Comments on: LTTE Air Strike: Turning Point or Confirmation of Protracted Conflict? https://groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict Journalism for Citizens Thu, 29 Mar 2007 05:35:31 +0000 hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.1 By: David Blacker https://groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/#comment-2465 Thu, 29 Mar 2007 05:35:31 +0000 http://www.groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/#comment-2465 s been an increase. He also assumes many things: His commment that just because the LTTE has threatened more airraids, that means they have the capability to do so. If they were going to launch more, I doubt they’d warn the GoS by telegraphing their moves. More likely it’s an attempt to slow any further ground ops in the north by hoping the GoSL will pause until they have sufficient AD capability. His suggestion that there’s a possibility that the LTTE can match the SLAF air capability smacks of the ridiculous. I doubt you can go up against MiGs, Kfirs, and Hinds with a few prop aircraft. He also seems unaware of history. He claims that only the Khalistanis and the Rote Armee Faction failed in their objectives. As an Indian, he should remember the failed Tibetan freedom fighters. One of the best examples of military success against a guerrilla army is the British victory in the Malayan uprising, but Raman seems to have missed it. The latter is significant for the fact that the Brits physically removed the Malayan population from contact with the guerrillas before carrying out ops against them." Avoiding bombing the airport was purely out of self interest. I doubt the IC would've looked favourably on such an obviously terrorist attack. On the suicide option, I agree that the LTTE wouldn't want to waste an aircraft unless it was a decapitation mission against the head of state. Also, the claim that the pilots were from the dispora might mean that these pilots are more interested in actually fighting than merely dying. It is quite possible that the aircaft took off from straight sections of the A9. Several of these were especially widened and reinforced after the CFA was signed. These can also easily be disguised and made to look like they're unusable.]]> I’m forced to look at Raman’s comments with some skepticism. I’ll repeat here what I said over on http://www.indi.ca

“Looks like Raman jumped the gun. The airstrikes by the SLAF over the last two days have been the most intense of the CFA, so instead of the decrease in operations he predicts, there’s been an increase.

He also assumes many things: His commment that just because the LTTE has threatened more airraids, that means they have the capability to do so. If they were going to launch more, I doubt they’d warn the GoS by telegraphing their moves. More likely it’s an attempt to slow any further ground ops in the north by hoping the GoSL will pause until they have sufficient AD capability.

His suggestion that there’s a possibility that the LTTE can match the SLAF air capability smacks of the ridiculous. I doubt you can go up against MiGs, Kfirs, and Hinds with a few prop aircraft.

He also seems unaware of history. He claims that only the Khalistanis and the Rote Armee Faction failed in their objectives. As an Indian, he should remember the failed Tibetan freedom fighters. One of the best examples of military success against a guerrilla army is the British victory in the Malayan uprising, but Raman seems to have missed it. The latter is significant for the fact that the Brits physically removed the Malayan population from contact with the guerrillas before carrying out ops against them.”

Avoiding bombing the airport was purely out of self interest. I doubt the IC would’ve looked favourably on such an obviously terrorist attack.

On the suicide option, I agree that the LTTE wouldn’t want to waste an aircraft unless it was a decapitation mission against the head of state. Also, the claim that the pilots were from the dispora might mean that these pilots are more interested in actually fighting than merely dying.

It is quite possible that the aircaft took off from straight sections of the A9. Several of these were especially widened and reinforced after the CFA was signed. These can also easily be disguised and made to look like they’re unusable.

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By: sam https://groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/#comment-2464 Thu, 29 Mar 2007 04:57:00 +0000 http://www.groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/#comment-2464 I wonder what the international community’s response has been. For example, how does the Co-Chairs really perceive the LTTE’s stunt?

The LTTE could have easily dropped their bombs on the civilian airport. It would have been an easier target. But they chose not to.

As B. Raman writes in a SAAG entry: “It was a precision attack, which carefully avoided causing any casualty or damage in the international airport, which could have roused international ire. There were no civilian casualties—-targeted or collateral. As a result, it would not be possible to characterise the attack as an act of terrorism. It was pure and simple a conventional air strike. ”

One of the images the LTTE published post attack shows two cadres sitting in the cockpit , smiling at the camera, signaling the ‘V’. The image, which appeared on many international news sites and was published in some international newspapers, portray the cadres as young revolutionaries, returning after a successful attack against the oppressor. They do not come across as terrorists – and I would suggest generates more “awe” than “shock”.

The attack could be seen as a public relations excercise: to demonstrate to the international community that their targets are military and not civilian. As Raman suggests – their attack is not terrorism, and following that line, the LTTE is not a terrorist organisation – or doesn’t fit neatly in to the Western defitiion of a terrorist organisation.

In terms of the mission not being a suicide mission – I doubt the Tigers would have too many spare aeroplanes. And they would know the signal that ramming the World Trade Centre towers for example, would send.

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By: N https://groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/#comment-2463 Thu, 29 Mar 2007 02:59:36 +0000 http://www.groundviews.org/2007/03/29/ltte-air-strike-turning-point-or-confirmation-of-protracted-conflict/#comment-2463 In terms of the runways being bombed, from what I’ve read around this kind of light plane doesn’t really need a huge runway to take off from and could even do so from roads as long as they are wide enough for the plane’s wingspan. I reckon those runways were probably just decoys, think the SLAF was achieving something when they weren’t.

The institutional failings in the security establishment never fail to amaze me. What happened in 2001? The Tigers were seen in the base but the warning systems were just not there to implement an effective counterattack. What happened last week, the planes were heard/seen 40 minutes before the attack, no counterattack, response was initiated based on the intelligence. This lack of forward thinking is depressing and the shortcomings really need to be addressed.

Does anybody else find it odd that this wasn’t a suicide mission? One would think taking out the Kfirs would be a top priority and dropping a few bombs from a fixed wing aircraft seems an unlikely way of trying to do it. Now that they’ve exposed their hand, it would be that much more difficult for the LTTE to conduct a suicide mission with the planes…assuming our buggers get their act together.

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