“And unlike in your first reply, here you imply that JRJ is the one left American Politico and reached Indian Politico.”

Lolvut? What gave you that impression? 😀 This is what I said: “But beyond providing some helicopters and training, the US backed off, forcing JRJ to ultimately negotiate with Rajiv Gandhi or face possible military intervention.” So what choice was JRJ given? It was negotiate or be invaded and defeated.

“Even today, American Politico is dying to reestablish its power in SL, so it is hard to believe it had abandoned SL in 1980s.”

The US isn’t dying to do anything in SL. The US is backing India because the latter is opposed to both China and Pakistan who are seen as threats to the US, unlike they were in the early ’80s. India itself has leaned westward since its emergence into the open market and the collapse of its original super-power patron, the USSR. Since SL is seen to be increasingly leaning towards China, and the latter is seen as a threat both to India and the US, it is natural for the US to try to oppose Chinese influence here in support of India. It is hard to believe only if you don’t know your history, or don’t understand geopolitics.

“Here what I think could have appended…”

If you prefer to believe some sort of James Bond script instead, that’s upto you 😀 I’m just telling you what happened. If you don’t believe me, open a history book.

I buy everything you said but the last part. And unlike in your first reply, here you imply that JRJ is the one left American Politico and reached Indian Politico. Even today, American Politico is dying to reestablish its power in SL, so it is hard to believe it had abandoned SL in 1980s.

Here what I think could have appended. May be… may be… Indian Politico proved JRJ that American Politico (and the Mozart from Colombo American Embassy) was playing a duple-game, supporting the SL government and the Tamil group.

Well, if I didn’t think it was valid, I wouldn’t have suggested it 😉 In the late ’70s, India was leaning increasingly towards the Soviet bloc; mostly as a result of the patching up of US-China relations by Nixon which forced India to abandon the Tibetan freedom struggle, amongst other things. While the US had originally been supportive in India’s clashes with China, following the Nixon visit, India needed to look for another superpower, and that was the USSR, which was also at odds with Mao’s China. To balance this off, India’s smaller neighbours — particularly SL and Pakistan — leaned towards the US, and this leaning was reciprocated. None of this initially mattered that much because Moraji Desai had a great rapport with JRJ, but Indira Gandhi intensely disliked JRJ, and after ’83, when it became clear that India was arming and training the separatists, JRJ hoped that Reagan — who he greatly admired — would provide some muscle. But beyond providing some helicopters and training, the US backed off, forcing JRJ to ultimately negotiate with Rajiv Gandhi or face possible military intervention.

David, is there any valid argument for that? I don’t see any. Did American Politico found another proxy? No. Did American Politico totally abandon Sri Lanka or even south Asia? Absolutely not.

It was more a case of the Americans abandoning JRJ.

We are very proud of you.

Indians landed in Jaffna and leant a bitter lesson. People also learnt a bitter lesson from the IPKF. Lessons from history we all must learn.

Once when a bank was being robbed in main street jaffna the people had phoned the army but they didnt come till the terrorists left the place and only then did they come and fire all over the place,SLA at that time was not like how it is now

Even if India let Sri Lanka to continue with other operations, SLA could have got the power to roam the north but still we could have seen long and bloody fights for years. In fact that started even before the end of the Liberation Operation: that started with the Nelliady MMV suicide attack. But since all the people left Varamachchi, LTTE could not remain there.

I believe it was a drama designed by Indian Politico and may be JR. First, Liberation Operation (strengthening the SLA and weakling the LTTE so the Tamils will loath LTTE), then returning the boats load of food (India owning the Tamils’ heart, taking away from LTTE and SLA standing up a bit longer), then sending the plane loads of food (pressuring Singhalese to understand the reality) and finally the Indian Politico friendly accord. Who knows the food on the boats and the planes could have loaded concurrently.

But the number one question of this bloody war is: why did JR abandoned his friendly American Politico and joined the hated Indian Politico?

I was at home in Jaffna during the operation and knew what was happening–that the Tigers mined the area heavily and withdrew with only minimal loss, and the army largely killed civilians but claimed that it had killed Tigers. I was displaced and became a refugee but went back home briefly after the Indo-Lanka Accord. As the Nelliady truck attack by the LTTE showed, the SLA was in no position to crush the LTTE anytime soon.

Calling Lalith Athulathmudali as “Vadamaradchi Veeraya,” and believing that “had India not intervened, the operation would have crushed the Tigers,” have been utterly amusing for me to watch. I regarded those baseless claims as just another of a number of historical myths that animate a large number of Sinhalese.

25 years on, given the many experiences of the army involving large offensives beginning with the Vadamarachchi Operation and the resultant frustrations is why the armed forces were clear on ending the war in 2009. Clearly Mr Gotabaya knows at first hand the importance of taking advantage of a dominant military position given the external pressures Sri Lanka may have had to endure.

Mr Weiss gives his reasons for the more hasty manner in which the government concluded the war in 2009. At 51:38 in this speech at the ANU – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7uzRNl8NByo. The rest of the speech is interesting also.

Clearly the government was concerned or at least suspicious of external intervention by India, the only country that will be able to make a physical intervention in Sri Lanka. This was due to past experiences beginning with the end of the Vadamarachchi Operation.

It is impossible to definitely determine the outcome Vadamarachchi Operation had India not intervened. There are only probabilities, perhaps the Tigers may have been permanently operationally defeated, perhaps not. Certainly they were under stress and like the equally brutal campaign against the JVP shortly thereafter the government may have decisively ended the Tigers military capabilities.

Similarly it is impossible to know if there would have been less civilian causalities between March 09 to May 09 had the government taken the same “patient” approach to the end of the war as it had to its prosecution in the years prior.