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The JVP and Ethnic Relations: Walking a Tightrope to 2024 (Part 1)

Photo courtesy of Economic Times

As the 2024 elections approach in Sri Lanka, the National People’s Power (NPP) is positioning itself as a major contender. However, the JVP, the dominant party within the NPP, carries a legacy closely associated with Sinhala nationalism. This raises critical questions for voters, especially those from minority communities, about how the JVP now approaches the complex issue of ethnic relations. This analysis explores the JVP/NPP’s recent trajectory on this crucial topic, examining their past manifestos and public statements – key indicators of a party’s vision, values, and plans for the future – to determine whether they represent a coherent and genuine shift in ideology or a calculated political strategy. Analyzing these documents allows us to trace the evolution of the JVP/NPP’s approach to ethnic relations, providing valuable context for understanding their current position as Sri Lanka heads towards the 2024 elections. The JVP/NPP’s approach to ethnic relations will have profound implications for Sri Lanka’s future, making their stance a critical issue as the country heads towards the 2024 elections.

A history of mistrust

To grasp the complexities of the JVP’s current position on ethnic relations, it’s crucial to acknowledge their history. From its inception, the JVP was closely associated with Sinhala nationalism. This was especially apparent during Sri Lanka’s civil war, where the party fiercely opposed granting autonomy to Tamil regions. This position, along with their actions during the conflict, gave them a reputation for opposing Tamil self-determination – a legacy that still affects their relationship with the Tamil community.

The JVP opposed power sharing efforts like the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment, seeing them as threats to Sri Lankan unity. The party’s leader, Rohana Wijeweera, even went so far as to frame Tamil nationalism as a reactionary movement aligned with imperialist interests (Venugopal, 2010). This stance was not merely rhetorical; the JVP actively supported policies that ran counter to devolution, such as the legal separation of the Northern and Eastern provinces.

Even after renouncing violence and entering mainstream politics in the early 1990s, the JVP has struggled to shake off the perception of being fundamentally opposed to Tamil aspirations. Their past continues to haunt their present, making it challenging to build bridges with the Tamil community and raising questions about whether their commitment to inclusivity is genuine or merely a tactic for electoral gain.

From homogeneity to targeted recognition

A closer look at the JVP’s past manifestos and policy documents shows a gradual shift in how they approach ethnic issues. While still stressing national unity, they increasingly recognize Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and cultural makeup. However, this shift hasn’t been straightforward, and the party’s stance is often marked by ambiguity and conflicting signals.

Their 2015 manifesto, while light on specifics regarding ethnic relations, focused on uniting “our people” and solving “the problems faced by our people”. A closer examination, however, reveals a lack of specific proposals for addressing Tamil grievances or advancing power-sharing arrangements. While the manifesto touched upon the need for ethnic harmony and reconciliation, it largely avoided committing to concrete actions that might address the root causes of ethnic tensions. This lack of concrete engagement likely contributed to their modest performance in the 2015 elections, securing only 4.87% of the vote and failing to win any seats in the presidential election. The lack of support, especially from Tamil communities, highlighted the JVP’s struggle to appeal to voters beyond their traditional base.

The JVP’s 2019 manifesto showed a clear shift toward a more inclusive tone. It explicitly calls for a “Sri Lankan nation with equal recognition for Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim, and other nationalities”. This suggests a move away from promoting a single, uniform national identity to recognizing the unique identities of different groups in Sri Lanka. The JVP even criticizes previous governments for fueling divisions between Tamil and Sinhala communities for political gain, presenting themselves as a party that can heal these rifts.

The 2019 manifesto took a more targeted approach by addressing the specific needs of different communities. It included separate sections for Tamil communities in the North and East, for upcountry plantation workers (mainly of Indian Tamil origin), and for the Muslim community. This shows they recognize that different groups have different needs and cannot be treated the same way. They even proposed practical steps like hiring Tamil speaking officials in the North and East to provide government services in Tamil, and setting up a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to look into violence against Muslims. They also committed to promoting trilingualism – the use of Sinhala, Tamil, and English – in government services and education, viewing Sri Lanka’s linguistic diversity as a positive factor. However, even with these efforts to promote inclusivity, the JVP-NPP didn’t perform well in the 2019 elections. The aftermath of the Easter Sunday attacks created a focus on national security that overshadowed their message of unity.

The JVP’s English language newspaper also reflects this focus on shared economic struggles instead of directly addressing ethnic tensions. “Red Power” articles from 2020 to 2022, while talking about a unified Sri Lanka for everyone, often emphasize class conflict. The JVP presents itself as the only party that can bring real change, rescue the country from economic trouble, and resist outside influences[1]. They heavily criticize the government – both past and present – for being corrupt and abusing power, blaming these problems on capitalism[2]. They don’t talk much about specific ethnic concerns. Instead, they focus on criticizing “communalism,” which they see as a tactic used by power hungry politicians to exploit ethnic and religious differences[3]. This allows the JVP to present themselves as above ethnic divisions and focus on shared economic problems that affect everyone.

The JVP continued this move towards inclusivity in their 2021 “Rapid Response” booklet[4]. Campaigning as part of the National People’s Power (NPP), they called for a “new system of governance” that would give more power to local regions (NPP, 2021). They proposed making Provincial Councils stronger, which hints at giving more autonomy to different areas of the country. However, they still didn’t explicitly support federalism, a system where regions have a lot of self-governance.

The language of inclusion

The JVP’s changing views on language policy show their attempts to embrace inclusivity. The 2015 manifesto proposed trilingual education (Sinhala, Tamil, and English), suggesting an understanding of language as a key marker of identity and a potential tool for greater inclusion. This commitment to trilingualism was further emphasized in the 2019 manifesto, which advocated for ensuring citizens can access services and education in all national languages, promoting linguistic diversity as a strength. This commitment to trilingualism reflects a notable shift from their past, when the JVP’s rhetoric often presented the Sinhalese majority as victims of discriminatory policies, particularly regarding university admissions and employment opportunities (Venugopal, 2010).

The devolution dilemma

A major challenge for the JVP is their stance on devolution – giving more power to local regions. Historically, they strongly opposed the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which was supposed to do just that. They saw it as a step towards separatism and a risk to Sri Lanka’s unity. This made many Tamils see them as a party unwilling to share power. This history still affects them today, as they try to secure a majority at the elections without upsetting their Sinhalese nationalist supporters.

While their 2019 and 2021 manifestos acknowledge the distinct needs of Tamil communities and advocate for decentralization, they stop short of explicitly endorsing federalism or full implementation of the 13th Amendment, measures that many Tamil political actors view as essential for meaningful power-sharing. This balancing act is also seen in the JVP’s newspaper. “Red Power” articles, while calling for a united Sri Lanka with equal rights for everyone, often criticize “communalism.” They claim that powerful people use this tactic to divide communities and stay in power. This allows the JVP to appear as a party that’s above ethnic conflicts. But this approach might ignore the real issues faced by Tamil communities who have experienced discrimination and want more control over their own affairs. This is especially noticeable in “Red Power” articles from 2020 to 2022, where there is little mention of specific ethnic problems. By saying that both Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalism are just tricks used by the rich to divide working people, the JVP risks oversimplifying the complexities of the ethnic conflict and the grievances of the different groups.

Furthermore, the JVP’s own actions have sometimes contradicted their language of inclusivity. They have actively supported policies that run counter to devolution, such as the legal separation of the Northern and Eastern provinces. This gap between their words and actions reinforces the belief that the JVP remains tied to its Sinhala nationalist past. This dissonance is also evident in the contrast between NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s conciliatory approach and the hardline rhetoric of other senior members (Kotelawala, 2024). While Dissanayake has hinted at implementing the 13th Amendment, other senior members have boasted about the party’s role in defeating “separatist terrorism” and defending Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.

This ambiguity raises questions about whether a genuine ideological shift is underway or if these are merely tactical maneuvers to appease different constituencies. This tension is particularly relevant considering the JVP’s limited success in attracting different constituencies in past elections, which underscores the challenges they face in breaking through the polarized political landscape.
Despite their efforts to present a strong leftist alternative that transcends ethnic divisions, the JVP’s past attempts have often been undermined by credibility issues and the pull of communal narratives that attracted their Sinhala base to other parties. Their manifestos show a gradual shift in rhetoric and policies, but their unclear stance on key issues like devolution and their struggle to reconcile their past with current goals remain challenges. As Sri Lanka approaches the 2024 elections, it remains to be seen whether the JVP can bridge the trust deficit with the Tamil community and convince voters that they are genuinely committed to building a unified and equitable nation.

[1] Red Power, Mar, Jul and Sep 2021

[2] Red Power, Mar, Jul, Nov and Dec 2021

[3] Red Power, Nov 2020

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