Wijayapala, Frances Harrison did produce a world class scoop, which was telecast globally but was strangely pulled off the BBC’s archives and which she has since developed amnesia about! During the honeymoon of the CFA, 2002 (or 2003), she covered Mahaveera Day. It was the first time that the Black Sea Tigers paraded, in masks. She interviewed Soosai, who said on the record that: “We think other liberation movements should learn from our tactics. We think that Al Qaeda learnt from us, in their attack on the USS Cole in Aden Harbour”. This was telecast on the BBC World’s Asia Today programme in December ( Dec 11th in some places such as Canada, I think) that year.

“No, I’m not. I think military actions need to be scrutinized individually–to the extent possible. This is why I limited my inquiry (at the seminar) to the use of heavy artillery in the second and third NFZs. I can’t imagine that EVERY single military act was reckless. But I have doubts about the absence of recklessness in the specific instance cited.”

By instance, I assume you mean the use of artillery in the NFZs, and not the decision to continue military action? See, Gehan, IMO the latter is too broad an action on which to make a ruling of recklessness, which was why I compared it the decision to go to war. We need to look at the sub-actions that then made up that decision. Perhaps the use of artillery in the NFZs is a more realistic series of incidents to examine, but perhaps even then it would be necessary to look at the specific incidents. For instance, in WW2, the Brits decided to continue night bombing in spite of the fact that it was both less effective and more dangerous for the population of Germany, weighing it against the debilitating RAF Bomber Command casualties daylight bombing would entail. Can you therefore rule that reckless endangerment? I think not. HOWEVER, “Bomber” Harris’ decision (which Churchill acceded to) of increasing the target radius to include the housing estates of the German factory workers was a definite war crime within the night bombing decision. You follow?

“I fear lumping all military acts into one ‘war’ is unhelpful. Surely, a just or unjust war doesn’t automatically exempt or condemn all military acts taken therein. Isn’t that absolutist?”

I am not lumping them all into one war, but I fear you are lumping together all the acts subsequent to the decision to continue military action. Again, another example from WW2: the Germans decided to use submarine warfare in the Atlantic to cut off Britain and the USSR from US resupply. Submarine warfare in the ’40s wasn’t a precise art, and some might say that this recklessly endangered civilians. But the crime Donitz was charged with and found guilty of was unrestricted submarine warfare which allowed the U-boats to target all vessels in the area, including neutral ones. So it was a decision within a decision that was found wanting.

“You’re right. This is precisely why talking about the decision to go into war is not helpful. We need to examine individual military acts separately. We need to ask more specific questions relating to recklessness and proportionality. As I mentioned before, we can’t escape these specific questions if we wish to engage in a sincere dialogue on the need for accountability and the barriers to reconciliation.”

Fair enough, but I don’t think the time allowed my panel at the seminar (not to mention our inability to actually investigate) was sufficient to go into such a detailed examination. It was for this reason that Marga asked Arjuna and I to examine the narrative. I selected the hospital incidents for a detailed analysis because that seems to be at the heart of the report’s conclusions.

“Right again. Leaving aside the narrative of the UNSG Panel Report, the counter narrative at least raises the question of recklessness and warrants a more detailed examination of the events. This is all I really want you to concede; and you have.”

I don’t think our counter-narrative raised such a question. The question was always there, as it is in all wars. Reckless endangerment is probably the hardest charge to either prove or disprove. Perhaps you disagree and could point us to some cases where such charges were successfully prosecuted. Arjuna and I understood our brief from Marga as to examine the narrative regarding the SL Armed Forces covering the period January 2009 to the cessation of hostilities, and to specifically address the first two charges mentioned in the Executive Summary — “(i) killing of civilians through widespread shelling; (ii) shelling of hospitals and humanitarian objects”. And this was what we did. Reckless endangerment could very well be said to have contributed to the above two allegations, but the report’s tone of voice and insinuations focus on deliberate intent to kill civilians, and this was what we also therefore focused on. So if you feel that the counter-narrative left the issue of reckless endangerment unresolved, you would be right; because our task was not to resolve that issue.

From what is known and understood about the nature of the LTTE and its leadership, it seems to me pretty obvious that all a siege (as opposed to a concerted attack) would have done is to have given the Tigers even more time to ensure that more northern Tamils suffered and died than actually did. That, after all, was part of the Tigers’ end-game strategy: maximum Tamil suffering & casualties to provide fuel for their supporters in the West & future generations to create more myths & legends to feed future struggles.

If you disagree with what David Blacker writes, Against Frauds, then why don’t you tell us where his facts or arguments are in error? With respect, argument by insult doesn’t get us very far on this or other issues.

I appreciate where you’re coming from, David. But there are a few issues that may require further clarification.

‘It [the decision not to besiege the tiger area] was a strategic decision, much as the decision to attack in the first place was also strategic. Are you then suggesting that every single military act thereafter recklessly endangered civilians?’

No, I’m not. I think military actions need to be scrutinized individually–to the extent possible. This is why I limited my inquiry (at the seminar) to the use of heavy artillery in the second and third NFZs. I can’t imagine that EVERY single military act was reckless. But I have doubts about the absence of recklessness in the specific instance cited.

‘The GoSL could also have prevented a large civilian death toll by never going to war in the first place.’

I fear lumping all military acts into one ‘war’ is unhelpful. Surely, a just or unjust war doesn’t automatically exempt or condemn all military acts taken therein. Isn’t that absolutist?

‘…to prove the latter [war crimes], you need to look at things in a more detailed manner, just as you would look at any strategic decision. You have to look at the specifics; the tactics. And that was what my panel was attempting to do.’

You’re right. This is precisely why talking about the decision to go into war is not helpful. We need to examine individual military acts separately. We need to ask more specific questions relating to recklessness and proportionality. As I mentioned before, we can’t escape these specific questions if we wish to engage in a sincere dialogue on the need for accountability and the barriers to reconciliation.

‘The presence of recklessness cannot be ruled out without a far more detailed examination of the events.’

Right again. Leaving aside the narrative of the UNSG Panel Report, the counter narrative at least raises the question of recklessness and warrants a more detailed examination of the events. This is all I really want you to concede; and you have.

Frances Harrison reported from SL from 2000-2004, so I guess she must’ve done lots of radio, tv and on-line pieces.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/fooc.shtml

Classic quote from her chat at the Frontline Club discussion: ..Frances Harrison said “the ceasefire days were good to send reports from Sri Lanka but the situation there at the moment is not good.” Perfect. Ceasefire = Good. War = Bad.

Interestingly, her FB accounts includes as ‘friends’, Sunanda Deshapriya and Arjunan Ethirveerasingam (PR forThe Vanga Machan LTTE ship and ex-TRO).

For a ‘Person of Righteousness’ nothing particularly surprising, is there?
http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2011/06/27/people-of-righteousness-target-sri-lanka/

There’s a dreadful of Culture Club song which encompasses her mindset perfectly. Watch if you dare:)

“I think there is a place for dispassionate views on the final days of the war. But you’re being a tad too cynical, David. I don’t think it’s fair to dismiss the allegation of recklessness in respect of a specific event by claiming that all wars are in some way reckless. That’s what I mean by an absolutist stance.”

I don’t think I’m being particularly cynical, Gehan. It’s just that I don’t see the decision to continue the attack and not besiege the Tiger area to be sufficiently specific. It was a strategic decision, much as the decision to attack in the first place was also strategic. Are you then suggesting that every single military act thereafter recklessly endangered civilians? How do you reckon such a thing? And isn’t that in fact absolutist?

If your point is to get me to concede that GoSL recklessly endangered civilians by not besieging the area, I’m afraid I can’t do so anymore than I can concede that choosing the military option in 2008 recklessly endangered civilians.

“All of this boils down to one simple realization: during the final stages of the war, the GoSL could have prevented a large civilian death toll had it not prioritized political/military advantage over civilian life. Simply saying ‘war is nasty; deal with it’ is a conversation stopper. It also leads to impunity.”

Not at all, Gehan. The GoSL could also have prevented a large civilian death toll by never going to war in the first place. However, they did so because there was a political/military advantage to doing so. To say that advantage was prioritized over the cost of civilian life is correct; that is what every civil leader does when he chooses war to further political will. I’m not saying “war is nasty deal with it”, and certainly not from a legal standpoint; but from an ethical and moral one which was, as you yourself suggest, the seminar’s standpoint as well. This doesn’t bequeath impunity from culpability in war crimes; but to prove the latter, you need to look at things in a more detailed manner, just as you would look at any strategic decision. You have to look at the specifics; the tactics. And that was what my panel was attempting to do.

“You already know that, in dealing with the issue of proportionality, collateral damage is always weighed against military advantage. At the end of the day, the counter narrative does not rule out the presence of recklessness; nor does it suggest that the military advantage gained through exercising the high casualty option was such that it outweighed the civilian casualties that were incurred.”

The presence of recklessness cannot be ruled out without a far more detailed examination of the events. The tone of voice of the Darusman Report’s narrative points to the far more serious act of the GoSL intentionally setting out to kill as large a number of Tamil civilians as it possibly could, and it was to this allegation that Arjuna and I were briefed to look.

Whether the advantage gained in killing or capturing the Tiger high command and destroying an organisation that was directly and indirectly responsible for the deaths of over 100,000 people in 30 years was insufficiently weighty enough in comparison to the numbers of civilians the GoSL expected would be killed around Mullivaikal is a very subjective matter. Personally, I think it was advantageous enough to warrant it.

“Doesn’t this in the very least warrant some accountability?”

I think accountability in all things is a necessary requisite of governance.

“Also, the idea that only a viable political solution can bring an end to this chapter was presented by a number of participants including one of the panelists during the session on restorative justice. Crucially, no one challenged the idea. So it certainly remains (to me at least) the main conclusion of the seminar.”

As I said earlier, a political solution is necessary regardless of what happened in the closing stages of the war. A political solution was necessary in 1975, and it still is.

Justitia, are you sad that you could not come up with anything at all to refute David’s analysis, that you could only attack the messenger but not the message?

Could someone kindly point to a single pathbreaking or original article that Ms Harrison wrote while she was working for BBC in SL? Anything gleaned from sources other than local media?

I think there is a place for dispassionate views on the final days of the war. But you’re being a tad too cynical, David. I don’t think it’s fair to dismiss the allegation of recklessness in respect of a specific event by claiming that all wars are in some way reckless. That’s what I mean by an absolutist stance. All of this boils down to one simple realization: during the final stages of the war, the GoSL could have prevented a large civilian death toll had it not prioritized political/military advantage over civilian life. Simply saying ‘war is nasty; deal with it’ is a conversation stopper. It also leads to impunity.

You already know that, in dealing with the issue of proportionality, collateral damage is always weighed against military advantage. At the end of the day, the counter narrative does not rule out the presence of recklessness; nor does it suggest that the military advantage gained through exercising the high casualty option was such that it outweighed the civilian casualties that were incurred. Doesn’t this in the very least warrant some accountability? I thought the sessions on restorative justice and reconciliation were very much premised on this notion that there needs to be accountability. People are slowly realizing this. Remarkably, even the ultra Sinhala Nationalists are coming out of the woodwork calling for some investigations. Champaka Ranawaka is a case in point. Who would’ve thought?

Also, the idea that only a viable political solution can bring an end to this chapter was presented by a number of participants including one of the panelists during the session on restorative justice. Crucially, no one challenged the idea. So it certainly remains (to me at least) the main conclusion of the seminar.