last year show a complex, fluid dynamic: a desire to address past grievances (transitional justice, missing persons) coexists, particularly post-general election, with a pragmatic focus on present needs and future development (economy, governance, reduced military presence). The MFA’s response by focusing on rejecting any external process related to the past, might be perceived by some Tamils as insufficiently acknowledging the substantive need for addressing that past, even as the community itself looks towards the future under the new president, and government. The response doesn’t explicitly bridge how the government purported commitment to “domestic mechanisms” (an entirely unoriginal thesis) will tangibly differ from previous efforts or satisfy calls for meaningful justice, a key point of scepticism highlighted in the social media commentary studied last year.
I find four other concerns with the MFA statement’s thrust and tone.
- Emphasis on unilateralism: The MFA says the UK’s actions as unilateral. This is obviously true. From a sovereign standpoint, the sanctions were not mandated by a body like the UN General Assembly or Security Council. However, by framing this as the primary point of contention, the MFA risks appearing to be dismissive of the underlying reasons for the sanctions anchored to very well documented, long standing international concerns regarding accountability for alleged serious human rights violations during the war and especially its bloody, brutal denouement in May 2009. By definition, international human rights law and norms transcend purely domestic jurisdictions, with a scrutiny that’s invited particularly when domestic processes are perceived to be partial, compromised, cosmetic, ineffective, insufficient or slow. Sri Lanka’s a cogent example for all of this.
- Reconciliation: MFA’s assertion that the UK’s unilateral actions “do not assist but serve to complicate the national reconciliation process” is significant. It positions external accountability measures as an impediment or detrimental to internal healing. The Sri Lankan government presents the sanctions as having the potential to polarise opinion domestically and be perceived as unwarranted, hostile external interference (which in a grounded reading folds neatly into mainstream Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism’s historic, and at times frothing rejection of such measures). However, this stance potentially understates a counter argument that has been repeatedly articulated by civil society over the years: that a lack of credible accountability for past atrocities is itself a fundamental obstacle to genuine, lasting reconciliation, particularly for victim communities seeking justice and closure. The UK government explicitly framed the sanctions as aiming to prevent impunity, suggesting they view accountability as a prerequisite for, not a complication of, reconciliation. The MFA’s response does not fully engage with this perspective.
- Domestic mechanisms: The commitment to “strengthening domestic mechanisms on accountability and reconciliation” while not original and echoes what previous government has repeatedly noted with little to show for it, aligns with the principle of subsidiarity (handling matters at the national/domestic level where possible). The critique, however, lies in the context of historical precedent. For years, international bodies, including the UN Human Rights Council (where the UK is active in the Core Group on Sri Lanka), have expressed concerns about the pace, independence and effectiveness of Sri Lanka’s domestic accountability processes. In the Core Group’s statement earlier this month, the UK’s Ambassador for Human Rights to the UN, Eleanor Sanders, on behalf of the Core Group on Sri Lanka noted that “As the Government seeks to make progress on human rights and corruption cases, we urge that any comprehensive reconciliation and accountability process carry the support of affected communities, build on past recommendations and meet international standards”, and went on to state that “We also encourage the Government to re-invigorate the work of domestic institutions focused on reparations and missing persons.” The MFA merely stating that past violations should be dealt with domestically, without concrete, timebound assurances or addressing past critiques of these mechanisms’ efficacy simply will not assuage international concerns that led to the sanctions in the first place. The MFA’s response lacks specificity on how current strengthening efforts differ substantively from previous attempts.
- Tone and a revealing omission: The MFA’s response focuses entirely on the process (unilateralism, domestic jurisdiction) and the impact(complicating reconciliation) rather than substantively engaging with the substance of the allegations prompting the sanctions. Tellingly too, while noting sanctions on former military commanders, the response completely omits specific mention of the fourth individual sanctioned – Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, also known as Karuna Amman. This individual’s association with gross human rights violations, including from the time he was part of the LTTE, is robustly documented. As Human Rights Watch reported in 2013, “LTTE forces under Karuna’s command were directly involved in some of the worst crimes of Sri Lanka’s 26-year-long armed conflict, which ended in May 2009, Human Rights Watch said. In June 1990, 400 to 600 police officers who had surrendered to LTTE forces, many of whom may have been under Karuna’s control, were bound, gagged, and beaten. The LTTE then executed the Sinhalese and Muslim police officers among them. Karuna has admitted that the LTTE committed these killings in an interview with the BBC, but claims he was not at the scene. Under the legal principle of command responsibility, though, Karuna could still be criminally liable for the massacre even if he was not physically present.” The MFA’s response only explicitly referred to “three…former military commanders of the Sri Lankan armed forces” and chose to ignore Karuna completely.