Photo by Eranga Jayawardena

As another year begins to draw to a close on post-war Sri Lanka, we can take stock of which changes, or the lack of change, we see around us. The full scope of human rights are still not available to civilians living in areas formerly controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which are now tightly controlled by the Sri Lankan armed forces, with strong restrictions prevailing on their right to move freely and their right to assemble, amongst other fundamental rights.

Pressing issues such as hundreds of unsolved cases of disappearances, and the rights of detainees and ex-detainees – particularly those of former LTTE cadres – remain unresolved since 2009, which marked ‘the end’ of the civil war in Sri Lanka.

The cost of living has nearly crippled much of the population, and yet, highways, new roads, and bridges are blossoming all over the island with unprecedented speed and efficiency.

Sri Lanka remains teetering on the edge of change and transition – and yet it does not seem to be going over the edge in a hurry.

Instead, a slow transformation that is difficult to identify, understand and categorise, seems to be taking place before our eyes. It is in this context that the International Day on Women Human Rights Defenders dawns on Sri Lanka, and the world, on the 29^th of November 2011.

Challenges faced by Women Human Rights Defenders

Within almost any socio-political context, Women Human Rights Defenders (Women HRDs) face challenges that are unique to them by default – simply by virtue of being women. Society and social structures, particularly law enforcement, continue to be patriarchal leaving women vulnerable to discrimination and violence on a daily basis.

Not only do these structures actively violate the human rights of women, it leaves women powerless in the aftermath; it leaves them with little power to legally reclaim or fight for their rights.

It is in this context that Women HRDs face a set of tough and distinct challenges – they operate to protect human rights and fight against the violation of human rights in a world where they themselves face discrimination and are often not seen as voices significant enough to be contended with.

An international conference for Women Human Rights Defenders held in Colombo in 2005 identified four major sources of abuse that Women HRDs face around the world: State-based violence and issues of accountability and justice, the growing rise in fundamentalist movements seeking and gaining political power, the use of sexuality-based attacks to intimidate women and harm their bodies and reputations; and the need to address abuse perpetrated by communities and families.

Additionally, women that work as human rights campaigners or activists have the inherent dilemma of balance. Particularly in cultures and societies like that of Sri Lanka, there are social obligations and roles that women are expected to fill as mothers as wives and as daughters. Women who choose to work in the field of human rights are not always understood by their families and loved ones; their profession is not always accepted. Many Women HRDs find themselves facing the tough challenge of balancing their homes and personal relationships with their work.

Women HRDs almost anywhere will doubtlessly admit to the pressure and guilt at seeming unable to give priority to their homes, children, and personal lives in the face of the nature of human rights work. As Aida Edemariam asks in an interview with Gillian Slovo, the daughter of Ruth First and Joe Slovo – both leading figures in the anti-apartheid struggle – ‘What is the cost of trying to change the world, and who exactly pays it?’

Whilst Women HRDs face these issues almost everywhere in the world, they occupy a very special and useful position, as women, and play an important role in the larger picture of defending human rights. As women, they are primarily important in standing for the rights of women in a context where women are still particularly vulnerable to the effects of war, political persecution, and the ongoing issues of gender-based violence and discrimination.

A brief history of Women Human Rights Defenders and their movement in Sri Lanka

Historically, the movement of women HRDs in Sri Lanka has always been closely linked with three key avenues: Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zone and related issues, the war and the impact it has had on women, and an ongoing campaign to end violence against women.

Several historic protests and strikes demanding the rights of workers in factories of Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zone have been crucial to the development of the human rights movement in Sri Lanka. Through much of it women have been at the forefront of these strikes. The Polytech Factory Strike of 1983, during which several women (acting both as key organisers and protestors) were arrested in an attempt to quell the protest, is even today seen as a landmark moment in the history of this movement. More recently, 21 year old Roshen Shanaka was killed due to injuries sustained during a protest in the Free Trade Zone, inflicted on him by police. Several large protests took place – with Women HRDs once again at the forefront – to demand justice in the face of this atrocity.

Through the late 80s and early 90s, a movement to end violence against women and to promote awareness of women’s rights gathered momentum and began to assert itself with a sense of urgency. These campaigns, spearheaded by women across political and social groups, began to shape the larger movement to protect women’s rights, and to promote the notion that ‘women’s rights are human rights’.

In 1994, Radhika Coomaraswamy – a Sri Lankan lawyer, academic and activist – was appointed as the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women for the United Nations. This was seen as a turning point for the women’s rights movement and the movement of Women HRDs in Sri Lanka, which gained confidence in continuing to strengthen their campaigns.

The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, saw the active participation of many Sri Lankan women from several human rights and women’s rights organisations representing diverse issues and communities.

Subsequently, this newly invigorated campaign to end violence against women followed an interesting trajectory in the years to come, and culminated in the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in 2005.

However, in the 90s, the key issue that overcomes the movement of Women HRDs is the issue of war and women affected by war. Naturally, the tense political climate that prevailed at this time as a result of the conflict ensured that the job of Human Rights Defenders became much more dangerous.

Rajini Thiranagama, a young Tamil Woman HRD, lecturer at the University of Jaffna, and activist and writer, was shot dead outside her home in Jaffna. Her family and those close to her suspect the LTTE, whose brutal strategies she had openly criticised and worked against, primarily through the actions of University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) of which she was a founder member. This brutal killing was met with outrage by human rights defenders everywhere – particularly women HRDs in Sri Lanka.

The fact that women are particularly vulnerable to a host of atrocities in times of war is undeniable. Women, particularly Tamil civilians in the North, are increasingly vulnerable to sexual violence, sometimes perpetrated by State actors including the military, and State supported paramilitary groups, leaving women powerless to complain.

Women become vulnerable as mothers and wives, as their sons or husbands are abducted, disappeared or killed as a result of the ongoing conflict. In the South, a Marxist uprising spearheaded by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was brutally crushed by the government – and the cruel phenomenon of abductions and disappearances became the infamous trait that characterised this struggle.

The mothers and wives of the disappeared from both the North and South emerged as a huge factor influencing the movement of Women HRDs as they stepped forth to demand justice.

The year after Thiranagama’s death, Richard de Zoysa, a Colombo-based journalist, activist and writer, was abducted from his home and killed. There are clear indications that his abduction and murder was State-sanctioned. His mother, Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu is the founder of The Mother’s Front, one of three organisations founded at this time by women, which even today continue to landmark the story of the movement of Women HRDs. The other organizations are The Organisation of Parents and Family Members of The Disappeared, in which several mothers and wives of the disappeared were involved at a high level and the Association of War-Affected Women, founded by Visaka Dharmadasa – whose son was declared Missing in Action as a soldier of the Sri Lankan Army.

At present, Sri Lanka seems to have come full-circle – as today, in post-war Sri Lanka, the families of the disappeared, particularly women, are becoming an increasingly strong voice in the campaign for justice and rights.

What are the challenges that Women Human Rights Defenders face in post-war Sri Lanka?

Sandhya Eknaligoda, the wife of journalist and cartoonist Prageeth Eknaligoda who disappeared in January 2010, personifies the struggle of Woman HRDs in Sri Lanka today.

Whilst she is at the forefront of an ongoing public campaign that demands justice in Prageeth’s case, she is also the mother of two teenage boys. She juggles her personal life and her fight for justice, along with the pressures of being a public figure in a now public and therefore risky campaign.

Similarly, hundreds of women in the North and North East – particularly from Mullaitivu, Jaffna and Mannar districts, are stepping forward to demand justice for the disappearances and killings they have witnessed in the North.

Sri Lankan Women HRDs today are forced to work in a political climate in which democracy and law and order are quickly deteriorating, in an atmosphere of impunity and a culture that continues to regard women as inferior and inconsequential. With little power to shield themselves against sexual harassment, domestic violence and gender-based discrimination, women continue to fight an age-old battle. Furthermore, a culture of moralistic repression continues to blossom and flourish in Sri Lanka.

In 2005, Colombo played host to a historic gathering of Women HRDs from across the world – organised by the International Coordinating Committee of “Defending Women Defending Rights: the International Campaign on Women Human Rights Defenders” (ICWHRD). At a closing public session of the conference, Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International said, “All of us – women and men – must demand the protection of those who defend women’s rights and women who defend all human rights, insist on justice when they’re attacked, and fight for them to be given the recognition they are due.”

Today, in 2011, it is interesting to note that a country that had the privilege of hosting more than a hundred of the world’s leading women activists and HRDs continues to be a battleground for its own Women Human Rights Defenders.

The writer is a Consultant for the Human Rights in Conflict Programme at the Law and Society Trust.

• DISAPPEARANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS & POLITICAL ACTIVISTS LALITH KUMAR WEERARAJ AND KUGAN MURUGAN ON 9TH DECEMBER 2011
• 42 Political Activists and HRDs Detained and Prevented from Participating in Peaceful Protest in Jaffna Town on Human Rights Day
• Women on Top: Sexuality and rights in Sri Lanka
• A Romance with Rights
• HAS MAHINDA RAJAPAKSA BEEN A TRAITOR TO SRI LANKA?

As one of the members of the Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990 (Citizens’ Commission), it is my privilege and pleasure to say a few brief words on behalf of all the Commissioners on the occasion of the launch of our Report.

The Citizen’s Commission was an initiative of the Law and Society Trust (LST) and its partners’ in the absence of an official government inquiry into the expulsion of Muslims from the Northern districts by the LTTE. Our mandate was to document comprehensively  and in depth the experiences of the expulsion, the subsequent two decades of displacement and resettlement of the Northern Muslims as well as their expectations of the state and civil society.

The fact that this was conceived of as a ‘Commission’, I think has important methodological as well as conceptual implications. A commission of inquiry (CoI) is generally appointed by the Executive Branch to inquire and report on a particular incident or series of incidents, to verify facts and to determine responsibility. As opposed to judicial proceedings in a court of law, a CoI process provides a number of advantages. A CoI process is able to 1) investigate the underlying socioeconomic and political causes in addition to uncovering facts and assigning responsibility; 2)unlike court proceedings which are adversarial, where facts and legal arguments are presented by counsel, and there sis limited ability to investigate further, a CoI process allows for an inquisitorial approach which allows the Commissioners’ to to be open to a wider range of questions they want answers for as well as the witnesses who they want to hear and take account of; 3) lastly, it also has the ability to involve and inform the public in ways not available in judicial proceedings.

This initiative itself is a unique achievement, in that it is perhaps it is one of the few instances of such a broad-based CoI process being initiated by civil society in Sri Lanka. Our Commission brought together a diverse group of civil society members at the national level and the regional level as well as a number of community based organisations with roots in the Northern Muslim community. What we all have in common is a deep commitment to ensure that the voices of Northern Muslims are heard and that justice is ensured.

We know that official Commissions of Inquiry in Sri Lanka do not always yield expected results. A number of recent studies on Commissions appointed by successive governments have pointed out that they end up being tools to launch attacks against opponents, a way to deflect criticism of the government or a way to co-opt civil society members to white wash violations or all of these things at once. This is borne out, for example, in Kishali Pinto Jayawardene’s work on Commissions of Inquiry, which show how such commissions have largely served the interests of governments, and/or been a cover for impunity and therefore how counter-productive they can be.  She does however, I think, make an important distinction between ‘bad’ commissions and ‘good’ commissions. While bad commissions, were patently political; had political appointees and arrived at political verdicts that suited the government of the day, good commissions did perform the function of telling the truth and did make good recommendations although never implemented. For example, the four Presidential Commissions of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons which functioned during the period 1994 – 2000, looked into thousands of complaints of disappearances and established that over 20,000 cases of “disappearances” had in fact occurred, most at the hands of security forces but, unsurprisingly, their recommendations were mostly ignored.

The methodology followed by us in our work and in compiling our report was multi faceted, including primary and secondary research as well the collection of close to 400 narratives from displaced persons. This research was complemented by several visits by us to different locations to meet with members of the Northern Muslim community, where we also heard first-hand accounts of their experiences and expectations. I think this process ensured a more nuanced analysis of the events of 1990 and the issues at stake. The diverse background of the Commissioners’ opened up a space to talk about the expulsion, its consequences and return and resettlement in an open and frank exchange. The presence of a number of women, both as Advisors and Commissioners allowed us to have a number of special meetings with women of the Northern Muslim community. Given that men used to dominate discussions at mixed meetings, this created an important space where women could talk about issues personal to them, including psycho social problems experienced by them. At one of the meetings, when the women learnt that one of the Commissioners (Gameela Samarasinghe) was a psychologist they opened up to her about their problems in a way they otherwise might not have, talking about their mental trauma and distress following displacement. Gameela was able to respond not just with empathy but with a deep understanding of the psycho-social implications of displacement.  The presence of a retired High Court Judge Mr. Majeed, with a wealth of knowledge on land issues and land law, as a Commissioner, meant that those who came before the Commission could go deep into the critical issue of land separating perceptions and attitudes, myths and facts, and law and non law from one another. The presence of a member of the host community, Dr. Anes gave a necessary balance to the sittings in Puttalam where host – displaced community relations have been strained over the years.  During our visit to Mannar, Dr. Nesiah’s recollection of Tamil-Muslim relations in Mannar during the time he was the Government Agent there (‘65-‘68) enriched our historical perspective, which has been a critical facet of the work of the Commission. My own work on Muslim Personal Law in Sri Lanka, opened up the space to talk about the ways in which women in the community are discriminated by laws endorsed by the ‘community’. We hope therefore that this process resulted in a genuine ‘truth’ seeking. We hope that it has catalysed a dialogue and discussion about the issues facing the Northern Muslim community in Sri Lanka across a number of civil society members and groups with a view to understanding and addressing those problems collectively.

The involvement of community based organisations rooted in the Northern Muslim community in this Commission ensured a high degree of community ownership of the commission process.  The partner organizations were the Rural Development Foundation (RDF) the People’s Secretariat and the Community Trust Fund. It also ensured that our meetings were not always formal interactions. The Commission was welcomed into people’s homes for informal discussions over cups of tea and biscuits on numerous occasions, which gave us added insights to a number of questions.

There was also an expectation that the diversity of people and groups involved with the commission would situate the problems of the Northern Muslim community within the larger socio-political context of Sri Lanka while linking different groups working on similar issues around the country. As expressed by the coordinator, Farah Haniffa, at the outset of this process, many of the issues that the northern Muslims face are common to most SL citizens affected by the conflict, whether it relates to the ration amount, accessing services or language difficulties. Muslims to date have unfortunately not been able to articulate many of their distinct causes as part of the wider concerns of affecting the Sri Lankan polity. We hope that this process was able to realise that expectation at least to some extent.

Finally, we hope that this process reaffirms and reclaims the role of civil society not just to hold government accountable but also in the process of furthering post-war reconciliation in Sri Lanka, in an environment often hostile to civil society. We hope that the insights generated by this report will add to the ongoing discussion to seek an equitable political solution which involves all communities. There is of course no guarantee that the State will pay heed to the recommendations of the report of the Commission. Nevertheless, we hope the report does fulfill its mandate of providing a detailed and inclusive account of the expulsion, displacement, resettlement and the hopes and disappointments of our many fellow citizens. Farah Haniffa, who coordinated this process deserves a special mention and congratulations for her efforts in facilitating our working together–not always easy–as well as putting this report together in a way that brought so many people, groups, ideas, and perspectives. We hope that this can serve as a model for other efforts of this nature. We truly hope that our work will herald new possibilities of justice for Northern Muslims and open the doors wider for justice and peace for all Sri Lankans.

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(This is an edited and adapted version of the speech made by Chulani Kodikara, at the launch of the Commission Report on 3^rd Nov 2011. Also read Some observations on the Final Report of the Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990 and The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of the Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990.)

• The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of the Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990
• Some observations on the Final Report of the Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990
• Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in October 1990
• LLRC submission: The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in October 1990
• The Muslim question and resettlement of Muslim IDPs in post-war Sri Lanka: Two comprehensive interviews

This report provides what will be the definitive account of the story of the Northern Muslims following on their expulsion from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990. Faithful throughout to the narrative of the affected, and respectful in its well- nuanced references to earlier writings- Hasbullah, Thiranagama and others- its approach earns the reader’s respect and trust.

Commencing with accounts of pre- existing relations between co –existing Muslim and Tamil communities, the Report tightly states that.

“October 1990 was a water-shed in terms of both Muslim identity and Tamil identity in the North due to the horror of the expulsion. By driving the Muslims out of their homes, the LTTE finally created a mono-ethnic North.”

While the affected people’s  narrative uses terms such as “People from Batticaloa have come” it is clearly orders  from  the top that was responsible for this instance of  “Tamil Turning Terrorist” against Muslims, to use the report’s words. The creation of a mono- ethnic North was the Principal Objective of this exercise, not a consequence alone. The mind- set behind this, preying on civilians, find echo in the spectacle of the LTTEs destruction from behind of the civilian population seeking to escape from the war- zone in the final stages of the war in 2009.

The inaction of the Sri Lankan Army, though physically present in the North at the time of the expulsion, spoken to time and again in the narratives, is rightly seen by the Commission as an off-  shoot of the inaction of the State. The tragic outcome of this was that both Muslim and Tamil while being at that time very much under the domination of the LTTE, failed to see the commonality of their plight. The result was a single failure to come together against a common enemy, the LTTE.

This 230 page Report, vividly and with sympathy captures the experience of an ethnically- determined civilian population forcibly displaced. It recounts these peoples relationships- economic, social, religious and just plain peaceful co- existence wise, with neighbours prior to expulsion; identifies the problems they faced in displacement, how they faced up to them and who helped/hindered or just stood-by. It describes both the broadening of horizons and the acquisition of new skills, as well as the suffering through loss of family and material assets, and the all- pervading sense of uncertainty attendant on displacement.

Valuable insights lie in the section identifying Problems attendant on re- settlement, both problems at individual  level and problems faced as a community. Problems of re- claiming homesteads and farm- lands, problems of re- integration after a 20 year unwanted absence, problems  arising from the “natural increase” in both returning and resident populations in the absence of an attendant incremental development of the North’s resources; all these are amply depicted. As also the fact that all this has to be faced in the midst of Conflicting Perceptions:

Viz :  “We left because we were forced to and have suffered immeasurably in the intervening period.”

Versus  “You were away. You didn’t  have to suffer the depredations of the LTTE and the horrors of war.”

The courage,  determination and enterprise shown by this civilian population forcibly displaced by LTTE dictate its potent evidence of the vitality and cohesion of that community which will make them a power for good where ever they are. If, due to ties of marriage, employment, tenure of ownership, they decide to make their permanent residence in a part of Sri Lanka other than their area of origin, there should be full recognition by all quarters- administrative, judicial, cultural, that this constitutes the exercise of a Right of Citizenship of a Sri Lankan. Should he wish to re- settle in his area of origin, a like recognition of his right as a citizen to do so should undoubtedly be the basis of the provision of services to and assistance to him.

As they narrative eloquently puts it:

“We do not want to live like the displaced again.”

And, even more succinctly:-

“We can’t move backwards.”

Lands that have remained untilled, homesteads that have stood empty, worse still lands or homesteads that have been the refuge of and received the care of others who may well have come there on facing displacement themselves, and in any case themselves number among  the marginalized poor, pose challenges requiring sensitive solution.

At this juncture,  it is pertinent to remember that even the families of slain LTTEers, despite the grandiose words of the LTTE Boss, belong, objectively speaking, to the numbers of the poor and the marginalized.  Ethnically speaking they were Tamils of course- but there was little else to distinguish their circumstances of displacement and destitution from that of the Muslim poor displaced to Puttalam.

Bishop Rayappu Joseph is quoted in the Report as saying:

“The Tamils who stayed behind were displaced over 26 times, lost children to the LTTE, lost family members to death and disappearance, lost limbs etc.”

This is a timely reminder that the bulk of Tamils left in the North during the years of the war belong to the poor and the marginalized and it was they who were the cannon-fodder for the LTTEs grand designs.

The Report’s Recommendations are particularly apposite in this regard. They are:

“When issues faced by Muslim communities are shared by other communities, attempts should be made to articulate such issues on a common platform. Strategic partnerships for activism should be encouraged.”

And:

“Muslim leadership should not be seen to be advocating for Muslim return alone. Especially the Muslim civil society leadership should find ways of working with the Tamil leadership in the respective areas of fostering a culture of collective work and co- existence.”

The solution of problems attendant on re- settlement need to be tackled as a national issue. This needs close consultation and  cooperation between the Government of Sri Lanka, Community and Political leaders at national and regional level, and the affected people. The approach recommended above, however, is signally absent in the New Structures and Procedures which have been put in place for the settlement of property disputes in the North.

The structure and procedures which have been put in place for the settlement of property disputes in the North constitute an instance of the promulgation by administrative regulation displacing age- old laws of property rights and succession rights that have cemented the bonds between citizens-especially in a community with its own customary personal laws. While admittedly solutions are difficult in the face of out- dated laws administered by an over- worked courts system  and area administrative officials who lack the tools for bringing about an equitable solution as required in the circumstances, this instance of the by- passing of  Parliament and attendant public scrutiny, leaves room for suspicion that the objective of this executively  promulgated exercise is the consolidation of the Army’s say in civil matters in the North, and that the enjoyment  of rights be by grace and favour.

The charge of “Creating a Northern Province in the North-Western Province”:There is both poignancy and cause for sorrow in the spectacle of social relations gone sour evidenced by a host community who has gone from so signal  a welcome of such a great multitude of the displaced into their midst to taking the step of petitioning the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (the LLRC) against what they term “The creation of the Northern Province within the North-West Province”.

As the Report clearly describes, the State’s response to the challenge of the delivery of services to the displaced was the provision of a framework of delivery distinct from that serving the Host community. This was a response based on a political imperative, that of keeping the displaced as a distinct constituency from the host community. The end- result of the continuance of this practice over 20 years was a divergence in the quality of services available to persons living in close proximity. The inevitable alienation and resentment felt by the host community was the spring board for action, which took the form of a presentation of a petition to the LLRC by the Trustees of the Puttalam Grand Mosque and the Puttalam Branch of the Jamiyathul  Ulama (Council of Muslim Theologians) as representatives of the host community, in protest against what they saw as the adverse effects of the creation of a Northern Province in the North Western Province. Chapter 8 of the Report on “The Host community’s perspective of the displacement” is essential reading for the greater comprehension of the damage brought about the states  mis-handling of a situation.

Whether it is the adverse effects of ethicized politics in Sri Lanka including political favoritism, or the adverse impact of male chauvinism on the women of the displaced community, the Report is courageously transparent in its examination of the Enemy- Within.

The Position of Women in displacement

A wide- ranging section of the Report deals with intra- familial relations as well as relations with the host community in the context of displacement. The sensitivity and integrity shown in its reliance on the testimony of the women themselves is admirable. As a study that high- lights cultural gradations in Muslim communities within a country and the challenges of adjustments attendant on displacement from one Muslim cultural context to another  Muslim cultural context,  this  Report will undoubtedly evoke interest in all engaged in the comparative study of the intra- action of religion and cultural in  relation to Rights. In fact, one of the Reports most discerning comments  is based on the Commission’s research in this regard.

“While the modern Muslim leadership is in general looking for some rights-based solution to their common problems of displacement, it is not clear to what extent the community will be supportive of such a perspective for addressing problems faced by community women.”

Transitional Justice

That this study has been undertaken in a context of transition in Sri Lanka greatly enhances its value. This is a time when new ways of thinking based on a spirit of inclusiveness are essential both at policy and implementation levels. The creation of a  self- confidant population looking with hope to the future requires this. The aspirations of both Muslim youth returning to the North and the increasing number of Tamil- speaking Sri Lankan youth who are identifying the North as a location of expanding opportunity for the profitable practice of skills acquired in other urban surrounding in the intervening years, can find fulfillment only in such an enabling context. Youth of Tamil- speaking communities in Colombo too, faced with an uncertainty of safe residence in the face of the GOSLs plans for physical transformation of Colombo, are now feeling the need to seek jobs and safe residence elsewhere. They increasingly look to the North.

In the North as elsewhere modern means of production will replace the old, bringing in its wake change in the traditional relationships of status and power. The preparation of returnees to face this with equanimity is a task in hand.

My thanks to the Law and Society Trust and its funders for the vision  shown in initiating this research.

Let us of civil society manifest a like vision and determination to bring to a successful outcome, the process to which this Report has given such a rich inception.

• The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of the Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990
• Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in October 1990
• A Commissioner’s Perspective: Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE
• The Muslim question and resettlement of Muslim IDPs in post-war Sri Lanka: Two comprehensive interviews
• LLRC submission: The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in October 1990

In October 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) expelled the entire Muslim population of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. Within a period of 2 weeks the LTTE systematically chased out close to 75,000 Muslims residing in the districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaiteewu, Jaffna, Mannar and parts of Vavuniya.

The LTTE expulsion of Muslims has not been adequately integrated into any mainstream historical narrative in Sri Lanka. Most commentators routinely get the date of the expulsion wrong and few give it the status of a highly significant historical event that it warrants. This is unfortunately true of most events involving Sri Lanka’s Muslim community.

The Law and Society Trust (LST) in partnership with the Rural Development Foundation (RDF), the Community Trust Fund (CTF) and the Peoples’ Secretariat (PS) and an advisory group of prominent Muslim civil society actors conducted a two year long truth seeking initiative in the form of a Citizens’ Commission. The objective of this exercise has been to produce authoritative documentation of the expulsion and its consequences that is sanctioned by the community, and to list the community’s grievances through a document endorsed by the Commission consisting of eminent civil society actors. The Commission’s broadly defined terms of reference looked at a) the history of the expulsion, b) two decades of displacement, and c) the resettlement experience.

The Commissioners are eminent persons from civil society who are outside the Northern Muslim Community. The nine commissioners are Dr. Devanesan Nesiah, Dr.M.S.M.Anes, Dr.Catherin Brun, Dr.Gameela Samarasinghe, Dr.E.Santhirasegaram, Dr.Nimalka Fernando, Mr.Javid Yusuf, Ms.Chulani Kodikara and Judge.U.L.Abdul Majeed.

Shreen Saroor Juwairiya Mohideen and Jensila Majeed have assisted the commission process as members of the advisory group.

The commission has been conducting its inquiries since September 2009. Desk research has been done to collect newspaper reporting on the expulsion and scholarly articles that have been written on the event and the northern Muslims’ displacement experience. Commissioners have held 22 sittings in Puttalam, Negambo, Colombo, Mannar, Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Vavuniya.  Several of the Puttalam sittings were especially designed to elicit the participation of representatives from all five districts in the North, women from the Northern Muslim community, young people from the Northern Muslim community, and representatives from the host community in Puttalam. The commission has also collected 390 testimonies and 13 focus group interviews. These include 26 testimonies from host community members.

The Commission Report is now complete and was launched at the International Center for Ethnic Studies auditorium on the 3^rd of November. The report was very favorably received. The commentators were Manouri Muttetuwegama, Barrister, Attorney-at-Law, former Commissioner of the Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission, Chaired the Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal/ Disappearance of Persons (All Island 1998- 2000) and member of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Serious Violations of Human Rights 2007 and Seelan Kadirgamar, former Senior Lecturer in History, University of Jaffna.  Both commentators praised the nature of the initiative and the quality of the report. They also stated that it was an important precedent that highlighted the voices of those who were affected. Kadirgama stated that it was one of the few documentation projects of the kind and hoped it would serve as a precedent for other such projects.

The report is comprehensive and consists of 11 chapters. The report was written in order to give as much prominence as possible to the voices of the northern Muslims who spoke to the commission, and also to give as much social and political background to the particular conditions of the northern Muslim experience. Therefore a section of the report is devoted to capturing the experience of the expulsion and also a sense of northern Muslims everyday lives within the war zone, and in the context of displacement. (Chapter 4, 5 and 9)These chapters mostly contain narratives from the testimonies. These narrative most poignantly capture both the time of war in the north as well as the shock of having to leave their homes with no notice.  The following two quotes are from Chapter 4 of the report- Life in the North During War Time.

My mother was not very interested in associations etc but she was a popular person. She will help a lot for matters related to young girls and others. She would go forward for anything. Once 32 people died as a result of a shell attack, and she bathed all the ‘Janasas’ (all were female ‘Janasas’) alone. All the houses that came under this attack were destroyed. The army was on one side and the LTTE were on the other side and shells attacks were happening here and there. It was my mother who bathed them in a hurry and buried them. It was a very difficult time. They were in the mood to shoot anyone they saw. (p. 47)- The quote is from the testimony of R. Faiza of Moor Street Jaffna

The following quote captures the moment of the expulsion in a different location- this is from Sameena of Puthukudiiruppu on Mannar Island.

We left on the 25^th of October 1990 at 5 pm. The LTTE came to the village and announced through loud speakers that we had to leave immediately by the route they  showed us. About 40 cadres came into our village and came to all our houses and demanded 10,000 rupees or 10 sovereigns  in gold or to give them the house and leave. They came at the time my husband was having lunch. When they asked me where he was I said he was not at home as I was afraid they would take him away so I did not let them come in. Then I heard from the other people that they came and robbed the houses in the night so I removed all my jewellery  and put them in a tin and buried the tin.

They came again later that day and asked for my jewellery.  I told them I don’t have it with me now and told them to take the things from the shop and leave. They said it was there in the morning and how come its not there now? One of them got very angry and shot at the table in the shop and broke all the things. They behaved in a violent manner.  From next door they took all the sacks of paddy they had. Then the mosque leaders gathered and decided that we should all leave together and so we left.

Sameena later stated that they were able to recover the jewellery that they buried when the husband came back to the village in 1996. (p.62)

The other chapters trace the social and political background to the expulsion (Chapter 4) the state’s minimal attention to the issue (Chapter 6) and the northern Muslim in the context of Muslim politics.  Chapter 6 refers to the particular manner in which the northern Muslims featured in the political agenda of the SLMC under Mr. Ashraff, and the many developments both positive and troubling that occurred in Puttalam after Risharth Bathiudeen was made minister of Rehabilitation.

The northern Muslim displacement experience has lasted now for twenty one years.  At the time of the expulsion people thought they would go back in a matter of weeks, months—sometimes two years. No one expected it to last two decades.  I would like to read one quote that speaks to the initial moment of displacement.

A.Kuriza from Muslim College Road, Jaffna provides a narrative that amply illustrates the  pathos of trying to live in a place that was unfamiliar.

We reached Zahira School. Puttalam people were very helpful. We were expecting to return back. We were searching for a house for rent. We got a house for six months. But we said we do not need for that long, we want to rent only for a month. My son found a house which did not have doors, windows or grills. My children started to cry, when they saw the house. Then we did not take that house. My son took us to another house even this was not pleasant to any of us. Everyone started to cry. Then my son was angry that we did not like any of the houses he was showing. He was asking us if you all do not like anything I show what I am going to do. Later we went to a relative’s place in Kalpitiya. They used to come and stay in our place, when we were in Jaffna. We stayed with them for three months. (p. 103)

The fact that they were sent out of their district of displacement into a new province had consequences for them. In some ways they did not have the same restriction and security threats as those displaced in the north. However, they were not considered residents of the places that they lived in and this posed many administrative problems that affected their displacement experience. It affected their ability to vote, access to employment opportunities, and also lead to maintaining the distinction between hosts and displaced and obstructed integration and the increase of tensions between the communities.   Also while some displaced were very enterprising and managed to rebuild their lives many still languish in Puttalam in conditions similar to that which they arrived in to twenty years ago. This is covered in chapter 7.

Chapter 8 is devoted to the Puttalam host community’s perspective on the northern Muslims’ long sojourn in the four DS divisions of Puttalam—Puttalam town Kalpitiya Mundel and Vanathavillu.  The northern Muslims were compelled to over stay their welcome due to no fault of theirs. The Puttalam community has been forced to share their already insufficient resources with a community that suddenly arrived and almost doubled the areas’ population. And these people’ did not go back for twenty years. Chapter 8 looks at the host community’s perspective on the influx.

Almost all the northern Muslims that the commission spoke with referred to their northern homes with great love and sadness – even when they didn’t have plans to return. The report has one chapter –chapter 9 entitled The Loss of a Way of Life that explores this element of pain and nostalgia for a lost time and a place. This chapter also records testimonies about the way of life in the north – festivals, religious gatherings and lifecycle rituals that are no longer practiced.

The vast majority of persons that we spoke to wanted to return. And all northern Muslims that the commission encountered in the north were uniformly happy to be back. They spoke about the sense of freedom and independence that they had regained by returning to their own land (sontha uru) and the fact that they were no longer crippled by their language inabilities.  But they faced huge problems with lack of attention from the government, lack of infrastructure facilities, minimal interest of NGOs, and indifference and sometimes hostility from administrative officials.  Sometimes hostility was experienced from the local Tamil leadership in the north. This was particularly true of Mannar where there are a several conflicts among returning Tamils and Muslims over land. The report attempted to capture the problems of return in the 10^th chapter.

A review of the most important scholarly works dealing with the northern Muslims has also been done.

The expulsion, displacement and return experiences of the northern Muslims are particular and somewhat different from other experiences of protracted displacement. The Commission wanted to capture this difference and draw attention to it.  For instance one of the “problems” of Muslim return is that as one NGO person described it —one foot in the north and one foot in Puttalam. The act of ethnic cleansing by the LTTE compelled the northern Muslims to live outside the north for twenty plus years. This is the reality of their displacement and such feet in different places is a strategy that is necessary for their survival. The literature on displacement refers to this process as trans-local strategies of survival. Those designing programs have to take note of these strategies and not expect the northern Muslims to forget twenty years of living outside the north.

Chapter 11 contains a series of conclusions and recommendations. These are divided into recommendations to the state, the NGO/INGO community and the Muslim leadership.  The northern Muslims need assistance to return,  we have heard that due to lack of transport to school and poor facilities, children are dropping out. Some people who went to the north are returning to Puttalam due to the lack of a house and facilities for fishing and cultivation.  We also know of sections of the population that are not going back and will register as residents of Puttalam and elsewhere. However the situation in Puttalam is fairly tense and much work needs to be done there as well. And this work needs to address the needy of those areas in Puttalam without differentiating between the displaced and the host.

• LLRC submission: The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in October 1990
• Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in October 1990
• The Muslim question and resettlement of Muslim IDPs in post-war Sri Lanka: Two comprehensive interviews
• A Commissioner’s Perspective: Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE
• Some observations on the Final Report of the Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the Northern Province by the LTTE in October 1990

30 months after the end of war, more people travel between the once off limits North[i] and the South and many of the travel restrictions have been eased. The dreaded Medawachiya checkpoint is no more, and since 2010, we have not taken a flight or ship to Jaffna, travelling by road instead. Displaced people who were detained for about 6 months have now been allowed freedom of movement and many have been allowed to go back to their places of origin. Many youth detained in “rehabilitation” centres have been released and allowed to go back to their families and communities. Death certificates have been issued to few of the people killed during the war. Few schools, hospitals, and some main roads and bridges have been built and glamorous ceremonies held to open these by government and military officials. Three major elections have also been held in the North.

But much remains to be done for Northern Tamils to be able to live in dignity and for the country to move towards reconciliation.

In the last few months, we had spent a considerable amount of time traversing the major towns and roads as well as remote and interior villages and roads in Northern Sri Lanka. We had managed to reach some interior villages after questioning by suspicious and curious soldiers. We had survived without running water, electricity, beds, long nights battling mosquitoes, long bumpy rides in dusty buses on roads that felt more like tracks in a wild life parks and numerous other challenges.  But the difficulties we encountered pale in comparison to the difficulties people we encountered were facing and often we felt helpless and powerless to help them.

Below are some of concerns regarding the situation in the North and prospects for reconciliation, based on what we saw and heard first hand, complimented by some additional desk research for information and statistics we couldn’t find on the ground and additional references that re-confirm our findings.

1. Fate of those killed, disappeared & injured and their families:

In almost every village in the North we have visited, especially in the Vanni, we met families of those killed or disappeared during the last five months of war in 2009, in the years 2006-2009 and decades of war. In a submission to the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission on 8^th January 2011, the Catholic Diocese of Mannar, led by the Catholic Bishop of Mannar, Rt. Rev. Dr. Rayappu Joseph, asked for clarification about the fate of 146,729 people who were unaccounted for between October 2008 and May 2009, based on government statistics and documentary evidence.[ii] The submission also included a list of 100 people disappeared from the Mannar district between 2007-2009 and list of 166 persons reported as killed from the Mannar district in the last phase of the war. There has been no response received from the LLRC or any government official to these.

Searching and waiting for loved ones whom have disappeared

The lack of official acknowledgment of these killings and disappearances and independent mechanisms to confirm the killings and trace those disappeared are major concerns of Tamils living in the North. The Human Rights Commission and adhoc Presidential Commissions appointed since 2006 (such as the LLRC, Udalagama Commission and Mahanama Tillekeratne Commission) have failed to respond to these needs.

In almost every village we had visited in the Vanni, the former LTTE controlled areas, we also met people injured in the war. We have met people who lost both legs and those who have lost legs and arms and variety of other injuries and related sicknesses. Most of them have not received adequate assistance and struggle to live productively, with some finding it difficult to even continue medical treatment.

2. Detention and release of alleged LTTE suspects:

We also met many families whose loved ones have been detained for long time. According to the government, 876 persons are held in administrative detention at the Boosa detebtion facility in Southern Sri Lanka and 863 of them are Tamil.[iii] No information is provided about the period of their detention and we had heard about cases where detainees have been in detention for more than ten years without being convicted. In addition to the around 280,000 displaced who were detained, the number of those detained in “rehabilitation” centres is believed to be 12,000. There is no fixed and exact official figure, with various government officials and politicians giving different numbers at different times. The government claimed 1000 were in “rehabilitation” centres as of 17^th Oct. 2011 out of 11,951 that were on “rehabilitation” – voluntarily & based on court orders, plus a further 994 that had been transferred from custody of the Terrorist Investigation Department to “rehabilitation” centres. [iv]

In an interview to the Sunday Observer of 9^th October 2011, reproduced in the official website of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation had claimed that “Those who were fully involved with the LTTE were removed to Boossa and there was a fair amount of such people” and that “The TID categorized the people and took away those in the categories A,B & C; LTTE leaders, strict followers, and those who were assigned to recover things and arrest others”.[v] There is no information provided about how many were taken away, their names and details and where they are now.

Given history of enforced disappearances, torture and long detention in Sri Lanka this lack of uncertainty in numbers, together with lack of centralized list of detainees indicating place of detention and transfers, raised serious concerns about security of those in detention.

There is no clarity regarding whether or not or when the 1000 remaining in “rehabilitation” would be released or prosecuted. Different government officials and politicians have given different numbers that would be prosecuted, with no one indicating a time frame.[vi] Despite the lack of clear official statistics about how many entered the “rehabilitation” process, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation implies that most of the 12,000 surrendered in May 2009 after the death of the LTTE leader.[vii] In the same interview, the Commissioner General admits that the maximum period these persons could be kept lawfully in “rehabilitation” is two years – raising concern that the 1000 remaining as of 17^th October 2011, and indeed the majority of those kept after May 2011, are / were being kept illegally.

One of the alarming developments seen since the end of the war has been the threats, intimidation and restrictions placed on detainees released. Those released are being subjected to repeated registration, surveillance, interrogation in their homes and military and police camps. Many had restrictions placed on freedom of movement, such as getting permission of military before they leave their villages. [viii] At least one such person we met had been re-arrested, detained in Kandy for about a month in which process relatives observed signs that he was tortured.

3. Detention, release, “resettlement” and imminent forcible relocation of the displaced:

The mass detention of more than 280,000 Tamils from the North who had borne the brunt of the last phase of the war was amongst the most visible outcomes of the end of the war throughout most of 2009. Probably due to massive international and some local pressure, Tamils detained began to be gradually released, starting with children, elderly, injured etc. and by end of 2009, most people detained were granted freedom of movement.

From end of 2009, those displaced who were released were gradually allowed to go back to their villages in the formerly LTTE controlled areas. However, people are not allowed to go back to resettle in at least 9 villages in the Mullativu district and several more in Mannar, Killinochi and Jaffna districts which are presently occupied by the Navy and Army.

According to the latest Joint Humanitarian Update on the UN OCHA website, based on statistics of the GOSL[ix], as of end of September 2011, more than 120,000 people remain displaced.

65,008 persons who were displaced in the last phase of the war in the North after 2008 remains displaced, with 7,534 in camps and 57,474 being with host families. The update also notes that a further 55,616 remains displaced, having being displaced prior to April 2008. This number includes 8,013 in camps and 47,603 with host families, and is likely to include people from both the North and the East.

One of the new concerns is the Government’s decision announced on 20^th September 2011 that 7,394 persons still living in Menik Farm (at time of announcement) will not be allowed to go back to their villages, but will be settled elsewhere, in Kombavil, a jungle area in the Mullativu district..[x] While we were not able to obtain official information as to what these villages are, information provided by displaced people indicate that the military is occupying 9 villages, not allowing displaced civilians to go back. From what we learnt, these villages includes Puthukudiruppu East, Puthukudiruppu West, Sivanagar, Manthuvil, Malligaitivu, Ananthapuram in the Puthukudiruppu DS Division and Mulliwaikal West, Ampalawanpokkani & Keppappilavu in the Maritimepattu DS Division. Despite go and see visits to Kombavil, many residents had expressed their unwillingness to go to Kombavil, and some had submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission in this regard.

We visited Kombavil twice in the last two months and observed that government appears to be going ahead with plans of compelling people in Menik Farm to resettle in Kombavil, despite people’s concerns. The latest Joint Humanitarian Update confirms that there is no confirmation that these people would be allowed to go back to their own villages or a timeline for such an eventuality, and also confirms that issues such as access to seaside fishing areas, farming/paddy land, access to adequate health services and alternative choices other than Kombavil are yet to be resolved. [xi]

The slow return of some Muslims forcibly evicted from the North by the LTTE and Sinhalese who had left the Northern Province, has also started, and this is indeed a positive development. Some such returns have led to tension between communities, primarily based on land issues and allegations of resource allocations. Preventing such tensions and ensuring that all communities have right to return to an conductive atmosphere where they can rebuild shattered lives, in a way that does not affect the rights and sensitivities of other communities has emerged as major challenge. For example, Tamils around Madhu road in Mannar district claims that there were 22 Sinhalese families in the area in 1990 and that 180 have requested for housing to the Assistant Government Agent of Madhu Division. TNA Member of Parliament, M. A. Sumanthiran has pointed out that that 45 houses have been provided by a state Bank while only 5 have been provided to Tamils in the area. [xii]

4. Militarization:

In the last month, several well known peace activists, senior lawyers and journalists have pointed out that two and half years after war, the whole of Sri Lanka and many facets of life, remains heavily militarized.[xiii]

In our visits to the North, it was clear that the North remains heavily militarized and this continues to be resented by the Tamils in the North, many of whom believe the military is responsible for killing, disappearing, torturing, and sexually abusing Tamils during decades of war. Tamils also see the military presence as an obstacle to restoration of normalcy and civilian life in the North in the post war era. The military continues to be the most visibly present and dominant institution in the North, particularly in the formerly LTTE controlled areas. According to the official website of the Ministry of Defense, a “new Security Forces Headquarters Complex at Kilinochchi, comprised of an air-conditioned conference hall plus a separate auditorium, administrative offices, computer and signal room, mess hall and a few other wings was ceremonially opened” on 21^st October and this had cost Rs. 40.6 million (around USD 369,000)[xiv].  According to TNA MP Sumanthiran, “there is one member of the armed forces for approximately every ten civilians in the Jaffna Peninsula”[xv]. According to military’s own statistics, in Jaffna, there are more than 35,000 troops[xvi] for an estimated 626,329 people[xvii], an average of one military personnel for every 18 civilians, which includes children and senior citizens. Defense Ministry quotes the Secretary of Defense saying that “Military Intelligence Corps had to be increased to 6 battalions from the original 1-2 battalions”[xviii]. Militarization is a dominant part of parcel of live in the North (and East as well), over riding and sidelining elected representatives from the area and civilian administrators. The Governors of both the North and Eastern province are senior military officers and Government Agent of one of the districts (Trincomalee) is also a former military officer. The military plays a dominant rule in controlling civil and religious bodies and community and social life. It has also encroached into law enforcement, resettlement, rehabilitation, development, sports, cultural, shops, restaurants, hair salons, farms, transport and even touristic activities. Examples of some of these are provided below. In all the village level Development Committees in Jaffna, the President is a military officer. [xix] Some village development committees, such as Pachchilaipalli 2, comprise entirely of military officers.[xx]The civil military coordination website claims that it’s Misison includes even the upliftment of people through “spiritual values”[xxi].

5. Degrading and discriminatory registration of civilians in the North:

Civilians in the North have been subjected to repeated registrations by the military during the war and also after the end of the war. But even in 2011, this continues to happen in the Vanni and also Jaffna.

Despite the Attorney General agreeing to suspect registration of civilians in Jaffna & Killinochi districts by the military in February 2011 after a five TNA Parliamentarians of the Jaffna district filed a fundamental rights application, registration continued. Various other forms had also been distributed in Jaffna by the Police for purpose of registering civilians.

6. Occupation of land:

Large amounts of private land, and sometimes whole villages have been occupied by the military and there have been no compensation schemes announced for these long takeover of land. Many such properties continue to be occupied by the military. The military also occupies state land, and bypasses administrative laws and procedures in putting up structures at their own whim and fancy, such as shops, restaurants, farms, monuments etc. One of the most blatant incidents is the occupation of Mullikulam village in the district of Mannar since September 2007 by the Navy, without following any legal procedures and displacing the entire population indefinitely. According to the Civil-Military website for Jaffna, 200 hectares of land is inaccessible for cultivation due to High Security Zones and further 6000 hectares of land is not in use due to effects of conflict[xxii]. According to TNA MP Sumanthiran, “Tamil people inhabited 18,880 sq km of land in the North and East, but after May 2009, the defense forces have occupied more than 7,000 sq km of land owned by Tamil people”[xxiii].

7. Continuing violence in highly militarized North:

Numerically, numbers of those reported as killed, disappeared, arrested and tortured have gone down in 2010-2011 compared to 2006-2009. But people continue to live in fear in the North as killings, disappearances, sexual abuse, robberies, extortion continue to be reported from the North since the end of the war. In a three month period of November 2010 – January 2011, 40 such incidents were reported, predominantly from Jaffna.

In August 2011, the military and police conducted a spree of attacks on civilians and threatened religious leaders in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Mannar, in relation to protests and concerns of the civilian population regarding military complicity in relation to attacks on women by “Grease devils”.[xxiv]

Like before, these incidents seem to happen despite a large and dominant presence of the military on a scale not seen in the rest of the country, bringing about well founded suspicions of the military’s tacit or explicit involvement in these incidents.

One of the most shocking and brutal violence by Police against Tamil civilians was seen on 20^th September 2011, when Mr. Udaya Pushparaja Antony Nithyaraja (31) of Jaffna District was severely tortured by police officers in the premises of the Jaffna Magistrate Courts[xxv].

8. Violence against women:

Many women complain of rape, sexual abuse, including by military officials[xxvi]. Women complain of soldiers visiting houses when there are no men, telephone calls and sms (text) messages etc. There have also been allegations of trafficking. Several soldiers were arrested for rape of women in 2010 in Vishvamdu. Women also have been the prime target of attacks by “Grease devils”[xxvii]

9. Attacks on dissent and threats and restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association:

On 16^th October 2011, a Jaffna University Student Union leader, who was also a well known as an outspoken civil rights activist, was brutally assaulted [xxviii] while on 29^th July 2011, senior journalist and news editor of Uthayan was severely assaulted.[xxix] Both these attacks resulted in victims being rushed to Jaffna hospital for treatment. On 28^th May 2011 one of Uthayan reporters was attacked by armed thugs when he was on his way to work.[xxx] The individuals and organizations have been known critics of the government. On 24^th July 2011, Networking for Rights, an exiled group of Sri Lankan activists and journalists reported that two foreign journalists had been interrogated at midnight in Jaffna by Police and were compelled to leave the region and that the next day, they were attacked and robbed at gun point.[xxxi]

Several human rights defenders in the North have been subjected to threats and intimidations since the end the war. On one occasion, the names of a group of human rights defenders that participated in a human rights training in the North were printed in a mainstream national Sinhalese newspaper, along with the organizers, portraying all as traitors.

Several others have been questioned by military and intelligence and beaten. One was stopped and questioned at the airport in December 2010 and another questioned and slapped on arrival at the airport in September 2011.

On 16^th June 2011, a meeting of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the political party which won comprehensively in successive elections in the North, was broken up by the army and peopling attending the meeting attacked.[xxxii] In June 2011, it was reported in the Sinhalese newspaper “Ravaya” that the military had threatened people in Vanni not to participate in a protest of families of disappeared people and subsequently detained and interrogated two of the organizers. On the night of 1^st April, a Catholic Priest who had spoken out about problems facing civilians in Jaffna at a meeting with the visiting Congress of Religions delegation, had cow dung thrown at him.

Such incidents have also instilled fear amongst human rights defenders, journalists, opposition politicians and anyone holding dissenting views with the government.

Many NGOs and church groups keen to engage in counseling, community organizing and provision of other materials and services to people in the North continue to complain about restrictions and stringent regulations imposed by the Presidential Task Force (PTF). The difficulties in obtaining permission to provide any form of assistance drives away and discourages many groups and individuals keen to help people affected by the war, and this denies desperate people from receiving much needed support.

In many areas of the North, particularly in formerly LTTE controlled areas, the military demand advance notification of any social events and attend such events without invitation. On one occasion, Police officers interrupted the awards ceremony of a cricket tournament and took away a trophy on offer, alleging that it was in the name of a former LTTEer. In actual fact, the trophy in question was donated by family members in memory of parents that were dead.

10. Restrictions on freedom of movement in the North:

Despite the opening up of the A9 road in December 2009 and easing of some travel restrictions between the North and the South, travel restrictions still remain to the North. The Omanthai checkpoint serves as a separation of the North from rest of the country, and the separate and concept of entry / exit is indicated by a board that says “remain here until you are granted entry”.

In July 2011, a Sri Lankan journalist faced restrictions on travelling in the North, including being detained and questioned at an Army camp for several hours. Also in July 2011, days after an official announcement by the government that restrictions on travel for foreign nationals to the North have been lifted, the Ministry of External Affairs has insisted on additional documentation such as pre-planned travel itinerary for a visiting foreign national, who had a legitimate visa to visit Sri Lanka. The military officials allowed her to pass the Omanthai checkpoint, the main entry point to previously LTTE controlled areas, only after she showed a letter authorizing her to travel to specified cities for a specified time period from the Ministry of External Affairs, which according to her had been issued after obtaining approval of the Ministry of Defense. A friend from north who had called the Ministry of Defense was told that foreign nationals can only travel on the A9 road, and travelling to interior villages still required prior permission.

11. Sinhalese – Buddhist domination:

Fears and unhappiness about Sinhalese – Buddhist domination in predominantly Tamil areas was repeatedly expressed by people we met. We ourselves saw many indicators of such attempts. TNA MP Sumanthiran’s report to Parliament raises concerns that “steps are being taken to divide the District of Mullaitivu and create within it the new District Secretariat division of ‘Weli Oya’ and that there are orders issued to “to have Tamil civil servants removed or transferred from the North and to fill the vacant posts with Sinhala trainee civil servants and that one hundred and forty Sinhala civil servants have been relocated to the North as part of this initiative and Tamil civil servants have been ordered to go on compulsory leave, and further, that these drastic measures must be viewed in the backdrop of systematic deliberate exclusion of Tamils in the civil service in selection processes, promotions, trainings and development opportunities”[xxxiii].

Despite the North being predominantly Tamil, many road signs continue to be in Sinhalese. We noticed several such Sinhalese names around Mullativu on the eastern coast of Vanni and around Mulangavil and Adampan on the western coast of Vanni. We also observed several road names in Sinhalese only, named after Sinhalese soldiers.

Even some release letters for detainees, forms collecting socio-economic information are not in the Tamil language in the North.

The North also remains predominantly Hindu and Christian, and thus, the building of several new Buddhist statues and structures have also made Northern Tamils fearful of Buddhist domination of the North.

12. Lack of shelter, livelihoods, healthcare, educational, transport facilities:

30 months after the end of the war, people whose houses were razed to the ground due to no fault of their own, have not been provided houses by the GOSL. The few houses that have been provided have been built through people’s own efforts and with support of their relatives, friends, foreign governments, and private groups. However, all over the Vanni, military has been provided with housing that appears of much better quality than the housing displaced persons are compelled to live.

Some schools damaged in the war are still not repaired and it is common to see classes conducted in open air. Some schools are still occupied by military and some are still closed. TNA MP Sumanthiran sites examples of schools occupied by the military as Keppapilavu GTM school in Keppapilavu, Mulliyawalai, Mullaitivu, the Maththalan R.C.G.T.M. School in Mulliwaikkal, Mullaitivu, Mullivaikkal West K.S.V Mullivaikkal,Mullaitivu Mulliwaikkal East GTM School, Mulliwaikkal Mullaitivu, Vikneshwara Vidiyalayam Pooneryn, Arasaratnam Vidyalayam Manthuvil Puthukkudiyiruppu, Sivanagar Tamil Vidyalayam Puthukkudiyiruppu Mullaitivu and the Myliddy, R.C.T.M.S Mylidy, Kankesenthurai[xxxiv].

Hospital and medical facilities also remain scarce and often, people have to walk long distances and queue up for healthcare. According to the latest Joint Humanitarian Report, many primary medical care units and divisional hospitals in the North are still not functioning. [xxxv] TNA MP Sumanthiran’s October report to Parliament highlights inadequate health services in the Vanni, citing the This avoidable death of patient deaths, such as the death of a girl on 7th October 2011 as a result of untreated rabies[xxxvi].

Livelihood options remain scarce and most people live improvised and poor lives. Although some have been provided livelihood support by UN, church groups and NGOs, many remain improvised. A major o obstacle to develop livelihoods based on local resources has been the military encroachment into livelihood activities. The military regulates fishing, issuing passes to go to sea. Fishermen in Mannar district showed us three separate forms that require 30 signatures plus photos and additional documents, to enable fishermen to go fishing.

Some Northern Tamil fisherman allege that military often gives special privileges to Sinhalese fisherfolk from the South. The report tabled TNA MP Sumanthiran notes that while there are restrictions on fishing by Tamil fishermen in villages in Mullativu district such as in Kokkilaai to Chundikkulam in Kilaakaththai, Maathirikkiraama, Uppumaaveli, Thoondai, Alambil, Semmalai, Naayaaru, Kokkuththoduvaai, and Karunaattukkernee, Sinhala fishermen in the area have received direct permission to fish in this area from the Ministry of Defense. He also claims that while Sinhalese fishermen are given preferential treatment to fish in the North, Tamil fishermen are not given reciprocal permission to engage in fishing in the South[xxxvii]. Mr. Sumanthiran also reported that “people returned by the government to Uduththurai in Maruthenkerny (Vadamarachchi East), were soon after evicted from their houses along the coast and placed in transit camps on the other side of the coastal road. These houses are now being occupied by people brought from the South who are permitted by the Ministry of Defense to engage in diving for coral and star fish”[xxxviii].

In our visits to the North, we saw that the military has also started a large number of business, such as restaurants, shops, farm, hair salons, holiday resorts and tourism projects, denying the local people the opportunity to develop their own initiatives using local resources. The Civil-Military Coordination website lists “Tour Guide Service” amongst the services it offers[xxxix]. It appears that the military is using state resources for some of these activities and the legality of some of these activities is in doubt.

TNA MP Sumanthiran also highlighted the situation of unemployment in the North and East, saying “ The limited opportunities available are consistently given to individuals of the labour workforce from the South. Estimates suggest that unemployment in the Northern Province is between 20% to 30% in the Northern Province, compared to a National average of 4.3%. The reservoir bunds repair and road construction of the A9 road and the secondary road have been handed over to Sinhalese contractors from the South who bring in their own labour force. Only an insignificant number of Tamil labourers are employed by them despite the fact that there are numerous Tamil youth and men who are unemployed in the Vanni”[xl].

13. Impunity, allegations of war crimes, calls for international inquiry and LLRC:

Many human rights violations, abuses, criminal and illegal activities since the end of the war, including some mentioned above, continue unchecked and it appears that rule of law simply doesn’t exist in the North or a different sets of rules and laws apply in the North, distinct from rest of the country.

Allegations that grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law occurred during the last stages of the war, particularly from January – May 2009 is a recurring theme in the post war scenario. Allegations have been leveled against both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. However, with killing of the LTTE chief along with other top leaders, the focus of accountability has focused on the Sri Lankan government, given also it’s national and international obligations as a state. Allegations included the killing of thousands of civilians due to shelling and bombing, targeted shooting, attacks on hospitals, schools, churches, restrictions on essential humanitarian assistance including food and medicine. Civilians, doctors, religious leaders and militants who survived the last months of the war had given a number of first hand eyewitness accounts to the government appointed Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) when it held sessions in the North. University Teachers for Human Rights – Jaffna, a Sri Lankan group with a reputation for detailed reporting of human rights violations during the decades of war, produced a damning report of abuses by both the Government and the LTTE, while international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group also produced detailed reports containing such allegations. The United States of America Department of State also produced a report containing similar allegations. The last and most damning report came from a panel of experts on accountability in Sri Lanka, appointed by the UN Secretary General. Video and photos have also been circulating projecting horrific civilian casualties, including the shooting of unarmed LTTE cadres who had surrendered. A June 2011 50 minute documentary film produced by Channel 4, a British TV channel, and certification of the authenticity of some video clips by UN experts have raised visibility of allegations of war crimes nationally and internationally.

These allegations have led to calls for an independent international inquiry, by several western governments, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, international human rights groups and large numbers of Tamil Diaspora. Even the Indian government, which in the past had shielded the Sri Lankan government from criticisms, recently took a position that concerns being raised with regard to the sequence of events in the last days of the war needs to be examined. The failure of the Sri Lankan criminal justice system and a number of adhoc Presidential Commissions of Inquiry to establish the truth and ensure accountability for large and serious rights violations related to the war as well as unrelated to the war, such as extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse have given credibility for calls for an international inquiry.

The government’s response has been on one hand, a blanket denial that any violations of international human rights and humanitarian law took place in the last days of the war. On the other hand, the government has gone to great lengths to try and convince domestic critiques and the international community that Sri Lanka’s domestic processes, particularly the recently appointed LLRC is capable of dealing with any allegations of human rights and humanitarian law during the war. Questions about independence of the LLRC, whose Chairman and several members have served the incumbent regime and even defended allegations against the regime in international forums have not instilled confidence and hope of those calling for international inquiry. Witnesses had received death threats, one told us that he had been questioned three times by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) between January 2011 (when he gave the testimony) and October 2011 and others have been visited by intelligence officers. The lack of victim and witness protection program, restricted mandate including the scope to look at only the specific period of 2002-2009, and lack of respect paid to victims and families who came forward to testify before the LLRC have further indicated the inability of the LLRC to serve as a credible accountability or transitional justice mechanism. One the damning indictments against the LLRC process is that after more than one year, key interim recommendations by the LLRC has not been implemented by the government, including releasing a list of detainees.

Until and unless there is a credible domestic mechanisms that is seen as independent, particularly by victims, survivors, their families and others who have leveled allegations, calls for international inquiry is likely to continue.

14. Ethnic and north – south polarization; celebrations in the South and mourning in the North:

Despite the fact that LTTE prevented civilians from leaving the war zone, including by shooting at people who tried to escape, the government’s claim that it had undertaken a “humanitarian operation” and “liberated / rescued civilians held hostage by the LTTE” didn’t appear to have any acceptance amongst the Tamils in the North while in other parts of the country, this claim appeared to have gained varying degrees of acceptance.

The visible response in areas outside the North and East of Sri Lanka when the war ended was one of joy and celebrations. This was predominantly the response of the majority Sinhalese community, in line with the position of the government of Sri Lanka. If those who had survived in hand dug bunkers felt some relief when finally the shelling, bombing and shooting stopped, it was not visible. What was visible in the North was tears and mourning for large numbers of Tamils killed, disappeared, injured and displaced.

Monument for the war victory in Puthukudiruppu

This polarization was again visible during the 1^st anniversary of the end of the war. The south celebrated with a grand victory parade, while in the North, the military cancelled the solemn and subdued low key religious – cultural events organized to grieve and mourn for those killed and disappeared. Those who organized and attended these events, including several Catholic priests, were threatened by the military. A Catholic priest who attempted to build some small monuments for those killed in the war was also threatened by the military. Cemeteries and memorials of Tamil militants in the North, where family members used to go to say a prayer, lay a flower and light a candle, were raised to the ground. Even the house of the LTTE leader’s parent’s in Jaffna was vandalized and when his mother passed away, her remains were desecrated. On the other hand, massive and posh looking monuments for Sinhalese soldiers had come up in the North.

Thus, Tamils in the north find that they don’t even have the right to remember and grieve in the new kind of “liberation” they have been dished out.

15. Ethnic and north – south polarization; rejection of Rajapakse government at successive elections in the North:

Three separate elections, namely presidential, parliamentary and local bodies, were held across the country including the North in 2010-2011. None of the three elections could be termed free and fair, with election monitoring bodies reporting intimidations, killings, attacks, and threats and massive abuse of state resources and state media before and during elections. However, the incumbent regime hastened to assure Sri Lankans and the international community that elections were indeed free and fair. Thus, in elections that the incumbent regime insisted was free and fair, the regime led by President Rajapakse suffered heavy defeat in three successive elections in the Tamil dominated Northern Province, including in areas that were previously controlled by the LTTE. The last of these elections, the local government elections in Jaffna, Mullativu and Killinochi saw unprecedented campaigning by the President himself, members of the parliament including the President’s influential brother and son, and other senior ministers. Material assistance and economic development was promised and generously dished out to desperately improvised communities who had their properties and livelihoods destroyed during the war. However, all these failed to convince the Tamil citizens, who voted overwhelmingly for the Tamil National Alliance, the leading Tamil party. However, in Sinhalese dominated areas of the country, the Rajapakse regime won overwhelmingly, with the main opposition United National Party and other smaller opposition parties suffering heavy defeats.

The elections results amply demonstrated the continuing polarization between the North and the South in relation to political aspirations of Tamils. In the northern local elections, government politicians and their supporters campaigned on basis that since they hold the all powerful executive presidency and more than two thirds power in the national parliament, the only way for improvised northern Tamils to rebuild their lives would be to vote for the government in the local elections too. The rejection of this by the Tamil voters, in one way could be interpreted as an assertion that their identity and political aspirations were important more than economic development even in the most desperate of circumstances. From another perspective, it was an assertion that Tamils in the north didn’t consider the brutal war waged by the Rajapakse regime that defeated the LTTE, as a “humanitarian operation” that “rescued / liberated” them (Tamil civilians) from the clutches of the LTTE.

Even after these overwhelming victories in the North and East in the parliamentary and local elections held in April 2010 and July 2011, the TNA is given very little opportunity to actively participate and contribute their perspectives towards development of the region, with the Rajapakse clan and the military determining policy and practice. Thus, there appears to be little prospect that the Tamil National Alliance’s parliamentarians and local government representatives elected by popular vote in the North could wield much influence in decisions that affect the life of Northern peoples.

Thus, a regime that was rejected at three successive elections by popular vote will continue to govern the North and make decisions about priorities that affect the life of people there. This could only change in the longer term with constitutional changes that will provide for significant power sharing and autonomy for the North. In the short term, the only way the popular vote will have a meaning in day to day governance would be if the Sinhalese dominated central government will agree to involve the elected representatives of the North and East in making decisions and determining policies and practices that affect the life of the people there and drastically reduce the military presence and stop the military from interfering in civilian life.

16. Way forward:

As mentioned at the outset, the restoration of normalcy to the North, enabling Northern people to live without fear and in dignity, with equal rights, freedoms, opportunities as their brothers and sisters in the rest of the country will serve as a key to lasting peace and reconciliation in the whole country.

In this regard, a key element will be reduction of the military presence in the north, reducing the role of the military and the restoration of civilian rule. Removal of restrictions on travel, fishing, freedom of association, assembly, expression, movement along with guaranteeing of the right to dissent, grieve, mourn, remember those killed and disappeared, build memorials for dead and disappeared will also be crucial indicators. The stopping of acts that have direct and indirect connotation of Sinhalese – Buddhist domination, ensuring that sign boards, official forms etc. are also in Tamil language, stopping land grabbing and reparation for victims and their families (those who had been killed, disappeared, injured, tortured, detained for long periods without charges, sexually abused, whose houses and land was occupied etc.) are also key steps towards reconciliation.

Accountability for violations that have happened, both in the last phase of the war as well as throughout the three decades of war, and post-war, including some incidents mentioned above, is also crucial. A process of truth telling which involves acknowledges the wrongs that have been done, identifies perpetrators would be essential, even to consider measures such as forgiveness and amnesty.

Recognition of historical grievances and political aspirations of the Tamil community, that led to the birth of the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups leading to three decades of war, and concrete and credible steps towards addressing these would be the another important element that we believe is crucial for Sri Lankans to move on to be able to live with each other without notions of enemy. Given the polarization amongst the Tamils and Sinhalese communities, as evident by starkly contrasting election results in the North and South as well as reactions to the end of the war, such a process is bound to be long drawn out and difficult. However, in the short term, what would be crucial is for the process to be seen as genuine and not leading to yet another initiative that would be abandoned. The support the present regime enjoys amongst the Sinhalese population makes it well placed to undertake such a process, and good starting point might be to resurrect the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) process that this regime itself initiated.

In the end, reconciliation and lasting peace will come through meaningful actions such as ones outlined above, rather than empty promises.

• Final text of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in Parliament opposing the 18th Amendment
• “Sound is no substitute for argument”: Exclusive video of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in parliament against 18th Amendment
• Hansard on 18th Amendment debate, 8 September 2010
• Life in an Open Prison
• Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Breaking the Myth and Bringing the Truth

This is the continuing story of Gajaman Nona, an accomplished Sinhala poet, who was born in 1758. Emerging from a time capsule, GN finds herself in year 2011. The lady, who during her lifetime experienced dire poverty and took care of her four children with much difficulty, finds that her economic circumstances remain much the same 250 years into the future. However, unlike in the 18^th and 19^th centuries, a little investigation reveals that in 2011, there are more ways than one to make a ‘respectable’ living. Armed with information gleaned from perusing the newspapers and conversations with a group of people who appear to be untiringly working for the well-being of fellow human beings, GN decided to establish a NGO. Although she cannot quite decide what this NGO should be doing, being industrious, she doesn’t allow the lack of a clear aim to deter her and establishes ‘Rough Guide Inc.’, an organization which, as the title suggests, seeks to help fellow-citizens navigate their way through the difficulties encountered in their quest to live happy and fulfilled lives in Sri Lanka. She decides that the best way to launch her NGO is to undertake a fact-finding mission, a fashionable much-used strategy by people working for the well-being of others. The war victory celebrations in the country (she doesn’t quite understand what they are celebrating although the government keeps mentioning Tigers) and constant talk about the North and the Vanni makes her decide that her first fact-finding mission would be to Jaffna and the Vanni. Her insights on the situation in Jaffna and the Vanni and suggestions to those who wish to visit these areas are given below.

Suggestions to the traveller to the North: Results of the fact-finding mission

1. GN, who was travelling in her brand new four wheel drive with Rough Guide Inc. boldly painted on the sides of the vehicle, got the shock of her life when she was stopped at Omanthai, where a board which reads ‘entry-exit point’ is very prominently displayed, and her driver was instructed to alight from the vehicle and sign in/register at the army point. While her driver was registering a young army officer walked up to her, asked for her national identification card and wanted to know who she was and what she did. Her annoyance turned to confusion at being questioned because she was under the impression that the state of emergency no longer existed, everyone, including foreigners, could travel freely to the North and Sri Lanka was well on its way to becoming the miracle of Asia- a beacon of democracy and economic growth in South Asia. She tried to ask the young men in vain why they were stationed there registering people but they had no rational response. Indeed, this encounter did make her wonder whether the North was another country…

Suggestion: When you travel North, particularly if you are travelling in a vehicle that clearly shows you are from a NGO, please be prepared to answer questions from young army officers, who are probably quite bored and looking for chit-chat with anyone who passes by.

2. On the drive along the A9 GN spotted several shops that were being run by friendly young men from the military- strangely enough not many shops run by local civilians. Since GN had heard a lot about all the good development work that was being done by the government as part of the ‘Northern Spring’ initiative she assumed this must be part of that programme. After all, the civilians after years of armed conflict and displacement probably had no capital to start up small businesses anyway, and it would not make economic sense to let the business opportunity go to waste. So she thought it was valiant and resourceful of the military to enter the commercial sector in order to fill the void. Also who better than the military to show civilians how to run efficient businesses.

Suggestion: Please do your bit and contribute to the military economy of the North to uplift the lives of the conflict-affected civilians by stopping at these road-side shops and having a bite to eat or buying a t-shirt with ‘Kilinochchi Reawakening’ emblazoned on it.

3. Since President Mahinda Rajapakse in his speech at the 2^nd celebration to mark the war victory mentioned ‘freedom from terror’ and ‘freeing thousands of civilians in the North, who were held as hostages’, GN expected to see the people in the North living freely in prosperity. Instead, to her surprise, she passed army camp after army camp, soldiers on the road and even soldiers in what seemed to be private houses. When she tried to speak to a few citizens who were gathered at a local grocery shop just outside Kilinochchi town and asked them about the situation in their areas, she noticed a young soldier sidling up to them to listen in on the conversation. After observing this for a few minutes she turned around and asked the young man whether he was happy being stationed in the North, the soldier who responded by saying that he missed home and his family, in the same breath told her not to cause trouble and to be on her way. She couldn’t understand why the soldier was worried as the people were very unwilling to speak openly with a stranger anyway. She might have been mistaken but she thought she saw fear in their eyes when she asked them whether they were enjoying their new found freedom.

Suggestion: Those visiting the North, particularly the Vanni, please refrain from bothering the local population by talking about politics, the war, the ethnic conflict or the situation in their areas because walls have ears. In fact, it is best that you do not talk to the local population at all, particularly because there are so many people battling with each other to speak on behalf of the Tamil people- from NGOs, the different sections of the Tamil diaspora and Tamil politicians to the government. Best save the Tamil people the trouble of speaking for themselves.

4. Curiosity made GN travel further into the interiors of the Vanni in her brand new four-wheel drive. Once again, she thought she would be able to visit the areas in which the final battle was fought but was told that since she was an NGO she could not proceed further without clearance from the MOD.  She couldn’t understand why everywhere she went in the North everyone was asking her to obtain the permission of the Ministry. What does the Ministry do in the North? Does the Ministry run the North? Is there a parallel government that begins at the entry-exit point at Omanthai that is run by the MOD? She decided she had to investigate the matter further as she found it all quite, quite confusing. Here she was, thinking that the Northern part of the country had been liberated from the Tigers, yet soldiers were constantly asking her for MOD authorization. Did the government sign the North away to the MOD at the end of the war? But isn’t the Ministry only a part of the government rather than THE government in the North?

Suggestion: In order to avoid constant altercations with the security forces, please ensure you have clearance from the Ministry of Defence or in the alternative, take the guided tour of the North that is very helpfully being conducted by the Ministry. This way you will be able to access areas that are out of bounds to ordinary citizens and those working in NGOs and other organisations such as the UN, and be able to see the areas liberated from the clutches of the LTTE.

5. Since GN had heard that people who had returned home from IDP camps were facing difficulties as they had to live in temporary shelters and had limited access to water, sanitation, health and education and even livelihoods, she thought she would investigate further and try to unearth the ‘true’ story. Yet, when she approached a village in the interior she was stopped at an army check point and asked where she was going. When she told them she was on her way to see the living conditions of the IDP returnees she was promptly refused permission to proceed further. As GN is not one to give up easily, she travelled to the nearest army camp and asked to see the officer-in-charge (OIC) and inquired why she had been refused permission to travel further. The OIC asked her the reason for her travel, and when she very honestly told him that she wanted to see how the IDP returnees were living, was told that it was because of people like her that untrue stories were being spread outside the country about the government of Sri Lanka. He firmly told her that if she had anything to contribute, like for instance, funds to build roads, bridges or houses, they and the Presidential Task Force (PTF) might consider allowing her to work in the area. Otherwise he asked her to return home and not cause further trouble. When she returned to her vehicle, her driver, a young Tamil man, who looked quite shaken and worried, advised her that in the future she should not approach army officers and challenge/question them as it could lead to trouble both for herself and Rough Guide Inc.

Suggestion:  Word of advice to NGOs and those wishing to work in the Vanni- if you want to gain entry to the area it is best you do not undertake fact-finding missions or engage in any programmes, such as awareness raising or psycho-social care, that are likely to cause discomfort to the government. Instead provide hard cash and support the PTF’s and army’s efforts to ‘rebuild’ the North.

6. From the Vanni GN sped away to Jaffna hoping to see something different, perhaps happier people looking forward to the future. Once again she was surprised to see the heavy presence of the army. She was quite taken aback to note that all the soldiers, both in the Vanni and in Jaffna, spoke only in Sinhala. In fact, GN had been quite worried initially about travelling to the North as she doesn’t speak Tamil and was wondering how she would communicate with the people or even ask for directions if she got lost. With the presence of Sinhala speaking soldiers at every junction, she realized that it was entirely possible to navigate one’s way through the North without any difficulty. She remembered reading that several Tamil speaking policemen had been trained recently but didn’t come across any of them. Perhaps they had been posted to other parts of the country.

Suggestion: Do not be afraid that you will have to learn Tamil to travel to the Northern part of the country, which is predominantly Tamil speaking, as guides in the form of Sinhala speaking soldiers are at every point to assist you. Even persons who are afraid they might get lost do not need to worry. There are plenty of signs in (only) Sinhala that will enable you to find your way.

Stay tuned for more adventures in GN’s new life as the head of a NGO travelling the country to bring solace to the disadvantaged and disempowered.

###

Gajaman Nona is the latest entrant to Banyan News Reporters on Groundviews, which uses satire to raise awareness on and interrogate corruption, war crimes, impunity, censorship, civilian displacement, abductions, torture, extra-judicial killings, human rights violations, “national security” and humanitarian aid. To understand why satire is such a powerful expression and mechanism during violent conflict and severe media repression, read Bridging comedy and conscience.

• Civilian displacements in the Vanni
• Celebrating war victory and banning commemoration of dead civilians: this is “home grown & indigenous” reconciliation and freedom in Sri Lanka?
• Permission To Travel Out Of Jaffna
• A short note from the Vanni
• Security Forces North & East Operations

On 20^th September 2011 the Government of Sri Lanka had announced that Menik Farm, hosting 7394 persons (2097 families) will be closed down.[i] The solution imposed on these people has been to send them to Kombavil, an interior village in the Mullativu district.

Although the government claims the people are not allowed to go back due to landmines, the latest Joint Humanitarian Update[ii] has stated that “8.5 Grama Niladhari Divisions (GNDs) that currently remain closed due to continued military occupation and thus, remain inaccessible for humanitarian mine action and resettlement”.[1]

It is people living in these areas that are being forced to go to Kombavil.

Kombavil is a remote area, in the interiors of Puthukudiruppu, in middle of overgrown shrub jungle. When we were there, we observed that houses were very small and appear very basic. Workers confirmed that these houses would standard size of 12 feet by 15 feet, irrespective of family needs. The government had decided to send a first batch of 100 families to Kombavil on 5^th October, but workers in Kombavil said it would be difficult to complete even the basic semi permanent shelters and toilets before 5^th October.

When we visited Kombavil, it was clear that no infrastructure was in place. Fisherfolk would certainly face serious problems if they are compelled to live there. Infact, the people of Kombavil told us that even many of villagers from Kombavil have not yet been allowed to return after displacement.

The people are unhappy that after two and half years, instead of being allowed to go back to their own villages, they are being sent to an area they have never been to or known. Widows have expressed concerns about security and difficulties they would face in such an unknown area in rebuilding their lives and establishing livelihoods without support of men. Fears have also been expressed that no possibilities for fishing and farming exist in the proposed area and that no facilities exist for schools, places of worship, water etc.

There had been “come and tell visit” in which officials had briefed people about the plans to send them to Kombavil instead of their home villages. There had also been a “go and see visit” in which people to be sent to Kombavil were taken to see Kombavil. However, it is clear that these were just to present information after decisions had been taken, and not occasions where people affected could discuss options and alternatives.

Essentially, this is a decision imposed on these people, without any consultation and certainly not voluntary.  In a petition submitted to the IDP Project Office for the Vavuniya district of the National Human Rights Commission on 29^th Sept. 2011, people concerned have stated that “we want to go to our own homes and resettled”.

• Vaharai starves – International Community is Silent
• Tsunami and asbestos
• Double standards?
• Alliance Of Parties In The East?
• Forcible resettlements in East

Image from Channel 4

Introduction

The UK based Channel 4 documentary, “Killing Fields”, possesses an interesting characteristic. It has the power of accentuating the prejudices and biases of viewers. The reaction found on a variety of forums is arguably more illuminating than the documentary itself.

Those who feel the Sri Lankan government has done no wrong, are further convinced that there is an international conspiracy and the entire documentary is fake. There are those who are convinced that the Sri Lankan armed forces are evil. There are also those that believe the documentary is evidence of the need for a separate Tamil nation and are busy distributing DVDs to Western politicians. The remainder are horrified by the footage and can not watch the entire documentary.

With the broadcast of the “Lies Agreed Upon” [1]  documentary by the Sri Lankan television station Ada Derana [2] , we now have two very one-sided documentaries. Only together can any semblance of balance be achieved.

Callum Macrae, producer and director of the Channel 4 documentary, defiantly asserted, “… this film was accurate, this film was carefully researched, this film did not take sides in that war, we were as critical of the LTTE as the Sri Lankan government.” [3]  The question remains, is the Channel 4 documentary a work of journalism, advocacy or propaganda?

The promotion, introduction and narration of the Chanel 4 documentary contain a number of factual errors and omissions [4] . Let us examine the factual errors relating to displaced civilians propagated by the narration by Jon Snow.

Displaced Civilians

Jon Snow blames the government entirely for the displacement of civilians:

“These were civilians driven from their homes by government forces who appeared to see all Tamil civilians as virtually indistinguishable from the fighters of the Tamil Tigers.”

On January 28, 2009, Human Rights Watch reported:

“The LTTE has long prevented civilians under its control from fleeing to government-held areas. As the LTTE has retreated into its stronghold in the northern Vanni area since the start of a Sri Lankan army offensive in October 2008, the rebel group has forced civilians deeper into territory they control. An estimated 300 local staff members of the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are trapped in the Vanni because the LTTE refuses to allow them to leave for safe areas. Altogether, an estimated 250,000 civilians are now trapped in the small part of Mullaittivu district that remains under LTTE control.”  [5]

Human Rights Watch states “the rebel group has forced civilians deeper into territory they control”. This directly contradicts the claim by Channel 4 that “[t]hese were civilians driven from their homes by government forces…”.

If you pay close attention to Jon Snow’s narration you will notice that figures relating to the number of displaced civilians is consistently inaccurate.

January 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“By the end of January 2009, the remaining Tamil Tigers and as many as 400,000 civilians were now trapped by Sri Lankan government forces.”

However, many sources contradict this claim.

BBC:

“Monday, 26 January 2009

The military says it is now advancing into the 300 sq km (115 sq mile) triangle of land in which the Tamil Tigers are still operating. There are thought to be about 250,000 civilians in the area in which the rebels are still operating.” [6]

Human Rights Watch:

“January 28, 2009

Altogether, an estimated 250,000 civilians are now trapped in the small part of Mullaittivu district that remains under LTTE control.”  [7]

Washington Post:

“Thursday, January 29, 2009

The United Nations and the ICRC said 250,000 civilians have fled to dense jungle terrain where fighting is raging in the 115 square miles still controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, known as the Tamil Tigers.” [8]

The UN Advisory Panel report also contradicts the claim by Channel 4:

“125. At the outset of the final phase, on 13 January 2009, the Government website reported that, according to independent verifications, the number of civilians in the Vanni was between 150,000 and 250,000. The United Nations estimate at the time was 250,000 (although its subsequent estimates were higher).”  [9]

The higher subsequent estimate is captured in footnote 54:

“100. From as early as 6 February 2009, the SLA continuously shelled within the area that became the second NFZ, from all directions, including land, air and sea. It is estimated that there were between 300,000 and 330,000 civilians in that small area.54

Footnotes
54 United Nations Documents generally reference a number of 300,000 whereas the Additional Government Agent estimated that there were 330,000 civilians left in the area.”  [10]

At the end of January the United Nations estimated 250,000 civilians and then later revised it to 300,000.

February 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“By the 12th of February, the old No-Fire-Zone had been virtually abandoned and the government announced a new one about 7 miles long on a narrow sand-spit. As many as 400,000 people flooded there and found themselves trapped …”

AFP:

“Feb 1, 2009

The United Nations says up to 250,000 non-combatants are trapped in the area. The Sri Lankan government says the figure is closer to 120,000.”  [11]

BBC:

“Page last updated at 16:21 GMT, Monday, 2 February 2009

The army offensive has pushed the rebels into a 300 sq km (110 sq mile) corner of jungle in the north-east of the island, which aid agencies say also holds 250,000 civilians.

The government says the number of civilians is closer to 120,000 and that the army has a policy of not firing at civilians.”  [12]

Al Jazeera:

“Sunday, February 08, 2009

Since January 1, around 17,900 have fled the fighting. Aid agencies said around 250,000 were inside the conflict zone before the exodus began, while the government disputed the figures claiming there were only 120,000.”  [13]

April 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“At the end of April the government claimed that there were just 10,000 civilians left trapped in the area. In fact there were over 200,000.”

The UN Advisory Panel report states:

At the end of April, United Nations estimates were that 127,177 civilians still remained trapped, whereas the Government said there were only 10,000 persons left at the time.  [14]

The New York Times published:

“April 24, 2009

More than 100,000 civilians fled from the combat zone earlier this week but the United Nations estimates that anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 civilians remain trapped on the sandy spit of land. Sri Lanka’s Defense Ministry said on Friday that 15,000 to 20,000 civilians were caught in the conflict zone.”  [15]

May 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“By now most of the No-Fire-Zone was overrun by the government and on the 8th of May they announced a new one, around 1 square mile in size. 130,000 people were trapped in this area”

The Age contradicts Channel 4:

“May 2, 2009

…

The UN estimates that up to 50,000 civilians are trapped in a narrow strip of coast where the Tamil Tigers are putting up a last stand. Government forces have said only about 20,000 people were still left in the area.” [16]

ABC (Australia):

“Posted May 09, 2009 13:41:00

…
The guerrillas have been confined to a five-square-kilometre area in the district of Mullaittivu and only three square kilometres of that would be the new “safe zone,” Brigadier Nanayakkara said.
…
The military estimates that up to 20,000 civilians are trapped in the small area where the Tigers are resisting a military advance.

The United Nations has said nearly 50,000 civilians could be trapped by the fighting.”  [17]

A foreign journalist in the war zone reported:

“May 21, 2009 10:42 IST

…
From April 20 to 23, over 125,000 civilians fled from the Tigers’s clutches and went over to the government side.
…
This was the defining moment when Sri Lankan Tamils emerged from the war zone. The LTTE and thousands of people were shrunk into a 12 square km area. The entrapment was real, but they didn’t surrender.
Outside the war zone the government declared 20,000 people were with the LTTE. UN agencies estimated the figure at 50,000, but there were actually 70,000 people with the Tigers.
…

The LTTE understood that the end had come, the game was over. Probably, Prabhakaran and a few of his men were in the last 500 square metre area. On May 15, 16 and 17, the last bunch of 70,000 people came out.” [18]

Why Inflate the Number of Displaced Civilians?

Gordon Weiss conveys the implications of inflating the number of displaced civilians:

“I think the only explanation is that it was deliberately misleading and I think that the reason for that is because they didn’t want to account for the number of people killed inside the siege zone.”

Channel 4, quite rightly, accuses the Sri Lankan government of underestimating the number of displaced civilians. Ironically, Channel 4 then deliberately inflates the number of displaced civilians, presumably to imply a larger civilian death toll. The Channel 4 documentary has lingered dangerously into the territory of propaganda.

Conclusion

Is it possible for an objective person to still think the Channel 4 documentary is a credible work of journalism? The producer/director believes that by criticising the LTTE he has provided balance. He completely misses the point that balance is achieved by conveying different points of view. It is clear that the Channel 4 documentary does not adhere to the principles of news and current affairs.

Maybe it was intended as a work of advocacy? Whatever the intention, the Channel 4 documentary is a combination of journalism, advocacy and propaganda. Those that are intent on burying their head in the sand and claiming it to be fake need to recognise that it does raise some valid questions that Sri Lanka needs to answer.

If you seek truth and justice, it is disingenuous not to acknowledge the factual errors littered throughout the Channel 4 documentary. Some media and advocacy groups have promoted the documentary quite passionately. It may be time for these groups to decide whether they believe that ’the ends justify the means’. These groups should also consider whether the short term gains by promoting this documentary will be negated in the long term. Have they not learnt anything from the controversial Nayirah testimony? [19]

Sri Lankans should watch the documentary, but beware of the factual inaccuracies in the narration. For those of us who are far removed from war, it unflinchingly conveys the horror of war. It should be a reminder to us all, particularly those barracking from a distance, why we should not walk down that path ever again. If you disagree, you should consider whether you are willing to take the first step, instead of asking others.

Endnotes

[1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5O1JAfRXew

[2] http://www.adaderana.lk/

[3] http://groundviews.org/2011/06/21/exclusive-interview-with-callum-mccrae-director-of-sri-lankas-killing-fields-produced-by-channel-4/

[4] http://jayasolutions.com/slreport/sl-channel-4-journalism-advocacy-propaganda.html

[5] http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/28/sri-lanka-urgent-action-needed-prevent-civilian-deaths

[6] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7850603.stm

[7] http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/28/sri-lanka-urgent-action-needed-prevent-civilian-deaths

[8] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/28/AR2009012802009.html

[9] http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf

[10] http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf

[11] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iOMzJjueDNhgLg-wyIlxUDU45juQ

[12] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7865190.stm

[13] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/02/200928111020168135.html

[14] http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf

[15] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/world/asia/25lanka.html?ref=global-home

[16] http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/64-civilians-killed-in-sri-lanka-hospital-attack-20090502-aqwz.html

[17] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-09/govt-troops-shrink-sri-lankan-safe-zone/1677642

[18] http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2009/may/20/slide-show-1-how-war-against-ltte-was-won.htm

[19] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nayirah_(testimony)

• Debating numbers, killing lives: UN and Government differences emerge
• Sri Lanka – Killing for Peace
• Exclusive interview with Callum McCrae, Director of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ produced by Channel 4
• New leaks of UN war crimes report: Shelling civilians, horrifying medical conditions and failure of the UN system in Sri Lanka?
• When allegations become evidence

We used the web service Tweet Book to capture all our tweets over the past year in a single PDF. We’ve tweeted thousands of times over the past twelve months and have covered,

• The media fallout of the farcical fast of senior government Minister Wimal Weerawansa in front of the UN HQ in Colombo.
• Praise for our model of journalism on C-SPAN video in the US, captured from an event at the United States Institute of Peace.
• Key statements by world leaders like Desmond Tutu on post-war reconciliation and accountability for war crimes
• Bell Pottinger’s sickening relationship with the incumbent government, largely hidden from public scrutiny
• Key reports on Sri Lanka from, inter alia, HRW, AI, ICG and the US State Department, including responses from senior Ministers and the Foreign Ministry
• Foreign relations and the tussle in Sri Lanka between India and China
• The court proceedings on Sarath Fonseka
• The UNP’s perennial leadership crisis
• Key updates on the LLRC, including additions to our media archives, the most comprehensive available on the web
• Key submissions to the LLRC, including holding mainstream media accountable for highly selective and erroneous reporting of certain submissions.
• The most comprehensive coverage of the 18th Amendment’s passage in Parliament across any media in Sri Lanka including in-depth analysis, articles and video interviews, plus video of submissions by the TNA in Parliament and the racist responses of fellow MPs.
• Visualisations flagging the hypocrisy behind promises to abolish the Executive Presidency, and the utter farce of the President appearing before Parliament after it was passed into law.
• In-depth and sustained coverage of the Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General
• Unique use of web platforms to contextualise the first leaks from the UN Panel’s report and visualise key findings
• In-depth coverage of the Cablegate / Wikileaks affair, with the first and best visualisation to date of how it impacts Sri Lanka
• Unique use of Google Maps to visualise the extent of the devastating flooding in Sri Lanka in early 2011
• The bizarre boycott appeal by RSF against the Galle Literary Festival and the response to it
• The desecration of LTTE graves in Jaffna
• Coverage of the Cricket World Cup and its impact on post-war reconciliation, including a poll taken by hundreds, and flagging the surreptitious increase of fuel and essential items the day of the Finals.
• The launch of Moving Images – Sri Lanka’s first high definition short video productions – and media coverage around it
• Leading web investigations into utterly bogus newspaper advertisements against the UN report taken out by those closely embedded in the Army
• In-depth coverage of the leadership training programme, including the exclusive publication of the syllabi
• In-depth coverage of Channel 4′s video documentary Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields including exclusive interview with its producers
• In-depth coverage of the recent Katunayake FTZ clashes, including exclusive video and photos from our affiliate, Vikalpa
• In-depth coverage of the recently held defeating terrorism seminar in Colombo, including flagging the bizarre statements of the US Defence Attache, which led to an official State Department press release just two days after

In addition we’ve covered the challenges facing and often, the failure of mainstream media including homophobic editorials and plagiarism, self-censorship, tragic example of racism and Sinhala chauvinism in post war Sri Lanka, war crimes allegations, rehabilitation, breakdown in democratic governance, human rights violations, censorship, clamping down on the freedom of expression, corruption, nepotism of the Rajapaksa family, compelling reviews of culture and art, news articles and information on contemporary events and issues in Sri Lanka.

Read the full book of our tweets below, or view full screen here. The book contains all the web links we’ve flagged and all the public exchanges we’ve had with our readership over Twitter.

• A Public Memo to Members of Parliament representing the Tamil National Alliance from the Tamil Civil Society
• LLRC: Interim report to Government
• Launch of Moving Images: Stunning documentaries and photo essays from Sri Lanka
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Sinhala and Tamil translations of UN Panel’s report on accountability

The Living Scotsman’s review of The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers by former UN spokesperson Gordon Weiss flags, inter alia, photos taken by Ret. Col. Harun Khan when his UN convoy came under attack in the final days of the war. The so-called Convoy 11 incident is covered in detail in Gordon’s book. As our review notes,

“Weiss speaks of photographic evidence of the carnage taken by Col. Khan, but there is none to be found in the book itself. Dismembered babies may have been too gruesome to include in the tome, but are photographic evidence of the deliberate targeting of civilians. Weiss does not say who has these photos, but we can assume, amongst others, the UN does.”

Referring to the Living Scotman’s review, we asked Weiss, via Twitter, whether Col. Khan’s photos would be publicly released.

Weiss responded and asked us whether this sort of evidence should be publicly available.

To which we responded in the affirmative,

The response of Weiss was posted on his blog today. It is worth quoting Weiss at length,

“For those who don’t know, Khan, who features in Chapter 5 of my book “The Cage”, is a Bangladeshi Colonel and UN officer who came under bombardment courtesy of the Sri Lankan Army in late January 2009. He witnessed the resulting deaths and injuries to civilians – “nothing short of intentional murder” as he said – and extensively photographed the carnage. His presence was unfortunate because at the same time the Government of Sri Lanka was denying that its operations were killing civilians at all. There are many other images of the wounded and dead from these days in late January 2009, as well as close-ups of splash marks on trees, vehicles, and shell craters. I will not post other images of the dead, mostly because I think that it is rightly up to a credible and properly constituted judicial authority to weigh the evidence. Khan provided these images to me, as he did his testimony, with the specific intention that this wrongdoing should be known, not merely conveniently buried.”

Emphasis ours. The link to the photo Weiss provides is here. A copy of the same image appears below, albeit at a lower resolution.

There is however a problem with this photograph. As noted in our review of The Cage, The Report Of The Secretary-General’s Panel Of Experts On Accountability In Sri Lanka note on Page 24 that,

84. In the early morning hours of 24 January, hundreds of shells rained down in the NFZ. Those with access to the United Nations bunker dove into it for protection, but most IDPs did not have bunkers and had nowhere to seek cover. People were screaming and crying out for help. The United Nations security officer, a highly experienced military officer, and others present discerned that the shelling was coming from the south, from SLA positions. He made frantic calls to the head of United Nations Security in Colombo and the Vanni Force Commander at his headquarters in Vavuniya as well as the Joint Operations Headquarters in Colombo, demanding that the shelling stop, which sometimes resulted in a temporary adjustment of the shelling before it started again.38 Heavy shelling continued over night, and shells continued to hit the United Nations hub and the distribution centre, killing numerous civilians.

85. When United Nations staff emerged from the bunker in the first morning light at the first opportunity, mangled bodies and body parts were strewn all around them, including those of many women and children. Remains of babies had been blasted upwards into the trees. Among the dead were the people who had helped to dig the bunker the previous day.

Emphasis ours. In both the UN Panel report’s description of the incident and Gordon’s more detailed and graphic account, the dates mentioned are late January 2009. And therein lies the rub with the image Weiss has published on his blog. It doesn’t take a digital forensics expert to open up the image in Photoshop to look at the meta data of a photograph in order to ascertain for example, what camera model and what settings were used to take a photo. We’ve used Photoshop CS5, but almost any photo editing programme on any platform can access this data, just to underscore the point that this doesn’t require any expert knowledge or specialist software. And this is what we see for the image above,

A larger version of this screenshot can be seen here.

The problem is that this photo, part of what Weiss claims is part of “many other images of the wounded and dead from these days in late January 2009″ taken by Col. Harun was actually taken 22nd August 2008 at 5.08pm, and not in late January 2009. This emphatically does not help any advocacy, domestic and international, to hold those responsible for alleged war crimes accountable for their actions and calls for independent investigations to determine the veracity of these very serious allegations. It is possible that Weiss was careless, and posted the wrong photograph. It is possible he and the UN, as we noted in our review of his tome, have the originals of these images, where similar scrutiny under any photo editing programme can very easily determine whether they are in fact from late January or earlier.

Weiss in his blog post is concerned that akin to the response of Channel 4′s documentary Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields, this “this image of a dead mother and children (as well as others in the deep background and to the right side) will quickly be taken up by various loons as evidence of the set-design and pantomime skills of Tamil Tiger Productions Inc. Good luck to them.”

Good luck indeed. Though there is a significant discrepancy between the date this photo was actually taken and when Weiss says it was taken, it doesn’t appear to have been digitally manipulated. Again, since we aren’t experts in this field, we used a freely accessible online digital photography forensics tool to analyse this photo and could find no evidence of airbrushing or other editing artefacts, which are impossible to mask once done. See the image analysis here (where it is clear that nothing has been done to the image to enhance the visceral), and an explanation on how to interpret this here (from which example it is clear the model’s lip colour and perhaps size have been digitally altered, similar evidence of which you don’t find in the image Weiss has provided). Download a high resolution version of the image analysis as a PDF here (~4Mb).

To place this photograph in context, news reports today suggest the government has obtained the raw video footage of what was featured in the Channel 4 documentary Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields. Basil Rajapaksa, the President’s brother, noted recently that “the massive propaganda campaign carried out by treacherous elements in foreign countries against the country’s sovereignty and independence resulted in the controversial Darusman Report, the infamous video footage telecast by British Channel 4, among others”. It is unclear what traction, if any, the Channel 4 video has within Sri Lanka. It’s freely available online, but has never been shown on public television. However, noted blogger Dinidu de Alwis wrote a blow by blow account of the footage obtained by the government which was broadcast on public television last evening via Twitter. A selection of his live tweeting during the broadcast of this material follows, and is very revealing.

The thinly veiled racism and Sinhala chauvinism of both State and private media in Sri Lanka will, out of fear or favour, along with government and the Army, gladly lap up images such as the one Weiss has put up on his blog today as evidence that all the allegations made against the government and the Army are false or at best, misguided. Images such as this, though they depict an unimaginably horrible reality on the ground in the final months of the war, when published carelessly and bizarrely, without any fact checking, risk irrevocably undermining that which is needed most in Sri Lanka, a peace with justice and dignity for all. That goal is best serviced by advocacy that is principled and evidence that actually corroborates allegations. Anything else, tragically, strengthens the very forces one seeks to hold accountable.

###

Update, 2.20pm, 2 July 2011: tweeted:

We had earlier told Weiss that stating tweeted:

The problem with a single photo published in this manner is two fold. One is to do with the admissibility of this photo in a court of law. The other, with popular perception and optics. These are issues Sohan also flags. If the dates were incorrect set or the batteries were dying in Ret. Col. Khan’s camera, at the very least, Gordon should have noted this in his post. To have it discovered post facto is unfortunate, suggesting at best a complete lack of regard for the skill of digital forensics a government can and will command if ever these photos make it to a trial.

A photo shot today on or around Galle Road in Kollupitiya can have a date stamp from 2007, but it would be evident from the construction and the nature of the road that it was actually taken in 2011, after the road was made a single carriageway. Depending on the progress of the construction, a close approximation of location and date could be made. There is no similar artefact in this photo that can date it to late January 2009. Much like the watches that stopped after Hiroshima, there are possibly some photos taken that give a better indication of the actual time and date the images were taken, even though the date stamp is incorrect. However, without any a clear marker however or any artefact on someone’s person or captured in the environs that can help fix a time more accurate than the embedded date stamp, these images are, to a court, no different to those employed by the LTTE and its proxies around the world around the end of the war, which mixed graphic footage of recent days with library images of fighting and casualties from years ago.

If court proceedings on war crimes had occurred around the time these photos were taken, Ret. Col. Khan’s camera could have been taken to court, a photo taken, and the time stamp compared with those in these photos. If the difference in time was the same (around 5 months) lawyers could argue that these photos, even though they have timestamps from 2008, were in fact taken recently.

This is impossible to do today.

The question of public optics is also pertinent. For perhaps the best of reasons, the manner in which this photo was published risks feeding into an insatiable propaganda drive to deny and decry war crimes allegations. It may be quite tragic, but in fact, the majority in Sri Lanka believe and will stand by what the government says. If we hadn’t flagged the discrepancy of the dates, the Ministry of Defence would surely have. The response of Weiss to all this is telling,

Our counterpoint remains simply that,

We risk disappointment to hope that saner counsel, better technical skills and stronger strategic foresight prevails amongst those who seek to hold this government accountable.

• Chaos in Colombo: Mêlée over jobs indicates a serious economic problem in Sri Lanka?
• Ground report: Widespread public perception of military links to ‘grease devils’?
• Milinda Moragoda: The gap between promise and reality
• Would killing 50,000 civilians to finish off the LTTE bring peace?
• Twitter explodes with reactions and responses to Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields

(New York) – The Sri Lankan government continues its diplomatic offensive, denying and dismissing the growing evidence of war crimes during the final bloody battles between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that ended in May 2009.

Last week, at a panel presentation of the Channel 4 film, the ‘Killing Fields of Sri Lanka’, Sri Lanka’s United Nations Ambassador Palitha Kohona said, “To suggest that the Sri Lankan military was so foolhardy as to deliberately target the civilians, I think is a blatant lie… We had no intention of creating martyrs, we had no intention of creating more volunteers for the LTTE.”

If the killings of civilians were not deliberate, the Sri Lankan army attacks were clearly indiscriminate, which is no less a war crime. The recent findings of the panel of experts set up to advise UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon concluded that up to 40,000 civilians were killed in the final stages of the conflict, many as the result of indiscriminate shelling by government forces. The report also concluded that both government forces and the Tigers conducted military operations “with flagrant disregard for the protection, rights, welfare and lives of civilians and failed to respect the norms of international law.”

The Channel 4 film adds even more weight to the UN report, providing devastating and graphic footage of possible war crimes by Sri Lankan soldiers. It shows summary executions of prisoners by soldiers in uniform, half-naked corpses of women that raise questions about sexual abuse and includes revealing interviews with ethnic Tamils who described indiscriminate shelling that killed many civilians.

It is true that the LTTE committed horrific abuses against the civilian population by using them as human shields, forcibly conscripting children, and deploying artillery close to civilians. Human Rights Watch documented abuses by the LTTE for years.

It is also true that in the final stages of the war it was difficult to verify facts and corroborate evidence, especially when the government deliberately shut out foreign media, the United Nations, and humanitarian and human rights groups from the battle zone.

But it is wrong for the Sri Lankan government to dismiss this compelling footage as “fake.” The most vehement dismissals have been directed against a clip of several executions of naked, bound and blindfolded men by men in military uniforms. But the executions footage has been authenticated by four independent experts who have no connection to Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka’s own examination of the video, by contrast, carries no credibility. All the experts commissioned by the government were either Sri Lankan military experts or Sri Lankan nationals living abroad. All of the government’s objections had been addressed by the UN-commissioned experts in their recent reports.

Since the screening of the film for diplomats in Geneva and New York, Sri Lankan government officials have said that they will investigate any credible allegations of wrongdoing. But it is hard to imagine more concrete evidence of war crimes than this execution video. In addition to the video, several photographs of the same bodies, all publicly available, add information that should allow the government to find those responsible for these crimes if it wants to.

First, we know the identity of one of the victims. Human Rights Watch interviewed several people who identified one of the female victims as Isaipiriya, a LTTE media worker.

Second, there are strong indications that the incident took place on the evening of May 18– the final night of the war. The army said on the Defense Ministry’s website that Isaipiriya was killed on May 18; this information is consistent with meta-data on many of the photographs.

Third, regarding the identity of the perpetrators, the army itself said that its 53^rd division killed Isaipiriya. Yet, the government has not taken even the most rudimentary steps for a criminal investigation, such as questioning those in the 53^rd division who reported Isaipiriya’s killing.

After initially dismissing the footage as “fake” and “made with LTTE money,” the government is now, perhaps with the growing body of evidence, asserting that it is waiting for its domestic truth mechanism, the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, to conclude its investigations. The government now asserts that the Commission will look into some of these incidents if it deems them credible.

This is nothing but a delaying tactic. As noted by the UN panel of experts, the LLRC is not an accountability mechanism, is “deeply flawed” and its mandate is “not tailored to investigating allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law.”

Only a prompt, thorough and objective criminal investigation will fulfill the government’s obligations under international law. The government’s failure to open such an investigation, almost two years after the footage surfaced, is a clear indication that the government has no intention to meet its international obligations.

The government’s shallow show-and-tell exercise with the LLRC reflects a long history in Sri Lanka of setting up government commissions in response to serious allegations of abuses such as enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings that ultimately fail to adequately investigate or to hold those responsible to account.

Since 1977, Sri Lanka has set up at least 15 commissions in response to international criticism of its human rights record. The work of many of these commissions has been tainted with political interference and mainly served to exonerate the government security forces. But even in cases in which the commissions conducted thorough investigations, established numerous cases of abuses, and identified the perpetrators, the authorities failed to act on the commissions’ recommendations or to establish a meaningful accountability process.

Justice for Sri Lanka’s war victims is crucial. If Ambassador Kohona really wanted to avoid making martyrs of the LTTE, then he would support an independent international investigation into the allegations of war crimes. Based on the government’s track record, anything it produces is likely to be just another whitewash. What is really needed is to establish a full international investigation of the executions in the video and other numerous credible allegations of war crimes.

Elaine Pearson is the deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.

• Is the war crimes video confirmed by UN as authentic “unrepresentative and irrelevant”?
• Giving the middle finger: Sri Lanka’s conflicting responses to war crimes allegations
• Exclusive interview with Callum McCrae, Director of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ produced by Channel 4
• Twitter explodes with reactions and responses to Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields
• No One, in the US or Sri Lanka, Should Be Above the Law

Channel 4’s Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields is anything but understated. It is designed to shock, even if you are the most hardened of viewers. Images of blood-soaked bodies assail you from every angle. As a cellphone camera jerks around, you see the bulging eyes of a man-turned-killing machine. He appears to be enjoying himself. You feel disoriented. When you think you cannot take it anymore, there it is: Another body eviscerated, another child screaming for her mother, another man’s eyes tied shut, another gunshot through the head, and still another naked body piled atop a truck laden with violated human flesh.

And then you are left with nothing but darkness. And silence.

That silence lingered as the lights went up on the UN Church Center, where NGO workers and UN staffers, reporters and diplomats attended a subdued screening of Channel 4’s controversial (and at times sensationalist) documentary, Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields. Though the screening was punctuated by two short breaks, few viewers dared to get up for a glass of water or a refill of their morning coffee during the screening.

The panel that followed was moderated by Jose Luis Diaz, Amnesty International’s Representative to the United Nations (who has since written an account of the event here, and featured speakers from Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, Amnesty, and the director of the film, Callum McCrae.

McCrae said that he had very little to add to what the audience had just seen.

“As filmmakers, our job is to gather the evidence, to put together the film… it’s not our job to define what should happen next. In some sense, that’s your job,” he said.

Calling his film “prima facie evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity,” he stated that three entities would have to answer for these brutal violations: the Sri Lankan government, surviving Tamil Tiger leaders, and the UN and the international community. Refuting the idea that his documentary was causing problems in Sri Lanka, McCrae said, “The problems are there… without justice, there can be no resolution, no reconciliation.”

The representatives of the assembled rights groups spoke next. They summed up the violations of both parties to war, cataloguing in particular human rights abuses of the LTTE that they had documented over the years. They also pointed out the limits of domestic mechanisms under the current government, blasted the United Nations and the Secretary-General’s inaction on the report of a panel of experts he had convened, and called for an international inquiry into the conduct of the final phases of war. When they were done, the audience was given a brief opportunity to ask questions. A few hands were raised, but most appeared not to know what to say, or ask. After three questions, Diaz reminded the audience that the alleged crimes under discussion were subject to universal jurisdiction, allowing any country to pursue and prosecute them. He noted this as an avenue that might be pursued in the absence of domestic accountability processes.

And then something rather surprising happened. Two men from Sri Lanka’s Permanent Mission—two men often named in allegations of war crimes–were given the opportunity to respond to the documentary.

Palitha Kohona, Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations spoke first. Addressing a question that was posed earlier about why the international community had not taken these allegations seriously, he claimed that it was because they were not “well-founded.” Kohona’s response did not question the veracity of the footage; rather, it questioned the motives of the producers, and others calling for investigations, as well as the accuracy of their claims and commentary. He argued that the filmmakers and rights activists had confused “allegations” with “evidence” in their presentation, and referencing Channel 4, turned to McCrae and said “maybe you were upset that you were thrown out of the country, at some point.” Even as he admitted that UN staff left the North in September 2008, Kohona claimed that “the UN had dozens of local recruits on the ground, and they continued to stay there” as observers until the end. He continued, “In fact, we suggested that the UN also pull them out.” We might ask: If these local recruits remained, what assurances were made for their safety and lives that would allow them to act as observers? Kohona further claimed that the ICRC had a presence on the beach until the very last day.

In light of what he called “naïve mischaracterizations,” Kohona said that the documentary required more scrutiny and analysis:

It is easy to provoke people, get them emotional—and also, even if you count up all the people who are dead in that video, I don’t think you could come up with 100—that is not to suggest that others were not hurt or died—they may have! But even if you counted every single body that was in that video, I do not think that you could come up with a total of 100. (Emphasis added.)

Kohona then rejected the documentary’s assertions about the post-war North, and added a few final remarks to his dismissal of the film’s war crimes allegations: He averred that there are a number of ways in which the government has taken responsibility for investigating these concerns:

• The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) has “the mandate to go into all aspects of the conflict, including accountability issues”
• “The Attorney-General’s Department of Sri Lanka has established a special unit to pursue further any issues relating to accountability that are raised by the LLRC.”
• Kohona cited an Army statement that it would look into “any instances that can be substantiated where soldiers have broken the law,” noting that “there were instances which we saw on that screen, which were not very pleasant, and which may be brought under the criminal law of the country. And the military has said that very categorically—that they will deal with situations like that.”

In short, Kohona admitted that the footage reveals acts that require legal investigation and asserted that Sri Lanka has domestic mechanisms—in particular, the LLRC and the Attorney-General’s office–to investigate war atrocities. Such claims may be belied by the political realities in which these mechanisms operate: a judiciary subject to political appointments and decades of commissions of inquiry with little result. Those who stand accused occupy Sri Lanka’s highest levels in government and military, yet Kohona’s final point claims that the military will investigate itself.

In contrast, Kohona suggested that pointing out these shortcomings to say that Sri Lanka cannot investigate was “extremely paternalistic.” He continued: “I’ve not heard Amnesty International, or any other organization, suggesting that there should be an international inquiry into Abu Ghraib or what is going on in Tripoli at the moment.” (That Amnesty did call for an “independent investigation” into Abu Ghraib—even after US investigations and minor prosecutions—is conveniently forgotten.) In making this point, does the ambassador inadvertently liken the events depicted in the Channel 4 documentary to other grave violations of international law? Does American and British hypocrisy justify these acts, or would they not require, at the very least, independent and impartial scrutiny?

By way of conclusion, Kohona stated: “I must confirm that Sri Lanka will continue to abide by its responsibilities internationally, will conform to international standards, and wherever our troops, our security forces are found lacking, appropriate measures will be taken.”

The Asian Tribune has since published a written summary of Kohona’s ad-hoc speech here. However, his is not the speech that many Sri Lankans would be familiar with after reading last week’s news; that distinction belongs to Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva.

The ambassador handed the floor over to Silva, who was appointed by the Rajapaksa government last December as Kohona’s deputy at the Mission. Diaz reminded Silva that he had only two minutes, yet he spoke for nearly ten. Silva began by pointedly noting that he had not been invited to the event, nor to speak, though he was “featured” in the film as the Commander of the 58^th Division. He then proceeded to act as a living caricature of the Government’s initial response to the Channel 4 documentary. The deputy claimed that the footage was fabricated, and explained to the audience how he had determined this. He variously decried the identity of eyewitnesses, perpetrators and victims as Tigers.

Let us look more closely at one example provided as the “evidence” for this “fabrication.” Silva claimed that Channel 4 had mistranslated footage of a woman screaming as she hid with others in a trench. He said the same was true of the Sinhala-language footage, though he did not offer any examples. This is the scene he referred to, as translated in the film (09:41):

Don’t take the video

Please get in the bunker

What are you going to do with the video?

They are killing everyone

Silva suggests that we “ask someone who knows Tamil to tell what it is” and offered the following “translation” in response:

“And these people who are going down [into the trench] say not to film this! This is a production! This is a production!”

Viewers of the Channel 4 documentary will see that the narrator introduces this footage by noting that the identity of the videographer—and therefore, whether the person was a Tiger cameraperson or a civilian (09:28)–could not be confirmed. What matters is what we see: that a woman is shouting out of fear, asking the camera’s operator to get into the bunker when “they are killing everyone.” That “they” are not specified does not matter: Whatever the entity, it is targeting non-combatants, and this requires credible investigation.

McCrae noted that the producers had used four Tamil translators and five Sinhala translators to ensure their accuracy, and that these translations were independently verified. How many did Silva use? Were his translations verified? Either Silva has sought to deceive an international audience, or his mistranslation speaks to his own inability to understand one of Sri Lanka’s national languages.

The minutiae of these misrepresentations distract from allegations that are leveled at the government in this film, and the UN Panel of Experts report – in particular, the deliberate withholding of food, water and medical supplies; the shelling of hospitals and other non-military installations; and most grave of all, the intent to kill civilians herded into no-fire zones — allegations that Silva did not confront at all. A government that is convinced of the legality of its actions and the lack of evidence to prove otherwise should be able to confront such allegations, and would have nothing to fear in addressing them. Rather, evasions such as Silva’s reveal more than they conceal.

As he spoke, Silva waved a set of papers around, and told the audience that the government could provide links and analysis after the event. Owing to the length of Silva’s extempore speech, there was no time for audience questions at the end of the event, contrary to what the state media presents here. McCrae was given the opportunity to respond briefly, and with that, the event was over.

As the audience prepared to leave, two men from the mission handed out the two documents that were held up by Silva as “Sri Lanka’s response.”

See full screen version of this document here.

See the full screen version of this document here.

Let us then take a look at these documents: The first is called “Points to Ponder” and analyzes the commentary of the documentary while questioning the validity of its footage, and juxtaposing this with images of civilians killed by LTTE bombings. The second document is called “Channel 4 Faceoff—Exposing the appalling truth” and is drawn from the Defence Ministry website. Each document reiterates Kohona and Silva’s disjointed remarks, in a bundle of links, images and commentary that justifies the war and denounces the producers of the documentary—the second by making unsubstantiated claims that link their project to a pro-LTTE, anti-Sri Lanka campaign abroad.

Shortly after the event ended, the Government went on a publicity blitz. The Ministry of Defence, state media and a sycophantic press released numerous statements that denounce the documentary’s footage as fake. As with an earlier release by Channel 4 of a video documenting extrajudicial killings, it makes hyperbolic claims that link this footage to the Tigers, and has recently gone so far as to suggest, via an Army spokesperson, that Tamil asylum-seekers “invented” the footage to secure refugee status abroad.

Such remarks, along with those at Tuesday’s event, have allowed the Government to proclaim a public relations victory, as it has done here and here. Yet those in the audience who were not attached to the mission were visibly and audibly perturbed by the footage, and post-event, noted and questioned the differences they observed among the two speakers. They saw Kohona as a diplomat who understood how things worked, even if his arguments were unconvincing. Silva, on the other hand, was described by some as “an idiot.”

The words of one attendee summed it up: “The evidence is there for everyone to see.” Indeed, it is. What will be done with it remains to be seen.

The documents above and the audience reaction all beg the question: Why is the Government unable to come up with a coherent, reasoned response, let alone one that is adequate to the footage that confronts the viewer? Why were Kohona’s remarks shelved and Silva’s trumpeted by the state media?

Is it, perhaps, because Kohona’s statements about the footage and Sri Lanka’s mechanisms implicitly recognized that there may have been violations that should be investigated and accounted for? Because—unlike Silva’s utter denial–he explicitly noted that the State was responsible for dealing with violations of international law, and would then be required to uphold such obligations?

Taken together, Kohona and Silva’s two-faced response reveals a schizophrenic mission for a government that is unable to face up to the truth of the war, in order to reconcile and rebuild the country. As Human Rights Watch deputy director for Asia, Elaine Pearson, pointed out during the event, the Government has focused its efforts on touting “the Sri Lanka model” of counterinsurgency. In doing so, it has drawn the notice of liberal interventionists. Human rights activists are not with us, they are against us, its spokespeople shout in response– or, as Silva claims, they are aligned with the pro-LTTE lobby abroad in a grand, imperialist plot. The war on terror extends indefinitely. And the government has thus effectively created the conspiracy that it now seeks to vanquish.

Indeed, the Government’s inadequate response to the problem of accountability for war atrocities does not bode well for the future of Sri Lanka. It lays the ground for suspicion, fueling calls for international action, which are then used by those in power to justify their repression of domestic critics—actions that only indicate growing authoritarianism and raise further questions. Evasions of accountability thus serve to undermine local efforts at post-war rebuilding and reconciliation, and in fact leave the back door open for those who would make an example of the state’s failures. These efforts toward truth and justice—and not the whitewash of an international propaganda battle–are the real challenges for a democratic Sri Lanka, as it strives for everyday and political reconciliation, and the prosperity of its citizens in the years to come.

After watching the Channel 4 film, many of us asked: What will the Government do now? If these scattered, frenzied “responses” are the answer, don’t the people of Sri Lanka—and in particular, the war-battered people in this film – deserve better?

• Exclusive interview with Callum McCrae, Director of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ produced by Channel 4
• A Public Memo to Members of Parliament representing the Tamil National Alliance from the Tamil Civil Society
• Launch of Moving Images: Stunning documentaries and photo essays from Sri Lanka
• Mojo for mayhem or source of serendipity? Sri Lankan Army’s model to defeat terrorism
• Sinhala and Tamil translations of UN Panel’s report on accountability

‘Killing fields’ can be a phrase used to describe a most mundane fact known to humanity, or it could be a most provocative phrase to an ethnic majority or minority group. When viewed from the standpoint of a human being, one need not try hard to realize that the moment one factors in the number of killings that may have taken place, the amount of brutal wars that have been fought by man against man in the past, the kind of death and destruction that resulted in policies and practices of various states, such as colonialism etc., all of us belonging to the human race belong to one large ‘killing field’.

But we are sentient beings with a lot of dust in our eyes, we are easily provoked and even enjoy being provoked at times, and we often view things from a narrow ‘ethnic’ or ‘nationalist’ lens (merely conventional truths or sammuti-sacca, as a great philosophical teacher has stated; or, since we are on the topic of provocation, would I be permitted to use the phrase ‘conventional myths’?). So when ‘killing fields’ is thrown at us, as Britain’s Channel 4 recently did, we are provoked, for various different reasons. A trap is set, and we walk straight into it.

But how do we deal with such a sensitive issue? Are we to believe everything that we see, are we to reject all, can we to be selective, or do we whilst seeing what we see make an attempt to see the unseen as well? Can there be a more critical appreciation of the numerous factors and facets surrounding the episode, the moving image, the movers and shakers, their motives, the whole works? What are some of these factors?

A critique

To begin with, the reaction of the government, by and large, has been unsurprising. This reaction angers many, but it’s unsurprising and obvious because governments never rush to accept the allegation that their Armed Forces have committed war-crimes. It’s a standard response of governments which are engaged, or have engaged, in armed conflict. It’s natural, for as reported by AFP, when the Libyan Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmudi accused the NATO forces of having committed war-crimes, the immediate response of NATO’s spokeswoman Oana Lungescu was to call such allegations simply “outrageous”. So, this impression some have that it’s only the Sri Lankan government that resorts to such outright rejection of allegations and accusations is flawed; unless it’s so obvious like when a state drops a nuclear bomb for the entire world to witness, and then, because of the sheer power it wields, it comes out with the excuse that that it had to be done in the name of peace.

Not only that. The difficulty of getting top political leaders to initiate inquiries against their own Armed Forces has to do with a genuine sense of love they have for their Armed Forces personnel, the young and the brave, who ultimately are sent to the battlefield, knowing very well that they may not return; that asking a soldier to go and fight is akin to telling that soldier’s son that his father may not return, or telling a wife that her husband will die, or informing a parent that his/her son is gone forever.

It was reported recently that the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, after dinner, all alone, writes notes to families of the US soldiers killed in Afghanistan. Since late 2006, he has reportedly written some 3,400 condolence letters, and he states: “There’s probably not a day in the last four years that I haven’t wept…” Referring to the soldiers as ‘kids’, he says: “The only thing that actually matters to me long term is if somehow these kids think that here was a secretary of defence that was really looking after me. All the stuff, the budget decisions, the war decisions, all that other stuff, the only one I care about is what those kids think of me. The rest of it is just Washington talk.” (Gates’ Legacy of Care for Troops, South China Morning Post, 20 June 2011).

If then, to stomach the allegation that your ‘kids’ committed war-crimes is not an easy task, and there’s outright denial. This strong attachment shown by leaders commanding their Armed Forces should not be underestimated.

Furthermore, the moving image can very conveniently and surreptitiously hide many other serious factors which often go unnoticed. And in this regard it may be noted that the law, in such circumstances, is a hopelessly weak tool to address very complex political choices and decisions, and it’s an illusion that justice and reconciliation can only dawn if a particular set of crimes are investigated, which were committed during a specific time period (in a conflict which went on for decades), with a set of laws contained in an international legal instrument which are considered to be pure, rational and coherent; that there is a law, it’s clear, apply it, and peace, justice and reconciliation will arrive.

One such important factor was pointed out by Prof. Michael Roberts (People of Righteousness march on for Sri Lanka, The Island, 21 June 2011): “that, during Eelam War IV, and especially in 2008/09, the Tigers mostly fought in shorts, trousers or sarong. In other words one of the critical aspects of the vicious war was the blurring of the distinction between the “civilian” and the Tiger army person (whether infantry, catering, engineering or supply corps).” Any rational observer needs to take this into account, since one entire part of the footage shown by Channel 4 concerns video footage from the LTTE-controlled areas, and many men who are seen to be dead or injured, whether they are near a hospital or elsewhere, could be from the LTTE’s fighting units. How can one say they are not?

Are we also to believe that those images which came from the LTTE-controlled areas were captured by an innocent civilian who was running for his life? Wasn’t it all captured by a well trained individual belonging to LTTE’s media/propaganda outfit, and if so, could it not be the case that such video-recording may have been done in a manner that even in death, the dead were recorded in a way that blurs the distinction between the civilian and the fighter? And while there is apparent bombing and shelling going on, with smoke and noise, does it still mean that the LTTE did not provoke the Armed Forces into attacking them, knowing very well that their man will do the needful by recording the inevitable outcome, destruction and death that would follow? Are we to believe that bullets could only come into a no-fire zone, but cannot go out of it? And didn’t all this mean that even in the face of death, the LTTE was mindful of ‘propaganda’, not out of any serious concern for the civilians trapped under them, but simply to make an exaggerated case that civilians were indiscriminately targeted by the Armed Forces?

This also should give some impression about the ulterior motives of some (not all) of the actors involved in pursuing a revengeful policy of portraying that all that happened in Sri Lanka was one big ‘war-crime’. Having funded and fuelled terrorism for so long, some of these actors today proclaim that an investigation of both parties should take place, knowing very well that their ‘boys’ are no more. How ironically convenient the decimation of the LTTE has turned out to be for such proxy groups of the LTTE? Consider also the tremendous political and financial reach such groups have, the influence they have on certain governments, political parties and politicians in the Western world in particular. And when one takes into account this encircling global movement, along with the Tamil Nadu baying for blood, would not the Sinhalese consider themselves to be a global minority which is being unjustly pushed around after decades of armed conflict?

And do some of these groups which have now initiated a so-called ‘non-violent’ movement to win Ealam consider the debilitating impact their policies might have on the short and long term reconciliation efforts in Sri Lanka? How could they even stop to think, because their avowed agenda is a separatist one, which, they very well know, cannot be achieved if reconciliation and peace is to dawn within a single nation-state?

An alternative (a constructive-constructive?)

But how then do you move forward (if one is interested in moving forward)? Can there be an alternative perspective, which, while not endorsing the exact opposite of the above, is still an alternative which could lead to a lessening of the problems which seem to be mounting, now almost by the day?

To begin with, the attachment and love one has for the Armed Forces does not mean very simply that there are no fringe elements, miscreants, within the establishment which, wittingly or unwittingly, tarnish the entire image of the Armed Forces. Such elements should not be permitted to ridicule not only the Armed Forces, but an entire country as well. As the late Lakshman Kadirgamar once noted when speaking at the Kotelawela Defence Academy: “An officer whose character is flawed or compromised will forfeit the trust and respect of his men… An officer must not only be a man of valour, he must be a man of honour.” Armed Forces personnel are honourable men, and the people have faith in them and consider them to be so, but where it is seen that some have been utterly dishonourable, this faith is shattered and shaken, and it has to be restored before it vanishes.

This is necessary, especially in light of the Channel 4 footage which should move anyone for they depict, ultimately, the suffering of many trapped under the inescapable and inevitable harrowing conditions of armed conflict. At least two years after the war, people should be able to view these images with some detachment, and more importantly, with much compassion (whilst being mindful of the politics surrounding the promotion of such video footage). There should be an understanding especially of the amount of suffering that people underwent, and what those who survived had to say within the country. And how else can the truth about those specific clips be ascertained with some degree of certainty without a proper domestic investigation?

The government, let us not forget, can very well reject any such calls for a domestic investigation. But if then, wouldn’t they run the risk of realizing some day that for them, unlike for many in big and powerful countries, the principle of complementarity applies? (in fact, George W. Bush has realized this already).

Furthermore, it is also necessary to have an open mind about much touted ‘peace and reconciliation’ argument above. Firstly, not all investigations, especially domestic investigations regarding specific incidents which are carried out with the intention of identifying those who are seen to have committed crimes – and holding them accountable – leads to the break-up of a state or is a threat to sovereignty. It is indeed a moral and ethical course of action to take. And while I continue to maintain a somewhat skeptical view about the ability of the international law discipline to resolve problems, this skepticism should not be taken to the extreme of suggesting that the law is of absolute irrelevance.

Secondly, while the ‘need for reconciliation’ may be a slightly exaggerated claim (in that there is no violence unleashed by the people of one ethnic community on another and the people have, by and large, lived in relative peace even during the height of the war), there is not much to suggest that reconciliation in terms of providing a safe environment whereby the people feel secure and safe in the North and the East in particular, or that they could realize their basic civil and political rights, and engage in peaceful democratic activity, has been created. Not only should the politicians act with great responsibility, but they should also ensure that armed groups which may belong to some political parties or some politicians with ‘Chief-Ministerial’ ambitions are not running havoc in those parts of the country.

Conclusion (The End?)

When dealing with such emotive and sensitive issues, one is well on the path towards adopting an extremist approach. Carving out a middle-ground (and I am not suggesting that the above amounts to one at all), or maintaining a sense of ‘detached involvement’, without tilting towards either side, is an extremely difficult task. In the present context, it could even be dangerous, for one could be easily misunderstood. In a sense, it is convenient to be either a total apologist or an absolute critic; for then, one’s stand is absolutely clear, one is not misunderstood (s/he is with us, s/he is not), there is no real need for some in power to ‘watch-out’. Yet, an attempt to reach that middle-ground should be made.

Finally, a question: will there be progress? The question itself is a vague one. And if ‘yes’ is what a naïve optimist wants to hear, ‘yes’ shall be the answer. But he will soon realize that ‘progress’ can mean anything. The absence of a serious call for an international or internal investigation (preferably both, but at least the former) is ‘progress’ if you are a member of the government or one of its apologists. An international investigation, followed even by some form of regime change and political turmoil, could be welcome ‘progress’ for some separatist elements overseas and their apologists (and some politicians might benefit from it too). A domestic inquiry which ultimately is capable of holding any miscreant elements accountable can amount to some form of ‘progress’ for those who are desirous of seeing a lessening of the unnecessary problems faced by the government. An international inquiry would be ‘progress’ for those who believe that that is the only way to uphold the international rule of law. No wonder that one’s ‘progress’ clashes with, and is detrimental to, the ‘progress’ of the other.

In conclusion, however, there’s one point worth mentioning. If even amidst constant reiteration politicians are unable to see the dangers which are staring at them, and if in the face of such danger their only response is absolute denial, it would be beneficial for some to be simply vigilant, ever mindful, and observe the madness surrounding you, with equanimity. At least there will be some inner peace; and what greater peace or happiness can there be than that.

(Kalana Senaratne, LLM (UCL), is a PhD Candidate at the Law Faculty, University of Hong Kong)

• Sri Lanka’s Diplomatic Offensive Won’t Make Killing Fields Disappear
• Is Sri Lanka in danger of being held accountable by the International Criminal Court?
• Not signing the Rome Statute is not enough! (A response to Ranil Wickremasinghe and Mangala Samaraweera)
• Is the war crimes video confirmed by UN as authentic “unrepresentative and irrelevant”?
• Sri Lanka and the death of Muammar Gaddafi

It was the most gruesome of visual feasts and it when it ended, the most disorienting sense followed. One is struck, not by the extremity of human suffering; but by stillness, by the insouciance of the pools of blood. They appear on screen as almost as if they are the everyday aftermath of one of the island’s heavier monsoon rains. Excepting, of course, the fact that happy children do not float paper boats in these pools, nor is the water that comfortable colour of milky tea. The children are dead; the water runs red with blood. And it is simply, understatedly there.

“Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields” is a damning indictment of the various parties involved in the last few months of the civil war. It must be watched critically, and to do so, it is necessary to separate Jon Snow’s narration and open your eyes to the story that you must yourself piece together. Image upon images plays towards you, reminiscent of Goya’s exceptional set of prints “Disasters of War”. Then an illustration of the brutality of the Napoleonic Wars, it now feels like an incredible case of precognition.  War is brutal; our modern sensibilities, created in the aftermath of a bloody Reformation and a succession of world and civil wars accept this fact as part of our cognitive DNA.  As creatures of such knowledge structuring, it is unremarkable that, in the final analysis, we are somehow able to excuse the existence of the dead.  In ‘Killing Fields’, however, it is not the high rate of death that overwhelms you, it is the ease with which life loses its value. It becomes nothing to the SLA forces leering gleefully over the bodies of dead cadres; to the LTTE leadership who gunned down their own in the final struggle for Eelam; to the frontline doctors fighting a losing battle; to the thousands of Tamil civilians themselves, as they surrendered to attack from one side and betrayal by the other.

Channel 4 is to be commended for airing a documentary which provides a great degree of visual confirmation of the atrocities that occurred during the final months of physical hostilities between the Rajapaksa Government and the LTTE. While the story told is emotionally and mentally distressing, the first thirty minutes do not   raise issues that those who followed the army‘s advances closely were not aware of.   Within these several minutes, we are provided with detail of the SLA’s march upon LTTE territory, and the latter’s increasing struggle to hold its ground. Caught between the two, are the tens of thousands of Tamil civilians, sandwiched into increasingly small pockets of land. Reports of the thousands trapped and dying in Putthukidyrippu, Mullaivaikul, and the infamous No Fire Zones reached the ears of Sri Lanka’s local and internationally led civil society via the text messages and communications from priests, nuns and Tamil NGO personnel trapped within these areas. As the documentary confirms, the Tamil government doctors were in constant communication with the ICRC and the GoSL medical authorities as they requested aid and supplies. To their credit, various organisations attempted to make the local and international public aware of the rising numbers of the dead, and insisted on asking hard-hitting questions from all parties said to be ‘responsible’ for the high civilian count. These reports provided facts about the scale and the magnitude of death, but the human face of the civilian that was missing.

Reports typed up by NGOs and International bodies are often factsheets that proclaim statistics- and statistics are open to interpretation and easily dismissed- academics, politicians and policy makers do this every day. It is the visceral emotion of a grown woman moaning “Amma; it was from this hand that you fed me” that provides the jolt to your consciousness. Arguably, media today is well versed in the art of emotional manipulation and the Channel 4 documentary quite consciously imposes each image and story upon you in a sequence that deliberately wishes to evoke the maximum effect. The camera freeze frames on the bodies of babies, and children. A hospital administrator is shown being interviewed one moment; still and dead the next. The primary eyewitness story is from an attractive young woman. They are, perhaps, overused devices. It is imperative for the viewer to separate the production of the narrative from its external trappings. Yet, even with such ‘deconstruction’, you will still find that the videos and photographs speak entirely for themselves, and that your final conclusions are grim ones.

Visuals are a more effective method of concretising truth. Images of the LTTE’s attacks on public areas , and the subsequent broken bodies littering the streets of Colombo and Kandy cities  confirmed the ruthlessness of the ‘Tigers’ in their struggle for Eelam.  The LTTE deliberately used Tamil civilians as a human shield during the last few months of physical hostilities against the Sri Lankan government. They also funded their struggle through both legal and illegitimate concerns; grocery stores in Western suburbs and international heroin trafficking rings. Perhaps in strategy, the LTTE moved far and away from the nobility of a battle for self-determination and equality; but it is impossible not to consider that, in the face of the Sinhala chauvinism that made the national agenda in early postcolonial years, there was no path to follow but one that was volatile, ceaseless and increasingly violent. It should not be forgotten, as the new narratives being written in post-conflict Sri Lanka are attempting to do, that the LTTE’s eventually disastrous acts were political entrapment engendered by the harshness of the Sinhala Raj; they were freedom fighters once. The narratives created post-conflict are dangerous and must be interrupted, as the entrapment of the conflict by discourse is also responsible for its eventual end.

During the officially recognised thirty year period when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam fought the forces of the Government of Sri Lanka, the developments of the conflict came to mirror and link themselves with several external phenomena being played out in the international sphere.  Specific ideas of freedom, equality and human rights; discourses which were made concrete and hegemonic in the years following the Cold War were thrown into the language of the Tamil freedom struggle,  but also framed the general logic for the GoSL in its approach to seeking international succour.  The ‘war’ absorbed other discourses as it, unwittingly, moved with the course of history.  The regime of George.W.Bush, for example, switched Velupillai Prabhakaran’s label effectively from guerrilla leader to terrorist; and as America solidified the rhetoric of the ‘Global War on Terror’, the GoSL was lent legitimacy for its final, devastating advance upon the depleted ranks of the LTTE, ending physical hostilities in the summer of 2009, and, in the words of exultant commentators worldwide, ending Sri Lanka’s ‘terrorist problem’. Significantly, the LTTE were pioneered and refined the art of suicide; a method of attack that would prove important during the events of September 11^th.   Many observers note that the end to the war in Sri Lanka was a result of a more superior army, the possession of efficient fighting tools, the ruthlessness of the new army leadership and, more often than not, the regime of the Sonia Gandhi-led Congress party in India.  A less positivist driven argument would be to consider that the ability of the Sri Lankan government to make the final push; and to eviscerate the LTTE leadership in the manner that they did was made possible because the defeat of terrorism and the death of a terrorist had by then become a valid part of the moral fabric of  modern discourse.  The image of the lifeless Prabhakaran, shown widely on the international news in a manner that recalled Achilles’ ransoming of the body of Hector, was met with an abundance of joy and relief. Almost two years later, the same fate would await Osama Bin Laden- sans the public display. The importance of the example is this; discourse and knowledge authorizes the morality of what were, in both cases, extra judicial murders.  The manner of both executions were made possible because the death of a terrorist, a figure impossible to view from any other lens as a feared ‘Other’, has become a moral ‘good’.

The LTTE’s own activities in the extra-judicial world lent credence to such labelling, and there is no moral court in any system or society that will be able to easily exonerate such crimes. However, as Sanjana Hattotuwa notes in his review of Gordon Weiss’ The Cage (incidentally a tome that reads very much as the  book of this film) therein lies the rub, there is no one left of the LTTE leadership to be held accountable.  The bodies of several of the senior leadership were last seen lying, stripped, tortured and summarily executed on the very land they fought to claim. In a most macabre way, some of the many photographs and news clips of the dead Prabhakaran show members of the SLA posing for a group shot alongside the corpse. In one memorable news clip ( not shown in the documentary) there was even the whooping and raucous Sinhala commentary of an ITV presenter;  a man whose lack of professionalism was only matched by his undoubtedly diminutive wit.

While this presenter is certainly an excellent representation of the status quo that Sri Lanka has slid toward under the guidance of Mahinda and his Merry Men, his behaviour is overshadowed by the crudity of the SLA personnel we see in the last fifteen minutes of ‘Killing Fields’? Leers, vulgarisms and chauvinistic bravado abound as female cadres are thrown like dead cattle into the back of a truck and bound and gagged young men are executed in cold blood. This is not the behaviour of glorious war heroes, but the hysterical and brutish violence that has been engendered by the Rajapaksa regime.  In a style of execution that violates any subscription to judicial proceedings or necessary war tribunal, these soldiers- undoubtedly with permission from their Generals and the powers that be- have taken matters into their own hands. Not only the LTTE leadership easily identified in these images, but seemingly any person singled out as a ‘Kotiya’, were murdered, and a photograph taken for posterity; SLA forces pose with their trophies as if displaying a fascinating curio bought during a particularly exotic holiday. The inhumanity of the military personnel is shocking. Aren’t these supposed to be ‘our boys’, fighting an ‘enemy’ that threatened the bedrock of our national ‘peace’? Admittedly, Weiss’ book and the C4 documentary note the compassion of  many SLA soldiers, moved by the plight of  the civilians they met, sharing their military rations and assisting women and children to safety.  Many of these personnel; ranking officials and regular soldiers alike turned a blind eye when internees at IDP camps attempted escape. Weiss notes the story of a staff officer who unlocked the gates of the enclosure he supervised and encouraged people to leave.  Such actions are remarkable; not because they were made in the heat of war but because many of these soldiers were Sinhala persons hailing from the deep South; a place in which a number of  individuals you encounter will confess to having had little or no familiarity with their Tamil ‘Other’.  Such Samaritan like actions are, unfortunately, countered by the cold blooded executions carried out by their colleagues and what is the undeniably deliberate genocide  orchestrated by the Rajapaksa government.

Genocide is a strong word and usually reserved for Rwanda, Serbia, and other incidents where the world has sanctioned the fact that horrendous crimes took place. It is perhaps not incorrect to use it here. Perhaps in their removal of their own staff from the conflict area, and their continued vague silence on the ‘Sri Lanka’ issue, the UN itself has sanctioned the mass genocide that occurred in the last few months of Sri Lanka’s war?  The Channel 4 documentary is quite insistent in pointing the finger of blame at the UN; saying that it did not do enough- and that, even after the Darusman Report, it continues an eerie disengagement with regards to Sri Lanka. Ban- Ki Moon is shown happily walking through an IDP camp on a whistle stop tour; he did not stop to allow himself to see what really happened. Moon and the international community have been, oddly, unable to bring any real pressure on the GoSL.  The placing of blame on the UN, while quite correct within the situation is also, obviously bound up in Western hysteria regarding the growing strength of China and other non-Western powers. Moon’s strange inactivity will be ( and is) called into question, and China’s own activity on the UNSC builds not so much an anti-UN case but the usual refrain of Western commentators warning us of the dangers of allowing the international predominance of an ‘Other’. It is important to acknowledge the argument, but equally necessary to dismiss the hegemony of its discourse.

To place blame on the UN also further distances us from the accountability of the GoSL, and we will stop seeing them as significantly responsible. It also provides for the blossoming of a rather spurious counter argument from the GoSL’s favourite talking heads, Dayan Jayatilleka and Rajiva Wijesinha, who are manipulating a nuance of the thinking on hegemonic discourse to build a rude counter-rhetoric of ‘us’ versus ‘them’- spinning the image of the GoSL as the innocent victim of a Western conspiracy. It is, very simply, blatant exploitation of the oft dragged out colonizer/colonized dichotomy that both gentlemen have also managed to conflate with a similar dialectic that existed during the Cold War. To do so indicates a desperate scrabble to hide the truth behind a tissue of easily dismissible arguments, and to do a rather serious disservice to the complexities of the post-colonial analysis and the theoretical discussion of alterity.   Further to this, various members of the international community have been vocal but inactive with regards to the Sri Lankan conflict- damning neither the GoSL’s sixty years of state –led violence or the extra-legal activities that the LTTE leadership indulged in for three decades, that the UN continues in this vein is, in the final analysis, hardly remarkable.

The most eerie moment in the documentary is a sequence in which Gotabhaya greets his brother Mahinda. The two  men, smile, nod and acknowledge each other- the look that passes between the two of them speaks volumes and one cannot but wonder. Gotabhaya’s guilt is palpable in the hysteria he brings to any non-Rupavahini interview. To return to the point on genocide-  as ‘Killing Fields’, The Cage, and several others have pointed out,  the evidence of eyewitnesses, doctors, the UN and other non-governmental personnel make it abundantly clear that the SLA leadership was quite aware that when it sent fire and dropped shells into certain areas, they were clearly killing civilians as much as they were LTTE cadres. The ICRC, in fact, handed them bodies on a plate when it broadcast the coordinates of the various frontline hospitals. The government issued its own coordinates for a No Fire Zone, and as the testimony of Brig. Harun Khan demonstrates, fired directly into it. Like the schoolgirls at Sencholai, civilian deaths are dismissed in this easy manner; they must all be ‘Koti’. We know they were not. Such labelling by the government is a thin excuse for the deliberate genocide that led to the deaths of thousands of innocent Tamil civilians. The LTTE murdered some as part of their guerrilla warfare and cynical strategy; but the SLA and the Rajapakse government murdered civilians because they were, simply, Tamil.  This is genocide for it was obviously deliberate and moreover because it was a race crime; intending to obliterate as many Tamil persons as possible, subsuming action under the blanket of the ‘fog of war’.  Why else remove the witnesses from the media and the UN, unless you wanted to clear the scene for a premeditated crime?  This, overall is the question that the C4 documentary, Weiss’ book and other voices, many of whom have been featured here on Groundviews, have raised. It is a question that we must not stop asking the Rajapaksa’s. Surely, Mahinda Rajapaksa, lawyer and vociferous campaigner for human rights, knew quite well the crime he was about to become party to?

The Channel 4 documentary misses a fourth, and equally complicit party. To lay a j’accuse here is difficult but necessary. The Sinhala public, in Colombo and Kandy and other cities have always known, on some level, of the atrocities carried out by successive Sri Lankan governments, and the Rajapaksa’s in particular. The LTTE abducted little boys from school and made them cadres; the Rajapaksa government accosts journalists on the streets and makes them cadavers or exiles. Young Tamil men are abducted too; Sri Lankans live in a society where true freedom of speech is a fond and mostly forgotten memory, and where a 21 year old lost his life when protesting for his simple right to a fairer pension.  We are all, this author included, complicit in this genocide and we must be held accountable because we have preferred to remain silent and un-dissenting.  With the exception of a few voices, we have shook our heads and simply accepted what this government and its predecessors have done; we have either been as vaguely inactive as the UN and the international community or we have not done enough. In this way, we have lent and continue to give succour to  mass genocide and a future of oppression. The Channel 4 documentary and the roused international middle classes will, for the short time that it holds their interest, ask the UN, David Cameron and Barack Obama to intervene; will ask them what they are going to do about Sri Lanka. It is necessary to  ask the Sinhalese – and their middle classes in particular- what will you do? The evidence is mounting; will you remain silent and inactive yet again? It is time that head shaking and the bearing of witness was translated into real action. Free yourselves from the bounds of  that modern instinct that asks you to preserve yourself and your society; and look to a struggle that can truly initiate a just and free society.

• Exclusive interview with Callum McCrae, Director of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ produced by Channel 4
• Sri Lanka – Killing for Peace
• Twitter explodes with reactions and responses to Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields
• The end of war and Sri Lanka’s future: Videos from Vikalpa in Sinhala and English
• No respite even after war: The rape, execution, torture and disappearances of IDPs in Sri Lanka

For about 21 years, more than 100,000 Internally Displaced People from the Northen Province of Sri Lanka have been languishing in camps.  Mainly from the Muslim community, these people were forced out by the LTTE for crimes of not being Tamil.  In the wake of post conflict debates about reconciliation and rehabilitation, there are now challenges for future resettlement and rehabilitation of this affected community.

June 20^th was World Refugee Day.  For many it is about remembering the plights of many people the world over, who today are without rights, a state and an identity.  You can picture the Palestinians or the Rohingas or the Kurds.  Over the past week, in Sri Lanka, international attention has turned once again to the 300,000 refugees (or internally displaced people) after the end of the conflict in 2009.  Despite all this attention, very little is said about the plight of the other major victims and refugees of the 30 year old conflict, and that is the Muslim refugees in Puttalum

For centuries, the Muslim community has been scattered around Sri Lanka living in co-existence with the other two main ethnic communities (Sinhalese and Tamil) with very close socio-economic interactions among them. Despite the seeds for the minority rights crisis being planted at the time of Independence, the ethnic conflict that began to emerge at the end of the seventies only engulfed engulfing the Muslim community in the eighties.

In the north and east of the country, Muslims and Tamils coexisted with Muslim and Tamil children attending the same school and taking different roles in cultural displays and sporting events.  However as the ethnic crisis developed into armed conflict with Tamil youth taking to arms and the LTTE (Liberation of Tamil Tigers for Eelam) being formed, it became apparent that in the early eighties, in the east of Sri Lanka, there was a conflict of interest between Muslims and Tamils.  Whilst this was initially at a manageable and political level, it slowly disintegrated in 1990 as the LTTE massacred worshipers in a mosque in Batticaloa and other attacks on Muslim civilians (for further details you could read SRI LANKA’S MUSLIMS: CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE” by International Crisis Group).  The LTTE based in the North, gave its presentation of developments. It became an unspoken cliché that Muslims were ‘traitors’ as a result of many Muslims joining the government forces and setting up their own political parties. A number of intellectuals and the printed word began to break a  35 year old tradition which had previously categorised Muslims as part of the Tamil speaking  nation and now identifying the Muslims as different.  There was a total breakdown of communal relations in the East.

In the north however there was a different story. In every way Muslims and Tamils in the North had been traditionally totally integrated into local life as interdependent communities. There were Muslim traders, tailors, iron mongers, labourers and scholars. Several of them had even taken to farming in the Killinochchi area. The Muslims in Jaffna had lived next to each other and therefore densely occupied a small part of this town. As part of the arena of culture and scholarship, Muslims formed an important component of the historic University of Jaffna.

All this was to change on the 23^rd of October 1990, when at about 8am in the morning, a voice blasting through the loudspeaker mounted on a moving vehicle declared that: “Muslims are given 24hrs[i] to exit from the ‘Tamil land’ and they should leave all their possessions behind”. Armed LTTE cadres had gone round every village and handed over letters from their district leaders forcing the chief trustees of all mosques to read out the letters over loud speakers. The letters ordered all the Muslims to vacate their respective villages within 48 hours and hand over all their belongings such as vehicles, radios, sewing machines, water pumps etc to LTTE cadres at a particular village school.  They said the orders were from the LTTE high ranks and anyone trying to disobey would have to face the danger of losing life. Twenty four hours passed, and armed juveniles came round to push the Muslim residents out of their homes: men, women and children were herded through a narrow passage and, at the point of exit from the village they were bodily searched for valuables. Metallic cutters were used to remove jewellery that could not be easily removed, and each family was only allowed to take about 200 rupees (5 US dollars at that time). In some cases, even a change of clothes was not allowed to be taken out.  All possessions were deemed by the LTTE to belong to Tamil Eelam.

By the 26^th of October, it had become apparent that Muslims from Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi (other parts of the Northern Province deemed as land for the Tamils) as well had suffered the same fate.  Approximately 75,000 men, women and children were expelled. (For more details about this, please see UTHRJ; Report 6, Chapter 3, and http://jaffnamuslims.lk/)

In 1989, Mohamed Lateef (name changed) had just got married and had taken ownership of a rice farm and was looking to settle down to a quiet life of farming and raising his family.  That dream quickly shattered in 1990.

“ We were summoned to the mosque where we were greeted with this shocking news of the explusion ultimatum. Most of the people wanted to leave the place on the next day (Saturday). It was a nightmare and we were unable to sleep the night thinking of the agony of leaving the village we were born, keeping behind all our belongings, the junctions that created love and affection, the roads that told us many stories, the schools that taught & gained us employments, the mosques that made us humans, the Madarasa that taught us, books, exercise books, the burial ground that was keeping many of us, the play ground that gave us encouragement and the library.  The following day we started the journey with our children, grasping whatever little things we could carry in our hands. We were refugees. All the roads were full of our people from 9 days old baby to 95 years old man spread at a distance that could not find its end. We wandered aimlessly not knowing where to go and how long it would take us.  All that mattered was a safe place and even that in the current circumstance was uncertain”

Without knowing where they were going, these desperate people moved south in whatever mode of transport they could find. Most of them trekked miles and miles (those from Mannar braved the sea) for days, and those who could not stand the strain perished on the way and the rest reached Puttalam, the biggest Muslim settlement outside the Northern Province.

21 years on, and  Lateef is still in Puttalum with his family, living in the makeshift refugee camp, in  a coconut-leaf hut affording little respite to the elements, relying on daily wage earnings to support his family which has now grown to include 3 children, all born in the Saltern Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp in Puttalum.

“I don’t think about the past.  It just makes me sick.  There is no future for me to think about. I gave up thinking about the future a long time ago.  I just think about the present and how I can give my family at least two square meals a day,” he says wearily.

This incident has been largely forgotten in the annals of the Sri Lankan conflict.  Successive governments have failed to provide adequate reprieve and support for the displaced who find themselves in a political wilderness without much of a voice despite having representation in the government.  Problems with education, proper shelter and sanitation plague the camps and so the displaced people are dependent on menial jobs or handouts from philanthropists or the government and humanitarian organisations.  Unemployment is a massive problem for the majority of them who rely largely on seasonal demand for labour such as work in the salterns and various other odd jobs. They live in Cadjan huts, very often with two to three families crouched into one little hut.   On top of this, it has also become a delicate commercialized, criminalized and corrupt political scene.

“Yes we get support” remarks A.B. Niyas, the camp leader of the Saltern IDP camp, cynically.  “Every so often we get the refugee tourists, who come and see us, take photographs, give us some money, promise additional help and disappear.”

The order of expulsion had shocked the country with the forcible eviction creating a new dimension in the ethnic crisis distancing the three communities in their coexistence and wellbeing. What the Muslims from the north had experienced is a deliberate act of ethnic cleansing carried out by the LTTE.  However the questions to ask of that time are

• Why didn’t the government of Sri-Lankan armed forces move in to protect its citizens (these Muslims) against such an act of ethnic cleansing?
• What didn’t the Sri Lankan population react to this?
• Why did the international agencies keep silent when Muslims were being sent out of their homes on ethnic grounds?
• Why were the Tamil Diaspora silent when this was being enacted in their name?
• Why was the rest of the Sri Lankan Diaspora also silent when this was taking place?

And now, why do the same Diaspora who talk about responsibility and accountability for the end of the conflict, fail to mention these groups of forgotten people?

Puttalam still houses approximately 100,000 displaced persons across 141 welfare centres, from the five districts of the Northern Province. What were then considered to be temporary settlements have now become permanent abodes for these unfortunate victims of the LTTE’s horrific programme of ethnic cleansing.   Over the recent years, Puttalam has also played host to some Tamil and Sinhala IDPs who have been driven away from their homes in Batticaloa and Trincomalee.  The town is beginning to buckle under the pressure of hosting a large IDP population.

As some studies have pointed out, hosting a large IDP population has placed a great deal of pressure on the local services as they were not proportionally developed to meet the needs of the populace. Moreover, it has had a negative impact on the relations between the IDPs and the host community who originally welcomed the displaced people.

Recent incidents in the town have exposed these cracks.  There is now  a new fear that tensions between  the area’s original Muslim inhabitants, who have grown tired of the newcomers taking their jobs and, increasingly, buying their land, could lead to further crisis.

“We did all we could for them when they first arrived,” says Naleer, an amiable businessman and Puttalum Resident. “But they’re placing an unbearable strain on resources. They work cheap, so they’ve taken people’s jobs. They take education, healthcare, too.  They are supported by the government and INGOs on top of this.  We do not get anything from them. The situation has created a lot of hate.“   Many critics go on to say that the refugees are perpetually in this situation of desperation without doing much to help themselves, since they know that there will always be sympathetic support. “ This is a charge that M. Rahman, an activist from a local CBO set up by the displaced people refutes.  “We just want to go back home.  We don’t want to live anywhere else.  We are from Jaffna or Mullaitivu.  We lived side by side with our Tamil neighbors without much problem.  We want to go back to that”

After the Ceasefire Agreement was signed in February 2002, following what amounted to a public apology by the political leader of the LTTE and an agreement signed between the LTTE and main Muslim political party,  a number of these displaced families did  return to their homes in the North only to find their houses  occupied by displaced Tamils, or rebels, or destroyed. Those who stuck it out once again returned to Puttalum when the security deteriorated.

21 years after the evictions, the displaced Muslims still speak affectionately of their old Tamil neighbours and given the chance would return back to their home towns.  34-year-old Fatima Shafeek, a mother of two, vouches for this. “I was born in Jaffna and that will always be my home.  If I am given the chance I will go back“.  There are some though who are adament that they will not go back because they have stopped trusting the Tamils.  It is these who need greater support for healing to begin.

In any return for the displaced people, there are a couple of issues that would need to be considered such as:

1. Safety – Safety and security for the life of the displaced people and the dignity as well as recovery of lost properties to be appropriately discussed and  proper assurance given that this will be dealt with  during resettlement.
2. Basic Needs – Many people returning back would face shortages in basic needs such as water supply, adequate sanitation, basic health services, basic educational facilities, dried ration, compensation and opportunities to recreate employment for unemployed people.
3. Property Rights – As a result of  the expulsion in 1990, all documentary evidences in the government records have been destroyed such as ownerships of the properties etc. In any resettlement, positive and immediate arrangements need to be made to hand over the possessions of properties whilst returning land and compensating for this.  Any planned resettlement of outsiders in lands owned by these northern Muslims would need to be stopped forthwith The Government  to consider that  state lands adjacent to the lands owned by evicted Muslims  should  be given to them in keeping with the increasing demand due to an increase in population.
4. Relief-All relief, compensation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement activities should be done by a task force which includes district representatives of northern Muslims.
5. Education – Many of the schools have been damaged and destroyed due to the war. Special concessions would have be given to Northern Muslims in Education, government employment and livelihood programs.

In this delicate balance that has pervaded the war, there is now a call for restorative justice.  A period of healing has to be honoured.  People have to learn to trust one another. However in the politics that is ensuing, this is quickly being overlooked.  The real plight of people like this is being compromised by a failure to understand the process of restorative justice by all concerned.

Resettlement and rehabilitation of these Puttalam refugees are still major issues that need to be resolved.  It is no doubt that the internally displaced people would like to resettle in their original places, and therefore mechanisms for their right to return should be a major question answered by the government. The Government so far has failed to properly address these aspirations.  Likewise the communities (and the Diaspora that represent these communities) should also be working together to identify solutions at all levels of the spectrum.

There is however now a new generation among the refugees which has no affiliation with the parental roots to their villages in the Northern Province. They would prefer to continue living where they are now

As for Lateef, what does he make of the situation? Well just ask his ten year old son Mujeeb where home is.  He will reply that home is the coconut-leaf shanty in a camp in Puttalam

• The Muslim question and resettlement of Muslim IDPs in post-war Sri Lanka: Two comprehensive interviews
• TMVP in same dustbin as LTTE in the past?
• Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in October 1990
• The wages of passivity
• From Akkaraipattu

Groundviews caught up with Callum McCrae, Director of the highly controversial and very disturbing film by Channel 4, Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields, in New York, a day before the film was due to be screened for senior diplomats, UN staff and others at the Church Centre, in front of the UN Headquarters. Callum was joined by Marion Bentley, Channel 4′s Publicity Manager.

The interview is around 43 minutes. Download the MP3 (~51Mb) of this interview here to listen offline. This podcast is anchored to the following questions.

General

• What was your objective in doing the C4 video now, more than 2 years after the end of the war?
• Killing of unarmed civilians, collateral damage, has occurred in other wars, other contexts British troops have been involved in? Has C4 covered them in as great detail?
• What is accountability for you? Do they think the video will help in achieving accountability in the SL case? How so?
• Who is your primary audience for the documentary? Why?
• What do you expect the viewers to do? Is the video empowering or overwhelming? There has been criticism that the video is so visceral, it takes away from the viewer taking any action.
• Do you believe a video such as what they produced will help those who were directly affected by the conflict and remain in SL?
• Have you spoken to any in SL before or after the video was made public? What has been the reaction?
• Do you have any future plans to work on similar videos or other initiatives regarding SL? If so, what?
• What do you make of the Government of Sri Lanka’s response to this documentary?
• What responses have they received from diaspora communities?
• Why are you here in New York?
• Where else do you intend to show the film?

The video footage

• Why, with all the footage of supposed aftermaths, is there not a single frame of an Army shell or Sri Lanka Airforce bomb actually hitting a civilian target?
• Why did C4 only showed the footage of naked female bodies and held back the ones of males. Ethics of selection?

On the interviews

• There are no interviews of anyone from the two warring militaries – the LTTE or the SL Armed Forces. Why?
• Why are there no interviews with anyone with an opposing or neutral viewpoint, even legal analysts, political commentators, military historians, etc.
• No expert witnesses were interviewed on military tactics or on the claims about deliberate targeting by artillery. Gordon Weiss book and the Convoy 11 incident.
• Ask him why former IDPs were not asked about what the LTTE were doing – child conscription, slave labour, human shields, etc or about their attempts to flee the Tigers. Or on their treatment by the Army when they did escape.

On the commentary in the video

• Some have pointed to a very large credibility gap between the footage and the commentary. E.g.: the commentary claimed the naked corpses had been raped even though there was no easily visible sign of any abuse on the bodies (so how did you know?); the men doing the killing in the execution clips were identified as soldiers even though there was no overt indication of it.
• In the opening credits / introduction, Jon Snow claims the UN panel has evidence when the panel report doesn’t say it does (credible allegations vs. evidence).
• Personal reflections on the making and final broadcast of the video.
• Do you ever want to come to Sri Lanka?

• Sri Lanka’s Diplomatic Offensive Won’t Make Killing Fields Disappear
• Giving the middle finger: Sri Lanka’s conflicting responses to war crimes allegations
• Twitter explodes with reactions and responses to Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields
• Channel 4′s ‘Killing Fields’: Journalism, Advocacy or Propaganda?
• The war that confronts us: Looking at Sri Lanka’s official responses to Channel 4 video

Following the broadcast of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ on the 14th of June and its public release – for seven days – on Channel 4’s website, there has been an overwhelming international reaction to what has been described as ‘brutal,’ ‘horrific’ and ‘shocking’ footage of war crimes.

In an effort to collate the reportage following the release of the documentary, we have created a bundle that features the most significant news reports, blogs, comments and videos by international networks, which have been published on the web over the last few days. We have clipped several sources that include responses by ambassadors, civil servants and soi-disant advisors to the government.

The news agencies featured in the bundle include the Guardian, New Statesman, Independent, Telegraph, Hindu, Hindustan Times, International Business Times and numerous other sources including leading blogs from Sri Lanka.

Groundviews will continue to curate the bundle and upload new reports as soon as they are published. Please note that each clip in the bundle features a quote from a news report or blog post. The full article, video or podcast can be accessed by clicking the title featured on each clip. You can also subscribe to the RSS feed of our curated news bundle by clicking here.

• Award Winning Citizen Journalism – Looking back at 2008
• Photos and video from the UN headquarters in Colombo today
• Going beyond mainstream media: The best Twitter feeds on and from Sri Lanka
• The world in your Inbox – The Groundviews e-newspaper
• Groundviews system upgrade: Snap Shots

Apart from this, I would like to point out another visible issue that prevailed throughout the seminar, which strikes me as pertinent. All the speakers who addressed this event prevented themselves from uttering one significant name. That particular name was ‘unmentioned’ and ‘unmentionable,’ and it was of course “Former Army Commander Former General Sarath Fonseka”. As we all know, Fonseka was responsible for engineering the military victory by using his knowledge, skills and combat experiences. Soon after the war, he was praised and honoured as the ‘Best Army Commander in the world’ and was elevated to the rank of a “Four Star General’. Fonseka was the first serving ‘General’ in the history of the Sri Lankan Army.

The decision to remove his name from the seminar is quite apparently a political decision. There is no doubt about that. Fonseka, who is imprisoned in Welikada and facing a few trials in courts, was victimized because of his politics. It is an undeniable fact that Sarath Fonseka is a political prisoner. As a result of this political process Sarath Fonseka lost his military rank, uniform, medals, pension etc. His name was taken out from plaques and slates. The removal of his name from this seminar is merely another step in the very same process.

As a person who practices democracy and as a person who admires democracy, I personally have some serious doubts and fears about Sarath Fonseka’s encroachment to politics. Under any condition, history doesn’t permit us to trust military leaders when it comes to politics. Therefore, ‘General’ Sarath Fonseka also falls into the same category. Some of the remarks he made as a presidential candidate and some allegations that were leveled against him during his tenure as the Army Commander would affirm this prejudgment (I am pretty sure the Leader of the Opposition Ranil Wickramasinghe was very much aware of this during the election campaign.) But this doesn’t point out that Fonseka should be avenged in an imprudent and cavalier manner. The government and even the UNP (someday) should confront him ‘politically’ within the political domain, without playing foolish games that could possibly lead to disastrous repercussions.

In spite of all these matters, Sarath Fonseka’s contribution towards the military victory is irrefutable. This particular seminar, which was organized by the Army in order the counter the allegations that have risen in the international domain, was a great opportunity to muster the support of international community around Sri Lanka. But that cannot be gained by political decisions that are being taken to fulfill petty political desires. International support should be gained by prudence, responsibility, respectability and accountability. If the government has faith on these four factors, it is not so difficult to confront those challenges successfully and effectively. But unfortunately, these incidents expose their poor political foresight, particularly when it comes to delicate and important issues.

The international community is well aware of the way President Rajapakse and his brothers handled Sarath Fonseka’s matter. They are well aware of his incarceration, trials and all the other ill-treatment. Those types of things cannot be hidden from the world. Quite obviously, the international delegates who took part in this seminar must have noticed the removal of Sarath Fonsekha’s name from a phase of history in which he played an integral and essential role. It does not augur well for the government, especially in terms of gathering support. At the same time, we should not forget the fact that some powerful nations purposefully boycotted this event in order to express their objection towards the government’s approach on accountability issues. This sort of foolishness would affirm their convictions.

Just as they omitted Sarath Fonseka from their speeches, is it not possible that they could hide crucial incidents that were alleged to have taken place during the final stages of the war? Is it not possible for the government to ‘fix’ history for their benefit? Does this behaviour pave the way for an honest and frank dialogue between and the government and the international community? Is this a true ‘sharing’? Isn’t this seminar another time buying exercise in which they boast about themselves and exaggerate things while hiding the truth? These questions could come up in the minds of those delegates who came down to Sri Lanka to participate in this event, representing their own nations. They are the eyes and ears of their nations on this matter and therefore, undoubtedly, they will take this message to the world. In other words, they might lose their faith on the entire event and take it as a mere political event that is being carried out to fool the international community. Who will be the fools at the end?

Therefore, I believe, the Rajapaksa regime should find correct strategies to confront the global challenges it has to face at this very moment. These strategies should not be made of emotions, but intelligence. Ultimately, emotional political decisions would not provide desired results and all their efforts would become an utter waste of time. The government, especially President Mahinda Rajapakshe and his brother Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakshe, should realize this and revise their approach on former Army Commander Sarath Fonseka. Without achieving inter-personal reconciliation, they cannot guide the nation towards inter-racial reconciliation. Inter-personal reconciliation (between the Rajapakas and their political rivals) will lay a robust foundation for national reconciliation. And on the other hand, it will substantiate the fact that the Rajapaksa regime is ready for a sustainable reconciliation process and hence the international community will have to support them.

But, as we all know, these strategies will not be materialized in reality since the ‘very top people’ of the government are so much confined to party politics and personal gains and interests. They are not ready to come out of that ‘box’ and confront the challenges in a prudent manner. So the problems and troubles they have to face on a daily basis will deteriorate and worsen. At the end of the day, all their methods and strategies will provide no results and eventually the citizenry will also have to pay the price. That is the most tragic ‘repercussion’ we all will receive one day.

• Dayan Jayatilleka on post-war politics and enduring obstacles to peace in Sri Lanka
• Presidential hopefuls and escape-routes for the ‘hopeless’
• Don’t mix up war crimes investigations with political issues in Sri Lanka
• Placing ‘Defeating Terrorism: Sri Lankan Experience Seminar’ in a critical light
• General Fonseka and the interview

Admirably, the Government was kind and open enough to provide a live web feed of the proceedings of the three day Defeating Terrorism: Sri Lankan Experience seminar, held in Colombo. This allowed for non-invitees and non-participants like us to monitor the saccharine presentations via the web, flagging inconsistencies as well as inconvenient truths that were unsurprisingly left out or marginalised in the proceedings.

Often tongue-in-cheek but flagging serious issues and concerns, our updates over Twitter and on this site were anchored to content presented at the seminar by a range of government and army representatives. We published a key address by Australian counter-terrorism expert David Kilcullen on Day One and, given it’s official stance, rather surprising comments by the US Embassy’s Defence Attache on Day Two. On day three, the final day of the seminar, we listened in real time to the presentations by Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank, Lalith Weeratunge, Permanent Secretary to the President of Sri Lanka and Chairman of the Telecommunication Regulatory Commission and the closing remarks of the seminar by Rohan Gunaratna, who according to Wikipedia is “an international terrorism expert”.

Most of our live tweeting occurred today listening to these presentations, where we pointed out the divide between what was presented and the reality on the ground plus stories and information that placed in context some of the false or misleading assertions that were made, particularly regarding economic development, the use and spread of ICTs, the rehabilitation of former LTTE cadre and the conditions in Menik Farm immediately after the war.

All our updates are presented below for easy reference. We also did a screencast of the video presentation made today on the Sri Lankan army’s contributions to UN Peacekeeping missions.

• Northern Local Government Elections
• How Sri Lanka Defeated Terrorism, Defence Seminar: Observations from a participant
• Post-election updates from Colombo
• US Defence Attache’s observations on the end of war in Sri Lanka (Updated with US State Department response)
• History is Irreversible – A ‘Postmortem’ on the Seminar, “Defeating Terrorism: Sri Lankan Experience”

Just over a week ago, a couple of my colleagues and I appeared on a prominent Canadian talk show discussing our attempts, as both individuals and organizing members of the Young Canadians’ Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka hosted by the Mosaic Institute, to find a middle ground with respect to the relationship of the Canadian Diaspora to the internal politics in Sri Lanka. Joining us on the show was Craig Scott, a renowned professor on international humanitarian law and R. Cheran, a high-profile Tamil Canadian academic and journalist.

Amongst both our friends and the wider Canadian community, the panel discussion has been acknowledged as an example of an exercise in ‘truth telling’ rather than ‘finger pointing.’  During the half-hour discussion, key points in relation to understanding the mentality of the Diaspora were raised such the role of ethnic affiliation in adopted sides and the emotional intensity felt in the Diaspora during the last stages in the war.

Perhaps more importantly, participants also pointed to issues that have arisen since the end of the war that continue to stoke the flames of conflict. For instance, reference was made to recent news reports suggest that Tamil Sri Lankans living inside the country are unable to participate in the widely-publicized economic reconciliation of conflict areas. Cheran also made mention of the increasing militarisation of the North and North East, where there is one soldier for every four persons in the Eastern province and a soldier for every three persons in the Northern Province.

Speaking on behalf of myself, the panel discussion and the preceding Young Canadians’ Peace Dialogue has opened up a space to start developing respectful relationships between the various Sri Lankan communities in Toronto. These relationships do not always mean agreement; me, my colleagues as well as our wider circle of friends have spent countless hours disagreeing on our political views and approaches to issue. However we are united in recognising our common humanity and the needs that continue to be expressed in our respective communities.

I am not going to pretend that our voice dominates the discourse in the larger Sri Lankan Diaspora. However I can say with a fair degree of certainty that the majority of the traditional leadership in the Toronto Sri Lankan community – Tamil and otherwise – do not know how to respond to our alternative approach to issues in Sri Lanka and positive interactions with each other. The number of our friends and supporters do continue to grow, attracted by the mutual respect that has been foundational to our interactions. We hope that in having the difficult but necessary conversations that advance the goal of peace – characterized by safety, security and justice for all communities – we continue to communicate our deep emotional bond to the beauty of Sri Lanka and the resilience of its incredible people.

• The Media and the Future of Sri Lanka: Young Canadians’ Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka
• Ayelasah
• Cheran
• Will the Tamil aspirations be buried by the Diaspora’s memories?
• Can we End this Cycle of Hatred?