Image courtesy CNN

It has been a couple of days since the former military commander of Sri Lankan Army and common opposition’s presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka was released from the prisons and I can’t think of a better timing than this for me to express some of my thoughts related to these developments, which I am sure many here would share with me, at yet another crucial time for our nation.

First of all, many have correctly pointed out to me about the technicality of the use of the rank General when referring to Mr. Fonseka and it is my personal belief that it is one way for me to demonstrate my suspicion as to whether the so-called court martial was really working in a fair, transparent manner contrary how it would have been through a civilian court, while at the same time joining thousands of fellow Sri Lankans who aren’t ready to forget the existence of the first-ever four star General the Sri Lankan armed forces had, however much his photos are altered from frames or name is being erased from plaques. Thus, I shall continue to refer to him as General Sarath Fonseka out of respect, admiration and also in solidarity with many others who have been meted with injustices simply because of political, religious, racial or ethnic prejudices against them.

As I have mentioned openly in a few occasions before, I have always used my vote, be it local government, provincial, parliamentary or presidential elections, based on the policies of candidates rather than party affiliations. I still remember the reasons behind my decision to vote for Mr. Rajapakse in 2005 to be the President as much the reasons for my vote for General Fonseka during the 2010 Presidential elections, which I have already published an article on in Groundviews. But as we know, some of his close political confidantes back then are no longer to be seen along with him and the same way some of the blocs who voted for him also consider that moment as one-off. However, as much as some commentators try to bring arguments saying the presidential election votes for General Fonseka were merely protest votes against Mr. Rajapakse and he doesn’t have a political standing, it would be so naïve to de-value his influence given that he had been one of those people to have had a consistent policy from the moment he stepped on to politics and on top of it the visible public affection and/or the respect he has earned during the last 30 months both, in and out of prisons, as a politician. Therefore even though he himself can’t stand for elections (for at least the next 5 years, according to some legal experts) still the influence he will have on Sri Lankan politics is unquestionable. This is specially at a time when the main opposition party is having its own set of internal problems and almost all the other political parties having had their own share of splits within. In that context, some of the very first words of General Fonseka being trying to unite the opposition rather than craving for positions, while mobilizing people for their socio-economical rights, is a mature approach.

As a citizen and someone who has seen a bloody conflict almost all throughout my lifetime of closer to 3 decades, given that we have already wasted the last 3 years as a nation after the end of the military conflict without any serious initiatives to address the root causes of the conflict; in my opinion, the direction General Fonseka will take in the next weeks and months on key issues, will for sure decide for itself if we can be hopeful of a turning-tide towards challenging the system to make civil liberties, transparency, equality and rule of law as priorities or whether we all will passively see our motherland moving away from being a real Democracy towards a state which may be identified as more of a Autocracy due to power-hungry politicians trying to cling to power at any cost. This shouldn’t be misinterpreted as if this is a call for change of regime per-se, but if the authorities are willing to change and do what’s best for the country, that’s much better.

A welcome statement he did make within 24 hours of being released was on the conduct of the current administration in handling international calls for accountability on allegations leveled by various parties about the military conflict and General Fonseka quite correctly reminded his policy from day one being that Sri Lanka should not dodge the questions and imply guilt, rather cooperate to establish the truth, whatever it may be. I am sure he is not foolish to understand even such a call would not go well within some of the vote blocs out of the cities, still he had the courage to make that statement needs to be applauded, even though some opportunistic politicians have been trying to brand him as a ‘traitor’ again for this statement. As someone who has had friends and family members affected and lost lives due to the almost 3 decades of military conflict in our country, I see this as a positive, mature and responsible statement towards reconciliation. This is not just because of the fact that General Fonseka has taken a bold step of talking about something which is considered not even up for mention by Sinhala nationalists and thus defying some of the nationalistic elements who were believed to be also supporting him, but still giving a perfect example of how Mr. Rajapakse’s administration also could have, if his administration had the will, to have spoken about harsh realities related to reconciliation in an assertive manner given the popularity he had soon after end of the military conflict 3 years ago.

This kind of a statement, at least, gives an opportunity to make justice for people who had to make the ultimate sacrifice during the war be it a Tamil like Nilukshan Sahadevan, my colleague from Sri Lankan Youth Parliament and a young budding journalist gunned down in the middle of the night in Jaffna at his home or a Sinhala youth like Captain Sandun Chanaka of Sinha Regiment, my class-mate for years at Richmond College in Galle, who was killed in Pudukudiyiruppu South in the last stages of the war or a Muslim like one of my relatives, who was also a provincial media person from North Central province killed along with his sibling and her husband in a suicide bomb blast a few years ago. And I wonder what a difference we could have made to our tiny island if sanity prevailed to the rulers 3 years ago as soon as the military conflict was over rather than the arrogance shown since then, on a victor’s mentality. So, I respect General Fonseka for making that statement which I am sure is not an easy task for himself being the commander of the army and chief strategist during the final few years of the war.

As a person having a huge popularity among the Sinhala community as well as the minorities and then the blocs who are already fed-up with economic hardships in the face of a near impunity for huge levels of corruption in the country and daily challenges to civil, political rights as citizens; I believe it is equally important for General Fonseka to make a bold statement about Sri Lankan society being multi-religious, multi-ethnic nature given the cautious distance some of the Tamils and Muslims have been maintaining from General Fonseka partly due to the apparently mis-quoted statement attributed to him, supposedly saying that the minority communities are ‘tourists’ in this country. A strong statement on that nature will not only make him more admired as a straight-talking leader but also will be of immense value to condemn the minority of violent extremists within the country who are trying to create challenges for religious harmony in our nation with situations like what happened in Dambulla recently and afterwards carried out by chauvinistic elements. After all I am sure General Fonseka himself will know how some of these politically or financially motivated monks make real Buddhists embarrassed by bigoted actions including the example of how his own framed pictures in the Nagadeepa Viharaya which were hanging for a long time suddenly went ‘missing’ soon after he was imprisoned, for reasons known only to the people or monks who did that, while it’s not really a mystery for anybody to guess in terms of the motivation behind them.

Having done this, on the challenge of uniting the opposition to make Sri Lankan politics towards a vibrant democracy rather than going towards like some of the single-party autocracies in other parts of the world; no one believes it is going to be an easy task. Yet, he will have to manage the charisma, admiration and respect he commands across the country and importantly from every part of the society to maneuver through the rough political terrains in bringing together , the young and old, ambitious and reserved, Northern and Southern, rich and poor, friends and old-friends, young people and the intellects, Marxists and the capitalists, and the list goes on; the same way he was able to strategise and restructure a whole military outfit with its own share of divisions and internal politics amidst challenging conditions to successfully complete a military conflict. In this sense, I personally like his idea of giving importance to civic education among the masses as a key factor and clearly stating how he would like to work on a broad level with all parties rather than trying to further divide an already fractured opposition.

And if we have a strong opposition it will help the country to be steered in the right direction by keeping the government in power (whoever it may be) in check and holding them responsible for every single action for the betterment of our own country. Crucially, he will also have to have an inclusive and responsible approach to be implemented in the aftermath of the mobilization of the opposition political parties and people towards their civic rights. If not, it would be like winning a war which many thought will never end but not being able to move towards establishing a long lasting peaceful, inclusive society just the same way it is now because of the policy of not having a real policy as shown over the last 3 years by the present administration. We have already had enough of our lifetimes wasted due to petty political ideological mistakes which have cost the nation immensely and we surely can’t afford to be passive observers when it is yet to be corrected.

I also have a feeling that we Sri Lankans have been quite selfish here by expecting a 61 year old gentleman who has done a lot for his country over four decades with dedication to do more rather than enjoying his life in retirement with his family. But General Fonseka himself says that he is ready to dedicate his life to correct the political system of this country for the sake of making sure we don’t lose any more for the years and generations to come.

And I don’t believe that he is going to be the miracle-man to push the government to do the right thing or get the opposition be strong to make it a vibrant democracy; rather we Sri Lankans lacked a voice to rally behind to challenge when we thought things weren’t right and we have finally got a straight-talking individual who is ready to take the leadership, despite the risks and challenges inherent to the role, to give a voice to the unheard, in a louder manner than before.

In that sense, I believe we as citizens are in desperate need of getting back our lost identity of being part of a Democratic, Inclusive, Transparent, Just Sri Lanka as much as a four star General stripped of his ranks and perks after 40 years of selfless service to the nation is desperately trying to justify to himself that he wants to make sure he will still do his part to hold politicians accountable for their actions for the sake of future generations.

And as long as that desire is fulfilled regardless of whether it is by forcing the current political leaders taking bold, decisive actions for the future of the country or by people democratically asking a different set of leaders to do the same; I am sure we all can be prouder to be Sri Lankans and do justice to all who made sacrifices in the last decades for causes which they believed were correct and selfless, in their own ways.

Welcome back to freedom, General Fonseka!

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Photo courtesy JDS

Against the backdrop of grave planetary changes, Sarath Fonseka’s release, G.L. Peiris’s visit to Washington DC and the third anniversary of the defeat of the LTTE, an evaluation of the requirements of reconciliation are in order.  There is a need to distinguish between the symbolic and the substantive – both in turn playing their part in the journey beyond conflict.

The consequences of Sarath Fonseka’s release are yet to be registered, as are the causes for it to be ascertained.  Speculation abounds about it as the grand symbolic act of reconciliation, which will distract attention from the lack of or tardiness in the implementation of the more substantive measures that need to be undertaken.  There are those who maintain that it is a great meritorious act, which will vitiate malefic planetary effects, others cite Fonseka’s health and there are the more prosaic and “unpatriotic” explanations of international pressure.  Finally there is the explanation that it is a savvy political act aimed at sowing greater discord amongst the opposition. A Machiavellian twist to this is the regime’s expectation that Fonseka as the cat amongst the pigeons in the opposition will in the end consume himself- his incarceration not having turned him into a Mandela.

Sarath Fonseka may in the short term at least galvanize, with varying degrees of success, that section of the polity for whom he is a hero and martyr and those generally despairing of the Rajapaksa’s and the available opposition leadership.  As to whether his release will have an appreciable bearing on the substantive requirements of reconciliation is by no means certain.  That substantive progress on this front is a national priority, nevertheless, is surely beyond dispute.

Taking the LLRC report and the UNHRC resolution as the reference points, it is important that the key areas for action are identified and benchmarks for progress defined to measure demonstrable progress.  This requires a national conversation amongst those who have read the Report and who are both willing and able to contribute towards framing the process of reconciliation.  It also very importantly, requires the availability of the report in its entirety in the two official languages of the land.  There should be a copy of it in every public library in the country. No one should be denied access to it and to informed participation in the countrywide debate it has aroused.   That this has yet to be done, some five months after the report was made public, is a disgrace. Surely, so sovereignty conscious a government as the one we have, can get its act together to translate the LLRC report?  The latter is an indicator of the regime’s understanding of and commitment to the process of reconciliation and democratic governance.

In a similar vein, if there is an action plan or if there is to be one, it must be shared with the peoples of this country as the US secretary of State, apparently one of the privileged few who are privy to even a draft, has communicated to the foreign minister.

The issue of a political settlement of the ethnic conflict is a priority substantive issue.  It has been deadlocked for quite some time and while there are media reports about imminent movement on this front, the simple fact is that deadlock is attributable to the persistence of perspectives and positions integral to the conflict, rather than its resolution.  The arguments about Thirteenth Amendment Plus or Minus and when or whether the select committee should commence its deliberations need no rehearsing here.  What is impeding movement is the ideology of the regime and its perceived political exigencies, which are responsible for the belief that the defeat of the LTTE is the end of the story and that even now, India and the international community can be strung along with repeated and short-lived rhetorical commitments on devolution and not much else.

The President wants plausible deniability and no hostages to fortune on devolution. In political terms he is happy to trust his hardline allies to scuttle the enterprise – hence the passing of the buck to the select committee. In the meantime he will make out that Tamil political representation is stubbornly, if covertly, holding out for secession whilst at the same time, by drawing out proceedings, leave Tamil political representation high and dry, hemorrhaging credibility with its constituency.

In terms of process, the government-TNA consensus that comes out of direct talks being placed before the select committee is important because of the President’s political capital with the majority Sinhala community.  This is the time to lead; Mahinda Rajapaksa must have views on a political settlement, the need for one and the substance of it. The country needs to know; he needs to carry it along with him.  As for his hardline allies, given the importance of the issue, can he not tell them to put up and shut up or get out?

Other substantive issues that need attention are return of IDPs to their homes and out of shelter in transit camps and with host families, the provision of information on detainees to their families – an issue that was a subject in the GOSL-TNA talks and more recently of a circular, all of which to no avail- land dispute settlement and de-militarization.  The denials of the government on the latter score fly in the face of the ground realities.  Even the Leader of the Opposition in India and her fellow MPs are on record on the intrusion of the military into civilian and civic life in the north after their visit to the province. More recently the leader of the Students Union of Jaffna University was assaulted.

To demilitarization must be added the calls for investigations by the LLRC with regard to the ACF murders, the Trinco Five, the Channel 4 allegations and the incidents of civilian deaths for which the security forces are responsible, albeit, accidentally according to the LLRC.  Whilst the Geneva resolution calls upon the regime to state what it will do to ensure accountability – a key issue on which it notes the LLRC falls short- the commencement of investigations on what the LLRC has identified will go some way to checking the egregious culture of impunity.  Investigations have to be independent and it is worth monitoring as to whether information made available in Wikileaks cables will be acted upon in respect of the Trinco Five.

There is also the matter of independent commissions and that of right to information legislation.  Neither is likely under a regime so wedded to control, but nevertheless both are so fundamental to democratic governance that they must be kept on the agenda of substantive reforms.

Substantive, demonstrable progress is the need of the hour.  There are mileposts in the storm, so to speak – the Universal Periodic Review in October, the 22^nd session of the UN Human Rights Council in March 2013 and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to follow in November 2013.

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Image courtesy the Economist

GV editors note: In the transcript below and the video of it available on the BBC online, the BBC correspondent in Sri Lanka Charles Haviland asks “Are the terms of your release unconditional – will you be allowed to go  back to politics?”

Sarath Fonseka responds by noting that “As yet I have not seen this legal document.  Unless they have remitted the prison sentence which I have completed already, unless they do that I can’t do politics.  I can do politics but I can’t vote or contest.  So as it is, we don’t know exactly what is there in the document but we’ll come to know.”

In this regard, we reproduce below the letter sent by the Ministry of Justice to the Commissioner General of Prisons. Download as PDF here.

Start of transcript

The BBC met Sarath Fonseka on Tuesday morning at the rented house where the family now stays on the outskirts of Colombo.  Two restless barking dogs – a Dalmation and a Dachshund – calmed down by the time we started filming and the place was peaceful, the only extraneous noise being the occasional lowing of cattle in an adjoining field.  The former army chief looked tired but was due to set off to pay homage at Buddhist temples in the provinces the same afternoon. 

[Charles Haviland: Why do you think you’ve been released now?]  Sarath Fonseka: There’s a lot of pressure on the people who were behind putting me behind bars – internally, the local aspirations of the people, the sentiments of the people, the pressure was building up.  Then internationally we know that there was unlimited pressure.  The international community did a great job by maintaining continuous pressure on them.  Because they were interested to see proper democracy in this country.  With that in mind, they I think exercised a fair amount of pressure on the people who were behind my incarceration.

[You have your differences with President Rajapaksa but are you grateful to him for signing the papers for your release?]  I will ask you the same question.  If I put you behind bars, later on I put you out, what would you feel about it?

[Are the terms of your release unconditional – will you be allowed to go  back to politics?]  As yet I have not seen this legal document.  Unless they have remitted the prison sentence which I have completed already, unless they do that I can’t do politics.  I can do politics but I can’t vote or contest.  So as it is, we don’t know exactly what is there in the document but we’ll come to know.

[There’s still another charge outstanding against you, of harbouring army deserters.  Could you still go back to court and be sentenced again or is that out of the question?]  Yes [?naturally] they want to hold on to it, thinking they can put pressure on me by maintaining that.  But that’s another case as far as I’m concerned.  Obviously we don’t agree with the charges.  If they think they can put me behind bars again using that, most probably they are repeating the same mistake.

[Would you like ideally to go back to politics again and challenge the president in an election once more?]  Umm – yes, it’s not that I want to become the president of the country or something.  My intention and my agenda is not to contest for the presidential and become the president of the country only.  I have a political agenda: to change the corrupt political culture in this country.  As far as I can do that, I don’t mind not becoming president or not being an MP.  But we’ll definitely try to gather all the forces together for that purpose.  So when we go ahead with that, they will already be confronting us, obviously.

[How do you see yourself in terms of being an opposition leader in this country?  Do you think perhaps you are the best place to be such a leader?]  It’s not a case of whether I am the best or anyone else is the best.  It’s a case of who is really interested, genuinely interested, about the country’s interest.  Let the people decide that.  The people who think that this government is not doing their job and if they think there is a change required now then they will have to decide basically who is the best person or who are the best people to do that.  Otherwise I don’t want to get into a leadership clash or fighting for appointments or something.

[I’d like to talk about human rights issues starting with the international angle.  In March the US sponsored a resolution at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva which was critical of Sri Lanka on human rights.  It was adopted, India supported it, and it basically said Sri Lanka should do more to implement reconciliation recommendations which came from within Sri Lanka and should do more about accountability in respect of alleged war crimes.  Were you happy to see that resolution passed?]   Yes – because – on certain issues in that resolution we straight away we agree – the violations of human rights, the reconciliation, yes, it’s a must, but the war crimes – there are various different opinions.  So we have to argue with that, argue it out and clarify any doubts so that those who are pointing out any issues – I always believe that they must point out specific  issues, then we are ready to answer them, we can clarify anything.  I don’t want to hide and wait.  The way some people are trying to hide their face when it comes to war crimes and other issues – it gives the impression to the rest of the world that these people are guilty of something.  I have always said that I am ready to answer for any allegations about the war crimes in relation to the military operations,  so that is my position.

But human rights violations, yes, and the intimidation, the people are under pressure, terrified, terrorised, all due to the abuse of power by the government – I fully agree that if there is a dictatorship, ongoing dictatorship, or someone looking forward for a dictatorship, tyrannical politics – if people’s interest is not looked after, people are intimidated, if the opposition is suppressed – then obviously if things go beyond the control of the law-enforcing agencies in the country, if the judiciary is being pressurised, influenced – then obviously the accepted thing in the whole world – the rest of the world must also take some interest in those issues to help a country out.

[So you say the judiciary is intimidated, that there is intimidation in wider society, threats, etc?  Is this what you are saying?]  Yeah that’s true.  Judiciary – although it is not direct intimidation there’s a certain amount of influence on judiciary because after the 18^th Amendment was brought in –    [making the president very very powerful?]  – Powerful, and the judges and everybody else in the judiciary, Attorney-General’s Department, everybody [is] vulnerable for a one-man show.  So obviously they can’t be independent, they can’t take decisions.  They themselves are human beings who have to look after their families, who have to look after their jobs.  So indirectly they are pressurising the judiciary and judiciary cannot be independent under a situation like this.

[You’re saying that’s because the president has the power to directly appoint so many of these people?]  Yes.  Everybody knows in this country and he’s not doing it sincerely.

[Before you left the army some people accused you of taking part in that same kind of culture of intimidation and threats.]  Er – That is also the fault of the government.  When there were incidents here and there, the government did not come out and face the criticism and settle those issues, then the people formed their own opinion.  If someone is killed in Colombo or a journalist is attacked or killed, then if the government does not find the culprits, the people, the opposition will point the finger at the government and those who are – the military and the police, the people who have power.  As the people who are responsible.  In fact this president, very unfortunate, I know at certain media briefings , after some incident took place in relation to a media personnel, he has been saying “don’t disturb the military, if you disturb the military we will not be able to look after you” – and words like that.  So obviously the people were suspicious about everybody else, not only the army I mean, the servicemen – the intelligence –

[So you deny having taken part in those kind of violations in the past?]  I had more important things to do.  I was full time to ensure [indistinct word] fighting a huge war.  Rather than going behind one or two people in Colombo which didn’t matter to me at all.  If that is the case now, the way they are criticising me, the mud-slinging, I must start attacking each and every man in the government, if I had that frame of psychology.

[On the subject of the war – we’ve referred to it already – a panel appointed by Ban Ki-Moon said there might have been up to 40,000 civilian casualties – civilian casualties on a mass scale.  The government absolutely rejects that.  Where do you stand on this?]  I totally reject, refuse the numbers given that thousands of civilians died.  Because I knew exactly how the battle was fought.  How the military was moving forward.  The reaction of the civilians.  What were the civilians doing.  Of course a certain amount of casualties would have been there because everybody knows the civilians were also manning the LTTE bunker lines.  Civilians – there were pictures and the video footage to show that even elderly women aged 60 or 70 going through weapon training.  So there is no question – of a few civilians getting killed obviously but you can’t blame the military for that – because civilians were given weapons and put in the front line, it would not be possible  for the military to identify such people.  But the large figures of 30,000, 40,000, dying, it was not practicable.  The way we conducted the war, the type of weapons systems we used, the manuals we made, we were always concerned about the security of the civilians.

[So what’s your view of the idea that there should be an international independent investigation of those claims?]  That is up to the international community – if they have any doubts, if they have any questions they can do it.  I think they have all the right and freedom to do it.  Then it’s our business to confront them, meet them and discuss with them and thrash out any doubts.

[And Sri Lanka should be open to that?] Definitely, yes.

[And you would be open to that even if you were to come under the spotlight of investigation?] I’ve said from the very beginning, to safeguard the name of the military, those who sacrificed their lives, those who conducted that operation, I’ll come out at any time, I’m not scared to come before anybody.

[Who was really in charge of the war effort in the last months or years – you or the defence secretary or the president?]  If I could run it for two years and eight months, there was no reason for take over during the last month.  Nobody else would have had the knowledge about what’s happening on the ground more than me at that time.  Of course everybody wants to say, “we conducted the war”.  I don’t know what they have been talking, what they have been doing.  If they were discussing things without my knowledge without my presence, I don’t know.  They are themselves saying they planned certain things, they worked out certain strategies, they have to answer for that then.  They must say what they exactly did.

[But you were in overall charge?]  Yeah, definitely.

[Sarath Fonseka, thank you very much for speaking to us.]  Thank you very much.  You take my message to the international community also.  We want them to be with us, to build the country, and clear the name of the image of this country.  And we need their assistance.  And we are ready to cooperate and work with the rest of the world any time.  Thank you.

Watch excerpts of the interview on the BBC website. A podcast of the interview, sent to us by the BBC, can be accessed below.

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First interviewed in 2010, Dr. Farzana Haniffa appears again on Groundviews to talk about the Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE. As the Commission’s website notes, in October 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) expelled the entire Muslim population of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. Within a period of 48 hours the LTTE systematically chased out close to 75,000 Muslims residing in the districts of Kilinochchi Mulaitiwu, Jaffna, Mannar and parts of Vavuniya.

The Quest for Redemption: The Story of the Northern Muslims is the report by the Commission, release late 2011 and available for purchase online. As one of the Commissioner’s, Dr. Haniffa justifies why the Commission and its findings are an invaluable record of a chapter in Sri Lanka’s history that is often undervalued and glossed over. We talk about how the publication of the report has served to heighten interest over the complex dynamics regarding the Northern Muslims, and how the communities the Commission interacted with are also grateful for what in their minds is the first accurate historical record of what they underwent.

In a submission made to the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) by Dr. Farzana Haniffa in November 2010, the plight of the Northern Muslims was clearly flagged,

In summary then the Northern Muslims feel marginalised by the fact that the state has no policy on protracted displacement, no public acknoweldgement of the old IDPS and their needs, no cash grants for resettlement assistance, no commitment to assist with housing, no provision to address damage to property due to twenty years of neglect due to no fault of their own, no provision to address damage to social networks due to the conflict and the expulsion, no assistance with livelihoods, no plans for compensation. The northern Muslims are also distressed by the fact that they maybe absent from the government’s development plans for the North. They fear that they census and the local authorities bill may marginalise them by not taking into account the virtual limbo in which many of them currently live.

Dr. Haniffa notes that conditions have improved since 2010, and that the Government has unofficially given the assurance that protracted internal displacement would be addressed over 2012. She also goes into the complexities of return (“going back has not been easy” she categorically notes), the perception of the Northern Muslims by host communities and the tensions therein, the challenge of returning to a Peninsula that has still major challenges of infrastructure and the issue of co-habitation after twenty years of absence.

Going beyond the specific concerns regarding the Northern Muslims, Dr. Haniffa also critiques Muslim party politics in Sri Lanka post-independence, and how the real concerns over those evicted were hostage to the electoral desires and design of mainstream Muslim political parties. Towards the end, Dr. Haniffa notes that the process of documentation is still on-going, and that they are now working on getting photographs of the eviction from the families who have them, with a view to digitising them and placing them on the web.

Groundviews has also published three key articles dealing with the Commission.

• The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of the Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990 by Dr. Farzana Haniffa
• Some observations on the Final Report of the Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990 by Manouri Muttetuwegama
• A Commissioner’s Perspective: Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE by Chulani Kodikara

• The Muslim question and resettlement of Muslim IDPs in post-war Sri Lanka: Two comprehensive interviews
• A Commissioner’s Perspective: Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE
• Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in October 1990
• The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of the Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990
• LLRC submission: The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in October 1990

Photo via JDS. AFP PHOTO/Lakruwan WANNIARACHCHI.

The V-Day celebrations were on, as this piece was written. A military victory being commemorated at the Galle face esplanade, celebrated as the 3^rd anniversary of defeating the LTTE “terrorism”. President Rajapaksa bragged about what positives the military victory brought to this country. No more barricades on the Galle Road, he says. Fishermen can now go out fishing, civil administration has been established in all parts of the country and the LLRC was appointed to help achieve reconciliation, said the President. “Already”, he says, “recommendations that could be accepted (by whom ?) are being implemented, not because others want us to do so”. The government has a commitment for reconciliation, he stresses.

Then he says, the LLRC can not be allowed to be used to create racial tensions again. For he believes, there is now good and cordial relations growing between North and South, he says. People find new relations across North – South, while marriages are being made most preciously between the Sinhala and the Tamil, said the President, looking beyond the invited audience. “May the Triple Gem bless you all.” he concluded, for the military command to take the podium and announce high presidential honours to all soldiers who died, nay sacrificed their young lives for the nation, during the last days of the war, fighting to free the “motherland” from LTTE “terrorists”.

All that and the president’s address to the unified nation, was preceded by a narrator’s prologue highlighting all the Sinhala kings of yore like Dutu Gemunu, who fought the Cholas (and the Pandiyans) in uniting the “Sinhala” country from South Indian invaders. So the question posed by this narrator; “if President Rajapaksa was not there like those ancient Kings, ridding the LTTE separatist terrorists, what of Lanka today ?”

Yes ! What of Lanka today ? Where is civil administration, where is law and order, peace and “reconciliation” the President sounded out loud ? Where are all those civilian people who died in their thousands during the war, when the government commemorates its 3^rd anniversary ? Why had some Tamil people in the Vanni, left to huddle themselves into a dim and untidy hall in Vavuniya yesterday (18 May), to remember their sons, their husbands, their brothers and sisters who had gone missing, who lost their lives, during the war ? Why had a similar remembrance held inside the Jaffna university, also yesterday ? Why had the security forces kept watch over them and their organisers, making them look like anti government protesters ?

Most importantly, why was this V-Day anniversary turned into a “Sinhala” military parade and event, instead of a people’s participatory event with all those Tamil and perhaps Muslim people, also as part of national commemoration(s), building confidence and trust for sincere and actual social reconciliation ?

The Rajapaksa regime can not afford to loosen the grip it has on society through military presence and the hyped Sinhala war psyche for such reconciliation. The economy is also collapsing on the Sinhala South. The plight of the crippling economy leaves nothing for the people. It becomes quite evident when US Republican Congressman Ed Royce raised the issue of money laundering in post war Sri Lanka as a serious issue, with the visiting minister of External Affairs, Prof Pieris just yesterday (May 18).

The Rajapaksas are clearly on a duplicity trip, trying to buy time from all quarters. While the MEA Prof G.L. Pieris presents in the US, what the US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland  called “a very serious and comprehensive approach” in implementing the LLRC Recommendations as called for by the UNHRC Resolution adopted in Geneva and what Clinton now wants made public, the President on anniversary day tells Sri Lankans with the diplomatic corp kept seated and listening, he would only implement what is good for him and his regime. There would be no reducing of security presence in the North – East either, as long as there is a “threat to the nation”, says he. While celebrating the 3^rd year war victory, President thus accepts the military has not eliminated the “LTTE threat” as the nation and the whole world was told, with “kiribath and fire crackers”. With such political bewilderment, the Rajapaksas need a way out of the political imbroglio they are hemmed in, on a recklessly plundered economy and with no post war benefits for even the ordinary Sinhala people.

Difficulties of the Rajapaksa regime has given an opportunity to Wickramasinghe who wasn’t sure which way he should go with a rebellious Sinhala group demanding the right to decide party politics. He has now got his act together with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), leaving his Sinhala rebels aside. With a successful May Day rally in Jaffna and an apparent understanding in working together with the TNA, Wickramasinghe seems to be gaining ground in a socio economic chaos, the Rajapaksas are unable to manage decently and efficiently.

In the South, the trade unions are also rallying wage earners who were backing the Sinhala regime and Rajapaksa, to challenge and oppose the same Rajapaksa regime on economic issues. There is apparently a protest vote building up on issues, the war victory has no relevance to. The only possible way out as President Rajapaksa understands is, to push the whole country into an election mood for some months. That would diffuse trade union mobilising on wage issues and help the regime to galvanise the South against Wickramasinghe’s UNP, now working with the TNA. Well, at least that seems the option, he is working on, for he has no other political platform he could climb on.

Yet the Constitution would not allow a presidential election till end 2015 as the swearing in for the second presidential term was in 2011 November. Rajapaksa any way would not put himself as a guinea pig, testing the popularity of his regime. He would rather go for a calculated general elections, probably sometime in 2013 and six months from now. In fact he seems bent on trying out the voter mood at PC level right now, but that secured in his favour, he would have to try it out at national level. That needs a buffer he could use to stop the flow of protest votes from going UNP in the Sinhala South.

On a very conservative calculation, while there is serious discontent brewing in society on numerous issues from cost of living to breakdown of law and order, his UPFA could still retain at least 52 to 55 per cent from the 60.3 percent polled in April, 2010. The UNP, with the TNA now in total control of  Northern Tamil vote, has 29.3 plus 2.9 percent to start with. The TNA with its 2.9 percent secured 14 seats while the UNP got 60 seats. What if UNP goes up to 35 percent and the TNA to 3.5 percent ? That would leave the UPFA with around 120 seats, loosing almost 24 from its present 144 seats. A UPFA government all right, but yes, a much weakened government too. The Rajapaksas can not afford to live with a weak government in parliament, when most SLFP leaders already live as “angry souls” in a hijacked government, they bring votes for. Rajapaksa had in fact accepted in private, his immediate need in bringing the 18^th Amendment after the 2010 April general elections was because he does not trust most SLFP “grumblers”.

This is where Fonseka comes in politically handy again, on political conditions defined by Rajapaksa. He would not be the war hero he was made into by the JVP during the 2010 elections, saluting in full military regalia, on most city walls. He would not be leaving the prison as a hero of the anti Rajapaksas, with his usually catchy media quips. He would instead leave the private hospital on a presidential pardon, when released on a family appeal supposedly made by one of the daughters, written the way the President wants. In any form, its a presidential pardon in totality that Tiran Alles had been negotiating for, with Anoma Fonseka in the know.

Its such a Fonseka who would be coming out, thanks to President Rajapaksa. Thereafter with all the UNP dissidents brought around Fonseka, for a ride on a Sinhala campaign, Rajapaksa will be trying out a new DNA led by Fonseka, Sajith Premadasa and Karu Jayasuriya to deprive Wickramasinghe from gaining the disgruntled and disgusted Southern votes going away from him.

Fonseka-Sajith-Karu led DNA painted a new bloc, would be projected as a legitimate leadership that has a right to oppose the UNP and call for a dissenting vote against the UNP in the South. Though with the absence of the JVP, it would still be expected to at least poll 3.5 percent of its 5.4 percent polled in 2010 and top it with the dissatisfied Sinhala vote to poll about 06 to 07 percent with a UNP lineage in its leadership. IF that works the way Rajapaksas plan, reloading Fonseka for this post-paid Sinhala package, is worth his gamble. The DNA could then play buffer in parliament too, with about 06 to 08 MPs and may be a ministerial portfolio or two given in charity for those who helped this new “reload” for the future.

Yet the unpredictable factor is, the “time factor”. How soon will it be, or how long will it take the tide to start swelling into a Tsunami against the Rajapaksa regime ? Will it then leave the equation the same ?  In short, will it then accept this Fonseka factor as worthy of a vote in late 2013 ? Will reloading Fonseka save the Rajapaksas then ? Worth a wait to see, is it ?

• Sarath Fonseka and the Role of the Opposition: Will Sanity Prevail?
• What now about the Rajapaksa regime, after the South?
• The Return of Sarath Fonseka: An Enduring Headache?
• Blinkered vision of Tamil nationalists and socialists is self-defeating
• “Believable Change” with unbelievable evasiveness: Sarath Fonseka’s manifesto

I watched the Frontline Club panel on Sri Lanka, belatedly and reluctantly. I am skeptical about such public enquiries and debates into complex matters, which threaten to reduce the dialogue and truth into performance.

In my view, the problem with these ‘events’, for that is what they are, is that the truth is reduced to a many-sided thing; the more one counts the sides the more fragmented the truth itself becomes. But of course you never get ‘all sides’ of the story. So, for example, someone keeping a count of the sides could say the Muslim question or the gender dimension figured not at all.

In fact, Stephen Sackur set the tone for an evening of performance with his opening line: “First thing to say is that it is fantastic to see such a great audience.” The panelists inevitably came with their own scripts—prepared remarks, notes, papers (Mr. Wijesinha had loads of them), computers etc. Then there were the self-appointed (or chosen?) cheerleaders—prompting, laughing, clapping and some even heckling on cue. If at all anyone listened it seemed like it was only to rebut. Thus did the evening proceed to rehearse well-trodden narratives and imaginaries of dominance, violence and marginality in Sri Lanka. And I have no doubt that the panelists and their supporters will have also enaged in post-event reviews; “how did it go?”

I am not suggesting that the issues raised and discussed were not important, on the contrary. It just seemed like a classic case of the very gravity of the issues dwarfing the forum itself. I am certainly not saying that everyone who participated lacked seriousness or genuine intent, which may nevertheless be true of some, but I fear that in forums such as this, in which, at the very least, no one wants his or her position to come out looking ‘lesser’, ‘weaker’, or a ‘loser’ the truth is often the casualty. It is a battle, not always subtle, between well-held positions. It is not a conversation.

The fact is, like in adversarial adjudication, theatricality is a norm in such forums. Or at least, a la Derrida, it is inevitable that the performative elements of dialogue and truth are the ones that tend to get most play. The most theatrical moments of the evening were inevitably around the most sinister—such as the number of people dead or missing in the final months of the war. Numbers and counter-numbers were tossed around until the moderator, inevitably, said it was time to move on, “we have done the numbers.”

If, however, there was one moment when the mask dropped, it was in Mr. Wijesinha’s response to Dr. Manoharan, the father of one of the five students executed on a beach in Trincomalee 6 years ago, widely believed to be the handiwork of Sri Lankan security/law enforcement agents. The first part of this exchange is, sadly, worth recalling. Dr. Manoharan asked why no progress had been made in the case, including despite Dr. Wijesinha’s personal assurances. Mr. Wijesinha, began sagely enough, acknowledging that there was a strong case. He then said that he was present when the President had asked the Attorney General to issue indictments, who had said (to Mr. Wijesinha) that he did not do so because he felt there was not enough evidence to secure a conviction. Mr. Wijesinha went to say, “I said [to the Attorney General], for God’s sake take a leaf out of the British. What they do is prosecute ten people, acquit nine, one person gets two months in jail and then they will say justice.” Stephen Sackur—a seasoned Hard Talk moderator—could scarcely restrain himself and remarked, “I can’t believe that you told that to the Doctor [Dr. Manoharan] thinking it would reassure him.”

Mr. Wijesinha no doubt realised, from Sackur’s spontaneous response and the murmur of disbelief in the room, that it was actually looking more like a case of hit-wicket and tried again, this time making sure to mouth the ‘right’ words, restoring theatre. However, that was perhaps the one time he was being utterly unpremeditated.

Actually, Mr. Wijesinha’s performance of the evening in general merits particular comment because it embodies the theatre that is the Rajapakse regime itself—wearing a devil-may-care cockiness and triumphal face one instant followed by an innocent, we-are-oh-so-victimised cry the next; seeming polite and reasonable one instant but menacing and name-calling the next; full of confidence and bluster one moment but petulant and childish the next. Yes, this too is a familiar sort of theatre, one induced by a deep sub-conscious fear, of knowing that you simply cannot fool everyone forever.

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Editors note: As we were watching the live web stream of the Frontline event, a few moments after Rajiva Wijesinha’s incredible response to Dr. Manoharan, we tweeted:

tweeted:

• The Gaza Monologues: An interview with Ruhanie Perera and Jake Oorloff
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“There is no State of Emergency today.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Therefore, the attempt of the Sri Lankan government to replace emergency laws with another set of laws under a different name, yet meant to do the same task is not surprising. State of emergency is not only a particular set of laws. Removing emergency regulations while continuing with militarisation and a massive project of policing in socio-cultural arenas do not indicate a journey towards normalcy.” – Amali Wedagedara, Groundviews, 5 September 2011

“It is no secret that through 30 years there were armed groups and militias operating, especially in the North and East. All such groups have now been disarmed.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“March 3, 2012 marked a very dark ebb in our society as it saw the horrific rape and murder of little Jesudasan Lakshini (13), allegedly at the hands of former EPDP cadre, Kanthasami Jegatheswaran (alias Kiruba) (31), from the Delft Island, Jaffna. Currently being held in remand at the Jaffna Remand Prison, the accused was produced before the Kayts Magistrate this week (30). However, the hearing was further postponed to April 9, 2012, as the Delft Police had failed to conclude their compilation of eye witness statements, said attorney-at-law K.S. Ratnavel, who is appearing on behalf of the victim’s family. The pending statement is the last of four eye witness statements attesting to having witnessed Lakshini being intercepted and taken by the accused on her way to the market, he added. This raises the glaring question as to why the Police was unable to obtain a mere four eye witness statements in the course of almost a month following this incident, unless of course exterior political forces are in play.” – Marissa de Silva, Groundviews, 2 April 2012

“We have systematically removed from our vocabulary the references of refugee camps, land mines and villages under threat. ” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Back at the destroyed camp, we learned that earlier the same morning, the industries and commerce minister, Rishad Bathiudeen, had also paid a visit to the site. Upon his arrival, bombarded by residents’ desperate pleas to finally be allowed to return to their homes, he responded that he had only come to see what could be done to help them after the storm and ordered, “don’t try and turn this into a political issue”. Unfortunately, what Mr. Bathiudeen does not seem to know or acknowledge is that the reason for not allowing these people to return to their villages for almost three years is a political decision.” – Watchdog, Groundviews, 7 April 2012

“There were limits imposed on fishermen under which they could not go beyond a certain distance. These restrictions are also no more.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Many problems regarding the fishing industry in the North in many ways related to the militarization that was strengthened during the last phase of the war but not completely relaxed even after the end of the war. For instance, some coastal areas, which are very significant to fishing, still remains as High Security Zones (HSZ); and therefore fishermen are banned from engaging in their livelihood activities in those areas; in many areas, fishermen were allowed to go to sea only within a permitted corridor, and even for that they had to get passes from military forces.” – Sumith Chaaminda, Groundviews, 31 March 2012

“The check points and road blocks that we had through every two or three kilometers, and even on this Galle Road, are not there anymore… We are aware that the armed forces do not participate in the administration of the North or East. These regions are administered by the public service and the police. ” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“The reality that most, if not all the soldiers manning the Omanthai Checkpoint are not proficient in Tamil, is also quite telling in terms of the complete non-recognition of, and lack of respect for the Tamil community. More often than not, Tamil passengers unfamiliar with the routine have to rely on the Tamil translation of a more seasoned traveller. This indignity is further heightened when each of these passengers are made to have their personal belongings rifled through, until such time that the army personnel is adequately satisfied of the innocence of the specific passenger in question.” – Marisa de Silva, Groundviews, 16 April 2012

and

“The ubiquitous presence of armed security forces, weapons drawn, fingers on the trigger was fearsome. Every 100 metres on the Jaffna highway there was a security picket; every three kilometres, an army post; every 10 km, an army camp. The army was everywhere, running roadside shops, hotels and hospitality businesses. Even funerals or marriages or social functions in Tamil areas needed army permission in advance.” – The Hindu, 21 March 2012

“You will recall how terrorism compelled us all to live in the midst of much restrictions and obstructions, through 30 years. It is just three years since the war ended. Today, the country that faced such restrictions has returned to normal.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Especially for those living in the North, normalcy is far from reality. Only a part of these are the deciduous problems encountered, unfortunately but unavoidably, by people living in former conflict zones in the aftermath of war. It is now disconcertingly apparent that the militarisation of all spheres of life in the North is becoming increasingly institutionalised, and moreover, that this is the deliberate policy of the government. The regime is able to implement its policy with regard to the North, and more generally the continuation in force of disproportionate and repressive wartime national security measures, with virtually no meaningful democratic opposition.” – Asanga Welikala, Groundviews, 29 April 2011

“We are a country that is a member of the United Nations, working with friendship with all countries and sit with equality with all its members.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

On 30 June [2010], senior Government Minister Wimal Weerawansa urged the public to surround the UN office in Colombo and hold its staff hostage until moves by the UN to appoint a panel on Sri Lanka is dropped, putting the UN in Sri Lanka on high alert. On the same day, UN spokesman Farhan Haq said that when the UN contacted the Sri Lankan government over this statement, the government assured they were Minister Weerawansa’s “individual opinion”. On 2 July, it was reported that the government may tender an apology to the UN over the Minister’s comments. Any communication to this effect by the government to the UN is, to date, not in the public domain. On 4 July, Minister Weerawansa said he stood by his comment, and clarified that he made it as the National Freedom Front (NFF) leader and not in his capacity as a Government member. He also reiterated his call for the public to surround the building and protest against the UN panel. On the morning of 6 July, the NFF surrounded the UN compound in Colombo… Related to this, the Lanka Truth website runs a story on an alleged phone call with the President’s brother, the churlish Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in which he directly orders the Police to withdraw from the vicinity of the UN compound. – Groundviews, 8 July 2010

“We are already carrying out what we can agree to and can implement among the recommendations of the LLRC.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

The official media page of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) tells its own story. It’s blank. There’s literally nothing on the official website of the LLRC that provides information on public statements by the LLRC and coverage of its proceedings in the media. Furthermore, it’s impossible to find the interim recommendations or the final report of the LLRC on the official website… What remains of the LLRC’s proceedings and output – its interim report and recommendations, the accessibility and translations of its Final Report, most of the public submissions in Tamil, Sinhala and English, audio recordings and detailed records of media reports – are all, without exception, carefully curated and published online for public access by the very NGOs and platforms, including this site, that have been openly and repeatedly vilified by those in and partial to government. And all the government itself has managed to do was to establish a website for the LLRC – that too rather late into the LLRC’s activities and bereft of vital records. – Groundviews, 20 March 2012

“National political parties are today able to work and function freely in the North in absence of fear.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

The bizarre responses to what was a brutal attack, post-war, in broad daylight, against unarmed Parliamentarians engaging in nothing more subversive than the democratic process and it’s subsequent denial by the President himself – essentially shutting the door on any investigation or punitive measures – reflects a desire by government to, unilaterally and violently if necessary, define Tamil politics and moreover, throttle the growth of a more plural Tamil polity and society. These attacks are justified by senior government ministers, who believe that “the UPFA and other political parties represented more Tamils than the TNA”, which means that more can be expected in the future. The resulting humiliation of the TNA MPs is keenly felt and watched by a larger Tamil community, domestic as well as international. – Groundviews, The attack on TNA Parliamentarians in Jaffna: A timeline of outrageous denials (Updated), 5 July 2011

“Sri Lanka would soon pull out its remaining troops from areas still under military control in the Tamil-dominated northern province that was once an LTTE bastion, a prominent Tamil minister has said. ‘We have successfully taken the military presence off in most of the areas in the Northern Province. Only two in tenth of the areas are still under military control. We will soon make this area free of military presence. I need a month’s time from you to work on this,” Minister Douglas Devananda said while addressing people at Mathagal.” – Press Trust of India, 10 February 2012

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“Sri Lanka’s president has rejected a call by Indian legislators to withdraw soldiers from the island’s former war zone in the north where minority Tamils are concentrated, his spokesman… President Mahinda Rajapakse told a delegation of visiting Indian lawmakers that troops could not be pulled out despite the end of the decades-long Tamil separatist war in 2009.” – AFP, 22 April 2012

and

“President Mahinda Rajapaksa speaking at the Victory Day celebrations today said that it was not advisable to remove or reduce military camps in the North as the Tamil diasporas had not given up its attempts to win Eelam.” – Ceylon Today, 19 May 2012

• What is the bigger lie? US resolution in Geneva or number of people in Vanni in 2009?
• Who really supports reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka?
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Reloading General Sarath Fonseka for a post-paid Sinhala package
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents

Photo courtesy Vikalpa

For the 3^rd successive year, the Sri Lankan government has made elaborate arrangements to celebrate the end of the war in Colombo. This year, May was declared as “war hero’s commemoration month”. For the last few days, roads were closed in Colombo causing great inconvenience, as preparations were being made for celebrating the end of the war.

However, in the North, among Tamils, where the last phase of the war was fought, the mood was far from celebratory, but outright mourning and grieving. In the morning of 18^th May, I joined a commemorative Mass in a church that was yet to be rebuilt after the war. More than the church building, two monuments stood out. One for Fr. Sarathjeevan (popularly known as Fr. Sara, who died on 18^th May 2009) and another for all people who had been killed in the war. Villagers including school children and Hindus flocked to this church. Amongst those present were families of those killed and disappeared. About 20 priests participated. After the Mass,  flowers and garlands were laid for those killed. A Tamil priest from Jaffna welcomed the small group of Sinhalese from Negombo, Colombo, Anuradhapura etc., who had joined the mourning and the simple commemoration, while most other Sinhalese were seen celebrating.

In the afternoon of 18^th May, I witnessed the passion of women whose family members had disappeared and been killed, as they gathered at a Hindu Kovil in Killinochchi town and participated in a service there, which included the smashing of coconuts. Some of the women were crying and some were clearly angry with those that had killed or made their family members disappear. I would not want to be at the receiving end of such anger.

In the evening, I joined other friends in a solemn event in Jaffna to commemorate the 3^rd year after the end of the war after by remembering those killed and disappeared. All of us lit candles and some shared their tragic stories of those killed and disappeared. Several mourned also for the lack of space to even cry and remember without fear, with one boy thanking the organizers of the event, as several others he had spoken to organize such an event had refused in fear.   Another woman, whose brother had died on 18^thMay 2009, spoke of the tension with which they participate in these events, as they are fearful to hold them in public.

One of the organizers of the Jaffna event spoke of the challenge he faces every year in May to organize a commemoration. His fears were clearly grounded and real.

On 17^th May evening, some unknown persons had inquired about him and his activities. The priest in whose church the commemorative event was held on the morning of 18^th May in Vanni was also questioned by the Army the previous day about what services and activities were planned. On 18^th May morning, the Secretary of the Jaffna University Students Union was attacked and was seriously injured. A friend told us that he was in the accident ward of the Jaffna hospital while we were there.

In another interior rural village close to Jaffna, Army personnel had twice visited a Catholic Priest and threatened him not to have any special masses between 18^th – 20^th May. In their 2^nd visit, they had told the Priest he can have mass, but that he shouldn’t pray for those killed in the last phase of the war, as all those killed had been LTTE cadres. There had been no answer when the Priest asked whether the 1-2 year old children killed and elders over 60 years who had been killed were also LTTE cadres.  Some months ago, threats by the Army had compelled the same priest to scrap the plan to build a tomb to remember all those killed in the war and didn’t have a tomb or a burial place. On 27^th November 2011, the Army had insisted that lamps  not be lit  and bells should not be rung in Churches and Kovils in the North and in some places, and had even threatened Catholic Priests not to celebrate the Sunday Mass! (Perhaps ignorant that Sunday Mass is celebrated in churches all over Sri Lanka and over the world for hundreds of years). Outside the Killinochchi Hindu Kovil that the families of disappeared and killed had gathered, there was a significant Police and Army presence and one of my friends recognized an intelligence officer who was photographing us and watched us as we got into our van after joining the Kovil event. By coincidence or not, in the next few minutes, our vehicle was stopped at a check point and subjected to registration and questioning which was not at all usual in my previous travels in the North this year.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry (LLRC) had recommended that a special event on National Day (4^th February) be set apart to express solidarity and empathy with all victims of the tragic conflict, but this was ignored by the Government.

And the military appeared to be doing its best to discourage and stop any religious or non religious events related to remembering the dead and disappeared, to grieve and mourn. The intimidation and threatening of organizers of such initiatives are alarming.

I’m happy the war had ended. But I’m not at all happy about the way it was fought, especially the last phase. And celebrating while many others are mourning and grieving – and actively trying to prevent mourning and grieving – doesn’t seem to be the way towards a genuine reconciliation.

But I did have something to celebrate also – the courage, creativity and perseverance of those who dared to build small monuments, organize and participate in memorials events to grieve and mourn for those killed, disappeared and who have suffered. It is this courage  and creativity i believe that will lead us to reconciliation.

• Celebrating war victory and banning commemoration of dead civilians: this is “home grown & indigenous” reconciliation and freedom in Sri Lanka?
• Christmas 2008 in Sri Lanka
• Destroying monuments for those killed & disappeared: The Catholic Church and the Sri Lankan Government
• Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas: Five years after disappearance, where are they and what has happened to the investigation?
• Sharing a common god: The Sivasubramaniam Kovil in Slave Island

Photo courtesy UN

May is the month of the diplomatic success of Sri Lanka and its friends at the Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2009. That battle and victory are now the target of criticism and historical revisionism. It is alleged that Sri Lanka was brought onto the HRC agenda by our success, that the Sri Lankan team in Geneva at the time should have kept the resolution off the agenda as had our counterparts in New York, that the success of 2009 was the progenitor of an inevitable setback of March 2012 in the same arena, and that if we are in a hole today, we dug that hole in 2009.

This criticism, whispered and murmured since 2009 and finally out in the public domain, has the dubious virtue of being entirely ‘home grown’, because nothing remotely along these lines has figured in the voluminous commentary on the May 2009 and March 2012 votes published overseas, be it ‘Wikileaked’ cable traffic between Geneva and Washington DC, critical research monographs or ‘higher’ journalistic analyses. Having recognised its psychological well-springs and domestic political coordinates, one could ignore it except that wrong diagnoses inevitably lead to wrong policy prescriptions and are injurious to the national interest.

In several senses, the battle in the UN HRC on May 26-27^th 2009 was inextricably linked to and a ‘superstructure’ of our military victory on the ground on May 18-19th. It was a run-on of that ‘ground war’. The West planned the resolution in the UN HRC as a means of securing a ‘humanitarian cessation’ of our final drive for victory against the Tigers. It followed through on the resolution, having earlier failed to move it in time to obtain a UN mandate for such a cessation. It failed because we in the UN HRC prevented the obtaining of the requisite sixteen signatures until the war was won. It remained one signature short for a week to ten days. The final signature was obtained shortly after, and the EU supported actively by the USA (as Secretary of State’s explicit instructions in a ‘Wiki leaked’ cable dated May 4th render incontrovertible) moved the Special session on Sri Lanka. Much is made of the fact that the US was not a member at that time, but by the same token, nor was Sri Lanka (having lost its seat at an election held in New York) –which did not mean that we were not active protagonists and players.

That Sri Lanka came on the UN HRC agenda in May 2009 due to its Geneva team at the time as alleged in an article in a well-known business magazine (and amplified in a Sunday column), is demonstrably false, several times over. Firstly there was an EU draft resolution against Sri Lanka as far back as early 2006, which we successfully removed from the agenda after I took over. Secondly, it is the EU backed by the US that sought a Special Session on Sri Lanka and tabled the resolution, thus bringing it on to the agenda.  Personally driven by David Miliband and Bernard Kouchner and carried on the wave of mass demonstrations in almost every Western capital by the Tamil Diaspora (including a self-immolation in front of the Palais de Nations), there was no possibility of  preventing it, though delay it we did. Thirdly, the comparison and contrast with New York is grossly erroneous. Sri Lanka was structurally safe in the UN Security Council, with the Russian and Chinese vetoes (and Russia and Vietnam as the rotating Chairs during the most intense weeks of the crisis), as it never was in the Human Rights Council. This is why, as an International Crisis Group report confirms, New York was never the intended pathway of the West’s move for a cessation of hostilities, while Geneva was. As UN Under Secretary-General Sha Zu Kang, China’s former Ambassador/PR in New York and Geneva, told me “they were looking for nothing less than a UN mandate, and knew it couldn’t come from the Security Council with us and the Russians there, or from the UNGA because the numbers were stacked against them; so they wanted it from Geneva. You not only deprived them of one, you gave them a negative mandate with your counter-resolution.”

What is richly ironic about this exaltation of a (professional) ‘New York model’ over a ‘Geneva model’ is that the issue of accountability entered the agenda and was conceded precisely in New York. Two successive Sri Lankan heads of Mission in New York had, during the final war, and indeed its final months, told me of the need for ‘a diplomatic endgame’ as distinct from a military one. Our current PR in New York, Dr Palitha Kohona, may recall an irate telephone call from me in May 2009 from the Serpentine bar at the UN Palais to Colombo (he was then the Secretary/MFA) to protest that we seemed to have conceded on accountability in New York, going by a communiqué issued after an ‘informal consultation’, which was being used in Geneva to put pressure on us. I told him I would not agree to anything of the sort. Dr Kohona urged me not to dissent on the record as we had to appear to be on the same page in New York, Colombo and Geneva. I am proud that when I left Geneva, I didn’t cut and run, leaving Sri Lanka dangling on an accountability hook.

Fourthly, our victory in the vote in May 2009 did not put or retain Sri Lanka on the agenda of the UN HRC; the EU driven Special Session did, but our diplomatic victory removed it from the agenda and there was no further action mandated, not even the need to report back to the Council. The return of Sri Lanka to the UN HRC agenda has therefore to be sourced in the actions or inactions – the sins of commission and omission– in the years following the success of May 2009, i.e. the post-war years.

Ironies abound in the revisionist critique of our diplomatic success in May 2009. If a 17 vote majority, is a ‘hole’, how may one describe the high-stakes, Sri Lankan bid in late 2005 at the UN in New York which failed to obtain the vote of either China or India, or to put it differently, obtained the support of neither India nor China?  Surely the support of Asia’s two major players, or at least one of them, should have been ascertained before making a move which pathetically crumbled? If ‘preventive’ diplomacy were ever needed, it was to prevent such a fiasco.

Did Sri Lanka have the option of a dignified compromise in Geneva in 2009, a compromise that could either have kept the EU resolution from being placed on the agenda or one that could have led to a consensus? As the Special Session drew near, negotiations between Sri Lanka and the EU-led West were conducted at our behest by a Quartet, comprising our main neighbours India and Pakistan, and the current and incoming Chairs of the Non Aligned Movement, Cuba and Egypt, together with Sri Lanka. This arrangement was designed to reflect the chief concentric circles constituting Sri Lanka’s identity in the world: the South Asian neighbourhood and the global South. Those negotiations included one convened by the President of the Council, the Ambassador/PR of Nigeria, Dr Martin Umohoibhi, just before the vote was taken. The stance  of the West even at those last minute backstage talks, and more clearly and publicly, the amendment moved by Germany in the Council after formal session resumed (successfully forestalled by Cuba), clearly proved the impossibility of a compromise: the EU and its allies were dogmatically insistent that any reference to ‘sovereignty’ should be deleted from the text, that UN Human Rights High Commissioner should engage in a fact-finding mission to the war zone and report to the Council within six months, and that an international accountability mechanism was imperative. It is vital to recall the larger, real-world backdrop against which the issue was being posed: that of the bitter and victorious final battles fought back home. The Quartet, the NAM and I as SL’s PR rejected such a sell out of the Sri Lankan armed forces and citizens, our hard fought and finally won victory over secessionist terrorism, and the principles of the NAM.

My critics depict our stance and strategy of May 2009 as some kind of ultra-left, lone wolf confrontationist adventurism. This defies both logic and fact. Firstly, had it been so, it could not have garnered a near-two third majority of support, from Russia to Nigeria, from India to Indonesia, from the Philippines to Uruguay, from South Africa to Brazil. Secondly, a distinguished professional of the Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry Dr Rohan Perera, whom I always kept in the loop, consulted on draft texts and was invited to crucial meetings in Geneva during those days, is witness that all our strategic and tactical decisions were taken in a collective and collegiate manner, at consultations with our coalition, including crucially, NAM and the BRICs. Not a single decision was taken outside of and other than by our ‘united front’; not a move made without consultation with and concurrence of trained, experienced and accomplished senior diplomats of a diverse array of states who were in touch with their capitals (with Russia represented by a former Deputy Foreign Minister and China by the Ambassador who would go onto be the PR currently on the Security Council). A lesson of Geneva May 2009 was Sri Lanka’s need for –and ability to—‘unite the many, defeat the few’, rally the broadest forces, construct coalitions, build alliances with those who stood for sovereignty and a multi-polar world, neutralise those vacillators in the middle, thus helping us balance off pressures on our national sovereignty from the Diaspora-driven, ‘humanitarian interventionist’ powers.

It is unsurprising though, that the revisionist critics fault me for failing to arrive at a negotiated compromise when the last example they set of successfully negotiated compromise was the post-tsunami ‘joint mechanism’ (PTOMS) of  2005 with the Tamil Tigers, leaving Hon Lakshman Kadirgamar out of the negotiating loop. This mechanism consisted of a top tier in which the legitimate Government of Sri Lanka and the Tigers were accorded equal representation and the more important middle tier in which the Tigers were conceded five seats to the elected government’s three! The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka froze the operation of the P-TOMS’ middle tier and effectively aborted that deadly act of appeasement.

It is amusing that the tactics of the Sri Lankan Geneva team of the 1980s are upheld as a model for the 2009 challenge. It was not, though the performance was skilled and competent.  In the mid–to-late ’80s in Geneva, Sri Lanka was on the defensive, through no fault of its ably led team. In a lesson that may be apposite for March 2012 and beyond, but had no relevance for 2009, the Sri Lankan team of the ’80s found itself on the opposite side of India, while the latter had many allies and proxies. In such a situation Sri Lanka had to play for a draw as it were in Geneva. The crux of the matter, which has been avoided by the revisionist critics of our performance in Geneva 2009 and 2012, is the pivotal strategic significance of India for Sri Lanka’s external relations and those policy measures needed in the ‘intermestic’ realm to retain the support of that most critical of variables. I have been an unflinchingly consistent advocate of precisely such measures, and as a student of geopolitical Realism, have held that given especially the new strategic alliances, the road to Washington lies through Delhi.

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• Geneva 2012: The signs missed, lessons unlearnt
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• Focus on Human Rights

Today in the contemporary society there is a cost for everything, from the air that we breathe to the burial of the dead. But we never question the money’s worth for what we pay. Governments come and go, rules are enacted and shelved and applied to ones choosing, babies are born, killed and one’s life is sometimes snuffed out before being born. No one questions these nor are there answers one would be obliged to provide, life goes for the survival of the fittest. Man a social animal with more animalist inclinations living in a concrete jungle called modern conurbations. This is where we are today. We know the cost of everything and value of next to nothing. So is the cost of distrust. We do not know the cost of trust hence we fail to fathom the cost of distrust.

A society built on trust is sustainable, cheap and effective and value based. As opposed to this, distrust is a negative reflection of trust and it is prohibitively expensive, it costs one’s life, social harmony and economic growth of a nation.

In Sri Lanka, cost of everything is high and shooting higher and higher, the more the society is individuated from homogeneity the more we become socially and economically unsustainable and it would undermine all the systems that support society.

Individuation and division of people into segments and groups under various pretexts is good for market forces to make profit out of such atomisations, but this produces an unsustainable society.

For a society to sustain itself, it has to be homogenous, interdependent, sharing and caring so that in return it would produce social security, social harmony, efficient resource use, productivity and peace. The kingpin of such a cohesive society is mutual trust, inter-dependence and reciprocity. This is what we were once, and then, we did not have endemic poverty, civil strife, communalism and divisions as much as we have now.

The issues of distrust in Sri Lankan society can be categorised at three levels – individual, social and political.  At the individual plane there is trust between people. The Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims in their neighbourhood have very cordial relations with each other as individuals and families. Similarly their individual business relationships and other transactions confirm inter-dependency amongst them. This is a healthy sign at the people level based on individual and family connections. Very rarely is there a rupture in their personal, private and business relations amongst them unless distrust by ones own misdemeanour spoils the relationship. Here, culture, language, race and religion have never been a dividing force and as opposed to this mutual understanding and respect and reciprocation has often strengthened the bonds across the divide. Remarkably, individuals and families hail from diverse backgrounds where mutual relationship is not inhibited by diversity, instead diversity plays a neutral role and it was humanity that binds these people together. That is why the many tourists and other foreigners call us a smiling people.

Apart from these, the commonality of the socio-economic problems that people face in general is common to all people irrespective of their diversity. Therefore, socio-economic problems of most Sri Lankans are common except where developments are driven to regions due to political power building than when it is national development centric. Therefore people, if left to themselves un-interfered by social and political leaders tend to maintain harmony and perpetuate good relationships amongst them at their plane.

For the people, ‘Distrust’ at their plane is prohibitively expensive and threatens survival. At this plane, there is no reason for distrust amongst them since everyone is fighting for their own survival and they have their own issues to look after than the issues of politics and economy which are controlled by the powerful segments of the society. Therefore, for them ‘Trust’ and mutual recognition is the way for their survival.

At the Social Plane the people are divided as communities,Sinhalese (Buddhists/ Catholics), Tamils (Hindus / Catholics) and Muslims (Consisting of many ethnicities) . Each group have their leaders who represent their communal interests in the larger fabric of society. There is a need for such leaders to genuinely represent their communities so that the interest of the community is furthered for their betterment. Like the people relationship at their plane, social and community leaders need to represent community at the higher plane to further engender social sustainability and harmony without undermining the sustainability of the other. Unfortunately, very often social and community leaders do not reflect the aspirations of the common people instead they tend to turn out to be liberators of their people and thereby carve a niche for them as another class. Then they use their liberationist thoughts about the other’s hegemony and create divisions amongst the people in order to consolidate and perpetuate their position as leaders. To justify their claim to leadership and to keep them perpetually relevant amongst their respective peoples, they invent new issues like Dambulla, Anuradhapura and similar issues so that they will have a following that gives credence to their leadership. It is this breed that spawn chauvinism in society for their private gains.

Since independence, how many social and community leaders have sacrificed their personal wealth and positions to the benefits of their communities? They are a very countable few and the rest are parasiting on their community and larger society.

The main tool that this breed of community leaders use is ‘Distrust’. They spread distrust amongst unsuspecting innocent people and create divisions among them and create a place for this special class. As was displayed in the Dambulla case, it is the silent majority that pays the price for maintaining this class of leaders. They do serious damage to the society, amongst a people who have no division, they divide and they spread mischief in a harmonious society in the name of looking after the interest of their community. This sort of leadership is a social evil that parasites on the society and does no good to the country.

This sort of leadership does not go after the social and economic ills that threaten their community or society. They are silent about the increasing number of drug addicts, alcoholism, spread of pornography, human trafficking, economic inequity, poverty, failure of health & education and social & moral degradation and the absence of social justice. Invariably they are very often found frolicking with those parties that suck the society through the aforesaid social ills and other means.

To the leaders at this level, building trust is an anathema and it threatens their survival and they are hell bent on spawning ‘Distrust’ among people in the name of culture, language, race, religion and country. Can we then expect them to build this nation as a civilised country that thrives in meritocracy and good governance?

At the political plane similar to the social plane, it was the social leadership that very often evolves as political leadership. As often, political leaders use social, religious or racial aspects as ladders to climb up the hierarchy by creating a voter base not based on intelligent policies but on divisive and chauvinistic beliefs.

Post Independence history testifies, that our political class parcelled out to people not pragmatic programmes of nation building but chauvinism, language to preclude the other, disfranchising the estate workers, removal of minority protection clause in the 1971 constitution, supposed Dharmishta Society and Dignified Peace as Unique Selling Propositions (USP)to come to power. In the process they let the country to bleed for 30years. No political groups accept responsibility for what they did to the country that destroyed the social fabric and economic infrastructure of a nation that Lee Kuan Yu once wished to emulate in the 1960s.

Even in Post War Sri Lanka, the political class is still bickering over how to consolidate power by hook or by crook than by presenting to people credible and pragmatic programmes and policies as a way forward to sustainable Sri Lanka.

The goodwill, bonds and human fraternity prevailing amongst all Sri Lankans are destroyed by the social and political leadership today. The USPs used by all these leaders is a mirage to people that they never achieved but resulted in distrust and division.

The people have built their lives around trust and understanding whereas the social and political leaders build their lives on distrust and division which percolates down the society as time goes and that is how our society has come to be so divided and vulnerable.

These point to a fact that when more and more people trust their social/communal and political leaders the people would breed distrust and get more polarised to give way for the corrupt leaders to drain the social and national resources for the betterment of the few who command.

Who gains by ‘Distrust’?

Today, spawning distrust in a society is an effective marketing tool. Spawning distrust in a harmonious society creates a paradigm shift and results in creating new market opportunities. As such, this society is bound to be conflict ridden as more and more market players would come to the scene to sell security, conflict resolution, anti-terrorism consultants and arms dealers. No doubt, Sri Lanka with all the paragons of peace active in their peaceful domains, distrust is an ever growing phenomenon and this is testified by the ever increasing defence allocation in Sri Lanka’s budget and the closeness that it is building with Israel – a country thriving in arms supply and paradoxical relationship with other countries in peace time.

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In many post-conflict contexts the idea of reconciliation dominates public discussion. This is no different in Sri Lanka. But what exactly is meant by reconciliation? As Susan Dwyer (1999) points out there has been a “global frenzy” on this topic in the post-Apartheid era with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission often held up as an exemplary model. Much of this discussion, though, lacks analytical clarity. This is a brief attempt to explore one challenge posed to the notion of reconciliation in Sri Lanka: where or how can an inclusive Sri Lankan imaginary be located? I approach this issue through the area of my disciplinary training, literature, and attempt to reflect on how literary representations in general have struggled to articulate an inclusive conception of Sri Lankaness. A pervasive historical consciousness and the dominance of realism as a genre of writing, I argue, emerge as two inter-related phenomenon that are intimately connected to this problem.

To some commentators the post-2009 era presents an opportunity to break with the past. This appears to be largely the official government desire as well. In his address to the nation, following the defeat of the LTTE, the Executive President of country made the provocative and controversial statement that minorities no longer exist in Sri Lanka. Yet post-war events in the country clearly suggest otherwise. The majoritarian imagination of the Sinhala polity along with the Tamil minority’s self-perception as a historically wronged community and Tamil nationalism’s lingering desire for separation as evidenced by the activities of some sections of the Tamil diaspora and local Tamil politicians are all part of Sri Lanka’s post-war reality. There are signs of further ethno-religious schisms as evidenced by the recent Dambulla mosque incident.

While reconciliation might be seen as a future process that builds trust and tolerance between divided communities, the term also carries strong implications of a return or restoration. However, Sri Lanka’s past, both pre- and post-independence, provides little evidence of an inclusive conception of nationhood. Other than the elite English-speaking Ceylonese identity that flourished briefly in the early twentieth century, and found political expression in the Ceylon National Congress, Sri Lankan political culture and more importantly its national cultural imaginary has always been marked by, for want of a better word, a communal and religious dynamic.

This is not to homogenize Sri Lankan history and suggest that ethno-religious divisiveness has been the norm. Indeed, it is possible to argue that as recently as pre-1956 there were better relations between communities and ethno-nationalist consciousness was not a dominant concern. For instance, in the contest for the ‘educated-Ceylonese’ seat in the 1911 Legislative Council elections the goigama Sinhalese backed a Tamil vellala caste candidate over a karava Sinhala candidate—caste concerns superseded ethnic/racial considerations. Nonetheless a space where Sri Lankaness could be evoked and experienced, as in ecumenical Gandhian nationalism in India, has been largely absent in Sri Lanka. The ‘imagined community’ of Sri Lanka, to invoke Benedict Anderson (1983), has never been fully realized.

Literature and the attempt to imagine an inclusive nation

Literary writing is often a space where the idealistic and imaginative is explored. In a number of post-1983 English language novels, writers have tried to counter contemporary ethno-nationalist polarization in the island by attempting to imagine moments of connection and collective identity. I chose here two novels: Ambalavaner Sivanandan’s iconic When Memory Dies (1997) and Yasmine Gooneratne’s The Sweet and Simple Kind (2006). Broadly similar in structure both novels look at the past and the familial domain to imagine spaces of inclusivity. Yet both texts also represent a failure of the imagination because they replicate the trajectory of the familiar narrative of Sri Lanka’s inexorable slide into ethno-nationalist conflict—the imaginative here is subsumed by the historical and the ‘real’.[1]

In When Memory Dies, a text that is unique and exemplary in the way it attempts to imagine an inclusive Sri Lankan identity, Sivanandan creatively exploits the early labor movement in colonial Ceylon to suggest a subaltern multi-cultural anti-colonial movement. The text also features a number of instances where individuals transcend ethno-religious boundaries. The young Vijay born to Sinhala parents but socialized in both Tamil and Sinhala cultures, because his Sinhala father dies before his birth and his mother subsequently marries a Tamil man, is the most iconic example of the text’s attempt to question the naturalization of ethnic identity. But like his parents inter-ethnic marriage, Vijay’s life ends in tragedy. While his mother Lali is killed by a Sinhala mob during the 1958 anti-Tamil riots Vijay who tries to act as an emissary of reconciliation between the South and North at the end of the book is executed by his own Tamil cousin, a rising figure in the northern Tamil militant movement.

Unlike When Memory Dies the Sweet and Simple Kind looks at the issue of a collective Sri Lankan identity from an elite English-speaking perspective. Gooneratne’s text suggests that it was the historic responsibility of the English-speaking elite to disseminate liberal values to society at large. Centering on the powerful Wijesinghes and their manorial residence Lucas Falls—easily identifiable as a pastiche of the Bandaranaike and Ratwatte families—the story is one of how the once liberal and British educated Wijesinghe patriarch and most of his clan succumb to expedient ethno-nationalist politics in search of political power. While the text’s historical vision and understanding of Sri Lankan history is far more limited than When Memory Dies, the narrative trajectory is similar—from the promise of an inclusive and tolerant society to one riven by ethno-nationalist divisions.

Both texts try to imagine alternatives to Sri Lanka’s current predicament by looking at the past, but the imagination falters when confronted by the ‘reality’ of the island’s present. I would argue that this is at least in part due to the realist genre. Realism is largely compelled to remain faithful to the historical record and reproduce things as they are. While a certain degree of creative license may be available the imagination can be stifled by the realist form. Its greatest strength is the very ability to generate what Rolan Barthes has called the “illusion of reality” and create believable life-worlds and this is also why the realist novel has played a central social role, especially in imagining the nation. But it is this same compulsion to be ‘real’ that limits and constrains the imagination.

If one were to contrast this with the career of the African novel in English, for instance, an immediate difference is apparent. The writing of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o or Chinual Achebe, for example in its early phase was both realist and nationalist. Both writers saw the novel as a central literary artifact in in the process of decolonization. But as African post-colonial nationalism floundered Ngugi in particular abandoned the realist genre. This is what, American philosopher of Ghanaian origin, Kwame Appiah calls the post-realist and post-nativist turn in African literature.[2] If the earlier realist literary tradition contributed to nativist thinking and the naturalization of ethno-nationalist identities, post-realism helps the imagining of alternatives. But at the same time Ngũgĩ and many other post-realist African novelists are not post-national. While they may reject the conception of nation and nationalism as inherited from the colonial experience they try to imagine it in radically different ways.

Authenticity and the realist novel

Sri Lankan Sinhala writing has also been largely dominated by the realist mode. It may come as no surprise, therefore, that Gunadasa Amarasekara, arguably one of the most important and influential contemporary novelists, is a staunch defender of realism. For Amarasekara realism equates to authenticity. In Abudassa Yugayak, first published in 1976 and later updated in 1996, Amarasekara argues that the decline the Sinhala novel, following the work of Martin Wickremasinghe, is accompanied by social decline—the Sinhala novel he argues has failed in articulating a social vision that will help the Sinhalese rediscover their authenticity and become truly decolonized. Amarasekara repeats this theme across a number of his fictional texts as well as socio-political tracts. Exploiting outdated, but unfortunately widely prevalent positivist views on Sri Lankan history Amarasekara defines this authenticity as a form of transcendent Sinhala consciousness and a righteous form of governance associated with Buddhism which has survived for millennia from pre- to post-colonial times. The work of the novelist, as Amarasekara sees it, is to explore this notion of authenticity and how it can be realized in a modern social context.

Given the close association of the novel with the nation and the nationalist imagination it is unsurprising that a nationalist thinker like Amarasekara feels the need to defend it and uses it as a site to promote nativist thinking. What this evinces though is an inability to think beyond the legacies of certain modes of colonial thinking. Just as the form of the Sri Lankan nation state is the product of colonial-modernity so it seems is the literary imagination that accompanies it. The very ethnic identities that we take for granted today were crystalized in a complex negotiation between local actors and colonial forms of knowledge, institutional practices and practices of political representation. Imagining alternatives means the ability to be able to both critically reflect on these legacies but also to think beyond and outside them. From the perspective of literature perhaps we need a post-realist turn in Sri Lanka.[3]

To return to where I began if reconciliation means some kind of return, Sri Lanka needs to critically engage with the notion how an inclusive Sri Lankan identity can be generated. This necessarily means an encounter with the past—else we may have utopian declarations such as the one that minorities no longer exist. The past might not be the best inspiration for reconciliation in Sri Lanka but it does provide a template for how the nation should not be imagined. While Sinhala nationalism’s primary failure was and continues to be its unaccomodative majoritarianism, Tamil nationalism was equally majoritarian—it imagined and fought for a mono-ethnic Tamil nation. An ethical alternative to such majoritarianism needs to emerge. While critically engaging with the past we cannot be defined by it—only then might we be freed from the ‘tyranny of reality’.

References

• Amarasekara, Gunadasa. 1976 (1996). Abudassa Yugayak [An unreal time]. Boralesgamuwa, Sri Lanka: Visidunu Publishers.
• Anderson Benedict.1983 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.
• Dwyer, Susan. 1999. “Reconciliation for realists”, Ethics & International Affairs 13(1): 81–98, March 1999.
• Gooneratne, Yasmine. 2006. The Sweet and Simple Kind. Colombo: Perera and Hussein Publishing
• Sivanandan, Ambalavaner. 1997. When Memory Dies. London: Arcadia.

• History after the War: Challenges for Post War Reconciliation (Podcast)
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• History after the War: Challenges for Post War Reconciliation
• LOOKING INTO THE ABYSS

More than 5000 people packed Colombo’s Sugathadasa stadium (photo above) for the inaugural conference of the Peratugami Samajawadi Pakshaya (Frontline Socialist Party, FSP) on April 9, 2012. Photo and description courtesy Troubled Kashmir

Reading through Groundviews especially during the recent past, one would note that most contributions were in fact raising serious concerns over the core issue of governance as it is in Sri Lanka and the regime’s ideology in finding adequate answers for socio economic ills, the system itself carries as endemic.

One could safely assume, though Groundviews exposed and writers to Groundviews condemned the most recent Dambulla incident of insulting and depriving religious rights of the Muslim people, wanting reasonable and justifiable answers from this regime, there will be none. There were no reasonable answers for and culprits dealt with, in any of the previous attacks on churches and on the Muslim shrine in Anuradhapura in September, 2011. Every single such attack on other religious places had been instigated on a call from a Buddhist monk, or they have joined the religious mob parade, in the name of Buddhism. Funnily, Buddhism can only be “owned” by the Sinhala people within this island.

It runs on that awfully dominant social psyche created for waging war, now used to keep the military intruding into civil administration and the daily life of people, not only in North and East, but elsewhere too. It is the politicising of the whole State on this intimidatory Sinhala Buddhist politics with military power, that makes LLRC Recommendations anathema to this Rajapaksa regime. This type of power cabals can not provide any decent and disciplined governance, even to the racist constituency it uses for usurping unrestricted power, extending beyond the Constitution.

Hence the dismantling and muting of all institutions responsible for law and order in the country. This regime needs it to push and straighten its muscles and its goons the way it wishes. A disciplined and a “law and order situation” would not allow Mervyns, Dumindas, Muthuhettigamas and goons to continue with a Secretary to the Defence Ministry whom the foreign media tags as “the most powerful Secretary of Defence”, though Gotabhaya Rajapaksa is the most inefficient Secretary to the defence ministry since 1948.

The media avoids discussing Gotabhaya’s performance as Secretary to Ministry of Defence, which is appalling. Beginning in January 2010 which is post war, the police web site says, 877 out of 894 abductions reported, were accepted for investigations. The first quarter of 2011 has 235 abductions reported to the police, says the police web site. The GV noted in early April that according to media reports, February and March this year (2012) witnessed 29 abductions, while during the past 06 months up to April, there had been 56 abductions reported in the media.

In such context of mass abductions, police stations are mobbed and attacked by local citizens for custodial killings. Murder, rape of women and sexual abuse of children have all gone high during this Rajapaksa regime. Police and army personnel are accused of contract killing. There is also an increasing rate of suicides and homicides in the security forces, while every year since the war was declared victoriously over, the defence budget was consistently increased, at the expense of education and health. That defines the efficiency of this Secretary to the Defence Ministry, having taken the police department too under the ministry.

There is more to this regime, as to why it should be changed. Never has a Governor of a Central Bank (CB) played politics dirty and low as the present Governor Cabral. Never had one whose business into “Pyramid schemes” investigated by the CB, been appointed as its Governor. Never had any regime before, handed over the Treasury to one who was found responsible for big time fraud and was asked to leave public service by the Supreme Court for such fraud. And never had any Supreme Court allowed such proven guilt to be pardoned over a personal appeal to allow that same culprit to assume office as before. Now the two most important positions for the country’s economic survival and growth, are left at the hands of two, whose integrity and efficiency are beyond discovery.

This is no accident and not without political reason. Massive frauds are not possible, if a regime appoints clean and principled men to key positions. It is here worth noting that no ministry would have any mega corruption issue, IF the Secretary to the Ministry, who is the Chief Accounting Officer in the ministry and under whose signature all financial transactions take place, stands on his or her own integrity and open administration. The Sri Lanka Administrative Service (SLAS) is far from moulding righteous men or women.

This country, after 64 years of unrealised independence and people’s robbed sovereignty including over 06 years of Rajapaksa rule, can not be put to right with  change of faces. Politics that decides power with mega corruption has BOUGHT OVER the whole State, justified by and continued as such with Sinhala Buddhist supremacy. The whole system of governance has now come to live as a Sinhalised corrupt system that needs total overhaul. That needs a democratic programme with a democratic leadership, not just a regime change. That’s where a decent, democratic “Left” programme could stand the test of social necessity.

Wickramasinghe, a political schemer though no public leader, seems the only Sinhala leader who understands this political dilemma. This Sri Lankan political dilemma is not in for any “Spring”, Arab or not. Not for now. For now, its the next parliamentary or presidential elections, hopefully in 2015 or 2016 if not earlier, that still holds hope for a regime change. Its for that elections the UNP leadership with Ranil Wickramasinghe (RW), is now gearing for. Its for that elections he is building bridges for a Sinhala – Tamil alliance. Wickramasinghe is hopeful, there would be a substantial Sinhala middle class drift, away from this Rajapaksa regime in the coming year or two.

He is not too far away from such possibility. The economy is turning out to be a major factor that decides allegiance of the Sinhala middle class; the academics, the professionals, public officers in districts outside Colombo and the small time service providers in urban and rural towns. RW is also well aware, the Colombo centred trade unions have turned away from supporting the Rajapaksa regime. In fact the workers go on record as the first organised sector that successfully challenged and defeated the government on the Employees’ Pension Fund Bill and on salary increase demands.

The UNP is being dragged to add the extras on to the growing slice of the disillusioned Sinhala vote, RW believes he could now muster. He believes the North – East Tamil and Muslim vote and that of the plantations, could tilt the balance in his favour. He may not be wrong as Rajapaksas are now facing mounting pressure from many fronts; international, economic and from the Indian side.

Yet what remains unanswered is, can RW and his UNP provide answers for all ills ? UNP can only talk of “corruption free” economic management. How true would such promises mean with the type of men RW could have in his cabinet ? Even if he runs with a small cabinet of ministers with “good people”, what is his development programme ? His neo liberalism, yet to be told is not what he advocated through “Regaining Sri Lanka”, is now a discarded model, worldwide. Well, yes ! The next man (or woman) bidding to head the SL government should now say where he or she stands on economic policy and social development, before asking for power.

Mitt Romney the next Republican prospect for US Presidency, accused Obama for leaning towards “Euro Socialism” in his efforts to turn around the ailing US economy. “Socialism” has already entered presidential campaign jargon. Two working papers (12/64 and 65) released by the IMF on 01 March, 2012 though not representing official IMF positions indicate, it was those few countries with strong protective labour laws that withstood global recession this time. This rubbishes the claim that SL has too rigid labour laws for growth, the cry of the second generation neo liberals.

Launching his latest book in Colombo, January this year, “Marx’s theory of Price and its modern Rivals”, the Hague based business consultant Prof. Howard Nicholas said,

The US and European Central Bank have together printed US$ 20 trillion in three years. Where is inflation? More money has been printed than was in the last 50 to 60 years in GDP terms. But you open any economic text book, what is the fundamental principle; inflation follows too much money. But where is the inflation? Neo classical economist cannot get out of this. Keynes tried to get out, but he never left a theory of price, resulting in an equally redundant theory of money. You have to come back to Marx.

He then said [quote] I became so impressed with Marx’s economics, purely as a scientific analysis of capitalists society, that I wanted to translate it into plain English. I want to butcher neo classical economics, the idealogical nonsense misleading generation after generation. Marxism does provide that alternative [unquote].

There is certainly an opening for a “Left Agenda” now. One that would propose a far reaching democratic agenda than what RW and his alliance with even the TNA could possibly offer. Serious reforms, this country needs for post war reconciliation and development. That agenda certainly would have to revert to a nationalist economy, that would guide the market on terms and conditions required for selective growth in the economy. It would not be a “free for all” economy and it would not be a “State owned and controlled” economy either.

It would be democratic to the extent, the whole development process would be within a “National Development Policy” that would go through a serious social dialogue, before achieving legal status through parliament. That national policy would define and decide the shape, size and colour of education, health, public transport, industry and agriculture for at least a 10 year period.

What is seriously more important should be, the total State Reform the “Left Agenda” has to offer, that RW and the UNP can never offer. This Sinhala State can not be changed with a few “independent commissions” though campaigned for as transitional issues against the Rajapaksa’s 18 Amendment. This centralised State would give no meaning to the 13^th  Amendment, even if it is given the colour of full implementation. It is too heavily centralised in many ways, for such implementation. This State therefore needs a complete overhaul with the abolition of the heavily centralised Executive Presidency. There can not be and will not be any worthwhile devolution of powers, even under RW, if centralised power is allowed in any form.

It is therefore important, the “Left Agenda” takes upon itself the responsibility of pushing through the proposal in the “Final Report” of the APRC, handed over to President Rajapaksa in June 2010. This proposal, though in the absence of the UNP and the TNA, brought together the widest consensus possible in the Sinhala South. It got all shades of Sinhala chauvinism to agree for power devolution within a Constitution that gives back a bi – cameral parliament, the powers now enjoyed by the Executive President. It is a new solution, the UNP and the TNA can not politically oppose. It thus could be campaigned for as the post war solution for Constitutional reform, with the strongest possible consensus among the Sinhala South, the Tamils and the Muslims.

Such far reaching changes on State Reform and economic development would not be offered by the UNP and Wickramasinghe, but in the present context, RW and the TNA can not afford to ignore such reform, if campaigned for. That provides a “Left Agenda” more space now in SL, despite the fact that there is no serious and credible “Left” political party or movement to lay claim for such an initiative.

• Tamils done with – Sinhalese to be done with
• Interview with Austin Fernando, a Peacetime Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka
• In defense of the JVP campaign to support Sarath Fonseka
• Dealing with law and order as an issue of the Presidential elections
• Hard Talk

Original photograph REUTERS/Damir Sagolj

It is always a curious and odd little matter, to witness how even Buddhists become so obsessively attached to ‘sacred’ lands and in protecting them, commit acts seemingly prompted by hatred, delusion and ill-will.

Ideally, lands should not become ‘sacred’ for simple reasons. The Buddha, in attacking the rigid and unethical caste-system during his time, placed great stress on the importance of deeds or action. That was why it was said (in the Vasala sutta) that one did not become a Brahman (or an outcast) by birth, but by deed. That wonderful message ought to have taught us a very valuable lesson, which, to rephrase the Buddha, could be stated as follows: that a land becomes a ‘sacred’ (or Buddhist) land not by anything else but only by the words and deeds of those inhabiting that land. Even a place of religious worship would lose its sacredness if, in the guise of religion, all manner of nefarious activities are carried out therein. In such cases, your virtuous neighbour’s backyard becomes more sacred than the ‘sacred’ land or place of worship.

However, these are not ideal times and ideal societies. Laws and regulations can be enacted empowering ministers and other officials to declare a particular territorial area a sacred land. And of course, this is not a practice limited to Buddhists alone. But when mob violence is seen to be propagated, as was done in Dambulla on the 20th of April – when a number of Buddhist monks and laymen stormed a mosque in Dambulla and demanded the dismantling of that mosque – we know, very well, that something is not quite right; not only in the ‘sacred’ land of Dambulla, but also in this supposedly Buddhist-country.

Dambulla mob attack: some concerns

The immediate concerns arising from the unfortunate vulgarity exhibited by some Buddhist monks and their lay followers have been already highlighted. In what was said by some of the protesting monks, there are the obvious traces of violence, racism, religious extremism and that burning desire, if necessary, to cleanse the territory concerned of the ‘other’ (the ‘other’, in this case, being the follower of the Islamic religion). How this plays out politically – domestically and internationally, both against the country and against Buddhism – is easy to understand.

But there are other concerns too.

Firstly, the demeanour of such monks – who seem to be going against some of the fundamental precepts of the Dhamma, one being indriya samvara sila (morality concerning sense-restraint), which is one form of sila or morality a monk (a bhikkhu) is expected to follow – contributes greatly to the doubt and skepticism that is generated in the minds of the lay Buddhist follower today. The sangha community (or the community of Buddhist monks) has been traditionally, and principally, looked upon as a community which guides the layman in the path of the Dhamma and morality.

And given that it is the members of this community who ultimately preach and propagate the Dhamma and since they play the principal role of the ‘guardian’ of the Dhamma in the eyes of the ordinary layman (even though the politician is seen to be playing this role too), acts as were witnessed in Dambulla can have the obvious and natural effect of generating a great sense of doubt (vicikiccha) about, and ill-will (vyapada) towards all aspects concerning Buddhism, its fundamental teachings, the community of monks, etc. Doubt and ill-will are factors hindering the path to emancipation. Doubt, of course, can be eradicated through, for example, the knowledge of the Dhamma, confidence, discussion and questioning. But the question is: can a community of monks (of the Dambulla-type) be of any assistance to the layman in this regard when what one witnesses is a community of monks engaged even in, inter alia, ‘animism’? (as Dr. Laksiri Fernando put it, in ‘The government must apologize to the Muslim community’, The Island, 30 April 2012).

Secondly, viewed from a critical legal perspective, the Dambulla incident throws up significant questions about the turn to law, by which I mean a turn towards the laws contained in statutes, ordinances and the like to resolve the Dambulla-incident. Now, resolving a dispute through the law is acceptable and if all parties agree to respect the verdict, the legal-approach naturally turns into a useful mode of dispute resolution. It will soften tensions, calm your nerves.

But this legal-turn has its weaknesses too. By reducing this entire problem to a simple legal dispute, which the law books and laws will now resolve and one which then will be left in the hands of lawyers and judges, the legal profession can also act as a smokescreen which hides or shoves under the carpet some of the underlying moral and ethical concerns relating to the Dambulla-incident. The legal profession, under these circumstances, becomes a profession of irresponsibility, if some provision or the other decides the fate of the entire controversy. Laws, law books and judgments are (as we know) towards which fingers are pointed as a convenient excuse to evade moral responsibility for one’s words and actions: ‘Look, it is not my fault; it is that law, that judgment, which says so.’ Such legal formalism hinders political discussion and the resolution of political or other social problems and controversies through greater public participation and debate. The root causes go unaddressed, and they erupt in numerous other forms and manifestations elsewhere, some other day. And one such problem that law courts don’t discuss is one which is fundamental to the recent controversy: ‘political-Buddhism’.

Buddha and the fundamental problem of ‘political-Buddhism’

The Buddha, undoubtedly, is the most influential and admirable philosophical teacher I have come across.

And, I do not view the Buddha very simply as one who had nice things to say about non-violence, peace and harmony, or as an extraordinary person who, from birth to death, carried out fantastic and unbelievable acts.

But also, thanks to the excellent work of numerous Buddhist scholars (ranging from the likes of Ven. Walpola Rahula to Prof KN Jayatillaka, but more importantly, scholars such as Prof. David J. Kalupahana, et al.) I read the Buddha more as: a philosopher who, unlike any other, stressed the importance of understanding the concept of radical impermanence which runs through all our activities and lives (a concept which is far more complex than what is narrowly and inaccurately defined as one which means that ‘all things that are born end in death’); a critic who went against the traditions of his time and valued critical reflection and inquiry at all possible times (e.g. the Kalama sutta; also note the advice given to millionaire Upali when the latter expressed willingness to follow the Buddha: ‘Of a truth, Upali, make a thorough investigation’); a brilliant social reformer who made timely use of ideas and concepts that ordinary men and women believed in, to introduce the notion of morality as a counter response to the dangerous nihilism promoted during that time by the likes of Ajita Kesakambali (e.g. the Buddha’s deft use of the concept of ‘god’ to narrate the different destinies confronting human beings, stressed in a way that makes ordinary people believe in that concept and thereby are inevitably influenced to do good to reach the world of gods, devaloka); a master linguist who developed words to bring out the nuances of meaning which were not captured in the language during his time and which still baffle the traditional Eastern and Western mind (e.g. the coining of the term paccuppanna meaning ‘arisen with a background’, which expresses the meaning that the present is conditioned by the immediate past; which was in contrast to the strict manner in which ‘time’ was categorized during the Buddha’s day as belonging to the past, present and future, a categorization which did not make allowance for the complex and nuanced connection of the past and present, for instance); and a teacher who employed similes which had an extremely sarcastic bite, to drive home a point which could be somewhat discomforting to a traditional, conservative, mind (e.g. in explaining the futility of praying for salvation and the end of suffering, the Buddha tells Vasettha that such praying is similar in effect to a man who, having approached the river desiring to get to the other bank, calls out: ‘Come here, other bank, come here!’).

But how, one may wonder, could this noble message of a profound philosophical teacher go so wrong in the hands of those preaching that teaching? The seeds lie in the very notion that the Buddha had advised his followers to be extremely mindful of: excessive attachment. From that springs all problems, and when that clashes with other ulterior objectives and motives of various groups (reasons pertaining to history, tradition, race, ethnicity, nationhood, politics, culture, ideology, etc.), Buddhism ends up being another tool in the hands of the politically-motivated. Promoting Buddhism becomes political, and in the process, Buddhism ends up being another political language.

Now, there is absolutely nothing wrong in the practice of preserving and promoting Buddhism. In fact, Buddhism should definitely be protected and promoted. What is problematic here, however, is the way in which it has been promoted and is sought to be promoted and preserved. The noble teaching of the Buddha becomes a problematic form of political-Buddhism when under the guise of promoting the teaching, various other ethnic, political and similar agendas begin to be nurtured and promoted to the detriment of those believing and following different other teachings or religions [This is perhaps the significant problem shared by those following Christianity and Islam, in particular. While all these teachings and religions are a great source of inspiration to the individual, they become extremely problematic when brought into the public realm of politics and governance where people respond differently to different teachings and faiths].

And more seriously, it is very easy and convenient for bigoted and narrow-minded followers with ulterior political motives to intentionally misinterpret and misunderstand the teachings if necessary. To take one example: in the case of Buddhism, it was once the late Ven. Soma Thero (a priest I admired, but critically) who pointed out that getting hold of the wrong end of the Dhamma could cause unimaginable disaster. For instance, wrongly interpreting the meaning of impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and no-self (anatma) could end up in promoting violence and terrorism – because if everything is impermanent, suffering and without a ‘self’, then causing harm to anyone doesn’t mean much! So, one can imagine how dangerous even these fundamental notions of Buddhism can become in the hands of those who are more interested in politicizing Buddhism.

Responding to Dambulla’s ugly political-Buddhism

It is another version of this kind of political-Buddhism that we witnessed in Dambulla, in the face of which the question arises over and over again: how should one respond to such acts and events? Three broad responses have come to be suggested during recent times. One, the need for a government-apology; two, secularism; three, citizen-initiatives condemning the acts as being not committed in their name.

One: the suggestion has been made that the government needs to apologize for what happened (as usefully made by Dr. Laksiri Fernando, et al). This argument, in general terms, lays much of the blame squarely on the government for being responsible for creating the conditions for inter-religious disharmony. A different version of this ‘government-is-the-culprit’ form of argument has been also raised by those who would not agree with some of the views expressed by the above mentioned authors. So, for instance, even Janaka Perera usefully points out that the real culprits for the present crisis are successive governments and that in the present case, the “ball is now in the government’s court” (Janaka Perera, ‘Dambulla Crisis: Who are the Real Culprits’ in Sinhale Hot News, 3 May 2012).

The suggestion, in principle, is a very valuable one. As regards the Dambulla incident, certain reports suggest that a politician is behind the instigation of the mob-attack; and if so, the government definitely should apologize. But, over-stressing the need of this demand for an apology from the government has the (unintended, but at times even intended) consequence of shifting the blame away from others who ought to be held equally responsible. The government becomes the main culprit, sometimes the only culprit, whereas others go unchecked.

Two: the above form of critique of political-Buddhism and the politicization of any religion leads to the famous argument which demands for a secular state and secular constitution. It makes perfect logic to demand so, and in principle, is a demand that one who is seriously concerned about inter-religious harmony cannot easily dismiss. But one of the nagging problems concerning the demand for secularism (through legal and constitutional means in particular) is that it often has the effect of reducing a complex problem (concerning religion) to a matter that can be addressed through law. Principally, ‘secularism’, when viewed as a term representing a particular mindset, is an immensely difficult destination to reach.

Generally, it calls for: an entire rethinking of the place of religion in life and society, its role in the matter of politics and governance, to what extent religion should be a guide in such matters, and more fundamentally, about how education of religion should be conducted from school-level upwards, etc. In the case of Sri Lanka to argue, for example, that Article 9 of the Constitution is what leads to religious fundamentalism is based on the inaccurate assumption that taking away the provision leads to a better, harmonious and peaceful society. And for the secular argument to be accepted by a majority of the people, it cannot be seen to be made by those who are rabid opponents of Buddhism and Buddhists; which, in other words, calls for a politics of persuasion which has to be undertaken from within.

Three: one of the prominent initiatives undertaken by citizens nowadays, given the advancement of information technology, is the mode of online-petitions. A very useful and important recent initiative concerning the Dambulla mob attack was undertaken in the form of a petition titled ‘Not in our name’ (see http://notinournamesl.wordpress.com). It is yet another important way of expressing the thought that the kind of violence witnessed in Dambulla is not acceptable, is condemned, and is not undertaken in our name. This is, to reiterate, not only an immensely useful form of public protest but also one which has today gained much support. It has, most usefully, generated greater awareness of the incident.

However, what is hoped in the case of such forms of protest is that one is not deluded into imagining that this form of protest could be very effective at the end of the day. While supporting such initiatives, one still needs to be quite skeptical about them. Firstly, it just could be the case that it is precisely this form of protest (online-petitions, etc) that those who instigate and promote religious extremism are comfortable with. And in a sense, the very form of online-protest carries the image of our helplessness in the face of such violence and extremism. Secondly, and perhaps more seriously, the problem with the ‘not-in-our-name’ kind of language is this: contrary to our imagination, the kind of mob attacks seen in Dambulla could be acts which are not carried out in our name in the first place. They may be acts carried out in the name of those who are anyway having very rigid and fixed views about the place of religion in politics. And given the polarization that exists in contemporary society (NGO – anti-NGO, peace activists-war mongers, anti-Buddhist – Sinhala-Buddhist, etc), it is generally understood that those who resort to such violence/silently approve of such violence (group A) and those who say such violence is not in their name (group B) are anyway not on the same page ideologically and politically. Politically, then, group B’s resistance in the present case doesn’t shock group A into adopting a markedly different attitude. In other words: group A has to be critiqued, first and foremost, from within.

Common inadequacy: where are the monks?

This then brings us to the principal question: who constitutes this group within group A? I believe this is none other than the sangha community: the community of Buddhist monks. In all of the above responses, what is essentially missing is the role of the Buddhist monk.

At the end of the day, it needs to be reiterated – not once, twice but a hundred times if necessary – that it is the community of Buddhist monks which can most effectively and significantly end this madness that is being carried out by some in the name of Buddhism. When Buddhist monks are seen to be acting in the way they did, no amount of criticism can prove effective unless those from within that community itself come forward and respond adequately. And it is this glaring absence of a critical response from the community of Buddhist monks which has been the most unfortunate absence in the overall responses that followed. It is this that all of us (especially those who are admirers of the Buddhist philosophy) must perhaps resolve to remind the monks, lay followers, and ourselves, whenever possible.

However, while not abandoning the forms of protest and critique so far adopted, it is also necessary to call for a further nuanced critique and also the adoption of a skeptical (not dismissive) approach to certain comforting arguments which are made concerning the matter of religious harmony in Sri Lanka. The two are inter-connected.

Firstly, the kind of critique necessary is not that which pins the blame entirely on a single monk: in this case, Ven Inamaluwe Sumangala. Rather, it has to be pointed out that this is a problem not limited to the attitude of Ven. Sumangala alone but could be shared by many others in the sangha community who not only directly support him but also do so indirectly, by maintaining a studied silence (and that too, in the name of ‘tolerance’!). Secondly, one needs to be somewhat more skeptical (but not dismissive) of the ‘reservoir of goodwill’ argument that we often raise (see Javed Yusuf, ‘Dambulla: A challenge for all communities’, The Sunday Times, 29 April, 2012). While one can broadly agree with the sentiment expressed, our continued reference to this sentiment could even have the indirect effect of making us utterly complacent and even irresponsible. A probing examination should remind us that while Dambulla-type incidents are somewhat rare, the Dambulla-type mindset may be a more prevalent and rooted one, given the silence of many in the ‘Buddhist-camp’.

In short, the critical intervention of monks in particular is quintessential if they are serious about protecting and preserving Buddhism (and not the grotesque and dangerous aspects of political Buddhism). This is their duty, their responsibility. And this critical intervention, to be sure, is not one which calls for the spewing of hatred and malice directed at monks by monks. Certainly not. As the monks would well know, one can condemn certain practices and policies without hatred or ill-will (ujjhana).

Therefore, before people cry out that Buddhism is too serious a problem to be left in the hands of the contemporary Buddhist monks, or that Buddhism should be protected not from politicians but from Buddhist monks, it is necessary for the monks to come out more openly and critically in expressing their views about the incidents, attitudes, policies and practices that the Dambulla-incident represents. This is also a vital task that critical Buddhist scholars (far more than laymen and women like us) should be mindful about.

Conclusion

It is the Vesak season, and one often remembers that moment which has traditionally been considered the most poignant in the story of the Buddha; the moment the Buddha passed away, the moment of parinirvana. There is great silence that envelops the moment. The Buddha, who is now physically weak, addresses the monks surrounding him and inquires whether there is any doubt in their minds about any aspect of the Dhamma. Venerable Ananda, who is deeply attached to the Buddha, musters up all courage in the face of the great and noble light that now flickers before him, and informs that he has confidence that there is not one bhikkhu gathered there with any doubt or problem. And yet, the Buddha, the ever-mindful, declares: “All conditioned states are impermanent. Strive on with diligence.”

But when witnessing the manner in which the words and teachings of the Buddha have been misused, I, perhaps like many others, tend to consider a different moment to have been the most poignant and moving in the entire life-time of the Buddha. That moment comes soon after the Buddha gains enlightenment, and just before Brahma Sahampathi invites the Buddha to preach the Dhamma.

In this moment, the Buddha, with great compassion, wonders (quite unexpectedly, to our minds) as to whether he should or should not go out into the world and preach the Dhamma. It is this moment, this picture of the contemplating Buddha, which captures that poignancy. For, it is a moment when the Buddha, now surveying the world, realizes that the decision to go out and preach the Dhamma contains enormous risks and challenges, that there are many in the world who have a lot of dust in their eyes, that they are deluded by wrong concepts, ideas and beliefs.

In other words, that moment contains the very fundamentals of the philosophy the Buddha thereafter preached: that element of radical impermanence; that blend of the good and the bad; the happiness and sadness that enwraps a single moment and event; the great opportunity that was before the Buddha on the one hand and the tremendous risks that very opportunity carried with it on the other; the incomparable message of freedom that now had to be spread, and the glaring possibility of a restriction of the freedom of others that very message of freedom, if improperly and wrongly understood, could bring to others.

It was perhaps a moment in which the Buddha saw hundreds of men and women cross the metaphorical river with the aid of the raft named the Dhamma and put an end to their suffering, while a thousand others failed, and failed miserably, and in the process, did all manner of things to the raft, the river and all around them. To strive on with diligence is what is required. And those words contain a very valuable lesson to the socially-engaged monk, in particular, who is genuinely and sincerely interested in preserving and promoting the noble teachings of the Buddha.

• A different take from the Sangha: The dhamma and religious co-existence in Sri Lanka (UPDATED)
• The transformation of Buddhism in Sri Lanka
• Not In Our Name: Against religious extremism in Sri Lanka
• Monks of War – Al-Jazeera on the JHU
• The Mind of Compassion: Buddhism and Violence

Image from WSWS

“Disappearance is far worse than death, because when a person dies, when I know that, so and so is dead, the story ends and somehow or other we close the chapter. But when a person has disappeared, it is an eternal suffering.”

                                                                         (A.Santhipali, before the LLRC at Jaffna on 12^th November 2010)

In the controversial Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation, 53 LTTE cadres who surrendered during the final days of the war in May 2009 are alleged to have been disappeared and are reported to be under the category of ‘missing’. What happened to these 53 people? Their relatives and close kith and kin say that they were last seen and heard surrendering to the Sri Lankan Army.

In the LLRC report, many family members of former LTTE cadres have complained that their husbands, wives, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters have disappeared after they surrendered to the Sri Lankan security forces. These family members still await the return of their loved ones, not knowing whether they would ever return. Below is a quotation from the LLRC report where a wife complained to the commission about the disappearance of her husband and presented the tragic story, which she is forced to deal with everyday.

“The wife of another former LTTE cadre appearing before the commission at the District Secretariat in Madu stated that on 16^th May 2009 she and her three children had come to Mullaittivu from Mullaivaikkal. Her husband had not accompanied them but had joined them on 17^th May 2009. On 18^th May 2009, in the morning, he had surrendered to the Army at Mullattivu together with some important LTTE cadres (Elamparthy, Kumaran, Ruben, Babu and Velavan). They had surrendered accompanied by Farther Francis Joseph and had been taken away in a bus. She stated that she had not heard from him since then. The Commission made inquiries regarding Farther Francis Joseph from Farther Muralitharan the Parish Priest and Assistant Administrator of Madhu Church, and he stated that Farther Francis Joseph had been a political teacher of the LTTE and people had told him that Father Francis Joseph had been in the conflict area until the end with the LTTE and was supposed to have surrendered and since then his whereabouts were unknown.”

 (Page: 111 of the LLRC in the Representations to the commission regarding alleged disappearances after surrender/arrest)  

There are 18 such complaints lodged with the LLRC with regard to the 53 disappeared LTTE cadres, who surrendered. Their whereabouts are unknown to this day. Whether they are alive or dead is unknown and presents an extremely tragic and problematic context for their families, who still hope and wait for their return. During a visit this writer paid to Jaffna last January, she was confronted by dramatist in Jaffna who narrated the sad story of many wives whose husbands have disappeared due to the war. The Jaffna dramatist whose name is Dev Annand had done research on the subject and had woven a drama based on real incidents. His words are still alive in my memory.

“In the Tamil culture the wife has to wear red kunkuman (a pottuwa) on her forehead if she is married as a custom. But if the husband is dead, they cannot wear this as a ritual. So in the case of ‘missing’ husbands, women do not know whether to wear the kunkuma or not, and they are eternally getting criticized by the elders of their community for this: because those who believe that their husbands are dead, are telling them not to wear it, while the wife’s heart that still waits for the return of her husband wears the kunkuman as hope.”

When this writer contacted the Military Spokesperson, Brigadier Ruwan Wanigasuriya, and questioned him regarding these 53 LTTE cadres who have disappeared and inquired about what actually happened to them, Wanigasuriya stated that the army has appointed a commission called the Court of Inquiry headed by a Major General and also compromises of senior officers of the army to look into the findings of the LLRC report that are directly related to the army.

“This Court of Inquiry will look into all the findings concerning the military that are in the LLRC report, and under that they will look into this issue as well and investigate into this matter. However we have records of 27 LTTE cadres who deserted while they were hospitalized for various illnesses; and 13 other LTTE cadres who suffered natural deaths. The total of 11,995 people came to be rehabilitated in May 2009. This includes LTTE carders who surrendered during war and LTTE cadres who surrendered while they were in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. From this number, 10,874 LTTE cadres have been rehabilitated and reintegrated to the society. From this lot, 655 cadres are with us at the rehabilitation centres now, and 187 are in custody at the Law Enforcement Authority for investigations due to the fact that there are evidence against them”, Wanigasuriya averred.

However, when pressed to answer about the 53 LTTE cadres that have disappeared, Wanigasuriya said that they could either belong to the 27 deserters or to the 13 LTTE cadres who suffered natural deaths and further added that the Sri Lankan army has given away all the LTTE cadres who were caught and surrendered in May 2009 (except for the 655 who are still at the rehabilitation centres) to the Prisons Department and the Sri Lankan Police Department.

During further investigations, this writer contacted the Prisons Department, Prisons Commissioner, A. Hapuarchi, who revealed that there are 500-600 LTTE cadres in the prisons of Jaffna, Vavuniya, Anuradapura, Magazine, Colombo, Bogambara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Negambo arrested under remand warrants. However, when this writer contacted the Police Spokesman Ajith Rohana regarding this matter he refused to comment saying that it is up to the Ministry of Defence.

Nevertheless, though the authorities keep passing the buck to each other (amidst themselves), the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) spokesman and Jaffna District parliamentarian, Suresh Premachandran, stated that the Sri Lankan army was not only culpable for these 53 lives, but also for the hundreds of other who have disappeared without a trace in this country.

“The army is answerable for this. And it is not just 53, about 200 LTTE cadres surrendered to the army with Father Francis Joseph on that instance. And since then, up to today, no one knows anything about the whereabouts of those surrenders’.  No one knows what happened to them and whether they are alive or dead still remains a question mark. The families of these people have not heard from them since. So the families have lost all communications with these surrendered LTTE cadres”, Premachandran added.

Speaking further Premachandran also revealed that in Menik Farm (after 2009) the army had taken away hundreds of boys and girls; and since then the relatives of these youths have not heard anything about their whereabouts. “They have gone missing. One of our TNA members has a list of more than 500 missing personalities who have disappeared from the Menik Farm”, Premachandran stated.

The LLRC report earned different kinds of reactions from the public. Ironically, even the people who were in disfavour of this report at first (and criticized the LLRC while declaring that it is partial) are now urging the government to implement the report as the government has accepted it. One such political activist is Dr. Vikramabahu Karunaratne. When questioned about the 53 individuals who are noted in the LLRC as ‘missing’ while they were in the custody and protection of the army, Karunaratne stated, “This has to be investigated and reported and action should be taken about this by the government.  We heard of many similar situations where LTTE political prisoners have disappeared after they were taken into custody. The government is saying that they are rehabilitating, but they never tell us about where these rehabilitation centres are situated, or how many LTTE cadres are within their custody. And when the TNA MPs tried to visit these rehabilitation camps, the government denied access and did not allow them to visit the rehabilitation camps”.

Speaking further Karunaratne added that the process of rehabilitation is not indicated by the security forces or the government and further revealed that people have disappeared during the process of rehabilitation itself in Sri Lanka.

“We have received many reports from ex-LTTE cadres declaring that many carders disappeared during the process of rehabilitation and did not come out with them (once they were released)”, Karunaratne stated.

How does civil society respond to the disappearance of these 53 LTTE cadres? This writer spoke to a human rights activist who was closely monitoring violations of human rights in Sri Lanka during the time of the war. The activist spoke to this writer under terms of anonymity, and when questioned about these disappeared LTTE cadres and asked about what could have exactly happened to them, the activist revealed that they could either be killed, held in detention centres, or used as informants.

“Whether they are killed, held in detention centres or used as informants: either way it is illegal and wrong. Their family members should be allowed to see them. If they have done something wrong, then they should be legally charged,” he said.

Speaking further about the disappearance of the 53 individuals, this human rights activist stated, “Thousands of people have seen these people surrendering to the army with Father Francis Joseph. And therefore the army cannot deny it. Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission should question the Brigade Commander in Wattvakal in Mullaitivu as it is during his presence that most of these disappearances took place, and the documents about these arrests and surrenders that are with the military should be taken into careful consideration by the Human Rights Commission. According to the 3596 who have complained, 1018 people have surrendered and disappeared. This shows that the government is not willing to peruse the matter. How can there be any reconciliation without getting to know what has actually happened to these people? There is no point in building roads and monuments without actually finding out what happened to these thousands of people who have disappeared”.

It is not clear how many LTTE cadres who surrendered have disappeared today. The LLRC report says that it is only 53, but in reality whether it is more or less than this figure, the fact remains that many people disappeared during the time of the war. And they still keep disappearing. And every time someone disappears, somewhere, in some corner of this country, someone cries and waits for the return of that person who forgot to bid goodbye.

• Students Missing In Jaffna
• Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas: Five years after disappearance, where are they and what has happened to the investigation?
• Translation of Tamil newspaper reports on the Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation Commission hearings held in Killinochchi and Mullaitivu
• THE LLRC AND COMPLAINTS OF DISAPPEARANCES OF PERSONS
• Closer Look At Operation To Capture Thoppigala

When going through the album, make sure to read the captions.

• Groundviews on Twitter and Facebook
• Launch of Groundviews Facebook Fan Page
• Fake video and lies: The strange case of Dambulla’s Inamaluwe Sumangala thero
• Like Slaves In Jaffna
• A different take from the Sangha: The dhamma and religious co-existence in Sri Lanka (UPDATED)

A week ago, we disgraced ourselves. Racist louts, some in the garb of Buddhist monks, engaged openly in speech and behaviour so violent, even those who led it were forced to suggest later the footage broadcast on TV and now globally viewed on YouTube was doctored.

This was, of course, not the case.

Sri Lanka’s tryst with militant Buddhism is not new. It is the fundamental basis of the JHU, which is today deeply embedded in government. As much as the telegenics of last week’s outrageous violence shocked many, it is this very behaviour that most temple-going Buddhists in Sri Lanka have nurtured over decades, and continue to unquestioningly venerate when they support, through silence, word or deed, this violence.

Much remains to be said by the President, government and media on Dambulla. Not so long ago, a journalist – J.S. Tissainayagam – was jailed, tortured and humiliated for writing the government thought incited communal hatred. No such action will even be contemplated against the Mahanayaka of the Rangiri Dambulu chapter Inamaluwe Sumangala thero.  The Ven. Thero joins the ranks of good Buddhists like Mervyn Silva, openly protected, supported and championed by the Rajapaksa regime. Sadly, it is not over Dambulla’s priapic priests that we must be most ashamed about, but our President, his family and government.

There is some hope. On Thursday, fearing more violence, I created a simple blog for people to register their opposition to the soi-disant Buddhism on display in Dambulla. The responses, available online, are a humbling counterfoil to a saffron rage, and showcase a Sri Lanka that’s extremely diverse and refreshingly different. Excerpts from a few I reproduce below. There are literally hundreds more online.

Read them, and I urge you, add to them.

I am Mohamed Niyas, a Sri Lankan Muslim, professionally a Teacher. I respect all religions and beliefs in this country and teach the same to all my students of all ethnic groups. I was shocked how can the monks who always preach saamaya, maithriya, karunaawa like great philosophies could lead such a racist mob in Dambulla. I feel relieved to know many of Buddhist people in Sri Lanka condemned this violence.

fahima7s: This is the first time the violence towards other faiths has been filmed so vividly. Many churches and kovils have also been bombed and burnt in the past. What do these Buddhist monks want? Don’t they know that our culture is enriched with other faiths? We have already lost a lot of our Burghers and Tamils and we are impoverished by it. Even if we build highways and prosper economically, we will still be poor. Cannot Buddhism flourish without the Buddhist monks protecting it?

Iranganie H. Fernando: Have these perpetrators of this incident of shameful violence learnt nothing from the terrible experiences of the past 30 years? All religions teach love & compassion to all beings and respect for each other… there must be action & strategies to prevent such abominable behaviour. I am a 73-year-old woman who grew up in a mainly peaceful society in pre & post independent Sri Lanka… Certainly these horrific acts of violence are not in my name!

Maithri: During the war, the government tried to show the world and the country that SL is a nation of cultural and religious diversity. And I believed in it, and to an extent that is still true. But this whole thing has just gone to show that the government don’t care about that unless it is in their own interest. Shameful behaviour from them, and members of the sangha who should really know better.

My name is Chhimi Tenduf-La. I am not Sri Lankan but I am embarrassed. I am proud to live in this amazing country and, for the most part, I think you would be hard pressed to find nicer people than Sri Lankans anywhere in the world. Most foreigners would say this (except, to be honest, when driving). The actions of this mob, and the official response which as good as sanctioned it, is very sad indeed. We can only be proud of the brave woman in the video who stood up to these bullies. She is a Sri Lankan. Not really sure what the other people are.

David Blacker: Some of us fought, killed, died, were crippled, and watched our friends die beside us so that this country would remain united and free. We did not do it so that another bunch of violent extremists could divide our country again in the name of religion; nor for you, the government, to support it.

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Published first in the print edition of The Nation, 29 April 2012.

• Not In Our Name: Against religious extremism in Sri Lanka
• Monks of War – Al-Jazeera on the JHU
• A different take from the Sangha: The dhamma and religious co-existence in Sri Lanka (UPDATED)
• Fake video and lies: The strange case of Dambulla’s Inamaluwe Sumangala thero
• The Mind of Compassion: Buddhism and Violence

Photo courtesy Vikalpa

The outcome in Geneva last year (March 2011) of the voting on Sri Lanka’s conduct of the war and related human rights record was very clearly in favour of the Sri Lankan government. The line up in the voting and the scale of the majority were such that is appeared that this year too the outcome would be similar, despite some recent wavering by India. But the conduct of the Sri Lankan government in the mean time was so counter- productive that it precipitated the debacle of March 2012. We should have anticipated the disaster but it seems to have taken the Sri Lankan government by surprise.

If the Sri Lankan government had learnt at least the main lessons that it had opportunities to learn in recent years, the voting would have been very different – perhaps even more favourable to the Sri Lankan government than last year. Apart from mindlessly deflecting votes that could have come our way, we alienated many countries and many institutions. Our people will pay the economic price for such aimlessly alienation in the years to come.  Even after the event the Sri Lankan government went on proclaiming the vote as a defeat for Sri Lanka, rubbing salt on its own wounds, and needlessly dragging down the population who were never consulted on this issue.

No two situations are identical but we can learn much from the success or failure of other governments and leaders in crisis situations elsewhere. For example, the impending passage of the historic Voting Rights Bill of 1965 in the USA was in serious crisis but President Johnson and Martin Luther King jointly overcame that crisis. I recommend to those interested in strategic leadership, Ronald A. Heifetz’s “Leadership without Easy Answers” (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass; London, England, 1994;), especially chapter 6 titled, “On a Razor’s Edge”. In this chapter he particularly deals with Johnson “Leading with Authority” and also with King “Leading without Authority”. In other chapters he deals with other leaders such as Gandhi who very successfully and astutely “Led without Authority”.

The unlikely partners and heroes of the passage of the U.S. Voting Rights Act were Martin Luther King and L. B. Johnson. King was handicapped by at least one serious moral failing. Moreover, Kings support base in the USA were mostly voteless Blacks, numbering about 10 percent of the total population, unlike Gandhi in India and Mandela in South Africa who had the backing of massive majorities in those countries and whose triumphs were inevitable in due course. The outcome of the Voting Rights Act remained very doubtful till King and Johnson made it happen against massive odds. It needs to be noted that Johnson entered the US Congress as a Texas based White racist in 1937. As set out by Heifetz: “For nearly 20 years he had voted against every civil rights bill before Congress – laws to end the poll tax, segregation in the armed services, and lynching”.

Johnson gradually modified his political stands thereafter as the Civil Rights Movement advanced, and he began to entertain ambitions for higher office. In the 1960 Presidential election, John F. Kennedy, reputed to be a Northern liberal, picked Johnson as his running mate to provide political and regional balance to his candidacy. President Kennedy initiated the Civil Rights Act, inclusive of a strong Voting Rights Clause, but his Vice President Johnson was not very enthusiastic. The draft Act got diluted and the Voting Rights Clause dropped altogether before the Act was finalized. In the mean time Kennedy was assassinated in 1964 and Johnson became President. Johnson took a political decision to stick to Kennedy’s policies. Accordingly, he successfully steered through the Civil Rights Act but without the Voting Rights Clause.

The Civil Rights Act helped to desegregate and gave Blacks access to jobs and other forms of economic advance but it was the Voting Rights Clause that was vital for political empowerment. Blacks all over USA, led by King and others, continued to demonstrate and insist on voting rights. The town of Selma was one of many flash points. Selma had more Blacks than Whites but even as late as March 1965, only 3 percent of the registered voters were Black. The rest of the Blacks were excluded in one way or other, e.g. by requiring them to pass literacy tests that virtually no one could pass. Blacks organized protests but Governor Wallace ensured that they remained largely vote less. Demonstrations by Black men, women and children were put down very brutally by the State police. TV crews filmed these scenes which were telecast into homes throughout the USA. Horrified Americans urged Johnson to intervene, but he held back.

There were marches into and sit-ins at the White House by civil rights activists but Johnson continued to hold back. There has been, from the times of the civil war, a long history of opposition to federal intervention into the affairs of the states. Johnson did not want to rouse such feelings prematurely till pressure to intervene became irresistible. He knew that the Voting Rights Act was needed but also that for most liberal Whites, especially in the South, the issue of voting rights for Blacks was of low priority. Privately, Johnson encouraged King to mount protests; both knew that these would provoke violent suppression and even killings, but this was a price that needed to be paid. They were using the media to mould White public opinion to accept Federal intervention and an effective Voting Rights Act, and also to promote national unity. In contrast, the media in Sri Lanka seem to be used by the state to obstruct progress towards settling the National Question.

Civil rights activist became very critical of Johnson for failing to intervene. King continued with his protests, but Johnson continued to hold back. At one point King escalated the protest by convening a Clergy March, inviting those in religious orders all over the USA, men and women, to join in a 50 miles march from Selma to the state capital, Montgomery. Anticipating violent intervention by the state police, King appealed to the Federal Court to restrain the state police; instead the Federal Court ordered that the march be postponed indefinitely till adequate protection could be assured. This created a crisis, and Johnson sent an emissary to work out a compromise. That compromise was to march to the bridge near the end of the town of Selma, pray on the bridge, and then turn back. King reluctantly agreed but insisted that the march would resume later. In the event two of the protesters were killed, a Black youth shot by state troopers before the march, and a White clergyman brutally beaten to death after the march. When the marchers reached the bridge, as agreed, they stopped and prayed. When they opened their eyes after prayers, the state troops had moved away, virtually inviting the marchers to continue to Montgomery, defying the Federal court order. This was a trap but King did not fall into it. The marchers turned back as agreed but promising to march again all the way to Montgomery on another day.

The pressure on Johnson to intervene kept mounting but he continued to hold back. He was waiting for that pressure to build up to a level that would overwhelm any massive negative reaction to federal intervention. He knew that if he acted prematurely, Wallace would effectively mobilize Southern White reaction to it. But he also knew that widespread violence against Blacks, men, women and children, and against other peaceful protesters, graphically telecast frequently throughout the USA, was hurting the  political prospects of Wallace,who could not hold out much longer. As Johnson anticipated, within a few days of the Clergy March, Wallace asked to see Johnson to request federal intervention to maintain law and order. That meeting and request were promptly agreed to, and the meeting was immediately followed up by a Press Conference convened by Johnson at which he announced, in Wallace’s presence, that the Governor had requested Federal intervention but that Johnson would ensure that the intervention was the minimum necessary to maintain law and order. In one stroke Wallace was defanged and the way cleared for Federal intervention.

The back of the opposition to the Voting Rights Act had been broken, bringing much credit to Johnson. He wasted no time in asking for and receiving an invitation to address a joint meeting of the Congress. In his inspired and historic speech at that meeting he took the moral high ground and urged the Congress, this time very receptive, to quickly pass the Voting Rights Bill that he was introducing. The Voting Rights Act came into law on 6^th August 1995.

Compared to the obstacles that Johnson has to overcome, the problems of President Rajapakse relating to the Geneva resolution are mostly minimal. Within the island his political support base has been unassailable. He has much to gain and very little to lose by implementing the LLRC report, by fully implementing the Constitution (including the 13^th Amendment), by resolving the National Question to the satisfaction of the Tamils and Muslims, by imposing discipline among the unruly members among his followers, and by maintaining law and order. In fact this is what many leaders within his party and almost the entirety of the domestic opposition and the international community have been asking him to do. Accounting for those taken into custody and investigating allegations of unlawful activity (including assassinations, torture, rape and extortion) on the part of the armed forces and para-militia would be more problematic, but if he undertakes to act accordingly and sets about it step by step, his standing, internal and external, will rise except among some fringe elements within the island and among the Diaspora. Those fringe elements will only discredit themselves President Rajapakse surely understands this. It is investigating the past that may be problematic, not the resolution of the political problems referred to in the Resolution. Perhaps some of these political problems are internal to himself, located in a blind spot in his politics, just as President Johnson at one time had problems with several civil rights issues in his political vision. Johnson’s political ambition helped him to progressively shed those inhibitions relating to civil rights issues such as segregation, affirmative action, voting rights for Blacks, etc. For Johnson the residual blind spot was the Vietnam war and it was that blind spot that ultimately ended his political career.

What can the Sri Lankan government learn from the Voting Rights crisis in the USA? As soon as Johnson had decided that he wanted an effective Voting Rights Act, he went on to work out, with King’s backing, appropriate strategies to eliminate or reduce the divergence between that objective and the positions taken by key opponents such as Governor Wallace and Senate Republican Leader Everett Dirkson. Both Johnson and King avoided hurling abuse at those holding different views, as that would invariably be counter- productive. Johnson was a master strategist who kept his eyes constantly on his ultimate objective (a strong Voting Rights Act), refusing to be diverted by the success or failure of intermediate objectives (such as political demonstrations) or by those who crossed his path. That he was a Southern White with a racist past may have helped him to understand and overcome the opposition from that quarter. President Rajapakse too, given his Southern roots and empathy with Southern hard liners, should not find it difficult, if he is so inclined, to overcome opposition to the implementation of the LLRC report and the Constitution (inclusive of the 13^th Amendment in full) , to deal with Sinhalese,Tamil and Muslim communities to clear the way for national reconciliation, and to enforce discipline and law and order.

There is truth in the charges that some of the Western countries have double standards on war crimes but it is also true that some of those countries helped Sri Lanka very substantially to secure international condemnation and isolation of the LTTE, and to win the war. Moreover these charges have little to do with the political issues at the heart of the proceedings in Geneva. A problem with charges of “double standards” and “bullying” is that these will bring ill consequences that will soon hit us. Indeed they have already begun to do so. Unfortunately it is the Sri Lankan people, not the Sri Lankan government, who will be hit. If we are serious about those allegations, are we willing to formulate and present a resolution charging some of the western powers with war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan? I suspect that we would find it very difficult to find co-sponsors for such a resolution. If so, such a resolution will be a non starter and cannot be part of a viable strategy.

Our major handicap is that we seem to have no clear objective. Are we committed to 13 A+ (as Sri Lanka government has frequently proclaimed) or 13 A- (as also frequently proclaimed in respect of police and land powers) or in negotiating a settlement with Tamils and Muslims, or in implementing all of the LLRC report or some of it or none of it? To be credible, such commitment needs to be detailed and contained within specified times frames. The fact that the Interim Report of the LLRC has not been implemented, a complaint detailed in the LLRC report itself, throws doubt on the commitment of the Sri Lankan government. If we do not spell out credible time-bound commitments and make adequate progress within the intervening months, the outcome in March 2013 could be worse than in March 2012. The charges of “double standards” and “bullying” make have helped to gain some Asian votes in Geneva but had less success with African and Latin American governments. But we do over the next few months will determine how the voting will work out next time. If we take the steps referred to above and meet the issues outlined in the Geneva resolution, that could be the core of a winning strategy. We need to engage with all key actors, internal and external, friendly and not so friendly. Perhaps we could even co-sponsor a resolution with India, the West, Japan, China, Russia and other countries and get it unanimously passed at the next meeting in Geneva. But for that to happen many changes internal to the Sri Lankan government are needed and much works need to be done at home and abroad. If it happens, it could helped to transform the future of our Island and our people.

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This paper reflect the views of the author, Devanesan Nesiah, and not those of any of the institutions that he has been associated with.

• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• Sri Lanka and the UNHRC: Implications for India and for Human Rights
• Messiah
• Counter-productive propaganda and human rights in Sri Lanka
• The Offer from a Sri Lankan Tamil Man

The author demonstrating in Colombo against white van abductions. Photo courtesy Vikalpa. 

In a country that has achieved so much in literacy, education and social development, is it not indeed unfortunate that “White Van” has frightened the entire nation? Appearance of a white van assures a disappearance of some one.  If you Google or do any other internet search  (or any media that is not controlled by the Government) on Sri Lanka, “White Van” resembles the Defence Authorities of our country.  Are we not ashamed of it?

“White van operation” is the most used mode of enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka at present. Enforced disappearance violates a range of human rights including  the right to security and dignity of a person, right to a legal personality, humane conditions of detention, right to fair trial, right to a family life and when killed, the right to life. The disappeared person is often tortured and in constant fear for life, removed from the protection of the law, deprived of all their rights and is at the mercy of the captors. Do you respect these rights seriously?  What would you do if you or a family member experiences abduction?
Disappearances are not new to Sri Lankan post-independence history. Between 1970’s and now, there were several insurgencies in the country and most of the disappearances were observed during those insurgencies. The present trend, however, is different. At present, there is neither an insurgency nor an emergency in the country,  but disappearances do take place.  Under whatever the circumstances, there is no legal, social or any other justification to forcefully abduct a person and destroy him/her.  In this article I attempt to analyze a few key governance issues revolving around the “white van culture” in Sri Lanka.

Present trend of abductions

A cursory glance at the recent abductions are mainly twofold; firstly, abductions of “criminals” (as the government called them) and secondly, abductions of dissenting voices. Let me deal with them briefly in order.

In recent years, several hundreds of suspects who had been lawfully taken into custody in the South were later found dead. In explaining these deaths, the police had an identical version on each one of them that those suspects were taken to a place to recover “weapons” where the suspect suddenly tried to grab a gun from a police officer and that the police had to shoot the suspect in self-defence! We all know that when hardcore criminal suspects are taken out, they are always handcuffed and guarded by officers who can physically handle him. In my view, this utter falsehood of “attempt to escape” can sustain only in a country where there is a total breakdown of internal supervision of police action.   It also suggests that government has a policy to destroy “suspects” without following a judicial process. The danger is not just that; rather the judicial organ of the State becomes irrelevant for serious criminal offences, because the Executive handles them on their whims and fancies.

That concerns lawfully arrested “suspects”. What about the others? Abductions of criminals and destroying them came in when the cell deaths in police custody became too much to be explained; or when political authorities preferred a sophisticated method of dealing with “identified individuals” without being answerable to anyone. For this to happen, there needs to be a trustworthy special group or groups of law enforcement officers who are assured of total impunity.  Secret detention places are also needed. Judicial experience all over the world shows that highest officers of the defence authorities must be either directly involved in such abduction operations or must approve the exercise directly.

The second category of abduction is to destroy the “Dissenting Voices” (who democratically challenge the government). While there are many examples, the recent trend started with the abduction of certain journalists. In particular, the abduction of Poddala Jayantha gave enough evidence of the motive of the abduction – non-criminal but he was a powerful dissenting voice in Sri Lanka, who organized the media against suppression. Like other similar abductions, the government did not honestly investigate into the incident; rather used state propaganda to discredit Jayantha. A man who wanted to stay in Sri Lanka was thus forced to live in exile.

Many dissenting voices faced white van abductions more recently and the list is not short by any means. Recently, two activists (named Kugan and Lalith)  working against abductions were abducted in Jaffna on 9^th  December 2011 –while they were organizing events to celebrate Human Rights Day the following day in Jaffna.  Media Minister Keheliya Rambukwella admitted that the two persons were in custody but did not disclose where they were detained. Now the law enforcement authorities are denying the arrest!    Then came the abduction of Kumar Gunaratnam and Dimutu Attygalle.  All these four persons belong to a JVP breakaway group now called the “Frontline Socialist Party”. Even though the track record of the JVP, particularly during the 1989-90 period is undoubtedly atrocious, the JVP came to the democratic political main stream – just like many other armed groups. Then emerged the JVP breakaway group, challenging the undemocratic moves of the regime somewhat effectively, compared to other opposition parties. There is no doubt that the government is jittery about any powerful opposition challenging the government’s credibility, particularly when a group of past JVP activists were involved.  However, that cannot justify abductions of unarmed political activists. If they have violated the law of the land, then the government has the full lawful authority to deal with them according to the law.

Whose White Vans are They?

I shall begin with the efficiency of the law enforcement authorities of the country.  As a practicing lawyer for nearly 25 years, I can assure the readers that our intelligent services and police investigators are capable of busting any major crime in the country, if there is no political interference.  I cannot recall a single case of “NORMAL” abductions which were not solved. Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities have successfully dealt with crimes from well planned murders to crime networks beyond territorial jurisdiction.  However, law enforcement authorities have failed to solve a single “White Van” abduction. Why? The capacity/ability is one thing and  integrity is something totally different.

The three prominent recent White Van episodes give us an indication as to who is presently capable of doing these. Kolonnawa UC Chairman (unsuccessful), Kumar Gunaratnam (successful but released) and Methias Chandrapalan, abducted from the judicial custody (whereabouts not known yet) are the three examples.

Kolonnawa UC Chairman’s brother was first abducted and he went missing. Then a White Van group came to abduct the UC Chairman himself. The assailants (in plain clothes) were apprehended and handed over to the police. It was later revealed that they were from the defence establishment. Their identities were established and even published in the media. But nothing happened! Government first said that the group (white van operators) was from the military engaging in an operation to arrest army deserters. As far as I am aware, arrests of deserters are made ONLY by uniformed Military Police officers with police assistance. There was no genuine investigation into this incident and what the media reported later was that a senior DIG “rescued” the white van crowd at midnight from the police. If so, why did a DIG get involved in rescuing a set of criminals who committed or were attempting to commit a crime? In an interesting coincident, the Officer in charge of the police station was transferred!

Judicial history of our country has not seen an abduction of a suspect in the custody of the jail guards (while walking from one court to the other). Chandrapalan, a suspect in a drug case, was abducted at gun point by a white van group in the presence of lawyers and the relatives of the suspect.   This happened around 12 noon in the main court complex, which is known for good security arrangements and where all movements are closely monitored. No serious investigations took place on this. Who can abduct a person from judicial custody in Sri Lanka? Answers are probably not difficult but public do not want to openly give an answer in fear of white van reprisal.

Take the abduction of Kumar Gunaratnam and Dimutu Arttygalle. This raised a series of contradictions of the government’s version. They went missing on 6^th April 2012 and were released “through police” on 10^th April.  The most interesting announcement came on 10^th early hours from the Police spokesman who said on TV that “a person called Noel Mudalige believed to be JVP dissident Kumar Gunaratnam, had  surrendered to the Dematagoda CCD police station last night and requested to go to Australia and the government has made arrangement to send him to Australia and he is awaiting departure at the Bandaranaike International airport.”  If the version of the police is true, any foreigner who wants to return to his/her own country can go to a police station when an air ticket will be bought at government expense and he/she will be sent! Brilliant! Is the government expecting us to believe this? Here again we cannot see (or expect) any reasonable investigation. Later, the Police spokesman said that they are conducting further investigations to “contradict the position of the JVP breakaway group and tell the country the correct position.” This is more serious than the offence itself. What motivates a police investigation – to solve the crime or to white wash a government?

We have seen the government alleging “international conspiracy” whenever they cannot explain their questionable actions and that is generally a good indication to measure the government’s involvement. See what the Acting Minister of Media said on this occasion:

“Certain people are tarnishing the country’s image by leveling false and baseless allegations against the government in connection with the abduction of two members of the newly formed Frontline Socialist Party… The intention of such fabrications is to denigrate the state in the eyes of the world and to inconvenience it”.

The conduct of a criminal (after committing a crime) is a relevant fact that is useful to see the complicity of the suspect to a crime. Let us keep this simple test in mind here and consider the government as a suspect.  In all these white van abductions, there is identical response from the government. Initially it is denied. Then say the police are investigating into the matter. This is followed by the government propaganda team (both in state media, private media and sponsored journalists) discrediting the “abductees”, while diverting attention from the crime of abduction. Then we see police getting involved in an unusual exercise of finding evidence to “contradict” (that there had been in fact an abduction). Finally, someone comes out with a theory of “conspiracy” without any real material to justify such an allegation.  In the absence of a genuine and transparent investigation into the abductions, let me pose the question to the reader; do not these facts   suggest the complicity of the government?

Some Common Features from Notorious Countries

Sri Lanka is not the only country that grapples with the menace of abductions. Motive for abductions may vary depending on the group of abductors.  In many notorious countries, there are “enforced abductions” for religious conversions, extortions, conscriptions, rivalries and so on. But here I discuss only the abductions involving state authorities. In countries where the state officials are involved in enforced disappearances, there are some common features. The case studies on abductions from those countries give an indication of at least following six features:

1. The state institutions (including parliament and judiciary) are generally corrupt and not at all poised to deal with the crime of disappearances/abductions. In fact, the law enforcement agencies do not believe that abduction is a crime.  Abduction network is protected by the political/military leadership.
2. The government with or without its para-military arms run a series of secret detention places, outside the legal scrutiny.  In many instances, the military give them physical security.
3. The police, military and supervision bodies are under one single authority and they are generally linked to the political Head of the State. They do not have any resource constrains for criminal operations.
4. Though the disappearance operations are well planned under an organized state authority, it often goes out of control. Thus, there may be some abduction that is not authorized by political or military leadership.
5. Abductions can sustain only where impunity is guaranteed and therefore, abductors are fully satisfied of the track record of the political leadership in guaranteeing “impunity” to them.
6. Even the notorious regimes do not want exposures on abductions. Whenever evidence emerges of the government’s involvement, they usually eliminate possible critiques. Or else, it would brand the critiques as “traitors conspiring against the country”. Usually, those regimes have strong propaganda machinery and sophisticated intelligent network to identify and discredit those “traitors”.

Testing the White Van with Governance Tools

Whether Sri Lanka has above common features is a matter for the reader to decide but let us look at our own experience with White Vans.

It is not difficult to understand that among the core of the problems of many serious issues in any country lie bad-governance structures. In my view, white van abductions can sustain only in an environment of bad governance. In that context, let me endeavor to demonstrate at least 5 possible reasons, why “White Van” operations do exist in Sri Lanka unabated.

Firstly; the lack of accountability of the law enforcement agencies. All public institutions, inducing the Defense Ministry, are run on public finance and are therefore, accountable to the public.  Who are our law enforcement agencies accountable to – public, politicians or “unknown”? The cardinal principle of governance requires law enforcement agencies to be truthful and honest in their dealings. They should only by guided by the law of the land. We all know today that any investigation can be manipulated by the political masters. Impunity is thus institutionalized! Arguably, the law enforcement agencies seem to be only accountable to the political masters and not to the public. There is further confusion as to who a law enforcement authority is, when the police and military are under one and single Minister (President) and Secretary.  Thus there is no check on each other. When there is a confusion of the functions, there cannot be effective accountability.

Secondly; lack of legislative supervision over the Executive.  I hold the view that the Sri Lankan Parliament today is an ornamental institution, without sufficient capacity or  willingness to respect/protect human rights. There is no Parliamentary Committee on human rights nor are there debates on human rights status of the country.  The opposition is confused and one often wonders whether an opposition member is a government member or not. Contrary to acceptable parliamentary norms, almost all Parliamentary Committees including COPE and COPA are headed by Ministers.  Minister in charge of  Defence is the President. Total Defence budget is not subjected to review by Parliament or its Committees. The secret expenditure of the military are even exempted from the Auditor General’s review (See Financial Regulation 237D). In fact, if the President and the Minister of Finance jointly state that they are satisfied with “any necessary expenditure on services of a confidential nature (the particulars of which cannot be divulged)”, the Auditor General cannot audit such accounts. When the President, Minister of Defence and the Minister of Finance are one and the same person, this exercise becomes a gross conflict of interest; thus no one will ever know how defence expenditure is spent.   This can lead to large scale abuse of defence expenditure.  On top of it, Urban Development is also part of the Defence Ministry! This total mystification is a breathing ground for cover up any criminal operation of the law enforcement authorities.

Thirdly – Lack of transparency in governmental actions. Sri Lanka does not recognize freedom of information and in fact, the disclosure of information might attract disciplinary actions against public officials under the Establishment Code. The provision of confidentiality has been used as a tool of oppression and as a main source of corruption, for many decades. It is because of this secrecy that the governments can misbehave and cover up.  This has been so serious that the officials, let alone the citizens, are unaware of the secret decisions taken by higher officers.  Do the public officials have backbones to legitimately question fellow officials or superiors on integrity issues of the institutions today? Since the 1972 Constitution we have seen the decay of independence and integrity of the public service but the present period is undoubtedly the worst. This caters to a wonderful opportunity to “work secret plans for the political masters”.

Fourthly- the weak Opposition is a contributory factor. As opposed to this period (where even the role of the Opposition is distorted), in early part of 1990, the then Opposition took major steps to prevent abductions, whilst an insurgency was on. One move then was to work closely with the UN Agencies to hold Sri Lanka accountable under the international human rights law. The best possible example was the actions effectively performed by the then Opposition MPs, particularly Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa. Once, Mr. Rajapasa was even arrested at the airport on his way to Geneva to attend the 31st Session of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in September 1990. (Read Rajapaksha v. Kudahetti (1992(2) SLR 223). Many political leaders such as Vasudeva Nanayakkara led from the front with the “Mothers Front”.  Unfortunately, there is no such political voice against disappearances today.  There may be many reasons for this. One reason seems to be the “societal silence” on the disappearance of Tamils for many years and the society was “forced to believe” that abductions were necessary to deal with the LTTE. With that mindset, most of the politicians including some of the parties in the Opposition are now finding it difficult to explain their long silence on abductions. There may be political explanations for this; but suffice it to say, whatever the explanations may be, they have failed in their political duty to challenge the crime of disappearances at the right time.

Finally, the weak civil society and feeble media. We need to ask ourselves whether we have done enough to preserve integrity and peace for the generations to come. When media was attacked, a coterie of government sponsored journalists supported the attackers. Though we have a few professional and fearless journalists, they are simply the exception, not majority. Civil society came under constant attacks by nationalist lobby for political reasons and state resources were frequently used to silence or weaken active NGOs, resulting in a grand opportunity for a despotic ruler.

Is silence the answer?  Governance is a dead letter where the public is not concerned about the fundamental freedoms. White vans created such an “oppressed” atmosphere that the public in general are not willing to speak up – obviously in fear of reprisal.  This is a clear objective of the oppressor. This reminds me of the words of Steve Biko – the Anti Apartheid hero from South Africa – “The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”.

In conclusion let me ask, are we not experiencing this presently – as a nation?

• New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka
• The abduction, assault, arrest and defamation of the Sudar Oli Editor: Questions for the Sri Lankan Government
• Horrible rise of disappearances in post-war Sri Lanka continues unabated
• Media and Violence
• Journalist Pakkiyanathan Vijayashanthan who went missing reported to Badulla Police station

54% of adolescent girls in Sri Lanka feel that a husband is justified in beating his wife. The UNICEF Global Report Card on Adolescents 2012 however is not available yet to try and unpack this further. What do they mean?

Surely, they cannot be suggesting that the arbitrary violence that some wives are subject to in Sri Lanka is acceptable; burned rice that results in cut lips and black eyes? It must be wives that were somehow overly flirtatious with another man. Wives that have behaved, or even worse, dressed, inappropriately. Wives that have proved to be whores!

What about those husbands that use wives like dogs? Psychologists call it displaced aggression, commonly known as kick-the-dog syndrome. Surely the adolescent girls can’t mean these husbands? Their wives did nothing more than open the door and welcome them home.

What about the husbands that come home inebriated and then proceed to beat their wives to a pulp for looking at them the wrong way? Do the 54% think this is justified?

Our friends at the Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC) have a theory that the alcohol socialization process in Sri Lanka begins with the mother at the fence discussing with her neighbour her husband’s need to consume alcohol due to the various problems he faces. ADIC says this results in young people (who accompany their mother to the fence as kids) turning to alcohol to solve their problems – meka bonna ona prashnayak!

Do you think the mothers at the fences talk about how beleaguered their husbands are to rationalize their still bloody noses, or visible grab marks on arms? Perhaps the 54% have stood by holding on to maternal hems listening to why this is ok, understandable even, that’s it, understandable.

Do you think that this level of acceptance among young adolescent girls mirrors our own as Sri Lankans?

Violence is under reported here.  As a Nation, we’re also on record refuting allegations that we in anyway mistreat women. Apparently we revere them, and have placed them in the highest offices of the land as a symbol of our respect and adoration. This ridiculous response however was not pilloried by our free and easy going mainstream press. We seem to accept that this is just the way things are in Sri Lanka…

Is it a really surprise then that 54% of young adolescent girls think that wife beating is acceptable?

We did a series of workshops for the Rotaract Club in 2010 and also 2011 that included a discussion on violence in relationships. Over two thirds of the participants, predominantly from Colombo, affluent, English speaking, agreed that a man can in fact hit a woman, if the woman has done something to deserve it… defining what deserved a violent response in relationships ran the gamut from overcooking rice to being unfaithful. We were surprised at the levels of acceptance that first year, and then, as we did more workshops and listened to what were rational and well thought out justifications for intimate partner violence, our surprise soon gave way to disbelief and finally almost resignation.

This is the way we are. Simple, really. It’s not even about insidious forms of patriarchy. There’s nothing insidious about our acceptance of intimate partner violence… or at least, it’s no more insidious than us using the term intimate partner violence in a bid to be inclusive of men and women who face emotional and physical violence in their relationships, regardless of marital status and sexuality. No, in Sri Lanka, we’re honest, open, even proud of our patriarchal weltanschauung. A man is a man, with man responsibilities and commitments, and similarly, a woman is a woman, with woman obligations and duties. Those who fall between and into the cracks… well, tough, this is Sri Lanka.

Recently we have wondered if Sri Lanka’s patriarchy has its roots in Buddhism. You might think this an unnecessarily reductive approach to what has long be acknowledged as an amalgam of anthropology, religion (especially the people of the book) and their resultant socio-cultural influences. But still, we have to examine our contemporary expressions of Buddhism, which must surely be derived from the various influences just outlined, including the Judeo-Christian God of those who colonized us for nearly 450 years.

Religion’s role in patriarchy is well documented. It is steeped in power. Just read the Ten Commandments. They were written for men who owned slaves, donkeys and women. Nietzsche, before syphilitic insanity claimed him – a judgment from God, of course – spoke at length of how faith and belief was used to manipulate the masses. The herd. The priests didn’t believe in the lie of God, and most crucially heaven and hell. They merely perpetuated it.

Have we men similarly perpetuated a lie that it is in fact normal i.e. the norm, to slap our women about, especially when they deserve it?

Do we believe this, or do we find it convenient? Are we afraid that our women may wake up to the fact that we’re bullies and cheats and, in general, loathsome? Surely this is unnecessary Feminist vitriol? Next thing you know, I’d be advocating that all women become lesbians? That’s what feminists do apparently, even the men.

This last week, we’ve been forced to engage with our Buddhist ways in Sri Lanka.

When we heard of what happened in Dambulla, did we collectively shudder, or did we bang our hairy Sinhala chests in exultation? Nietzsche’s ascetic priest that believes not what he preaches was alive and well. Power was on display. Policemen and the armed forces were mocked and chided.

Is there a connection between Dambulla and the 54% of young adolescent girls who have beatings and marital rape to look forward to? Are they not both a reflection of what we have become… or even worse, who we’ve always been?

There are answers out there, but we mustn’t be afraid to ask the questions.

How do we recover? How do we help the 54% and the rest of our young girls feel self worth and value that will not perpetuate our peculiar patriarchy?

We’re as far from comprehensive sex education – any well structured programme addresses gender and patriarchy – in schools as we’re from freedom of speech. But how far is that really? What is the distance? How many miles to go before we sleep?

The shortest verse in the Bible is John’s Gospel Chapter 11, verse 35: Jesus wept.

This last week, as I watched and read of the ugly militant Buddhism that has raised its head and stripped itself of robes to jump up and down naked and unabashed, all I could see were tears in Buddha’s eyes. Today, reading of the 54%, Buddha’s tears continued to flow.

Buddha wept, and we, if we don’t laugh, we’ll cry too.

• The transformation of Buddhism in Sri Lanka
• Aiyo!
• V-Day: Writings to end violence against women and girls
• Aroused by Akon’s Sexy Bitch: the Rise of Sinhala-Buddhist Fundamentalism?
• The Islamic Republic of Sri Lanka

Photo by author

The end of hostilities in May 2009 saw some 270,000 to 300,000 Tamils fleeing the conflict zone in the North and settling in camps for internally displaced people. Fleeing the fighting, together with the civilians, were thousands of Tamil Tiger combatants – many of them injured women fighters – both young women and more experienced middle-aged female fighters.

M10 – who lost her left leg in a 1995 battle in the Wanni region – surrendered herself at the Omantai military checkpoint in the closing days of the war after fleeing the heavy shelling on Puthikkudiyiruppu with civilians. There she was immediately taken to Pampaimadu Camp for interrogation by Sri Lankan army intelligence and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the police force.  A year later, in late April 2010, M10 was released.

M7, like M10, is an injured ex-Tamil Tiger young woman combatant who surrendered at the Omantai checkpoint in the closing days of the war.  In April 2010 she was released after a year in Cheddikulam camp, where the CID interrogated her. M7 recalls how she tried to look for a job in Batticaloa after the army left her in her mother’s house:

My father passed away when I was in the jungle. Now my mother has to look after my six younger sisters. I did not want to be an extra burden to my mother because of my disability, and so I traveled to Batticaloa town with my three disabled [ex-LTTE] friends. We registered ourselves at the IOM [International Organization for Migration] office and asked whether there were any jobs for disabled young women, like us. After taking our details the IOM officer told us that they would contact us if anything turned up, and then asked us not to come back to the office to make enquiries. We were hurt.

The IOM programme in Batticaloa and other parts of the East, funded by the United States government, says it “provides information and counseling to former fighters, referring them to vocational training, psychosocial support and employment opportunities” (Embassy of the United States 2009). Some participants, with appropriate experience and skill sets, also receive small grants to help them start their own business in their local communities.  Mehreteab (2007) offers a word of caution for dealing with disabled ex-combatants when he points out that many have little education, few skills and poor health in societies where it is already difficult to start a small enterprise or find employment to generate adequate income to achieve a moderate standard of living.

Disabled ex-combatants, more so female ex-combatants, are one of the most difficult to reintegrate in the absence of specific medical and psychosocial care in communities. Due to their disability they are unable to generate any income without intensive training and rehabilitation (Mehreteab 2007). The International Labour Organization (ILO) in its guidelines on disabled ex-combatants warns against treating them as “objects of charity” and adds that these ex-combatants “do not want to depend on families and communities to sustain them…[and] wish to become economically and socially active in their civilian communities and avoid being a burden on society”

Nonetheless, in the face of deprivation and hardship, female household heads like ex-Tamil Tiger young woman fighter M11 in Mylampavely feel empowered and proud of their achievements:

My husband works for the local government, but it’s actually me who runs the household. I am proud that I can care for my three children and also help women in the neighbourhood, especially those young girls who have returned home from the jungle with just the clothes on their back. Life’s tough, it’s hard. But I have survived and moved on. My story with the Tamil Tigers would probably fill a book – and there are good and bad memories. The women in the community respect me – they have to. I sacrificed my life in the movement [LTTE] for these people.

In post-war Batticaloa, M11 has a respected position in the district’s matrilineal society where women hold most of the responsibilities and authority in the family. She is referred to as perria akka (big sister in Tamil) in female networks in the clearly defined matriclans and matrilocal households in Mavadivembu, a status she attained after she married soon after her demobilization following the 2002 ceasefire. With a living husband and three children, she has a sumankali or properly wedded woman status. The sacred knot or thali tied by their husbands during the marriage and the red dot or kukum symbolizes the sumankali. Lawrence (2007) explains that Tamil culture respects the sumankali and it is common understanding that she has the capacity to provide protection through female networks.

M11 spends her free time, after sending her children to school, seeking out the former LTTE child combatants from Mavadivembu who self-demobilized in 2004 when the Batticaloa-based commander of the Tamil Tiger forces in the East, V. Muralitharan or Col. Karuna, split off from the main LTTE.

In 2002, a bitter political rivalry began to emerge between the LTTE supreme leader Prabhakaran, who had his loyal Northern (Wanni) command, and the Eastern commander of the Tamil Tigers Col. Karuna. In April 2004, the Wanni faction of the LTTE fiercely attacked Karuna’s 6,000 troops in the East and, sensing defeat, the Eastern Tamil Tiger commander disbanded his forces and went into hiding (Human Rights Watch 2004; Goodhand, et al., 2009). Thousands of child soldiers who were forcibly recruited were forced to leave Karuna’s group and countless girls self-demobilized silently by disappearing into war-affected communities where, today, they still struggle to cope. These self-demobilized former child soldiers are now young adults.

Former child soldier M12, who was recruited by the LTTE when she was 13, relates the visits made by M11:

I really look forward to the visits by perria aka [big sister]. I am very eager to tell my stories to people, but nobody wants to listen to me. We need people to talk to. Sometimes it is good to talk to people to get our problems out. Sometimes we feel we have been forgotten; dumped into the community and then abandoned. Perria aka was one of us in the jungle. She understands what we went through.

The protection roles played by mature women ex-combatants in the community reintegration of former young women fighters warrants further research as these girls struggle to develop a new sense of identity, unlinked to war.

In Batticaloa, women heading households bear the main burden of caring for injured Tamil Tiger female ex-combatants and traumatized returned former girl child soldiers in the absence of social welfare services. Though families in east Sri Lanka have been displaced, dispossessed and dispirited in the long running civil war and the December 2004 tsunami, matrilocal traditions and support provided by matrilocal household clusters seemed to have survived (McGilvray & Lawrence 2010). As this researcher found in his field trips, in a matrilineal society all the families which are part of the same sub-clan system could be found living in the same vicinity. McGilvray & Lawrence (2010) document that matrilocal clusters of married sisters in adjacent households in the same compound are emotionally appealing as it allows for shared childcare and sisterly solidarity that also acts as a deterrence against domestic violence.

Ruwanpura & Humphries (2004) found in the kinship networks in East Sri Lanka that neighbours and friends are an important source of assistance for female-headed households – particularly non-financial help that many women found invaluable such as childcare, help in chaperoning children to school, help with cooking, and emotional support.  Both researchers caution against dismissing the value of this friendship as it makes female heads feel more emotionally stable and secure.

The economic case for helping female-headed households, especially with extra mouths to feed in the care given to returning female ex-combatants, is strong. Help cannot be limited to just food subsidies given out by the World Food Program in Batticaloa. The circumstances of the households in a post-conflict environment need to be taken into account.

As the former young Tamil Tiger women combatants aim to establish themselves as adult individuals in Sri Lanka by an identity transformation from militants to civilians, they also struggle for some measure of security in their lives. This researcher found that the predictability of organized schooling through local NGOs like the Jeeva Jothy Foundation, in Batticaloa, can help former girl child soldiers overcome their traumatic experiences and develop an identity separate from that of a combatant.

The former girl child soldiers are enrolled in schools near Jeeva Jothy, with the house wardens ensuring their safety to and from school. Former child soldier M15, who was 16 when she was brought to Jeeva Jothy by her mother in 2004, recalls her past and talks about the future:

After I came out of the jungle, I went back to my village school. There I was treated badly. My hair was short; the teachers always scolded me and the other kids did not want to mix with me. I was depressed. Some NGO people told my mother about Jeeva Jothy and she then brought me here. When I arrived at Jeeva Jothy, I was enrolled in Grade 9.

In Jeeva Jothy, I got to know other girls like me and began to feel more confident. I started mixing around. I passed my A-levels and now I am in the Open University’ Social Sciences Faculty. I want to finish university, get a good job and help look after my mother and sisters.

The consequences of girls not receiving an education may be more severe than boys and Ruwanpura (2006) points out that this is due to the array of ideological structures stacked against girls in a capitalist system with inherent patriarchal values. In female-headed households in Batticaloa, adult children staying at home seem to be a vital resource because the survival of the family often depends on their wages. Problems of poverty in these families are compounded by the presence of dependent children, like returned girl child soldiers, while advancement to more comfortable circumstances often depends on the ability of educated working-age children earning decent adult wages.

Photo by author

The economic case for assisting households headed by women in Batticaloa is strong. But lumping together all female-headed households in the East, and suggesting a single solution is a recipe for disaster. There is a need for a more nuanced analysis, one that recognizes that female-heads of households make difficult choices in conflict situations and their aftermath (Ruwanpura 2006, McGilvary & Lawrence 2010).

But the current situation in Sri Lanka, with the end of the war, offers a window of opportunity. With a combined effort and international cooperation, much progress can be made in mending the relationship between the Tamils in Batticaloa and the government. In order to start the healing process at both the individual and community level, first and foremost, dignity must be given to the young women ex-Tamil Tiger fighters. Also the female networks, in a matrilineal society, that heal, nurture and protect all groups of women ex-combatants must be recognized, valued and supported.

References

• Briggs, J. 2005, Innocents lost: When child soldiers go to war, Basic Books, New York.
• Embassy of the United States. 2009, Press release: U.S. Government helps former fighters gain a new start in the East, Embassy of the United States, Colombo, Sri Lanka.
• Goodhand, J., Klem, B. & Korf, B. 2009, “Religion, conflict and boundary politics in Sri Lanka”, European Journal of Development Research, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 679-698.
• Human Rights Watch 2004, Living in fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Watch, New York.
• International Labour Organization. 1997, Manual on training and employment options for ex-combatants , International Labour Organization, Geneva.
• Lawrence, P. 2007, “The watch of Tamil women” in Women and the contested state: Religion, violence and agency in South and Southeast Asia, eds. M. Skidmore & P. Lawrence, pp. 89-116
• McGilvray, D.B. 2008, Crucible of conflict, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina.
• McGilvary, D.B. & Lawrence, P. 2010, “Dreaming of dowry: Post-tsunami housing strategies in eastern Sri Lanka” in Tsunami recovery in Sri Lanka: Ethnic and regional dimensions, ed. D.B. McGilvray & M.R. Gamburd, Routledge, London, pp 106 – 124.
• Mehreteab, A. 2007, Assistance to war wounded combatants and individuals associated with fighting forces in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Cornell University.
• Ruwanpura, K. 2006, Matrilineal communities, patriarchal realities: A feminist nirvana, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour.
• Ruwanpura, K. & Humphries, J. 2004, “Mundane heroines: Conflict, ethnicity, gender, and female headship in eastern Sri Lanka”, Feminist Economics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 173-205

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