Is this a functioning democracy or what? The governing coalition’s sweep of the local authorities election, the UNP’s successful resistance in a tough campaign in Colombo, as well as the TNA’s impressive performance at repeated elections in the North, make nonsense of the dark pronouncements and forebodings of dictatorship. Homogenization leads to conformism, which crystallises into a monolith, which translates itself into a dictatorship of discourse and opinion, which straitjackets society and creates a de-facto dictatorship. The results of the local authorities election proves that Sri Lankan society will not allow itself to be straitjacketed into conformity. We are, in short, a democracy.

The extrapolation by some commentators that the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration is somewhere along the trajectory of the recently overthrown Arab regimes is way of the mark because none of them permitted pluralist media (an important feedback loop), subjected their popularity to the test of authentically competitive multiparty elections. As Emeritus Professor of International Law at Princeton, Richard Falk observed to in a recent piece, “…as potent a unifying target as was the grim personage of Hosni Mubarak, cruel autocrat for more than three decades…” Thus, Mubarak can resemble Mahinda Rajapaksa and vice versa, only in the jaundiced eyes of demented Diaspora demagogues.

The election result contains a downside though. That downside is not dictatorship; it is something else, or consists of other things. One is the prevalence of lethal political violence, reflecting a long decline of the country’s political culture into quasi-gangsterism. The other is the clear and almost complete correspondence between the electoral and the ethnic. Sri Lanka’s is an unevenly divided democracy.

The UPFA’s wave which carried the traditional UNP strongholds of Kandy, Negombo, Moratuwa and Colombo’s suburbs reinforce the reality revealed by the statistical survey by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA): 74% of the Sinhalese identify most, with the SLFP. This is an unprecedented degree of identification, significantly surpassing the older congruencies between the SLFP and the rural, Sinhala-Buddhist vote. The UNP which once held most of that vote and later was a powerful contender for it, has now lost most of the Sinhala vote, rural and urban, Buddhist and Christian.

Given that almost 74 % of the country’s citizenry are Sinhalese, this places almost insurmountable obstacles to the UNP unless it switches its leadership, which is unlikely in the aftermath of its victory in Colombo. The SLFP’s electoral advantage in a national election is likely to be durable, though not at such high levels, given three factors: the unalterable demographic preponderance of the Sinhalese, a spike in nationalism due to escalating external pressures, the entrenchment of the UNP’s existing leadership and the party’s chronic inability to change its profile (a Wikileaks cable reveals Mr Wickremesingha’s solid defence of the merger and shrill opposition to its dissolution in conversations with the US Ambassador).

However, the unassailability of the SLFP’s hegemony assumes a steady-state or normal situation, which may not be a safe assumption, given the global economic crisis, which could contract the Sri Lankan economy in a few years unless we have got onto far more solid, modern and ethnically integrated footing as a society.

It is widely known that almost 60% of Colombo consists of ethno-linguistic minorities, and while this does not mean that the winning candidate must be from one of the minorities, it does mean that in order to win, a candidate from a majority community must have a multi-ethnic base and appeal, or his/her party must have such a profile. Dr NM Perera and B. Sirisena Cooray both Sinhalese, won because they did have this factor.

My friend Milinda Moragoda probably failed because the governing coalition has been unable to cultivate a multiethnic image. If Milinda’s campaign assumed that there would be a subterranean pan-Sinhala swing which, together with a split in the UNP’s Muslim vote effected by Mahroof, it was wrong. The visible tendency, or drive, towards cultural homogenisation and conformity, if not domination, was bound to be rejected by a multicultural, cosmopolitan Colombo citizenry.

As Richard Falk concludes, “In the end, we all must hope and engage. The beginnings of hope are rooted in the correctness of analysis…” The results of the recently concluded election have lessons and implications for Sri Lankan politics and politicians, as well as for those in capitals elsewhere who observe the Sri Lankan scene. While congratulating themselves on winding up with more political real estate than they had before the elections, the rulers must understand the contrasting lessons of Colombo and Kalmunai. The latter result shows the viability of an ethnic party which maintains its identity – and is permitted to – while remaining in the coalition. For its part, the Opposition UNP, while doing very well to retain Colombo, must comprehend that this result, if it locks in its present leadership, locks the party out of the Sinhala vote and therefore political power at a national level. Colombo is a-typical, as is the Northern Province. However severe a future economic crisis and however serious a future wave of street unrest, the factor of patriotism, nationalism or the collective perception of the Sinhalese of facing an existential threat, cannot be wished away, and as such, this UNP –as currently led, configured and profiled– will always be hamstrung at a parliamentary election while being batted out of the ballpark in a Presidential one.

The country’s rulers and foreign critics have similar lessons to learn from the election results. The foreign critics must know that Colombo and Jaffna are not the country at large, and the country at large has gone overwhelmingly one way. The rulers must know that the world outside, from Seattle to Singapore, is more like Colombo and Jaffna, only far more so, than it is like any other part of Sri Lanka.

• The Right NOT to Vote
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Photo courtesy Prevention Web

October 8^th 2011

Dear Mr. Milinda Moragoda and Mr. AJM Muzammil,

I wrote this open letter before the elections, to be read after, to avoid political misapprehensions that would have caused, if published earlier. Since you two may remember me, I wish I receive your attention on a few guiding principles to achieve best results when fulfilling your promises to serve the USSs, repeatedly orchestrated during election campaigns. It was heartening because you both had a singular interest on developing ‘Under served settlements’ (USSs) in the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) area, though through different approaches, and this ‘letter’ is to motivate a singular groove.

Recently I was perusing some reports and found two written by two consultancy teams, which I led, titled “Policy Framework for the Clean Settlements to Develop Urban Underserved Settlements” written in April 1997 for the World Bank and Ministry of Housing Construction and Public Utilities; and, “Environmental Profile under the Sustainable Cities Programme” written in December 1997 for the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements and Urban Development Authority (UDA). These organizations are your USSs development funding sources even today.

I propose that as the new Mayor one of you direct CMC officials to peruse these reports. The relevance of the reports is that other than UDA sponsored recent beautifying and environmental upgrading successfully achieved in the CMC area irrespective of adverse criticisms, there is hardly any positive difference visible regarding the layout and conditions of urban environment, when compared with these report contents.

Mr. Muzammil, your campaign mostly focussed on involuntary settler displacements, for example, numbering 6,000 plus families and planned eviction of about 40,000 more- cumulative above the existing; and, Mr. Moragoda, yours mostly focussed on over-projected resettlement solutions, for example, 35,000 new housing units in three years valued at Rs. 2.5 million per unit. Both seem to me as gross exaggerations.

But, I am not surprised of these due to our findings in 1997, applicable even today. In 1997 there were 3,732.41 ha extent in the USSs within the CMC, with 54,134 private buildings, 4,253 public buildings, 34,196 slums and shanties, with 1,404.54 ha under residential buildings, with only 210.67 ha covering slums and shanties- i.e. .006 ha per living unit.  Though figures may differ now, the latter figures self-explain why both of you promised upgraded housing, health and sanitation upon victory.   Now, elections over, it is time for both of you to prove the genuineness of your promises.

Therefore, I wish that you would seriously focus attention on principles on housing and property restitution for displaced persons. This is essential, as you two promised to convert USSs to Heavens, from Hell. Such revolutionary outcome requires enhanced conceptualization. Rather than making gung ho type promises or tearing the opponent’s manifesto, it is time the new Mayor addresses the problem on acceptable bases to methodically serve the USSs.

The need to address this issue becomes relevant as some will be displaced also in the future when you develop the USSs in the promised revolutionary manner. ‘No displacement at all due to development’ is wishful thinking. A lie, if said. Nevertheless, please remember that so displaced have a right to voluntary return to a habitat.

At the outset I may mention that these are not my personal thoughts. I suggest you and CMC officials study the Handbook on Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro Principles), accepted also by the United Nations. It is designed to assist all relevant actors- in the Government, Opposition, Ministries, UDA, CMC, Councillors etc- in addressing the rights, legal and technical issues surrounding housing, land and property restitution in situations where displacement has deprived persons of their former homes, lands, properties or places of habitual residence. These Principles were post-1997 initiatives and not reflected in the above consultancies.

Focussing attention to these Principles may sensibly condition you to be more rational to escape pitfalls and avoid rhetoric, for and against the Government or the Opposition, as visibly unfolded during the campaigns. These Principles will also prevail on the Opposition, whoever it is, due to the international and rational acceptability for displaced persons resettlement. Therefore, I submit an appropriate and abridged summary version of the Pinheiro Principles, to consider its initial acceptance by you as the base to counter USSs issues.

It will be pathetic if these Principles are totally rejected due to operational disabilities or differing visions. Nevertheless, at the inception it may be feasible to begin, review, readjust and even improve on them.

Summarily the Principles in the Handbook are as follows:

1. The Right to Housing and Property Restitution- All displaced persons have the right of restoration to them any deprived housing, land and/or property, or to be compensated for any housing, land and/or property that is factually impossible to restore, as determined by an independent impartial tribunal.
2. The Right to non-discrimination on any basis, e.g. race, colour, sex, language, religion, political etc.
3. The Right to equality between men and women, boys and girls, to the enjoyment of housing, land and property restitution and consequential equal rights. This includes voluntary return in safety and dignity; tenure security; property ownership; equal access to inheritance; joint ownership etc.
4. The Right to be protected from displacement inclusive of forced eviction, demolition of houses and destruction and the arbitrary confiscation or expropriation of land as a punitive measure.
5. The Right to privacy and respect for the home.
6. The Right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
7. The Right to adequate housing.
8. The Right to freedom of movement including the right to choose his/ her residence and not forced to remain under geographical limitations.
9. The Right to voluntary return based on a free, informed, individual choice, for which displaced persons should be provided with complete, objective, up to date, and accurate information, including physical, material and legal safety issues.
10. Compatibility with International Human Rights, Refugee and Humanitarian law and Related Standards in housing, land and property restitution procedures, institutions, mechanisms and legal frameworks.
11. National Procedures, Institutions and Mechanisms should be established and supported with equitable,    timely, independent, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures, institutions and mechanisms to assess and enforce housing, land and property restitution claims.
12. Providing accessibility to Restitution Claims Procedures to everyone affected and providing for submission of a claim for restitution and/or compensation to an independent and impartial body.
13. Provision of adequate consultation and participation in decision-making to the affected during restitution.
14. Establish or re-establish national multi-purpose cadastre or other appropriate systems for the registration of housing, land and property rights, as an integral component of any restitution programs, respecting the rights of displaced persons.
15. The Rights of tenants and other non-owners should be ensured.
16. Ensure that secondary occupants are protected against arbitrary or unlawful forced eviction. Any necessitated evictions should be carried out in a manner which is compatible with international human rights law and standards, such that secondary occupants are afforded safeguards of due process, including, inter alia, an opportunity for genuine consultation, adequate and reasonable notice, and the provision of legal remedies, including opportunities for legal redress. Authorities’ should undertake to identify and provide alternative housing and/or land for such occupants, including on a temporary basis, as a means to facilitate the timely restitution of displaced persons’ housing, land and property.
17. In cases where housing, land and property have been sold by secondary occupants to third parties, consider establishing mechanisms to provide compensation to injured third parties.
18. Ensure the right of displaced persons’ right to housing, land and property restitution is recognized as an essential component of the Rule of Law through all necessary legislative means, including through the adoption, amendment, reform, or repeal of relevant laws, regulations and/or practices.
19. It is necessary not to adopt or apply laws which prejudice the restitution process, in particular through arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise unjust abandonment laws or statutes of limitations.
20. Administrations should designate specific public agencies entrusted with enforcing housing, land and property restitution decisions and judgments.
21. Your mayoral administration should ensure, through law and other appropriate means that local and national authorities are legally obligated to respect implement and enforce decisions and judgments made by relevant bodies regarding housing, land and property restitution.
22. All displaced persons have the right to full and effective compensation (monetary or in kind) as an integral component of the restitution process. Complying with the Principle of Restorative Justice, ensure that the remedy of compensation is only used when restitution is not factually possible or when the injured party knowingly and voluntarily accepts compensation in lieu of restitution, or when the terms of a negotiated settlement provide for a combination of restitution and compensation.
23. The international community’s responsibilities are embedded in these Principles. They will assist CMC to mobilize foreign assistance, when these Principles are positively adhered.

These also highlight democratic and good governance principles. Some Principles are already implemented (e.g. item 16 above part) by the government, such as construction of alternate houses. Some require central and provincial concurrence, e.g. items 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 21, and 23 above. Items 9-13, 15, 16 etc have not been much cared by authorities. Hence integrated cooperation is essential for implementation of these Principles.

Since both of you have in common promised USSs development, whoever loses should join hands with the Mayor to implement the promises made for the USSs’ benefit, rather than to be vociferously critical of the winner for political expediency. It is essential that whoever becomes the Mayor, he should coordinate with the Opposition for active contribution to implement USSs development plans. Everyone should understand that displacement is inevitable in city development and when it happens the requirement is to shower the best to the affected and not to provoke hatred in them instead.  This is the singular groove I proposed.

There are a mass of informative publications and geographical information systems data with the UDA; similarly with the private sector, like the Panchikawatte Triangle planners and with financiers (domestic/ foreign) who should involve in development processes. Additionally, it is imperative to involve civil society groups who possess excellent thoughts emanating from grassroots experiences. Thought that politicians, Mayors, bureaucrats, consultants, donors and planners are the only individuals who could deliver is inaccurate, while admitting that each of them has a role to play. Hence, the winner coordinating them efficiently will be essential to deliver.

Therefore, having the interest of the USSs, I request the winner to perform with coordinated action plans for the greater good of the USSs and the City, maximally based on recognized conceptual reasoning as summarily explained above, as a process for consequential socio-economic development and enhancement of the already successfully operative beautification of the City. “The winner has all” mentality should not prevail if best results are anticipated. The loser also should play an honest and equal positive role for success and should have access to decision making. I believe that your hearts are unspoilt to accept these propositions.

With best wishes to see a great city under your leadership, I remain,

Sincerely,

Austin Fernando

• Homeless in one’s homeland
• The divide between Muslims and Tamils: Perspective of an IDP
• LLRC submission: The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in October 1990
• Human displacement
• The voice of an IDP single mother in Puttlam

President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga always wrote well and spoke eloquently when she resisted a propensity to be overly loquacious. While her recent peroration contains many intelligent and valid points, her credibility and their validity comes into serious question because she is not an independent observer or a reformist leader –in-waiting, but precisely a two term president who won by record majorities, and was indeed the immediate predecessor of the present incumbent.  Most ironic is the fact that many of the ills she identifies or attributes to present day Sri Lanka stem directly from her political sins of omission and commission. What is conspicuously lacking in her discourse, is any sign of reflexivity; of self-criticism.

My criticism pertains to four vital spheres (including those of her current concern), namely viable devolution, a less discriminatory society, the role of radical Sinhala nationalism/ultra-nationalism and of course defeating terrorism and reunifying the Sri Lankan state.

Having been elected by an unprecedented majority, CBK could have easily pushed through reforms making for moderate power-sharing if she had activated one of five options feasible at the time: the 13^th amendment, the Mangala Moonesinghe Select Committee Report (to which one of the signatories was her mother, Madam Sirimavo Bandaranaike), the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, promulgate an Interim Administration as per the 13^th amendment or improve modestly on the 13^th amendment through majorities in the provincial councils.  She did none of these. Instead she headed off on a wild goose chase of an overly ambitious ‘union of regions’ package. And having done so, what is her credibility and ethical standing in criticising the government of the day?

CBK is concerned about a more inclusive, non-discriminatory society. I believe this to be sincere. However why she did not move in this direction by implementing her own Equal Opportunities Bill? Why did she withdraw it? Having done so, what is the credibility of her contemporary social critique?

President Kumaratunga laments the role of the Sinhala hawks. Fair enough, but who empowered them? By picking Justice Sarath N Silva over Justice Mark Fernando, CBK surely helped tilt the balance.

During the dark days of appeasement under the CFA, I was invited by her as the main discussant at a meeting of the SLFP parliamentary group, held at the President’s Pavilion in Kandy and chaired by her.  I articulated the perspective that a united front of the centre-Left with the JVP was necessary but that the centrist SLFP must be firmly hegemonic and that the JVP really had nowhere else to go. I also recall Mahinda Rajapaksa as being most critical and pessimistic about a bloc with the JVP. In the event the SLFP under President Kumaratunga’s leadership conceded a massive slice of forty seats to the JVP! It is this parliamentary bloc that President Rajapaksa inherited and had to keep together while fighting the war. It is precisely the JVP that threatened to withdraw or actually withdrew from the APRC after its Experts Committee which had produced a constructive report on devolution. Apprehensive that his parliamentary majority may be in jeopardy, the President hit the brakes on the entire exercise.

Sinhala extremism was re-legitimised by her insistence that Vijaya Kumaratunga had been killed by Premadasa, rather than the JVP and the JVP alone. It fed off her erroneous choice of a peace mediator, at the wrong time too. She chose Norway, with its strong Tamil lobby, and did so in the late 1990s when the Sri Lankan military could have gone on the counter offensive , and persevered with the ‘ peace process’ after the assassination attempt on her  and the events of 9/11, which taken together would have provided her the external conditions to smash the Tigers.  She crippled her own military’s capacity to go for the kill by continuing with the Sudu Nelum movement, an anti-war movement which could and did conduct its campaign only in the Sinhala majority areas, thereby cutting into recruitment for the military in such a manner that it could not hold the territory it liberated and go onto liberate more.

Southern extremism and fundamentalism were fuelled by the Sudu Nelum phenomenon and the role of Norway, both CBK inputs.

The Sinhala ultras received a major, if unintended contribution from President Kumaratunga in the shape of her PTOMS proposals, which were challenged by the JVP and frozen by the Supreme Court—and quite rightly too, as its crucial middle tier gave the Sri Lankan state 3 slots and the LTTE 5!

As to the core issues of defeating terrorism and reuniting the territory of Sri Lanka, President Kumaratunga made some signal contributions but failed to capitalise on them and went onto partially reverse some of them.  She could have continued the offensive following the admirable liberation of Jaffna by her, and  her no less admirable defence of Jaffna in year 2000.  Yet, she did not. Furthermore, at the time of the strategically critical Karuna split, she permitted Prabhakaran’s forces to make a sea-borne landing in his rear area, passing through Sri Lankan navy lines.

Sartre once said that what matters is not what is done to us but what we do with what is done to us. Mahinda Rajapaksa inherited a divided territory and a military whose spirit was debilitated.  With these, he achieved that which no leader achieved for three decades. He defeated the Tigers, reunited the island’s territory and reopened the electoral political space for the revival of democratic Tamil politics including Tamil nationalist politics.

The TNA’s Northern success, running against the ruling coalition in an area with a heavy military ‘footprint’ means one thing above all else:  Sri Lanka remains a functioning, competitive, multiparty democracy. All thinking and policy within Sri Lanka and about Sri Lanka must stem from recognition of that basic fact. Yet, will the critics of the incumbent administration and of this country grant us that much? Knowing them as I do, I shan’t be holding my breath.

All those who wrote that democracy had died in Sri Lanka with the 18^th amendment, not to mention those who cannot write a paragraph about Mahinda Rajapaksa without an obligatory reference to Nazi Germany, should tender apologies to the reading public or at the least wriggle in shame in private, at the TNA’s performance in the Northern and portions of the Eastern province. But again, knowing them as I do, I shan’t be holding my breath.

An emerging ‘pivotal power’, Turkey, much admired for its secularism, moderate Islamic political party and independent foreign policy, has faced a long standing problem of secessionism from its Kurds. Today Turkey is in a better place, not only because of its admirable leadership, but because there is unprecedented space for the Kurds. Since Turkey hardly has a federal state or regional autonomy for the Kurds, what exactly is that space? It consists of several Kurdish language radio and TV channels, over 30 members of parliament, and many mayors in the Kurdish majority areas.

All this the Tamil people and the TNA have now. This should not be scoffed at, nor should Sri Lanka’s post-war achievement in opening that space and keeping it open.

The election results confirm that which I had told the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the presence of President Rajapaksa, in 2006 or early 2007, when he asked me how sure I was that what I had defined as a Just War, would result in a Just Outcome. I answered that with the North and East liberated by the military from the Tigers’ totalitarianism, electoral and political space would re-open and the Tamil people would be re-enfranchised, enabling them to democratically re-inscribe their grievances and aspirations in the political agenda, albeit within a united Sri Lanka.

Today the domestic geopolitics of the island are clear: the UPFA is the pre-eminent force among the vast majority inhabiting two thirds of the island while the TNA is the pre-eminent entity among of the Tamil people. The UPFA preponderates at the centre, the TNA at the Northern periphery.

This reality is the antechamber to another reality. The TNA cannot dream of another political negotiating partner other than the UPFA. An alliance with the UNP makes no sense because that party lags so far behind, it cannot deliver anything in the foreseeable future, and furthermore, any alliance with the TNA will hurt the UNP’s electoral chances, not enhance them, as candidate Fonseka found out to his cost. The UPFA is the only real game in town among the Sinhalese. Similarly, no dialogue with the Tamils is possible without the TNA or bypassing it. Any consequential political dialogue must have as its main axis, the UPFA and the TNA.

That second reality results from a third, or bottom line reality. Neither the Sinhalese nor the Tamils can prevail over one another. The Sinhalese could not be pushed beyond a point and they proved it with the victory in war. The Sinhalese will keep the country as a united territory and the single state, however long it takes, whatever the odds, and whoever the foe, internal or external or any combination thereof. Those located or having regrouped overseas who, having lost the war for Tamil Eelam are trying to regain what they lost by enlisting the support of erstwhile colonial patrons, will learn that what the Sri Lanka state has liberated and reunified, it shall hold, under whichever leader, flag or generation and “by whatever means necessary” (Malcolm X). The Tamils for their part will not relinquish their collective identity and search for dignity.

A sustainable peace is not possible exclusively on the terms of either one or the other community. There will neither be a Tamil state (separate or federal) nor a Sinhala peace over the Tamils. There will have to be a modus vivendi. And such a modus vivendi can only be found along the Buddha’s Middle Path or the Aristotelian Golden Mean between what Sinhala and Tamil nationalism wish.

With the election results we have a new balance of forces; a new conjuncture. It is not and cannot be an equivalence or perfect equilibrium, given abiding demographic realities and the decisive results of a thirty years war. However, it provides a chance for a fresh look and a new realism.

Have we been here before? In 1977 the electoral map was fairly similar, with the UNP enjoying more than a two thirds majority while the TULF dominated the North and pockets of the East. The difference is that the War of Secession has been fought over a prolonged period, and lost. Yet there are lessons to be learnt from the avoidable tragedy that resulted from delay on the one side and delusion on the other. Let us not make the same mistakes again.

Of course, today we are in another place. Any illusions of a separate state as inspired by the Vadukkodai resolution have been burnt or buried at Nandikadal. Any illusions of imposing silence on the Tamils and eliminating their cultural and political resolve have been dispelled by the electoral map that has unrolled with the parliamentary and local government elections. Both communities have thrown their best or worst at each other and both are still standing. What resilience and resolve! Both the Sinhalese and Tamils should not only be proud of themselves but of each other, because we are inhabitants of one island, and share the same DNA: we are brothers and sisters. What we could achieve together! I am glad we won the war, but sorry we ever had to fight one. Now, we have attained some kind of balance. If the TNA pushes too hard or overshoots the mark, opinion will harden in the bulk of the island, and vice versa. There can be no solution to Tamil grievances which are unacceptable to the majority of Sinhalese, just as there can be no deep-rooted, peace without Tamil consent. Now is the time to reach out to each other in mutual respect and realism, and establish a durable peace.

In the face of external threat and pressure, we must erect and maintain a rampart of granite and steel, but in domestic politics, including or most especially ethno-politics, we must make a paradigm shift from the politics of confrontation to the politics of peaceful coexistence.

• THE DEEPEST DIVISION IN SRI LANKA
• PRABAKARAN MUST BE LAUGHING
• Politics of Sinhala Nationalism: Underpinning of the UPFA Victory and Undermining of the Sri Lankan Nationhood
• In defense of the JVP campaign to support Sarath Fonseka
• Picking up the Tamil Tigers’ scent

Updated, 27 July 2011: Listen to exclusive interview with Suresh Premachandran here.

This statement on the results of the recently concluded local government elections (covered in detail by Groundviews here) was issued originally in Tamil by Tamil National Alliance MP Suresh Premachandran. Download PDF here. Only brief excerpts in English have been picked up by domestic and international media.

In order to stimulate wider debate over its content and points, we’ve translated Premachandran’s full statement in English. Though we’ve checked it for accuracy twice, a note from our translator is worth keeping in mind, “The meaning [of the statement] is captured though every subtle nuance and emphasis is not. The entire thing is written in free flowing passive voice Tamil which while lyrical, is difficult to translate.” We also encourage our readers to suggest better translations of key phrases and words through comments.

In a closed email exchange with colleagues, we wondered if a more conciliatory approach, eschewing triumphalism, could have made the reasons why this victory was significant for the TNA and Tamils more appealing to the Sinhalese, some of whom today openly profess – much like the President himself – that racial identity is no longer a factor in post-war Sri Lanka, suggesting instead that “working together” (as ‘patriots’) to acknowledge and address legitimate Tamil grievances is the way forward. Perception is reality. There is in media, polity and society a tendency to conflate the TNA with LTTE, which could easily lead to trenchant claims that their electoral performance on Saturday is proof that separatist tendencies and ideology are alive, albeit in new forms. This perception can in turn fuel the racism in sections of Central Government and its core vote base that no matter what ‘we’ do for ‘them’, the Tamils will always support secession. The result is continued suspicion and fear that justifies a high military presence in the North and East, plus increasing encroachment into civilian administration.

###

Statement by TNA MP Suresh Premachandran

This election was concluded at an important time where the United Nations and the international community are pressuring the government over claims that they committed war crimes and that a fair investigation is necessary.

In an effort to escape this difficulty, the Government worked hard to win these Local Government elections and demonstrate that the Tamil people are on its side. The entire state machinery was deployed and the Government approached the election as if it was a war. They threw piles of handouts at the people and promised people jobs. They attempted to buy over some [TNA] candidates at any price while threatening others into dropping out of the election. They caused a great deal of panic among the people and prevented them from voting. In addition, some voters were attacked with waste oil.

However, the people defied the sweet talk and threats by ensuring a great victory for the Tamil National Alliance and a bitter defeat for the government and those on its side.

The Tamil people’s demand is that they exercise full powers of self-rule within their homeland consisting of a merged North and East. Once again, the Tamil people have declared that they will not relinquish their political aspirations for any amount of giveaways or on account of any level of intimidation by ensuring the victory of the TNA.

The TNA requests the Government to adhere to the democratic verdict of the Tamil people and offer a political solution without any further delay.

The Tamil people have – by ensuring the victory of the TNA – accepted and supported the recommendations of the UN [Panel’s report], which state that the government’s war crimes and human rights abuses require an impartial international investigation.

The TNA asks that this verdict of the Tamil people be respected and that the government accept and allow an international investigation. The TNA requests that the international community continues to pressure the government to provide a political solution that allows the Tamil people to live in their homeland with dignity and freedom.

The TNA expresses its heartfelt gratitude to the Tamil people who in the midst of various threats and difficulties considered it their national duty to go to the polling booths in their numbers to cast their vote for the Tamil National Alliance.

• EXCLUSIVE: Interview with TNA MP Suresh Premachandran on the LG elections, Parliamentary Select Committee and Political Solution
• Don’t mix up war crimes investigations with political issues in Sri Lanka
• Law students write against 18th Amendment
• Crossing Red Lines: The New Tamil Consensus in Sri Lanka
• Not signing the Rome Statute is not enough! (A response to Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mangala Samaraweera)

Groundviews is curating news and updates from the ground, as well as domestic and international media coverage on the historic local government elections in Jaffna. Polling started at 7am today.

In addition to @groundviews, Follow #NLGE on Twitter for updates from Jaffna, in addition to the usual #lka and #srilanka. In addition to our own curation, we are following:

• @anuradhakherath (on the ground updates)
• @dinidu (on the ground updates)
• @perambara (on the ground updates)
• @apelankawe (on the ground updates)
• @nirananketell (expert opinion / analysis)
• @rkguruparan (expert opinion / analysis)
• @lankasol (for interesting updates with international focus)
• @DMbreakingnews (mainstream media updates)

Subscribe to #NLGE’s RSS feed here. There’s also a hashtag for other local government election news, #SLGE. Subscribe to its RSS feed here.

Groundviews also maintains two key curated Twitter lists. One for leading bloggers, the other for Twitter accounts related to media and journalism. Both will invariably feature updates on the elections.

Our curated Bundlr will gather Twitter updates and conversations, news reports and other information posted on the web related to the elections, with a key focus on Jaffna.

• Curated list of the best Twitter accounts on Sri Lanka
• Curated list of best Twitter accounts by Sri Lankan bloggers
• Photos and video from the UN headquarters in Colombo today
• Groundviews on Twitter and Facebook
• Going beyond mainstream media: The best Twitter feeds on and from Sri Lanka

In March 2010, Groundviews launched a unique initiative online to ascertain what citizens perceived and accepted as democracy in Sri Lanka.

To date, 74 people have submitted 42 ideas and cast 596 votes, but what do YOU think?

Click on http://bit.ly/sldemocracy

To coincide with a planned in-depth survey on democracy in Sri Lanka by Social Indicator, the polling arm of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, we are revisiting this initiative that when launched last year generated a lot of buzz online.

From blue sky thinking to tried and tested initiatives that need to scale up or be better recognised and supported, we invite you to co-create a unique catalogue of ideas on how post-war Sri Lanka can strengthen democratic governance. We strongly encourage those from the grassroots, or work closely with communities at the grassroots to contribute their ideas.

Please vote on the ideas you like, contribute your own, and pass on the word to participate!

• Strengthening democracy in Sri Lanka: An open invitation to generate fresh ideas
• In conversation with Prof. Anil K Gupta: Grassroots innovation and development
• 1,000 posts on Groundviews: Bearing witness, shaping peace
• Happy New Year!
• Groundviews Wins 2007 Award of Excellence in New Communications from Society for New Communications Research

Women constitute 52% of Sri Lanka’s population, however women constitute only 2% of elected members of Local Authorities. A critical concern is the very low levels of nominations received by women (approximately 6%) from political parties (See table below). Much of the blame for this under representation must be borne by the major political parties which have consistently failed to give adequate nominations to women. They are the parties that win seats in any local election.

In South Asia, our immediate neighbours with whom we enjoy close historical and cultural ties, the under- representation of women at local elected political bodies have been addressed through legally enforceable quotas for women. In fact Sri Lanka remains the only country without any special measures to facilitate women’s representation in Local Authorities. In Bangladesh, at least 25% of seats are reserved for women in Union Councils (1996 legislation); in India not less than 33% of seats are reserved for women and other marginalized groups in all Panchayats or Local Bodies (1992 Constitutional amendment); in Nepal 20% of Village and Municipal Councils are reserved for women (1990 Constitution); and in Pakistan 33% of seats are reserved for women at the Union, Tehsil (Municipality) and District level (2000 Devolution Plan). Obviously, all these countries have recognized the necessity for women’s representation in local authorities as both a factor of development as well as a fundamental rights issue. We remind the two major political parties that such provision is necessary to fulfill promises made in Mahinda Chintanaya and Deya Dinawan Aya to the effect that nominations for women will be increased.

Serious under representation of women among elected members of local government bodies has distorted the agendas of these agencies in ways that divert attention away from vital issues such as malnutrition, water and sanitation, alcoholism and gender based violence.

The government has just dissolved Local Authorities around the country and called for elections to be held in March 2011. We urge all political parties to ensure that women get at least 25% of the nominations at these elections. Unless and until nominations by political parties are substantially increased, it will not be possible to increase women’s representation in Local Authorities, which in turn will continue to limit women’s participation in Provincial Councils and in national level politics.

There are challenges, and serious ones at that. As Chulani Kodikara avers in Women and politics in Sri Lanka: The challenges to meaningful participation,

“…women’s groups will continue to demand for increased representation for women in political institutions on the basis of equality, democracy, justice, etc even though this language appears to have lost all currency in Sri Lanka. No amount of appeal to these values has so far changed party attitudes towards nominations for women even at the local level. There is clearly too much at stake. As many political analysts point out political power in Sri Lanka is maintained through elaborate and well organized patron – client relationships that connect actors from the national to the local levels. These relationships play a central role in the socio-economic as well as political benefits, opportunities and positions available to people.  Nominations during election times are opportunities to bestow rewards on those party loyalists, but not indiscriminately. To be considered a ‘winnable’ candidate, money and muscle are important as is the active involvement in maintaining and supporting the chains of dependency between the party and the constituency. Most women lack both money and muscle and are passive ‘clients’ in the margins of these networks (except if you a wife, widow or daughter of a politician of course).”

Further, as noted in a previous article published on Groundviews,

“Ensuring gender justice in the aftermath of war does not happen in isolation. It is more often than not part of a wider process which addresses root causes of the conflict and which attempts to negotiate a new post war social order in which all people irrespective ethnic, gender, religious or other differences are ensured equality and social justice. Post war reconstruction and reconciliation in Sri Lanka is however almost exclusively government led without the benefit of such a process. This is what we desperately need an inclusive process in which all of us, men and women, can re-imagine and renegotiate the fundamental contours of this nation state in a way that the rights of all identity groups are recognized and respected.”

[Editors note: Also see in-depth video interview with Chulani Kodikara here. The interview deals with, inter alia, the challenge of women's representation in party politics in Sri Lanka.]

• Provincial Council Elections 2008/2009: Nominations for and representation of women
• Women and politics in Sri Lanka: The challenges to meaningful participation
• A Brief Commentary and Table on the Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Bill 2010
• A conversation with Kumudini Samuel
• A critique of the Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Bill

Introduction[1]

This briefing paper highlights some of the key aspects of this Bill and attempts to provide the reader with a basic introduction to the issues and implications of the Bill in its current form. We first examine the change in the electoral system and some of the implications it will have on the exercise of franchise (point 1) and then discuss the implications of the changes being made to the amount required as a deposit and the way it could affect the smaller parties and independent groups (point 2). In point 3 we briefly deal with the changes to the youth quota from a mandatory 40% youth quota in nomination lists to a 25% youth and women quota  and how it affects women and young people. Point 4 addresses the changes to the nomination period which has been shortened to 1.5 days from the previous 7 day stipulation while point 5 deals with the extraordinary powers vested in party secretaries and leaders of independent groups in the filling of vacancies. In point 6 we address the setting up of delimitation committees to draw up the boundaries of the wards. In point 7 we point out that although the Constitution stipulates that all Provincial Councils have to be consulted, the Northern Provincial Council has not been consulted about the formulation of this Bill.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

We asked that the Supreme Court declare that some clauses of the Bill were inconsistent with the Constitution, and also that they require a 2/3 majority in Parliament as well as the approval of the People at a Referendum to be made law.

1. Replacing the Proportional Representation system with a largely ‘first past the post’ system

Under the present Proportional Representation (PR) system the number of members elected from each Party or Group is determined by the proportion of votes received by that Party or Group in the entire electoral area. A party or Group should receive a certain percentage of the total number of votes to have any representative. Candidates are elected on the basis of the total number of preference votes received by them, within the number of seats allotted to the party or group. The proposed reforms introduce a mixed system of First Past the Post (FPP) and Proportional Representation but the number elected under the Proportional Representation system is not fixed. Only a maximum of 30% of the number of members elected under the First Past the Post system will be elected under the Proportional Representation system.[2]

It reintroduces the ward system, where each local authority is divided into electoral units called wards and each ward elects one member (unless there is a provision for more than one member to be elected from a ward – these are referred to as multi member wards). This will necessarily limit the participation of minority parties and independent groups because the First Past the Post system is based on the strength of numbers (as opposed to the proportion of votes garnered). As a result it also defeats the Constitutional objective of a “Representative” Democracy since the FPP system is not “representative” of all political opinions or interests but only of the party or group that garners the most amount of votes. It diminishes the Sovereignty of the People, especially the exercise of their fundamental rights and franchise, and the fundamental rights of thought and free expression (which includes the meaningful exercise of the franchise).

It is also important to understand that under the new ward-based voting system the 5% cut off point for disqualification applies to votes polled in a ward as opposed to a local authority area. This means that even if a candidate polls 7% of the votes in one ward and only 3% of the votes in the next ward, that 3% will not count towards the parties final tally of votes in that particular local authority area. This puts smaller parties, minority and independent groups at a distinct disadvantage because it makes it difficult for these groups to receive allocations from the seats allocated on a PR basis.

2. Mandatory deposits for all candidates

Every party has to make a mandatory deposit of money in respect of each candidate and additional person nominated. According to the Bill a recognised political party has to make a deposit of Rs.5000/- for each candidate it nominates whereas in the case of independent groups a deposit of Rs.20,000/- is expected to be paid for each person it nominates.

The distinction is arbitrary, and irrational and thus violates the fundamental right to Equality. It also violates the voters’ fundamental rights of thought and franchise. It further limits the participation of minority parties and independent groups as every party has to contest in every ward and therefore each of these smaller parties will have to pay the deposit on each candidate for every ward. Since every party that fails to get more than 5% of the vote loses their deposit, this provision effectively discourages the involvement of minority parties and independent groups in the electoral process at the local government level. This is made worse by the fact that there is no provision in the Bill for parties to contest in certain wards only and all parties have to contest every ward in a local authority area. These provisions will thus violate the Constitutional principle of Representative Democracy.

3. Nomination Quota for Women and Youth

The Bill seeks to remove the mandatory existing quota of 40% for youth in nominations lists for local government elections and replace it with a non-mandatory quota of 25% for women and youth. This violates the guarantee for substantive equality under the Fundamental Right to Equality. Article 12(4) of the Constitution recognizes the need for affirmative action relating to women. A mere recommendation cannot meet the obligation of the State to ensure substantive equality of women.

The right to substantive equality of Sri Lankan youth is also violated. The mandatory quota of 40% reserved for youth in nomination lists in local government elections was introduced mainly in response to the findings of the Youth Commission in 1990 that was appointed to look into the causes of the violent youth uprising that took place between 1987 and 1989, and in recognition of the inequalities faced by youth wishing to participate in elected bodies. No legitimate reasons have been established for the withdrawal of the special protection that has been afforded to youth, thus violating the fundamental right to Equality.

The clause is also uncertain and vague and could be interpreted to mean that no more than 25% of a nomination list can include women or youth. Such an arbitrary limit to political participation of identified groups violates the fundamental right to Equality and the right to political participation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sri Lanka is a state party.

Placing both women and youth within the same percentage with regard to participation in local government elections is also self-defeating as there is no clarity as to how the percentage can be divided between the said groups. Further, there is no indication as to whether female youth would be placed under the category of ‘youth’ or ‘women’ which makes this clause even more ambiguous.

For the above reasons, the clause also has no rational nexus to the objectives of the Act. This too violates the fundamental right to Equality.

4. 1 ½ day nomination period (in lieu of a 7 day period)

Considering the importance of the electoral process, shortening the nomination period is arbitrary and irrational, and thus contrary to the fundamental right to Equality. This reduction may limit the participation of minority parties and independent groups and negate the Constitutional principle of Representative Democracy and thus diminish the exercise of the Sovereignty of the People and the direct exercise of fundamental rights and franchise.

5. Filling in of vacancies

The Bill provides for filling in vacancies based on nominations by the secretary of the political party / leader of the independent group, out of any person qualified to be a member. There is no provision for a by-election. Parties could substitute elected candidates with persons not desired by the electorate, making a mockery of the entire electoral process. Parties could even deliberately call upon their elected members to resign, to facilitate the substitution of other persons desired by the party, though not desired by the electorate. This clearly impacts on the exercise of political thought and franchise by the People and the principles of Representative Democracy.

6. Delimitation committee

The Bill establishes a Delimitation Committee and permits the Minister to appoint five persons to this committee. It vests absolute discretion on the appointments to this committee in the Minister, and permits arbitrary exercise of power, and thus violates the Fundamental Right to Equality.

There is provision for the Delimitation Committee to make recommendations to the Minister for the division of each local authority area into wards considering the factors specified.[3] There is no rational nexus between the said criteria in determining the boundaries of wards. This will permit irrational and arbitrary variations being made to electoral boundaries violating the fundamental right to Equality. This concern is made more significant by the fact that the data for delimitation will be based on the most recent census which at present is representative of data from the last census in 2001. Furthermore, this due to the unrest at the time this census did not include some districts in the North and East of the country.[4] In fact in the case of certain districts in the North and the East a census was last conducted in 1981. The sections are ambiguous as to whether the “recommendation’ is a ‘recommendation’ or a ‘binding determination’. This undermines the exercise of political thought and franchise by the People and negates the principles of Representative Democracy;

7. Failure to refer Bill to ALL Provincial Councils

Article 154G(3) of the Constitution provides that “no Bill in respect of any matter set out in the Provincial Council List shall become law unless such Bill has been referred by the President, after its publication in the Gazette and before it is placed on the Order Paper of Parliament, to every Provincial Council for the expression of its views…”

The present Bill legislates on subjects in the Provincial Council List. While the Bill has allegedly been referred to several Provincial Councils, the Bill has certainly not been referred to the Northern Provincial Council.

[2] This means that the number of representatives elected under the PR system will not be fixed but will be based on the number of representatives who are elected under the FPP system.  For example if 10 representatives are to be elected from a local authority of a particular area as per the provisions of the bill it will not be split up as 7 representatives under the FPP system and 3 representatives under the PR system. Rather 10 representatives will be elected and not more than 30% of that number (3) additional members will be allocated from the PR list – a total of 13 representatives for the local authority (rather than being 30% of the total, 30% is added on to the total. Furthermore this number will never exceed 30% and will always be adjusted down if it exceeds 30%). This means that the actual percentage of members appointed under the PR system will be between 21-23% in practice

[3] These factors are

(a) the ratio of the ethnic composition of the local authority concerned, and the need to ensure equal representation for each ethnic group in that local authority area ;

(b) the geographical area of the local authority and its physical features;

(c) the population of the local authority area and the density of such population

(d) the level of economic development of the local authority

[4] http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/PDF/p7%20population%20and%20Housing%20Text-11-12-06.pdf

• A Brief Commentary and Table on the Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Bill 2010
• Local Authorities Elections (Amendment) Bill: Progress or Regress?
• Provincial Council Elections 2008/2009: Nominations for and representation of women
• A perennial struggle: Women’s political representation in Sri Lanka
• Women and politics in Sri Lanka: The challenges to meaningful participation

Chulani Kodikara has written five articles for Groundviews, three on the topic of women in mainstream politics in Sri Lanka. Revealingly, they are comparatively three of the most under-read articles on this site. Women are not willing to go back to pre-war status quo, a compelling essay written for the special edition on the end of war, has at the time of writing only generated around 450 pageviews, abysmal in comparison to the tens of thousands who read and engaged with other articles in this special edition.

This marked lack of interest in and awareness of a vital issue provided the backdrop for a recent conversation with Chulani on the issue of women’s representation in Sri Lankan mainstream politics. Fundamentally, the issue is marginal to mainstream political parties and of peripheral interest at best to most voters – female and male. In an important essay, Chulani notes that “the main obstacle to equal political representation of women in political institutions in Sri Lanka is political parties” and goes on to say,

In reality however, beyond the symbolic inclusion of one or two women in nomination lists, both parties have not taken concrete action to seriously address the under-representation of women in political institutions. The enormous costs of contesting elections, the thuggery and violence, the competition within the party fostered by the proportional representation system and the general lack of support for women candidates from male colleagues mean that even the few women who are offered, are often reluctant to accept nominations. (From Women and politics in Sri Lanka: The challenges to meaningful participation)

In this interview, I ask Chulani about affirmative action, and also whether for example, the entry of telegenic females sans political acumen to parliament in any way helps advocacy on stronger female representation. Pegged to this, I also question her about substantive equality, that goes beyond, in her own words, the classical liberal notion of formal equality which assume that removing formal barriers, for example giving women the right to vote and be elected to political office, is sufficient to give women equal access to political institutions.

We talk about the role of women in post-war Sri Lanka, examples from South Asia as well as the rest of the world where women play a far more active role in politics, getting women to vote in women, the political culture in Sri Lanka and changing it for the better, experiences of other countries that post-war that have actively encouraged the participation of women in processes of reconciliation and the need, that Chulani herself has identified, to “revisit and reframe the discourse on increasing political representation of women in Sri Lanka”.

• A perennial struggle: Women’s political representation in Sri Lanka
• The legacy of Chanaka Amaratunga and the future of liberalism in Sri Lanka
• Women and politics in Sri Lanka: The challenges to meaningful participation
• Compilation of special edition on the end of war in Sri Lanka
• A conversation with Kumudini Samuel

Content on Groundviews was republished or referred to by the Sunday Leader, the New York Times, Le Monde Diplomatique dozens of other local and international Twitter accounts of leading journalists and others, Livemint.com published by the Wall Street Journal in India and a range of other blogs and websites.

Around one hundred highlights from our tweets anchored to the 18th amendment are now archived in four parts.

• Part 1
• Part 2
• Part 3
• Part 4

A full list of content on the 18th Amendment published on Groundviews can be accessed by clicking here, which includes podcasts, videos, photos and text, some of which were reduced in collaboration with Vikalpa. Other content includes statements from Leftist parties and opposition to the 18th amendment by civil society, including law students, academics, lawyers and citizens from the East.

Groundviews published for the first time in Sri Lankan media a web-based interactive timeline to highlight various promises and statements made by the President and government over abolishing the office of the Executive President. In The pathetic capitulation of the organised Left in Sri Lanka the site catalogued clear pronouncements by Left political parties against the present form and continuation of the Executive Presidency available on the web to flag the hypocrisy of leading Leftist politicians.

More than any event in the past, our Facebook fan page, independent of the debate on this website, also generated a lot of commentary amongst its 1,600+ members.

In bearing witness and recording dissent, Groundviews was acutely aware that whatever little informed and principled debate and discussion on the 18th amendment was limited to a few able to access sites such as this, the English mainstream print media and a few independent websites in Sinhala and Tamil (e.g. Perambara, Vikalpa, Vikalpa’s YouTube video channel). Responding to the comments left by a reader on the site, Sanjana Hattotuwa, the founding Editor of the site noted,

“…but even as such does flag the question as to why so few people around Sri Lanka are agitating against such a harmful amendment. I know of no protest movement – spontaneous of party political in nature – outside of Colombo against the 18th amendment. When I was asked this question in the morning by BBC Radio, I put it down to the general apathy in our country, which has more voters than it has citizens.

A timeline of duplicity: Promises to abolish the Executive Presidency records Susil Premajayantha as saying “75% of the people in rural areas are not worried about the Executive Presidency or the 17th Amendment”. This applies to the 18th amendment as well. With mainstream media still fearful of robustly interrogating the implications of the 18th amendment for what they might have to face once it is passed, a supine opposition facing an enduring crisis in its leadership, NGOs that have never really galvanised public opinion, much less sustained public support and with politicians who are opportunistic and with a marked lack of principled politics, one can argue that the President merely uses what is fundamentally a dysfunctional democracy for parochial gain. Hence for example the genuine belief on the streets, and outside fora such as this, that the 18th amendment will actually hold, inter alia, the President more accountable to Parliament and that elections henceforth can actually be conducted in a free and fair manner.

This is why I appreciated very much reading Resisting the Loss of Citizenship in Sri Lanka, for simple actions citizens can take against this government long after the furore (or is it führer?!) over the 18th amendment has passed.”

After the 18th Amendment was passed by parliament on the 8th, we questioned via our last tweets for the day whether Sri Lanka was in fact a breeding ground for authoritarianism and noted that what we published during the course of the week was a hard to erase and courageous record of critical dissent and principled opposition to a heinous constitutional amendment.

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Though these were penned in the context of the 18th amendment, they undergird a vital reflection and debate that needs to ensure Sri Lanka’s democracy is not hostage to the whims of any Executive President, be it the incumbent, or someone far worse in the future.

• Hansard on 18th Amendment debate, 8 September 2010
• Exclusive video: Parliamentary debate and objections to 18th Amendment
• Photos of candle-light vigil against 18th Amendment (Updated with video)
• Photos from protest by lawyers in Colombo against 18th Amendment
• Photos from demonstration against 18th Amendment

As pointed out by many historians, Sri Lanka’s leaders at the time of independence did not lead a mass anti-colonial movement like in neighbouring India. We were pretty much granted independence and universal franchise in the teeth of hesitation by our leaders who had to be convinced reluctantly that the masses were ready for democracy. Sri Lanka’s nationalist struggles were rooted more in relation to a revival of Sinhala identity, culture and the Buddhist religion. While a similar revival was also taking place within the Tamil population, I am only concerned with the characteristics of Sinhala nationalism in this article.

Recent analysts have been pointing out that Sinhala nationalism has never been only or even primarily anti-Tamil. In fact its main fight has been against westernised elites, colonialism and neo-colonialism. These elements are linked to the strong feeling of past injustice that informs the Sinhala Buddhist identity. This is linked to the notion that successive waves of foreign domination displaced the Sinhala Buddhists from their ‘rightful’ place and that the state has a responsibility to redress these grievances. There is a material basis for this: demographic and socio-economic changes that resulted from free education policies, better health care facilities and the crisis in the agriculture sector created a large group of rural, vernacular educated youth seeking to move out of agriculture. But a stagnating economy meant that aspirations and expectations could not be met easily. Government jobs were the main source through which these aspirations could be met. It is in such a context that language became a key issue around which nationalist sentiments were most strongly expressed. English represented the language not only of the coloniser but of the local elite who maintained status and class inequalities through their political, economic and cultural domination symbolised by language. The English speaking, ‘westernised’ elite was able to access opportunities that were denied to the vernacular educated masses. Perceived imbalances in the representation of Tamils in the government sector and in the universities added an anti-minority element to the language problem. But the main grievance was against the state and a leadership that was alienated from the culture and values of a considerable section of the population. The 1956 political campaign of SWRD Bandaranaike managed to capitalise on these grievances and to promise a leadership and a state that would work differently.

The fact that the state was evaluated and legitimised on the basis of its ability to address the historical grievances of the Sinhalese meant that successive political parties campaigned on the basis of promises to satisfy the majority community. And it appears that the more unpopular the policies of a government have been, the more aggressively it has played the nationalist card. The government of J R Jayawardene is a classic case in point. This most liberal, pro-western government was preaching a Dharmishta Samajaya while busily dismantling democratic institutions, consolidating power within the Executive and launching a series of reforms that in the long term was to make Sri Lanka one of the countries in the Asian region with one of the fastest growing gaps between the rich and the poor. It was also during JR’s watch that the ethnic conflict took a turn from simmering tension and occasional skirmishes to one of protracted violence and terror.

It is not difficult to see similarities with the regime of JR Jayawardence and the Rajapakse regime. Even more consummately than the Jayawardene regime, the Rajapakses have managed to present themselves as ‘authentically’ Sri Lankan. The elitist, cosmopolitan image of Ranil Wickramasinghe, whose obvious discomfort with anything to do with people, let alone the local, has served as a superb counterfoil to the ‘authenticity’ and common touch of the Rajapakses. Their intransigence in negotiating with the west, diatribes against neo-colonialism, the aggression against the ‘interference’ of foreigners in the affairs of a sovereign nation have nicely chimed with the sense of historical grievances that is embedded within Sinhala nationalism. They have managed to maintain this image while implementing policies that will surely increase hardship and suffering for a majority of people in this country. For there is no doubt, the kind of development envisaged by the Rajapakse regime is not about a fairer, more just world but perpetuating the exploitation of the vulnerable.

But to come back to the problem of civil society, its intellectual disdain of nationalism as a concept has meant that it has also failed to grasp that within the ideas of Sinhala nationalism lies a very real problem of a society that is mired in privileges and connections. That apart from the idea of historical grievances, the fact that post-colonial Sri Lanka has failed to establish institutions and systems that are not rooted in feudalism, patronage and elitism is what drives the nationalist imagination. The dependence on social connections has become so much a part of our lives that most of us operate in that system unthinkingly. Most of us would not think twice about doing favours for a ‘known’ person or would not dream of attempting to do anything without first finding a ‘contact’ who can facilitate things for us; that who a person is, their background, their networks becomes a primary consideration in how we treat that person. This has meant that those who are without connections and who are not known, struggle at most things ranging from getting attention from a doctor to putting a child to school to getting a job to being heard in a seminar or workshop. Even if we look around most of our civil society organisations it is easy to see a pattern of old school, family and social connections. This has prevented civil society initiatives from being truly anti-establishment because whatever its pretensions to the contrary it remains very much a part of the establishment. This has meant that civil society organisations in Sri Lanka have never been able to lead or influence social movements; rather, civil society organisations are at best doing good work in an isolated little corner of their world or at worst project driven, aid-dependant NGOs.

If there is to be any genuine change in Sri Lanka, change that does not involve one cycle of violence followed by another, as part of civil society we need to engage in some serious reflection. How much have we been part of a system upholding the status-quo? How many of us can genuinely claim to have looked beyond the comfort zones of our cultural and social networks to reach places where our most taken-for-granted positions may be challenged? Even in our everyday practices and engagements, how much have we moved beyond our personal networks? And what kind of influence can we have if we do not? Let us be realistic; we do not have the power to change anything unless we can truly become a part of broader social movements.

If we are serious about the threat that faces Sri Lankan society today in the face of a totalitarian and corrupt regime, we may have to at least enter into dialogues with those beyond our immediate circles. We may need to examine more closely why ideas of the nation and nationalism mean so much to people; why a sense of historical grievance is so much a part of the national consciousness. This regime (like others before them) have tapped into the racist elements of nationalist sentiments. What I am suggesting here is that the more multi-dimensional nature of nationalist thinking is taken into consideration so that we can engage with it in a way that challenges all of us. It may require us to examine our privileged positions; and to ensure that we are not simply reproducing circles of privilege. It will be hard – not simply because of how it may challenge us, but because the euphoria of the end of the war, the short-term benefits of the big development projects that are being implemented, will mean that not many people will be ready to enter into a dialogue about social change. But there are dissenting voices. And those voices are not just within our circle of civil society organisations. In fact, they may be from among those we would in general not consider our allies. Maybe there won’t be complete cohesion among those voices; but unless we are willing to understand where they come from; what the commonalities and differences are among us, how we can challenge and change each other, we will be nothing more than ineffectual. And that is something we cannot afford to be. Not in these times.

• The ‘Sinhala-Nationalist’s Burden’
• Politics of Sinhala Nationalism: Underpinning of the UPFA Victory and Undermining of the Sri Lankan Nationhood
• Katunayake Protest as an Invitation to Political Economy
• The Nationalist Epidemic
• Defeating the result and the cause of war – Role of the mass movement

The war is over, you will say; there is peace, at least in the sense that armed conflict, air raids, artillery, suicide bombs, and state and LTTE terrorism have subsided. That’s good is it not? Yes that’s true – I will not touch on whether war crimes lie strewn along the way; I have already had my say. “Then what’s eating you?” you will ask. “I have little confidence in the future” I will respond. Or to be a little colourful: The government’s persistent assault on democracy is breeding the next generation of Prabaharans and Wijeweeras. Rousseau was more sensational: “There is peace in dungeons, but is that enough to make dungeons desirable?” Hang on, this is getting lurid; let’s start again at the cold-blooded analytical end.

What is war victory?

There are contradictory opinions in circulation re the significance of the end of the LTTE. Let me recount four.

a)     The Sinhala nationalist narrative: A terrorist monster that was devastating mother Lanka has been annihilated. Everything is ok now. Tamil problem! What Tamil problem? There is nothing left to worry about. Devolution, what devolution? The bloody Indians and the imperialist West, having failed to defeat our brave soldiers on the battlefield, are now planting political rot on the inside. Never! The people have spoken and given our great leader a huge mandate to do Chintenaya; he must not overstep one centimetre ‘Tamilwards’.

b)    The Left-Liberal interpretation: Historically the LTTE was born of unfairness to Tamils under the jackboot of the Sinhala State. It too then foolishly responded with war and terror and dug its own grave; in any case Thmil Eelam was fantasy. The destruction of the LTTE leaves the Tamils forlorn. The government will take no notice hereafter; Rajapakse ain’t gonna “give” them nothing, and there’s bugger all they can do about it. Meantime the regime exploits bigotry spurred by electoral and war victory to cement dictatorship.

c)     The lament of the Tamil separatists, mostly in the diaspora: The Sinhala State with Delhi’s backing subjected the Tamil people to genocide and consolidated the hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhism. The struggle for a separate state is not over; Eelam referenda in the diaspora, trans-national contraptions, and pressure on Western governments are ways of keeping the flag flying.

d)    Lankan McCarthyism: Senator McCarthy saw a red under every bed and hounded every radical voice in America. One arm of the Lankan regime, despite war victory, shrieks of perpetual terrorism and craves to hang “traitors” as a short cut to silencing dissenting voices

These and other intermediate hypotheses throw different light on the same reality in the perception of different actors. The Sinhala nationalist narrative is cosseted with state power hence hegemonic and will prevail for now. Hitler and Mussolini’s final step in the accession to power was facilitated by electoral victories and greeted by rapturous crowds. It was not internal dissent but external intervention, the incredible horrors of war, death and destruction that unseated that mandate. This is a chilling thought; in Lanka an electoral landslide on the heels of war victory is a continuum, a process, a pointer to the consolidation of dictatorship.

May 2010 is not just the first anniversary of war victory; it is also the first month of consolidation of that victory in massive electoral mandates affirming that victory. I must repeat; war and the electoral mandate form a continuum, a single process. The mandate rejects an equal relationship with the minorities and reflects the will of the Sinhala people; let’s face it, let’s not be ostriches. Democratic and civil society spaces have suffered a crushing contraction. I do not use the term civil society in the petty NGO sense; I use it as in eighteenth and nineteenth century enlightenment political discourse; civil society is the wide public space, distinct from the state on one side, and the private space of the family on the other.

Girding up for the long road

The Left-Liberal voice is the cry of a moral and rational interlocutor, but for now a muted voice; for how long I cannot tell. If dictatorship consolidates whether it can be reversed by internal (national) processes alone is moot, but what needs to be done by homo-democraticus in the present conjuncture is unambiguous.  The watchwords are patience, consciousness building and public education. In the old days it used to be called educating the masses, sounds patronising but it is true.

Tens of thousands of people are involved in networks of patronage and corruption; willing partners, their mind-set limited. Millions more have grown indifferent, prefer ignorance or benefit from crumbs. Social ethics are in decline, moral apathy is customary, and Lankan society exists in a condition of anomie. This is not an injustice inflicted on a good people by corrupt and power hungry politicians and venal and inefficient bureaucrats. No, that is not the whole picture. The people are themselves involved in the game; partners willingly inducted into an ambiance of corruption, power abuse and patronage.

Political practices need appropriate terms to denominate them. Caciquism though not a common word is a timely acquisition in our political lexicon. It is a system of rule by local political bosses mainly government party MPs, and other hangers on. Previously I have compared our regime, within a Marxist reading, to Marcos type authoritarianism, crony capitalism, and patron-client relationships. These are valid but miss what is distinctive about the Lankan case; we are moving in the direction of a populist elected dictatorship flourishing in symbiosis with a network of regional claques who have made politics a business, a business to reap profits and usurp civilian power. Politics has become the most lucrative business in town; caciques soak sleaze like moose in rut wallow in pheromone laden urine pits. The cacique stabilises a local power base, delivers votes, plasters walls, battles covetous competitors and leads the masses in hosannas.

Challenged by uncertain outcomes in the aftermath of triumph in a race war, a landslide mandate for elected dictatorship and a packed rubber stamp parliament the patient long term project of the Left and Liberal alternative has to be patient pluripotent mobilisation; I have borrowed the word from modern genetics. Every mammal starts as a single cell which multiplies into a small group of embryonic stem cells, pluripotent cells with the potency to develop into livers, kidneys, muscles – even the evil brains of fascists. The pluripotent re-education and conscience building tasks facing the independent left and democratic liberals needs patience; they must hang in for the long haul. It has to be pluripotent in that there will be a variety of challenges not now foreseeable and response must be imaginative and flexible.

An organisation calling itself the Coffee Party movement has appeared in the USA in opposition to the wacky Tea Party movement. It is an interesting group had has already gathered a following of 200,000 fed up with the nutters, racists and reactionary dinosaurs who characterise the American far right. What is interesting is that the Coffee Party is a de novo example of pluripotent political consciousness building and grass roots mobilisation. Not aggressive mobilisation in the sense of street warfare but rather raising people’s awareness, and encouraging the concerned and the willing to intervene. The keywords of the Coffee Party are “coming together of concerned, intelligent citizens who are tired of angry rhetoric” and “all political persuasions joining in a spirit of equanimity to discuss the nation’s problems” (Newsweek 3 May 2010).

Of course an America based model cannot be copied for Lanka but in a very broad way there is something to think about; how to take a step back and understand caciquism, how to take a long view to pluripotent cooperation of concerned citizens of all persuasions. I am convinced that the time has come to discard dated ideological garments and spurn obsolete organisational mantras that we have been slaves to for half a century; time to think afresh, time to think lateral.

• Reading the results of the municipal elections in Sri Lanka
• Are alliances the key in Sri Lanka’s up-coming Presidential election?
• Blinkered vision of Tamil nationalists and socialists is self-defeating
• The UNP’s Leadership Crisis: An Individual Conflict with Catastrophic Prospects or Redefinition of Current Political Tasks
• Looking back, looking forward: A brief chat with HRW Human Rights Defender Award winner Sunila Abeysekera on war and peace in Sri Lanka

“But  when states are acquired  in a province differing in language, in customs, and in institutions, then difficulties  arise; and to hold them one must be very fortunate and very assiduous…He should also take precautions to check an invasion of the province by  a foreigner  as powerful as himself. Invariably, the invader will be brought in by those who are disaffected because of excessive ambition or because of fear” [1] The North and East could be said to broadly resemble the province that Machiavelli refers to here. When regions are dissimilar in language, customs and institutions any politically astute ruler needs to understand that unless these rights to differing language, customs and institutions are recognized and respected, the political price for the state will be huge. Machiavelli wrote this cautionary advice to the Italian rulers about 500 years ago but his words also provide valuable insights to the current Sri Lankan political leadership too. His words demonstrate that one needs to be careful about the regional alignments of political forces in order to protect the sovereignty of the state. One year after the comprehensive military defeat of the Tigers, are we conscious of the huge task of reconciliation and resolution of Tamil grievances? Are we ready to learn from Machiavelli’s warning?

This short article attempts to make some observations on the difficulties of political resolution of the ethnic conflict but will try to argue for the recognition of multi-ethnic   and pluralist nature of our people and to preserve their dignity and rights within a Sri Lankan national democratic culture.

Primordial aspirations

Following the victory against the LTTE it appears that the hopes of a political solution have been somewhat dashed as the Sri Lankan government has yet to give any gestures towards such a move. The Sinhala political leadership appears to be playing a waiting game. A hawkish element within the Sinhalese leadership in government has been fostered by an ideology which does not recognize the humanity of other ethnic groups other than Sinhala people. Historically this has been the one of most negative and significant ideological factors which drove the Tamils and their political culture towards a separatist discourse. In both communities’ primordial national aspirations have been major obstacles in resolving the ethnic issue as they have taken very entrenched political positions.Premordialist national aspirations are described in the way in which the current national identities are articulated by using historical material and applied them to the past in order to gain political advantage. For an example inscriptions are used to prove a particular nation has the right to make political claims on the basis of such historical material. The academic research has argued very strongly to show the way in which our history is analyzed and its political implication. The history of Sri Lanka has generally been written in premordialist terms, with nationalist assumptions anachronistically applied to the past …  ancient chronicles and inscriptions which proclaim that Sri Lanka must be ruled by Buddhists to prove their point” [2] This is the situation in relation to the Tamil political leadership too.

The Tamil Tigers were responsible for driving the Tamil community to the brink of disaster from the inception of their organization. In the end when that brought their leadership to disaster and death they left behind their primordial national aspirations. Their utopia of a separate state on traditional homelands has still been the main ideological and political base for their political ambitions. These ideological and political aspirations were not buried with the Tamil Tiger leadership. This separatist ideology was readily adopted by the TNA and later the Illankai Thamil Arsu Kathchi (ITAK) and   it was made manifest when they   campaigned in the parliamentary elections on the federalist platform. They also claimed that before the advent of European powers the Tamils had a separate kingdom in the north highlighting again their primordial aspirations. No military defeat can vanquish ideology, though it may suffer a temporary setback. Following the defeat of war the LTTE’s proxy the TNA continued the political struggle with the same ideology and argued on the basis of those same aspirations.

Political will

The lack of political will on the part of the victor is yet another major obstacle for a just and lasting political solution. When a war is lost the struggle changes to the political arena where both sides test their political strength. Prior to, and since the elections the political struggle has continued. As Gramsci observes “then the defeated army is disarmed and dispersed, but the struggle continues on the train of politics and of military “preparation”.[3] When the political struggle continues on the terrain of politics then the hope of finding a solution appears to be less and less distant but in reality this perception can be deceptive, as the loser cannot negotiate on equal terms, nor gain concessions from the winner .  Both the Presidential and Parliamentary elections marked the highpoints of the political struggles. However, during this period the Sinhalese leadership failed to reassure the Tamil community or provide them with political gestures of reconciliation. To date, there has been no clear messages and no definite assurances to a community who underwent one of the most tragic experiences in the history of armed conflicts.

Aftermath of the war

When the clear winner emerged, the government hardened their political stance towards an eventual solution. The Tamil political parties TNA/ITAK have signaled that they would accept a solution within a united Sri Lanka. Yet it is clear that they still cling to their primordial political aspirations, reminding the people of the existence of a Tamil state before the colonial rule began and going back to federalism as a political solution. Even though they have somewhat softened their position that was not enough to allay the deep mistrust that had been building prior to and during the war. The reconciliation would have had a chance if the both parties reconsidered their respective political projects and reformulated their political positions. Then, the struggle in the ‘terrain of politics’ could have won a profound understanding leading to a political resolution of the conflict. This opportunity still stands. Following their work and research in state building D.Rothchild and P G Roeder made the following observations ‘Yet the success of power sharing depends on the continuing commitment of the leaders of the ethnic groups to moderate their own demands and their ability to contain hard-line elements within their own communities. Such moderation and control are likely to be short supply after civil war” [4] The Sinhalese political leadership during and after the war did not show their ability to contain the Sinhalese hawks and moderate their political positions in relation to Tamil democratic rights. The same happened with the Tamil Tigers in relation to their political project of Tamil separatism. This state of affairs continued after the war and still continues to hamper any hope of reconciliation, though the onus on political leadership now rests with the Government and the Sinhalese leadership.

Sri Lanka’s fragile democracy needs strengthening to take up the essential task of democratizing our society. At present political dissent and tolerance has come under severe strain. The electorally weakened opposition or the UNP has neither strategy nor political will to tackle the issues of political democracy or good governance. When democratic structures are fragile it is not possible to fully ensure the democratic rights of a people who have experienced discrimination under a majoritarian rule. Therefore the Tamil democratic rights are realizable only with a wider democratic opening within the Sinhalese community. This benefits everyone, because a solution that protects Tamil democratic rights also protects the rights of the Sinhalese community.

Absence of resolution

We inherited a deeply divided nation that in the absence of a political resolution, we will in turn pass on to the next generation. Such a predicament will generate hopelessness that can be exploited by a new kind of militant outfit. Eric Hobsbawm in discussing the reasons for the rise of militant nationalism in Germany before the war makes the following analysis. ‘all the same, even if we do not see resurgence of militant nationalism as a mere reflect of despair, it was plainly something that filled the void left by failure, impotence, and apparent inability of other ideologies, political projects and programmes to realize the men’s hopes [5] The Sinhala political leadership should learn from these experiences and make sure that there is a political project that will give the Tamil people hope not despair and political strength rather than impotence. In order to achieve this, devolution of power is the most capable and suitable political project. Being Sinhalese and belonging to the majority community many of us will never understand the nationalist sentiments of an average Tamil youth who is overcome by hopelessness in the face of political and social marginalization. Benedict Anderson in his celebrated book “Imagined Communities” explains the nationalism’s attractiveness and vulnerability of people to the call to die for the nationalist project. “Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, nation is always conceived as deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings [6] .In order to understand the reasons why so many youths came forward to die during the war in the North and East Anderson‘s explanation is useful. It is also useful in understanding the power of nationalist feelings and how it will drag us into another military project in the absence of a just political solution. Even though, the Tigers’ utopia of a separate state was buried with them at Vellamullaivikkal , even though their guns fell silent on 18 May 2009 the likelihood of their dream  resurfacing cannot be ruled out unless there is a political solution within a united Sri Lanka that can restore the Tamil community’s dignity and respect.

After a generation of the most destructive 30 year war in this country, there is a historic opportunity to lay bare the basic foundation for ethnically inclusive and pluralist political structures that would withstand the pressures of multicultural and multinational nature of our country. If this does not happen the Sinhalese leadership will go down in Sri Lankan history as a leadership who won the war but lost the peace.

Notes

[1] Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (London, 2003) pp.10-11

[2] E.Nissan and R.L Stirrat, ‘The generation of communal identities’ in Sri Lanka, History and the Roots of the Conflict, J Spencer (Ed.), (London, 1990) p.40

[3] Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, (London, 2007), p.229

[4] P.Roeder and D Rothchild ‘Dilemmas in State Building in Divided Societies’ in P Roeder and D.Rothchild (edi.)Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars (Ithaca and London, 2005) p.9

[5] Eric   Hobsbawm,   Nation and Nationalism since 1780: Programmes, Myths and Reality (Cambridge: 1997), p.144.

[6] Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and the Spread of Nationalism (London 1893), p.7   Emphasis added.

• TNA and the New Era of Tamil Politics: Are They Living Up to the Challenge?
• Politics of Sinhala Nationalism: Underpinning of the UPFA Victory and Undermining of the Sri Lankan Nationhood
• TNA’s Failure to Seize the Moment: Who Will Fill the Vacuum?
• On “traitors” and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration
• A reponse to ETHNOS OR DEMOS? – QUESTIONING TAMIL NATIONALISM

Shanthi Sachithananthan, the Chairperson of Viluthu, has been featured several times on Groundviews in the past, including an interview two months ago looking at significant developments in Sri Lanka after the demise of the LTTE and her views on the July 1983 pogrom against Tamils.

In this recent interview, Shanthi, who recently campaigned for political office in the parliamentary elections in April 2010 after forming an independent political party, speaks about her experiences interacting with voters from the Batticaloa district – the issues they confront, their aspirations and the extremely poor awareness of governance, representative democracy and electoral processes. Shanthi’s approach to campaigning is also revealed by her as a vehicle to prise open vital debates and issues amongst voters mainstream political parties would rather not address, or seek to underplay.

I asked Shanthi whether Tamil representation in parliament now would engage in politics of antagonism or engagement with the Sinhala majority, and whether the overtures being made to the TNA by government were seen by her to be a positive development. After Shanthi offered her thoughts on the space for strategic engagement by the Tamil polity with government, I asked her what she felt would be the foundations for such engagement, if were to take place.

We talked about the Tamil diaspora, and the means through which they could engage with Tamil politics in the country, with the State and civil society if not government per se.

At the time of the interview, Shanthi had just returned from Jaffna. What she says about the situation on the ground, the breakdown of the rule of law and the fear psychosis is disturbing to hear. Although the allegations of the deterioration of law and order have been, unsurprisingly, strongly challenged by the government, Shanthi’s accounts of random abductions of children, violence and the ensuing anxiety amongst parents and other civilians is not an account dismissed easily.

I finally ask her what she wants to do with party politics in the future to strengthen citizen engagement with governance in the East and North in particular.

• Post-war Sri Lanka: A conversation with Shanthi Sachithananthan
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
• Prabakaran’s Role in Tamil National Struggle: Interview with Shanthi Sachithanandan
• Two years after war’s end in Sri Lanka: What can the Tamil and Sinhala diaspora do?
• Ground realities in Jaffna and its environs: Two key perspectives

In a society that has just emerged from a murderous war, humility and reconciliation should be foremost in the agenda of Ministers. It seemed to have slipped the minds of many candidates to pause and realise how important and historic this election would be in redefining our lives.
Though not a direct parallel, Sudan held its first multi-party elections on 11^th April, just days after Sri Lanka. The undemocratic nature of the elections was brought to light in the international media. Opposition parties, who believed that the results would be rigged, boycotted the elections. This was an important move. If opposition parties boycotted elections in Sri-Lanka, it would have also brought to sharp relief concerns over the Rajapaksa regime’s democratic credentials.

So what now? With two elections post-LTTE, are we still an optimistic island? Yes, investment is increasing, job options are diversifying, and international tourism has increased. But what can be said about domestic concerns? Have you visited the Cancer Ward at the General Hospital? Have you witnessed the deteriorating Education system and the strain it has put on children driving them to suicide? Have you seen the environment, the garbage dumps, the rancid air? Have we taken the next step to include IDPs in Sri Lanka’s civil society? Is it safe for women? For ethnic minorities? For the media?

• Blinkered vision of Tamil nationalists and socialists is self-defeating
• The Tamil Population and the Politics of Boycotts and Non Participation
• Urgent questions to pose to the Leader of the Opposition
• Parliamentary Elections, April 2010: An opportunity for voters in the North and East
• Not signing the Rome Statute is not enough! (A response to Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mangala Samaraweera)

I got two feedbacks from two prominent personalities in Sri Lanka on this survey;

Response 1: “Cannot go by Indian survey as it is, because most people who have changed their minds after PC elections do not reveal the change unless the one who is interviewed is personally known to the officer carrying out the survey, due to sheer fear. Environment is so bad, the govt. sources take revenge at slightest knowledge that someone is in favour of SF. Therefore my understanding is that SF will win provided election/polling is carried out fairly without ridging votes, which hardly can be believed.”

Response 2: “That Indian outfit is well known and reputed. They will lose customers in India if they fudge data to support one side in tiny Sri Lanka.  I would take non Lankan survey more seriously than any Lankan survey. Specially one by an outfit with a reputation to lose!” and he said MR will win.

Therefore a group of people here in Auckland decided to carry out a telephone survey during the last weekend (16-17 January) using a very small sample in 6 districts; Colombo, Gampaha, Matara, Kalutara, Puttlam and Moneragala. According to that survey General (Rtd.) Sarath Fonseka (SF) is going to win the next presidential election. We have to wait until the results are out to verify which sample is more representative and to see whether the sample size really matters. We captured 100 responses.  We assessed four critical sensitive factors (CSF) and the outcome is as follows;

CSF 1: Percentage of valid votes in the whole country except for Northern  Province (62.5% in 2009 PC election; 77.7% in 2005 presidential election).

Projection for 2010 is 78.12%; apx. 11,000,000 votes.

CSF 2: How do those who have not voted in 2009 PC election would vote on 26^th Jan 2010? This is the most sensitive factor as it counts nearly to 2,500,000 votes.

Many respondents of the view that those who did not vote in 2009 PC election are mostly hardcore UNP votes and the survey outcome suggests 3 – 4 out of five of such votes would be for SF; 1,500,000 – 2,000,000 votes.

CSF 3: Is there any change of voting pattern from last PC election?

Survey suggests that 0-2 out of 5 (0% – 40%), who voted to UPFA in the last 2009 PC election, would vote against UPFA. Colombo reported 40% while Moneragala reported 0% and other four districts reported 20% swing to SF. However, giving the benefit of the doubt to MR the whole island average swing is projected as moderate 13.6% (5,162,000 of UPFA votes except Northern Province in 2009 PC election) which is apx. 700,000 votes.

CSF 4: Northern Province polling rate and percentage to SF.

Projection is that 420,000 votes would be polled and 60%-70% of valid votes would be for SF; Apx. 250,000 votes.

FORECAST

Viplav’s forecast of 12% lead should result in that MR polling at least 55.5%, so that SF would be polled 43.5% leaving 1% to others. But if we project CSF-2 towards more favourable to MR, that is only 1,500,000 vote-swing to SF, then MR would get apx. 50.4%. Therefore, according to our survey it is very unlikely that MR would lead by 12% to post 55.5% as published by Viplav pvt Ltd, instead he would be polled just between 48.3% and 50.4% as on 17 Jan.

C A Saliya

Auckland

18 Jan 2010

• Analysis of how Jaffna voted and why the EPDP feels defeated in Sri Lanka’s first post-war elections
• Suggestion to the Select Committee on Electoral Reform
• A bizarre polling card: Evidence of a flawed election?
• Heeding the voices of the North
• Democracy in Sri Lanka: Ideas and responses