Are We Back on Square One?

The proximate cause that led me to write this article was a question asked by a friend of mine who earn his daily income by selling sundry items in Kandy pavement. He is known to me for almost 40 years as we were members of the same political party in the 1970s and 1980s. He has been always a careful observer of events that have been taking place in national and international political arena. His question reads like this: “Comrade, it seems that the LTTE will be definitely defeated in the military front soon. Since it has been a military-politico organization, I think it would weaken or even disappear with the military defeat. So don’t you think Sri Lanka’s situation in February 2009 would be similar to its situation in February 2002?” The question puzzled me, so my immediate response was: “what do you mean?” He explained: “In February 2002, you people described the Sri Lankan situation as ‘no war, no peace.’ I think in February 2009, we will be back at the same situation -‘no war, no peace.'” Although I did not have much to say responding to his observation, I found it was quite interesting and insightful. Are we back on square one? I thought that it would be pertinent to jot down my thoughts on this challenging question.

There would be many affinities between February 2002 and February 2009. In December 24, the LTTE declared unilateral ceasefire for a month to which the GoSL positively responded. In February 22, 2002, two contending parties, the GoSL and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement thus systematizing the informal agreement that was operative for two months. Many observers, Sri Lankan and foreign, portrayed this situation by using the phrase, ‘ No War [writ small], No Peace [writ large]’. This description signified the transitional nature of the outcome of the signing of the CFA, meaning, that although direct military confrontation came to an end, the cause of the conflict remained to be addressed. The causes of conflict are not confined to the so-called root causes of the conflict but included multiplicity of grievances generated by the war situation. In other words, the wide spectrum of conflicting factors included immediate attendance to humanitarian issues to long-term issue of restructuring the Sri Lankan post-colonial state. Hence, the cessation of hostilities between two main contending parties were seen as an opening up of a new space within which deep-rooted and difficult substantive issues could be addressed and the humanitarian contingencies directly attributed to war could be removed. In February 2002, the Eelam War 3 between the GoSL and the LTTE was ended by the Sri Lankan government agreeing to bring in the main contending party, the LTTE, as an equal partner to conflict settlement process. It was anticipated that the two parties with Norwegian mediation and financial contribution by the donor community would be able sit and discuss substantive issues in order to come to an amicable settlement. However, the process failed to bring in expected results.

The situation in February 2009 would be at least at surface level quite similar. It is likely that the Eelam War 4 would be ended by the end of February 2009. So that, as in February, ‘No War [writ small] would be achieved but by different means. In February 2002, the war was ended by recognizing the LTTE as an equal partner in conflict settlement process and accepting that there was a territory controlled by the LTTE. This is consistent with the notion of power symmetry in classical conflict resolution theory. The situation today is however significantly different. The principal contending party is removed from the equation or its importance is substantially marginalized. Hence, this time war would be terminated by the removal of one party with the military victory of the other. However, the causes of conflict would remain unchanged after the end of the military conflict. Although, this result is not the outcome that the classical conflict resolution theory anticipate, the situation that would emerge is somewhat similar to ‘no war, no peace’ situation that existed in the post-CFA period. My situation analysis is summarized in Figure 1.                 

 

FIGURE 1

Comparing post-February 2002 and post-February 2009

  Issue	  Post-February 2002	  Post- February 2009
1.     Relationship  between contenders	Making contenders (the GoSL and LTTE) partners of problem-solving	Removing the principal contender (the LTTE) from the equation through military defeat
2.     Direct Military Confrontation	Came to end through an agreement between contenders.	Came to end by defeating one party, the LTTE
3.     Outcome	No war, no peace; One part of the country was under the LTTE rule.	No war, no peace GoSL controls the entire territory.
4.     Causes of conflict	Remain unresolved	Remain unresolved
5.     How to address them?	Through negotiation with third party mediation	Still undecided. Possible mechanisms (a)   The wining party (the GoSL) deciding the agenda; (b)   The winning party in consultation with friendly Tamil parties setting the agenda; (c)    Setting the agenda in consultation with India as a third party; (d)   Both (b) and (c). Â

 

The orthodox conflict resolution theory and the policies based on it had failed to unleash processes making shift from ‘negative peace’ to ‘positive peace’. Signs were visible after the third round of talks in Oslo, Norway that the process was not moving ahead. Finally, the peace process collapsed although ceasefire prevailed until August 2006 and the party that signed the CFA was defeated at the Parliamentary election held in April 2004. The signing of the CFA definitely provided a new space, but the lack of political will, strategic action by the contending parties, especially the LTTE, the absence of human right protection attached to the CFA and total neglect of human rights violations by the GoSL, Norwegian government and many EU countries, the resistance of Sinhala extremism had contributed to the failure of the 2001 peace process (see for details, Sumanasiri Liyanage, One Step at a Time: Reflections on the Peace Process in Sri Lanka, Colombo: South Asia Peace Institute, 2008).  

Emerging scenarios and the way in which armed conflict would be ended soon have once again revealed the flaws of classical conflict resolution theory. It is difficult to argue that the space that would be created in post-February 2009 may be less conducive to addressing the issue of national integration and the associated economic, political, social and cultural grievances of numerically small nations and other ethnic groups. One may even argue that the removal of one extremist character (the LTTE) from the equation may even contribute to widening the space open for other characters. However, post-February 2009 situation may be more complex and the final outcome depends on the interventions of multiple agents representing different points in the ethnic and political landscape. The outcome in my opinion would depend on four variables that can be discussed separately although a degree of interdependence between them may be theorized. The four variables are:

1.     The relative independence and strength of Sinhala exclusive nationalist elements like JVP, NFP, Hela Urumaya and their front organizations;

2.     The relative independence and strength of the Tamil nationalist parties (TNA, TMVP, EPDP, PLOTE, Anandasangaree wing of TULF), Muslim parties and Malayahai Tamil parties;

3.     The strategic and instrumental rational actions of the SLFP in general and Rajapakse family in particular; and

4.     The Indian factor, (Indian elections and Indian international and regional policy priorities, Indian investments in Sri Lanka).

Many conflict resolution experts have already concluded that emerging post-war situation would be detrimental to a democratic solution and to the aspirations of the numerically small nations and ethnic groups as they have envisioned that post-war politics would be dominated Sinhala exclusive nationalist elements. While accepting the fact that Sinhala nationalist feelings would be encouraged by a military victory over the LTTE, I do not want to be a pessimist. There may be a significant section of Sinhala population who would not share Sinhala exclusive nationalism. So I envision if democratic forces in the country can organize themselves on clear social-democratic agenda and try to enter into a democratic front with non-exclusive nationalist parties mentioned above, the situation may be converted into a space that promote and facilitate more constructive outcome. The way in which the ruling party act would depend on the relative strength of and balance between the Sinhala exclusive nationalist forces and the democratic and non-exclusive nationalist forces. The latter would be able to receive the moral support of India whatever the outcome of the Indian elections.    

The writer teaches political economy at the University of Peradeniya

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