Dessert Fox
Have you seen this:
http://transcurrents.com/news-views/archives/6961
Interview of Ambassador Dayan Jayatilleka by La Lettre Diplomatique

We want philosophers who can solve our problems and not who multiply our problems by hiding them.

Cyril, tell that to Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Uruguay, all led by radicals and revolutionaries, who support Sri Lanka against hypocritical calls for accountability by imperialism and its stooges…

PresiDunce, perhaps it hasn’t occurred to you that my support is for the same reason that 90% ( going by Gallup) support the same leadership…and that support may not be FOR but AGAINST….

Hiya, Pitathtara Puthraya, you are so right about my radicalism. I can’t help but wonder why my book was reviewed by the reputed UK journal that has been around for 40 years entitled RADICAL PHILOSOPHY? Maybe you should write a letter of protest to the Editor…? :))

Thanks

The Leadership Quarterly, Volume 18, Issue 3, Destructive Leadership, June 2007, Pages 176-194

http://hoganassessments.co.uk/sites/default/files/pdfs/resources/research-articles/journal-articles/Toxic-Triangle.pdf

4. Castro and Cuba: an illustration of the toxic triangle

A considerable scholarly and popular literature on Fidel Castro and his Cuban regime has built up over the past 50 years, including 20 major biographies (e.g., Fuentes, 2004, Geyer, 1991, Quirk, 1993 and Raffy, 2004). Castro and Cuba provide a useful illustration of the foregoing themes.

4.1. Castro as a destructive leader
Castro is one of the iconic figures and longest serving dictators in modern history. As a teenager he displayed intelligence, unusual memory, remarkable energy, physical courage, and talent for self-promotion. During his college days, he tried repeatedly to lead various student groups, with no success. These student groups, moreover, were characterized by a propensity for serious violence (Ros, 2003). He identified the previous Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, as an expedient political target for his ambitions. In his early 20s, Castro became a principal opponent of Batista, competing for the public’s attention with Batista’s other political opponents. After the successful overthrow of the dictatorship at the end of 1958, the 32-year-old Castro and his supporters swiftly extended their control, rapidly suppressing dissent while simultaneously promising free elections, democracy, as well as a better life to the peasant underclass. He embarked on a triumphant US tour and media blitz within weeks of seizing power. All of this prompted one State Department observer to note: “It would be a mistake to underestimate this man…He [is] clearly a strong personality and a born leader…” (Quirk, 1993, p. 243).

As a young man, Castro was seen as bright, charismatic, idealistic, courageous, bold, ruthless, skilled at self-promotion, and able to attract a band of capable and equally ruthless and bloody minded supporters. His charisma is apparent in newsreel clippings. His personalized use of power is seen in the way he enriched himself, and in his lifestyle compared to his citizens. Castro’s narcissism is evident from his exhibitionism (long speeches starring him), grandiosity (sending troops to Africa and Central America), and unwillingness to admit to any mistakes (Geyer, 1991, Montaner, 1983, Montaner, 1999, Pardo Llada, 1976 and Raffy, 2004). The negative life themes appear in his fractious relations with his father, difficult upbringing in several foster homes, and ridicule and mocking by schoolmates for his illegitimacy and his rural upbringing (Montaner, 1999, Pardo Llada, 1976, Pardo Llada, 1988and Raffy, 2004). Castro’s several wives and mistresses report that an ideology of hatred for the United States was a constant theme in his private life (Geyer, 1991, Fuentes, 2004 and Raffy, 2004).

4.2. Cubans as susceptible followers
Two groups of Cubans were positioned to profit from a Castro-led revolution. The first, and quite small group, consisted of Castro’s inner circle: backers and fellow revolutionaries (e.g., Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, brother Raúl Castro) who shared Castro’s worldview and would themselves accede to power—always a desirable outcome for political operatives. The second was Cuban rural residents and the uneducated urban poor, a large group for whom the promise of escape from poverty was alluring. The first group did indeed gain power; the degree to which the second group profited from the Castro regime is highly debatable (Fuentes, 2004, Latell, 2005 and Raffy, 2004). A third group—a relatively large and mostly apolitical professional middle class-opposed Batista’s corrupt dictatorship and initially backed Castro’s revolution. Their support vanished as it became obvious that elections and democracy would not materialize (Montaner, 1983, Pardo Llada, 1988 and Quirk, 1993). Many of them, or their unaccompanied children, fled to the US and Europe during the 1960s (Thomas, 1998 and Triay, 1999). Their departure drastically reduced the number of potential dissidents and further consolidated Castro’s influence.

4.3. Cuba’s propitious environment
Cuban history prior to Castro was a story of political dysfunction in the midst of economic prosperity, resulting in: (a) the typical Latin American income inequalities; and (b) political instability with coups and revolts occurring every few years (Thomas, 1998). Cuban political and legal institutions were ineffective and corrupt. A culture of presidentialism and a concentration of power at the top of the political structures existed (Geyer, 1991 and Thomas, 1998). Crisis and governmental instability were the norm. A small inner circle, including high officers in the police and the military, supported the dictator Batista, who left them alone to do business. Most of the rest of the population, including the large middle class and the larger poor and uneducated segments, chafed at the violence and corruption and resented the status quo. A long history of instability and ineffective governmental institutions made the Cuban population ripe for revolution.

After seizing power, Castro and his supporters consolidated their authority by swiftly dismantling democratic and social institutions and replacing them with powerful police and surveillance systems to control dissent (Latell, 2005, Fuentes, 2004, Quirk, 1993 and Thomas, 1998). The Castro regime has perpetuated a sense of insecurity with recurrent references to external threats in the form of invasion from the US or the return of Cuban Americans who would take back their homes and property (Alarcón, 2006).

4.4. Destructive outcomes
We have a charismatic and determined ruler, susceptible followers, and an oppressive and unresponsive government often operating in situations of crisis and urgency. What followed was a revolution initially hailed by leftist thinkers in the U.S., Latin America, and Europe as a paragon of freedom, economic justice, and human rights (DePalma, 2006 and Matthews, 1961).
The problem was Castro and his followers. Like Stalin, Mao, and all the former Communist leaders of Eastern Europe, Castro was motivated by self-interest and a narcissistic need for power. There were some positive developments for the Cuban poor, notably in health care and education, but at great cost to their freedom and human rights. The overall consequences of Castro’s regime have been an economic disaster, and for all the predictable reasons. On the one hand, Forbes magazine has estimated conservatively that Castro is personally worth nearly $ 1 billion (Kroll, 2006), with extensive accounts in Swiss banks (Latell, 2005 and Fuentes, 2004). On the other hand, pre-Castro Cuba ranked third in Latin America in per capita food consumption; today it ranks last. Telephone service is at 1950s levels, electric power generation is only ahead of Haiti (U.S. Department of State, 2002). In the 1960s and 1970s, one quarter of the population fled, and many more would leave today if they could (Fontova, 2005 and Thomas, 1998). It is not the case that economic sanctions by the U.S. have caused this decline in Cuban wellbeing. The wrong-headed policies of a corrupt Cuban regime and a non-functioning economy are largely to blame.

http://www.capitalismmagazine.com/books-non-fiction/2798-useful-idiots.html

So Duncey, you agree that there is no sign of the GoSL preventing people from leaving the country as Justita claims? OK 😀

@David Blacker

There are plenty of instances of the Government of Rajapaksa helping underworld thugs and assorted criminals to LEAVE the country illegally. One example was Karuna who was sent to England on a fake passport. The other example was sending Duminda Silva who was a suspect in the Baharatha Lakshman murder illegally to Singapore for so called treatment to his brain. 😀

ps. I forgot Kudu Lal who was also sent abroad by “Dr.” Mervin Silva.

Justita, can you point to any example — even one or two will do — of the SL state (never mind the Armed Forces) preventing people from legally leaving the country — ie with a passport and visa?

Actions speak louder than words.