Hi Wijayapala,

A couple of sources mention 155mm mortars in the hands of the LTTE rior to 1990. These are:

“Inside Jaffna Fort: Battle of Nerves”, Ceylon Daily News, 11.9.86, reproduced in Saturday Review, 20.9.86, p.6.

Rohan Guneratne, War and Peace in Sri Lanka, Institute of Fundamental Studies, Sri Lanka, 1987, p. 47.

The article in the Daily News/Saturday review quotes a senior army officer as saying that the Tigers use 155mm mortars among others. Guneratne bases his assertions on Jane’s Weekly which in turn, depended on Robert Macdonald who spent 6 wweeks in Jaffna during Operation Liberation. Macdonald wrote a very interesting piece on his experiences in Pacific Defense Review:

Robert McDonald, “Eye Witness in Jaffna”, Pacific Defense Reporter, August 1987

Some details in Guneratne’s description of the 150mm mortars are corroborated by the officer quoted in the Daily News.

Also, there are numerous photographs from this period, relating to the arms handover by the LTTE showing the Tigers handing over mortar bombs which are way larger than 81mm. The 155mm mortars used by the LTTE in 1986-87, acording to Guneratne, were called “Kutti Sri Kutti”. It is possible that the information in teh article you have cited relate to the Pasilan which was a later development.

I too think Depinder Sigh was exaggerating a bit but there is plenty of evidence to show that Jaffna Fort came under regular mortar barrages. One army officer even went so far as to claim that they “fell like rain”. (Iqbal Athas, The Fear of living dangerously”, Weekend, 3. 8. 1986, p.23)

Also see: Tim Smith, Reluctant Mercenary: the recollections of a British ex-army helicopter pilot in the anto-terrorist war in Sri Lanka, The Book Guild, England, 2002.

Not much info on the use of RPGs in 1986/87. Several soviet made pieces were captured in the East in 1986 and an RPG destroyed a saladin armoured car in the Neliaddy atack in July 1987. In December 1986 one was fired at a helicopter gunship and although it entered the machine failed to explode because the safety pin was still in place. But I think they were used sparingly.

“The Tigers also used mortars of much larger calibre than 60mm, sometimes 120mm and even 150mm. They were all home made. I am not sure exactly when these come into play for the first time.”

I read that the LTTE seized mortar technology from the EPRLF during its clashes from 1986 onward, but to my knowledge none of them were larger than 81mm until 1990 when the LTTE produced the “Pasilan-2000.”

http://www.thesundayleader.lk/archive/20080511/defence.htm

“According to Depinder Singh not a single building inside the Jaffna Fort was standing when the IPKF took over.”

Not sure if this was credible; my understanding is that the SLA occupied the fort continuously throughout Eelam War I and was driven out only in the early 1990s.

“I haven’t come across any other instances where they used RPGs during this phase (’84-’85) except during the attack on the Jaffna police station, perhaps you can enlighten me on that.”

How about in ’86-’87?

“My take on this is that although the LTTE was bringing in weapons through their own channels, the project was still in its early stages of development.”

It was, but my point was that at no time was the LTTE dependent on Delhi for weapons, and it never had insufficient weapons for its fighters, to my knowledge. This was in stark contrast to the other militant groups that were dependent on Delhi but were still under-equipped (with PLOTE in the worst place, with too many cadres and little if any support from Delhi).

Hi Wijayapala,

The LTTE had camps in Jaffna before ’85-’87 but after ’86 there were more of them and on a larger scale than before. The Atchuveli camp (wich I think the army raided in early January 1985) was a pretty smal one compared to the large open air camps they seem to have opened in ’86 where scores of recruits trained regularly. They also seem to have operated with greater impunity despite the airforce possessing greater means of atacking them. Not too sure why this was so.

The Tigers also used mortars of much larger calibre than 60mm, sometimes 120mm and even 150mm. They were all home made. I am not sure exactly when these come into play for the first time. They did use mortars in the attack on Jaffna police station but were they the light mortars they may have obtained from international sources or the home-made ones, I am not to sure. The latter becomes more prominent during ’86-’87 when the siege of army camps tightens. Kittu boasted that they could produce 25 mortar bombs per day intheir factories but this may have been an exaggeration. But the Tigers did have enough mortars by mid 1986 to throw a few bombs at army camps almost every night. According to Depinder Singh not a single building inside the Jaffna Fort was standing when the IPKF took over. The Tigers surrendered dozens of heavy mortar bombs and some mortars to the Indians but I am quite sure they didn’t give up all of them.

I was refering to some intelligence reports cited by gvernment sources with regard to arms ships being anchored in international waters and their cargoes ferried by boats. I think the LTTE shipping line plays a bigger role in 1986-1987 although the evidence is not conclusive.

Yes, no other group as far as I know, possessed RPGs by the time of the Kokilai attack. I think the army recovered several RPG grenades not the launcher. But a few weeks before that they recovered 2-3 launchers and RPG grenades when they smashed the LTTE hideout in Atchuveli. I haven’t come across any other instances where they used RPGs during this phase (’84-’85) except during the attack on the Jaffna police station, perhaps you can enlighten me on that. The landmine, was the premier weapon of theis phase (supported by small arms) where the army is gradually forced to confine themselves to the camps. The heavier weapons become more prominent later with the camps themselves coming under pressure. My take on this is that although the LTTE was bringing in weapons through their own channels, the project was still in its early stages of development. Weapons are coming in dribs and drabs rather than in substantial consignments. It is possible that we are looking at the contents of the first consignment of weapons through the Tigers’ international shipping channels, the main cargo having been loaded in India and the contents smuggled across bit by bit. Still there isn’t a huge increase in the use of sophisticated weapons during this period, we only encounter them in small quantities. This (along with the increased potential of other groups) is enough, however, to escalate violence dramatically compared to the period before august ’84 and alarm the goverment and place teh inexperienced military under severe stress.

Hi Channa

I agree that the LTTE’s dominance in Tamil militancy characterised the 1986-7 period, but I did not follow some of your points. The LTTE established camps in the Jaffna peninsula as early as the summer of 1984 (like Atchuveli, which the SLA destroyed the following year), and it maintained weapons factories in Tamil Nadu (Coimbatore) even through the IPKF war. I am not familiar with the LTTE’s use of mortars in this period, although they did play an important role from Eelam War II onward; it had only about 16 60mm and 81mm mortars when the IPKF war started.

Also, the LTTE’s shipping fleet was just as important in 1986-7 as it was in 1984 when Prabakaran purchased the MV Cholan. This was amply demonstrated by the LTTE’s failed attack in Kokilai in Feb 85 when the SLA recovered AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and nightvision goggles, which to my knowledge the other groups did not have. The LTTE did not have to anchor its ships in international waters at this time; they unloaded at Madras and transported the weapons to the Vedaraniyam coast where smaller fiberglass boats would smuggle them to Sri Lanka.

I think in 1986-87 with the LTTE becoming more dominant and India getting increasigly cranky witht he Tigers, the Tigers move their operations to the peninsula. They set up at least five major camps in the peninsula and also set up weapons factories and workshops. The mortars that come to play a big role in the siege of army camps come from these factories. LTTE also comes to rely increasingly on their arms shipments; the ships are anchored in international waters and the LTTE boats ferry the cargo to the shore. The control of the north easters and north western coasts becomes very important in these operations.

However, during Operation Liberation India again comes to play a hand. Alarmed by the possibility of teh Tigers being defeated, RAW reportedly suplied teh Tigers with 20 tonnes of exxplosives that later come to be used against the Indians themselves. RAW is also reported to have provided the Tigers with a number of heavy machine guns in late June. However, I think overall after 1985 the Indian influence diminishes.

“Once again, thank you for your feedback. Greatly appreciated.”

Your welcome!

“I think we have to see all these factors as significant: Indian training and refuge and the increase in the number of cadres. It was a combination of these that made the militants a serious threat to the security forces in 1984-85.”

How about after 1985?

“I more than agree that a slight change in the arsenal can make a huge difference, but that makes it all the more striking how little had changed given the dramatic increase in the number of cadres (from about 200 before Black July to as many as 40,000 by 1985 as you pointed out). They simply evolved from attacking police stations to attacking police stations on a larger scale.”

The 40,000 cadres were, according to Sivaram, trained (at this stage, trained mainly in India) but only a small number of them were armed. The militants’ attacks at this stage reflected this limited potential as well as their numbers. Remember, India gave them enough to keep the army on its toes, not to crush it. I standby my asertion that this limited potential was achieved during this short time largely due to Indian contributions but I admit it requires a bit more study.

I think we have to see all these factors as significant: Indian training and refuge and the increase in the number of cadres. It was a combination of these that made the militants a serious threat to the security forces in 1984-85. But your reflections have made me think more deeply about placing too much emphasis on the Indian training factor. I thank you for that.

Yes, very few people mention MGR’s two milion rupees and how much it helped the LTTE to set up its own shipping line etc. I do mention this and think I also need to focus more on this as an example of militants striking out on their own, independent of RAW tutelage.

Once again, thank you for your feedback. Greatly appreciated.

“we must make a distinction between quick grab and dash raids like Annacottai and Chavakachcheri in 1982 and sustained, devastating attacks like Chavakachcheri in November 1984 and Jaffna in April 1985.”

I entirely agree that Tamil militancy became more lethal after Black July than before. However, my view is that the key difference was the number of cadres involved, not Indian arms and training, with the primary beneficiary being the LTTE because it could impart its inherent effectiveness to a larger number (even though it had numerically less cadres than the other groups).

Only 8 Tigers carried out the 1982 attack against the Chavakachcheri police station, while 35 TELO cadres participated in the first wave alone for the 1984 attack. Estimates of the 1985 attack in Jaffna list 100-200 Tigers involved. I don’t think any of the other militant groups had carried out an attack of this scale, despite being larger than the LTTE (with the possible exception of the EPRLF’s failed attacks against the Karainagar navy camp and Gurunagar army camp).

“Yes, the Indians provided weapons of low quality but they were still far more lethal than what the guerrillas possessed in mid-1983. When you are looking at a military conflict which is fought with pretty basic weapons even a slight change in the arsenal of one side can tip the balance substantially.”

I more than agree that a slight change in the arsenal can make a huge difference, but that makes it all the more striking how little had changed given the dramatic increase in the number of cadres (from about 200 before Black July to as many as 40,000 by 1985 as you pointed out). They simply evolved from attacking police stations to attacking police stations on a larger scale.

This outcome leads me to ponder the possibility of Indian assistance actually weakening, not strengthening Tamil militancy! As far-fetched as it sounds, Indian arms and training primarily benefited the less effective non-LTTE groups (esp TELO and ENDLF) that by early 1983 had appeared to be all but defunct. By encouraging dependence, the Indians may have stifled these groups from developing their potential as the LTTE did on its own.

One major benefit the LTTE had that the others did not was the support of MGR. Instead of keeping the LTTE on a leash with arms and training, MGR gave vast sums of money without strings that allowed Prabakaran to develop his organisation on his own terms, for example building a shipping fleet and establishing the most sophisticated communications system of all the groups. MGR did not support the others; Karunanidhi did but he did not have the resources of the Tamil Nadu government as the leader of the opposition. I am amazed how few if any of previous publications have not considered this in explaining how the LTTE pushed out the other groups.

“It was Tamils who declared war on the rest of the country.It was Tamils who cleansed the entire North of the country of all other communities except Tamil”

RE above comment: You guys have selective amnesia!!! It was the sinhalese Government which declared war on the Tamils and tried to cleanse the entire southern parts of the country of the Tamils since 1956!!! Have you forgotten the several GOVERNMENT ORGANISED pogroms since 1956!!! Have you forgotten that the Government was UNABLE or UNWILLING to protect its own citizens ie. Tamils and sent them in ships to northern and Eastern provinces!!! That too at the mercy of the Indian Government!!! Indra Gandhi had to send Narasima Rao to Sri Lanka to threaten the sinhalese government to take action to stop the CARNAGE!!!Please do not start the history from a “convenient period”

LTTE was the by product of the STATE TERRORISM!!!Tamils had no way of protecting themselves then and even now!!!

Later the Government improved on their GENOCIDAL PLAN and started executing the “slow genocide” away from the worlds eyes. Burning of the Library, disruption of the International Tamil conference, bombing, shelling, murder, abduction, rape, creation of paramilitary are the master plans developed by the successive SINHALESE GOVERNMENTS whether it is blue, green or red. They are united in one thing ie. persecution of the Tamils!!!

Please do not put out the arguement of 50% of the Tamils living in Colombo!! How did you come up with the percentage? anyway they are there, because it was impossible for them to stay in the North and East because of the bombing, shelling, Multi Barrel launchers and the rape and extra judicial killings of the security forces and the paramilitary!!! They thought atleast in Colombo, the government will be afraid to do thse atrocities, because of the “prying eyes” of the International communities. But even in Colombo, some of them, including few elected Tamil representatives and other prominent Tamils could not escape the white van and the death squads of the Government!!!

Of course the Tamils who joined the genocidal governments and did untold harm to the Tamils should be ashamed of themselves!!! They are trapped in their own sins!! Even if they want to get out now, out of this sinful life, will be unable to do so, unless they commit suicide!!!

Unless the common sinhalese admit the follies of their government and accept the true history of the conflict and not succumb to cheap “anti Tamil” policies of the politicians, there will not be progress in the country. Tamils may vanish from the map of Sri Lanka, but ultimately the the lawlessnes of the Sinhala society aided and abetted by the politicians who are only interested in prolonging their political power and short term gain will destroy the entire country.

Hi Wijayapala,

Yes I agree, having a refuge in India was crucial. When I spoke of military potential, I meant that as well. A guerrilla group needs weapons and the skill to use them to hit as well as a refuge to run to. But I should have made that clear.

A bit more on the military potential enhanced by Indian training: we need to be very careful about making generalisation about this period. It was a period during which both sides increased their fighting potential no matter how crude it was. Yes, the militants were robbing banks and overwhelming police stations but we must make a distinction between quick grab and dash raids like Annacottai and Chavakachcheri in 1982 and sustained, devastating attacks like Chavakachcheri in November 1984 and Jaffna in April 1985. These latter belong to a phase (starting in August 1984) in which the militants demonstrated a clear ability to go beyond sniping at the army and police and launch more serious attacks. Above all they were now using the landmine with great skill. True, they now had large numbers of cadres to take on the army (40,000 by mid 1985 according to Sivaram) and I am sure without help from India other than providing a refuge, they would have been able to gradually build up their arsenals in other ways, but the marked increase in the ability to take the fight to the army which was demonstrated in late 1984 and early 1985 came mainly due to Indian help. Yes, the Indians provided weapons of low quality but they were still far more lethal than what the guerrillas possessed in mid-1983. When you are looking at a military conflict which is fought with pretty basic weapons even a slight change in the arsenal of one side can tip the balance substantially. If the JVP had a few rifles in 1971 and the skill to use them effectively, things would have been very different for the army. Likewise, the possession of large quantities of explosives, AK 47s, and RPGs and the skill to use them enabled the militants to turn the tables on the army in late 1984. They would have acquired these weapons and the skill on their own through other sources eventually as the LTTE demonstrated, but in that short period since 1983, it was Indian aid that enabled them to do so. But I think I need to qualify this assertion a bit more, in light of the issues raised by you and perhaps focus more on the other means by which the militants built up their arsenals.