Image from WSWS

“Disappearance is far worse than death, because when a person dies, when I know that, so and so is dead, the story ends and somehow or other we close the chapter. But when a person has disappeared, it is an eternal suffering.”

                                                                         (A.Santhipali, before the LLRC at Jaffna on 12^th November 2010)

In the controversial Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation, 53 LTTE cadres who surrendered during the final days of the war in May 2009 are alleged to have been disappeared and are reported to be under the category of ‘missing’. What happened to these 53 people? Their relatives and close kith and kin say that they were last seen and heard surrendering to the Sri Lankan Army.

In the LLRC report, many family members of former LTTE cadres have complained that their husbands, wives, sisters, brothers, sons and daughters have disappeared after they surrendered to the Sri Lankan security forces. These family members still await the return of their loved ones, not knowing whether they would ever return. Below is a quotation from the LLRC report where a wife complained to the commission about the disappearance of her husband and presented the tragic story, which she is forced to deal with everyday.

“The wife of another former LTTE cadre appearing before the commission at the District Secretariat in Madu stated that on 16^th May 2009 she and her three children had come to Mullaittivu from Mullaivaikkal. Her husband had not accompanied them but had joined them on 17^th May 2009. On 18^th May 2009, in the morning, he had surrendered to the Army at Mullattivu together with some important LTTE cadres (Elamparthy, Kumaran, Ruben, Babu and Velavan). They had surrendered accompanied by Farther Francis Joseph and had been taken away in a bus. She stated that she had not heard from him since then. The Commission made inquiries regarding Farther Francis Joseph from Farther Muralitharan the Parish Priest and Assistant Administrator of Madhu Church, and he stated that Farther Francis Joseph had been a political teacher of the LTTE and people had told him that Father Francis Joseph had been in the conflict area until the end with the LTTE and was supposed to have surrendered and since then his whereabouts were unknown.”

 (Page: 111 of the LLRC in the Representations to the commission regarding alleged disappearances after surrender/arrest)  

There are 18 such complaints lodged with the LLRC with regard to the 53 disappeared LTTE cadres, who surrendered. Their whereabouts are unknown to this day. Whether they are alive or dead is unknown and presents an extremely tragic and problematic context for their families, who still hope and wait for their return. During a visit this writer paid to Jaffna last January, she was confronted by dramatist in Jaffna who narrated the sad story of many wives whose husbands have disappeared due to the war. The Jaffna dramatist whose name is Dev Annand had done research on the subject and had woven a drama based on real incidents. His words are still alive in my memory.

“In the Tamil culture the wife has to wear red kunkuman (a pottuwa) on her forehead if she is married as a custom. But if the husband is dead, they cannot wear this as a ritual. So in the case of ‘missing’ husbands, women do not know whether to wear the kunkuma or not, and they are eternally getting criticized by the elders of their community for this: because those who believe that their husbands are dead, are telling them not to wear it, while the wife’s heart that still waits for the return of her husband wears the kunkuman as hope.”

When this writer contacted the Military Spokesperson, Brigadier Ruwan Wanigasuriya, and questioned him regarding these 53 LTTE cadres who have disappeared and inquired about what actually happened to them, Wanigasuriya stated that the army has appointed a commission called the Court of Inquiry headed by a Major General and also compromises of senior officers of the army to look into the findings of the LLRC report that are directly related to the army.

“This Court of Inquiry will look into all the findings concerning the military that are in the LLRC report, and under that they will look into this issue as well and investigate into this matter. However we have records of 27 LTTE cadres who deserted while they were hospitalized for various illnesses; and 13 other LTTE cadres who suffered natural deaths. The total of 11,995 people came to be rehabilitated in May 2009. This includes LTTE carders who surrendered during war and LTTE cadres who surrendered while they were in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. From this number, 10,874 LTTE cadres have been rehabilitated and reintegrated to the society. From this lot, 655 cadres are with us at the rehabilitation centres now, and 187 are in custody at the Law Enforcement Authority for investigations due to the fact that there are evidence against them”, Wanigasuriya averred.

However, when pressed to answer about the 53 LTTE cadres that have disappeared, Wanigasuriya said that they could either belong to the 27 deserters or to the 13 LTTE cadres who suffered natural deaths and further added that the Sri Lankan army has given away all the LTTE cadres who were caught and surrendered in May 2009 (except for the 655 who are still at the rehabilitation centres) to the Prisons Department and the Sri Lankan Police Department.

During further investigations, this writer contacted the Prisons Department, Prisons Commissioner, A. Hapuarchi, who revealed that there are 500-600 LTTE cadres in the prisons of Jaffna, Vavuniya, Anuradapura, Magazine, Colombo, Bogambara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Negambo arrested under remand warrants. However, when this writer contacted the Police Spokesman Ajith Rohana regarding this matter he refused to comment saying that it is up to the Ministry of Defence.

Nevertheless, though the authorities keep passing the buck to each other (amidst themselves), the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) spokesman and Jaffna District parliamentarian, Suresh Premachandran, stated that the Sri Lankan army was not only culpable for these 53 lives, but also for the hundreds of other who have disappeared without a trace in this country.

“The army is answerable for this. And it is not just 53, about 200 LTTE cadres surrendered to the army with Father Francis Joseph on that instance. And since then, up to today, no one knows anything about the whereabouts of those surrenders’.  No one knows what happened to them and whether they are alive or dead still remains a question mark. The families of these people have not heard from them since. So the families have lost all communications with these surrendered LTTE cadres”, Premachandran added.

Speaking further Premachandran also revealed that in Menik Farm (after 2009) the army had taken away hundreds of boys and girls; and since then the relatives of these youths have not heard anything about their whereabouts. “They have gone missing. One of our TNA members has a list of more than 500 missing personalities who have disappeared from the Menik Farm”, Premachandran stated.

The LLRC report earned different kinds of reactions from the public. Ironically, even the people who were in disfavour of this report at first (and criticized the LLRC while declaring that it is partial) are now urging the government to implement the report as the government has accepted it. One such political activist is Dr. Vikramabahu Karunaratne. When questioned about the 53 individuals who are noted in the LLRC as ‘missing’ while they were in the custody and protection of the army, Karunaratne stated, “This has to be investigated and reported and action should be taken about this by the government.  We heard of many similar situations where LTTE political prisoners have disappeared after they were taken into custody. The government is saying that they are rehabilitating, but they never tell us about where these rehabilitation centres are situated, or how many LTTE cadres are within their custody. And when the TNA MPs tried to visit these rehabilitation camps, the government denied access and did not allow them to visit the rehabilitation camps”.

Speaking further Karunaratne added that the process of rehabilitation is not indicated by the security forces or the government and further revealed that people have disappeared during the process of rehabilitation itself in Sri Lanka.

“We have received many reports from ex-LTTE cadres declaring that many carders disappeared during the process of rehabilitation and did not come out with them (once they were released)”, Karunaratne stated.

How does civil society respond to the disappearance of these 53 LTTE cadres? This writer spoke to a human rights activist who was closely monitoring violations of human rights in Sri Lanka during the time of the war. The activist spoke to this writer under terms of anonymity, and when questioned about these disappeared LTTE cadres and asked about what could have exactly happened to them, the activist revealed that they could either be killed, held in detention centres, or used as informants.

“Whether they are killed, held in detention centres or used as informants: either way it is illegal and wrong. Their family members should be allowed to see them. If they have done something wrong, then they should be legally charged,” he said.

Speaking further about the disappearance of the 53 individuals, this human rights activist stated, “Thousands of people have seen these people surrendering to the army with Father Francis Joseph. And therefore the army cannot deny it. Sri Lanka Human Rights Commission should question the Brigade Commander in Wattvakal in Mullaitivu as it is during his presence that most of these disappearances took place, and the documents about these arrests and surrenders that are with the military should be taken into careful consideration by the Human Rights Commission. According to the 3596 who have complained, 1018 people have surrendered and disappeared. This shows that the government is not willing to peruse the matter. How can there be any reconciliation without getting to know what has actually happened to these people? There is no point in building roads and monuments without actually finding out what happened to these thousands of people who have disappeared”.

It is not clear how many LTTE cadres who surrendered have disappeared today. The LLRC report says that it is only 53, but in reality whether it is more or less than this figure, the fact remains that many people disappeared during the time of the war. And they still keep disappearing. And every time someone disappears, somewhere, in some corner of this country, someone cries and waits for the return of that person who forgot to bid goodbye.

• Students Missing In Jaffna
• Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas: Five years after disappearance, where are they and what has happened to the investigation?
• Translation of Tamil newspaper reports on the Lessons Learnt & Reconciliation Commission hearings held in Killinochchi and Mullaitivu
• THE LLRC AND COMPLAINTS OF DISAPPEARANCES OF PERSONS
• Closer Look At Operation To Capture Thoppigala

The author demonstrating in Colombo against white van abductions. Photo courtesy Vikalpa. 

In a country that has achieved so much in literacy, education and social development, is it not indeed unfortunate that “White Van” has frightened the entire nation? Appearance of a white van assures a disappearance of some one.  If you Google or do any other internet search  (or any media that is not controlled by the Government) on Sri Lanka, “White Van” resembles the Defence Authorities of our country.  Are we not ashamed of it?

“White van operation” is the most used mode of enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka at present. Enforced disappearance violates a range of human rights including  the right to security and dignity of a person, right to a legal personality, humane conditions of detention, right to fair trial, right to a family life and when killed, the right to life. The disappeared person is often tortured and in constant fear for life, removed from the protection of the law, deprived of all their rights and is at the mercy of the captors. Do you respect these rights seriously?  What would you do if you or a family member experiences abduction?
Disappearances are not new to Sri Lankan post-independence history. Between 1970’s and now, there were several insurgencies in the country and most of the disappearances were observed during those insurgencies. The present trend, however, is different. At present, there is neither an insurgency nor an emergency in the country,  but disappearances do take place.  Under whatever the circumstances, there is no legal, social or any other justification to forcefully abduct a person and destroy him/her.  In this article I attempt to analyze a few key governance issues revolving around the “white van culture” in Sri Lanka.

Present trend of abductions

A cursory glance at the recent abductions are mainly twofold; firstly, abductions of “criminals” (as the government called them) and secondly, abductions of dissenting voices. Let me deal with them briefly in order.

In recent years, several hundreds of suspects who had been lawfully taken into custody in the South were later found dead. In explaining these deaths, the police had an identical version on each one of them that those suspects were taken to a place to recover “weapons” where the suspect suddenly tried to grab a gun from a police officer and that the police had to shoot the suspect in self-defence! We all know that when hardcore criminal suspects are taken out, they are always handcuffed and guarded by officers who can physically handle him. In my view, this utter falsehood of “attempt to escape” can sustain only in a country where there is a total breakdown of internal supervision of police action.   It also suggests that government has a policy to destroy “suspects” without following a judicial process. The danger is not just that; rather the judicial organ of the State becomes irrelevant for serious criminal offences, because the Executive handles them on their whims and fancies.

That concerns lawfully arrested “suspects”. What about the others? Abductions of criminals and destroying them came in when the cell deaths in police custody became too much to be explained; or when political authorities preferred a sophisticated method of dealing with “identified individuals” without being answerable to anyone. For this to happen, there needs to be a trustworthy special group or groups of law enforcement officers who are assured of total impunity.  Secret detention places are also needed. Judicial experience all over the world shows that highest officers of the defence authorities must be either directly involved in such abduction operations or must approve the exercise directly.

The second category of abduction is to destroy the “Dissenting Voices” (who democratically challenge the government). While there are many examples, the recent trend started with the abduction of certain journalists. In particular, the abduction of Poddala Jayantha gave enough evidence of the motive of the abduction – non-criminal but he was a powerful dissenting voice in Sri Lanka, who organized the media against suppression. Like other similar abductions, the government did not honestly investigate into the incident; rather used state propaganda to discredit Jayantha. A man who wanted to stay in Sri Lanka was thus forced to live in exile.

Many dissenting voices faced white van abductions more recently and the list is not short by any means. Recently, two activists (named Kugan and Lalith)  working against abductions were abducted in Jaffna on 9^th  December 2011 –while they were organizing events to celebrate Human Rights Day the following day in Jaffna.  Media Minister Keheliya Rambukwella admitted that the two persons were in custody but did not disclose where they were detained. Now the law enforcement authorities are denying the arrest!    Then came the abduction of Kumar Gunaratnam and Dimutu Attygalle.  All these four persons belong to a JVP breakaway group now called the “Frontline Socialist Party”. Even though the track record of the JVP, particularly during the 1989-90 period is undoubtedly atrocious, the JVP came to the democratic political main stream – just like many other armed groups. Then emerged the JVP breakaway group, challenging the undemocratic moves of the regime somewhat effectively, compared to other opposition parties. There is no doubt that the government is jittery about any powerful opposition challenging the government’s credibility, particularly when a group of past JVP activists were involved.  However, that cannot justify abductions of unarmed political activists. If they have violated the law of the land, then the government has the full lawful authority to deal with them according to the law.

Whose White Vans are They?

I shall begin with the efficiency of the law enforcement authorities of the country.  As a practicing lawyer for nearly 25 years, I can assure the readers that our intelligent services and police investigators are capable of busting any major crime in the country, if there is no political interference.  I cannot recall a single case of “NORMAL” abductions which were not solved. Sri Lankan law enforcement authorities have successfully dealt with crimes from well planned murders to crime networks beyond territorial jurisdiction.  However, law enforcement authorities have failed to solve a single “White Van” abduction. Why? The capacity/ability is one thing and  integrity is something totally different.

The three prominent recent White Van episodes give us an indication as to who is presently capable of doing these. Kolonnawa UC Chairman (unsuccessful), Kumar Gunaratnam (successful but released) and Methias Chandrapalan, abducted from the judicial custody (whereabouts not known yet) are the three examples.

Kolonnawa UC Chairman’s brother was first abducted and he went missing. Then a White Van group came to abduct the UC Chairman himself. The assailants (in plain clothes) were apprehended and handed over to the police. It was later revealed that they were from the defence establishment. Their identities were established and even published in the media. But nothing happened! Government first said that the group (white van operators) was from the military engaging in an operation to arrest army deserters. As far as I am aware, arrests of deserters are made ONLY by uniformed Military Police officers with police assistance. There was no genuine investigation into this incident and what the media reported later was that a senior DIG “rescued” the white van crowd at midnight from the police. If so, why did a DIG get involved in rescuing a set of criminals who committed or were attempting to commit a crime? In an interesting coincident, the Officer in charge of the police station was transferred!

Judicial history of our country has not seen an abduction of a suspect in the custody of the jail guards (while walking from one court to the other). Chandrapalan, a suspect in a drug case, was abducted at gun point by a white van group in the presence of lawyers and the relatives of the suspect.   This happened around 12 noon in the main court complex, which is known for good security arrangements and where all movements are closely monitored. No serious investigations took place on this. Who can abduct a person from judicial custody in Sri Lanka? Answers are probably not difficult but public do not want to openly give an answer in fear of white van reprisal.

Take the abduction of Kumar Gunaratnam and Dimutu Arttygalle. This raised a series of contradictions of the government’s version. They went missing on 6^th April 2012 and were released “through police” on 10^th April.  The most interesting announcement came on 10^th early hours from the Police spokesman who said on TV that “a person called Noel Mudalige believed to be JVP dissident Kumar Gunaratnam, had  surrendered to the Dematagoda CCD police station last night and requested to go to Australia and the government has made arrangement to send him to Australia and he is awaiting departure at the Bandaranaike International airport.”  If the version of the police is true, any foreigner who wants to return to his/her own country can go to a police station when an air ticket will be bought at government expense and he/she will be sent! Brilliant! Is the government expecting us to believe this? Here again we cannot see (or expect) any reasonable investigation. Later, the Police spokesman said that they are conducting further investigations to “contradict the position of the JVP breakaway group and tell the country the correct position.” This is more serious than the offence itself. What motivates a police investigation – to solve the crime or to white wash a government?

We have seen the government alleging “international conspiracy” whenever they cannot explain their questionable actions and that is generally a good indication to measure the government’s involvement. See what the Acting Minister of Media said on this occasion:

“Certain people are tarnishing the country’s image by leveling false and baseless allegations against the government in connection with the abduction of two members of the newly formed Frontline Socialist Party… The intention of such fabrications is to denigrate the state in the eyes of the world and to inconvenience it”.

The conduct of a criminal (after committing a crime) is a relevant fact that is useful to see the complicity of the suspect to a crime. Let us keep this simple test in mind here and consider the government as a suspect.  In all these white van abductions, there is identical response from the government. Initially it is denied. Then say the police are investigating into the matter. This is followed by the government propaganda team (both in state media, private media and sponsored journalists) discrediting the “abductees”, while diverting attention from the crime of abduction. Then we see police getting involved in an unusual exercise of finding evidence to “contradict” (that there had been in fact an abduction). Finally, someone comes out with a theory of “conspiracy” without any real material to justify such an allegation.  In the absence of a genuine and transparent investigation into the abductions, let me pose the question to the reader; do not these facts   suggest the complicity of the government?

Some Common Features from Notorious Countries

Sri Lanka is not the only country that grapples with the menace of abductions. Motive for abductions may vary depending on the group of abductors.  In many notorious countries, there are “enforced abductions” for religious conversions, extortions, conscriptions, rivalries and so on. But here I discuss only the abductions involving state authorities. In countries where the state officials are involved in enforced disappearances, there are some common features. The case studies on abductions from those countries give an indication of at least following six features:

1. The state institutions (including parliament and judiciary) are generally corrupt and not at all poised to deal with the crime of disappearances/abductions. In fact, the law enforcement agencies do not believe that abduction is a crime.  Abduction network is protected by the political/military leadership.
2. The government with or without its para-military arms run a series of secret detention places, outside the legal scrutiny.  In many instances, the military give them physical security.
3. The police, military and supervision bodies are under one single authority and they are generally linked to the political Head of the State. They do not have any resource constrains for criminal operations.
4. Though the disappearance operations are well planned under an organized state authority, it often goes out of control. Thus, there may be some abduction that is not authorized by political or military leadership.
5. Abductions can sustain only where impunity is guaranteed and therefore, abductors are fully satisfied of the track record of the political leadership in guaranteeing “impunity” to them.
6. Even the notorious regimes do not want exposures on abductions. Whenever evidence emerges of the government’s involvement, they usually eliminate possible critiques. Or else, it would brand the critiques as “traitors conspiring against the country”. Usually, those regimes have strong propaganda machinery and sophisticated intelligent network to identify and discredit those “traitors”.

Testing the White Van with Governance Tools

Whether Sri Lanka has above common features is a matter for the reader to decide but let us look at our own experience with White Vans.

It is not difficult to understand that among the core of the problems of many serious issues in any country lie bad-governance structures. In my view, white van abductions can sustain only in an environment of bad governance. In that context, let me endeavor to demonstrate at least 5 possible reasons, why “White Van” operations do exist in Sri Lanka unabated.

Firstly; the lack of accountability of the law enforcement agencies. All public institutions, inducing the Defense Ministry, are run on public finance and are therefore, accountable to the public.  Who are our law enforcement agencies accountable to – public, politicians or “unknown”? The cardinal principle of governance requires law enforcement agencies to be truthful and honest in their dealings. They should only by guided by the law of the land. We all know today that any investigation can be manipulated by the political masters. Impunity is thus institutionalized! Arguably, the law enforcement agencies seem to be only accountable to the political masters and not to the public. There is further confusion as to who a law enforcement authority is, when the police and military are under one and single Minister (President) and Secretary.  Thus there is no check on each other. When there is a confusion of the functions, there cannot be effective accountability.

Secondly; lack of legislative supervision over the Executive.  I hold the view that the Sri Lankan Parliament today is an ornamental institution, without sufficient capacity or  willingness to respect/protect human rights. There is no Parliamentary Committee on human rights nor are there debates on human rights status of the country.  The opposition is confused and one often wonders whether an opposition member is a government member or not. Contrary to acceptable parliamentary norms, almost all Parliamentary Committees including COPE and COPA are headed by Ministers.  Minister in charge of  Defence is the President. Total Defence budget is not subjected to review by Parliament or its Committees. The secret expenditure of the military are even exempted from the Auditor General’s review (See Financial Regulation 237D). In fact, if the President and the Minister of Finance jointly state that they are satisfied with “any necessary expenditure on services of a confidential nature (the particulars of which cannot be divulged)”, the Auditor General cannot audit such accounts. When the President, Minister of Defence and the Minister of Finance are one and the same person, this exercise becomes a gross conflict of interest; thus no one will ever know how defence expenditure is spent.   This can lead to large scale abuse of defence expenditure.  On top of it, Urban Development is also part of the Defence Ministry! This total mystification is a breathing ground for cover up any criminal operation of the law enforcement authorities.

Thirdly – Lack of transparency in governmental actions. Sri Lanka does not recognize freedom of information and in fact, the disclosure of information might attract disciplinary actions against public officials under the Establishment Code. The provision of confidentiality has been used as a tool of oppression and as a main source of corruption, for many decades. It is because of this secrecy that the governments can misbehave and cover up.  This has been so serious that the officials, let alone the citizens, are unaware of the secret decisions taken by higher officers.  Do the public officials have backbones to legitimately question fellow officials or superiors on integrity issues of the institutions today? Since the 1972 Constitution we have seen the decay of independence and integrity of the public service but the present period is undoubtedly the worst. This caters to a wonderful opportunity to “work secret plans for the political masters”.

Fourthly- the weak Opposition is a contributory factor. As opposed to this period (where even the role of the Opposition is distorted), in early part of 1990, the then Opposition took major steps to prevent abductions, whilst an insurgency was on. One move then was to work closely with the UN Agencies to hold Sri Lanka accountable under the international human rights law. The best possible example was the actions effectively performed by the then Opposition MPs, particularly Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa. Once, Mr. Rajapasa was even arrested at the airport on his way to Geneva to attend the 31st Session of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in September 1990. (Read Rajapaksha v. Kudahetti (1992(2) SLR 223). Many political leaders such as Vasudeva Nanayakkara led from the front with the “Mothers Front”.  Unfortunately, there is no such political voice against disappearances today.  There may be many reasons for this. One reason seems to be the “societal silence” on the disappearance of Tamils for many years and the society was “forced to believe” that abductions were necessary to deal with the LTTE. With that mindset, most of the politicians including some of the parties in the Opposition are now finding it difficult to explain their long silence on abductions. There may be political explanations for this; but suffice it to say, whatever the explanations may be, they have failed in their political duty to challenge the crime of disappearances at the right time.

Finally, the weak civil society and feeble media. We need to ask ourselves whether we have done enough to preserve integrity and peace for the generations to come. When media was attacked, a coterie of government sponsored journalists supported the attackers. Though we have a few professional and fearless journalists, they are simply the exception, not majority. Civil society came under constant attacks by nationalist lobby for political reasons and state resources were frequently used to silence or weaken active NGOs, resulting in a grand opportunity for a despotic ruler.

Is silence the answer?  Governance is a dead letter where the public is not concerned about the fundamental freedoms. White vans created such an “oppressed” atmosphere that the public in general are not willing to speak up – obviously in fear of reprisal.  This is a clear objective of the oppressor. This reminds me of the words of Steve Biko – the Anti Apartheid hero from South Africa – “The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed”.

In conclusion let me ask, are we not experiencing this presently – as a nation?

• New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka
• The abduction, assault, arrest and defamation of the Sudar Oli Editor: Questions for the Sri Lankan Government
• Horrible rise of disappearances in post-war Sri Lanka continues unabated
• Media and Violence
• Journalist Pakkiyanathan Vijayashanthan who went missing reported to Badulla Police station

Political activists and leaders of the People’s Struggle Movement in Sri Lanka, Mr. Premakumar Gunaratnam[1] and Ms. Dimithu Attygalle[2] disappeared on 6^th April 2012.  Prior to their disappearance both activists had been preparing for the first convention of the Frontline Socialist Party, a party formed by a dissident group from the opposition party, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP – meaning People’s Liberation FRont). FSP party members had received credible information that both activists were under intense Government surveillance, shortly before their disappearance. There is currently no information regarding their fate or whereabouts.

Mr. Gunaratnam was a key leader of the People’s Struggle Movement (PSM) and Ms. Attygalle was the Secretary for Women’s and International affairs of the organization, which was a forerunner to the Frontline Socialist Party (FSP).

Mr. Gunaratnam had been  instrumental in forming the FSP which was due to be launched officially on 9^th April 2012 and he was expected to be appointed as its head.  The PSM has campaigned actively since its formation against the systemic violation of human rights by this Government including, disappearances, extra-judicial killings, illegal detentions and militarization in the North.

Details of Disappearance

Mr. Gunaratnam is believed to have been abducted from his temporary residence at No.29/1, Gemunu Mawatha, Kiribathgoda (Gampaha district), on 6^th April.  He was last seen by a party member who dropped Mr. Gunaratnam at his residence in Kiribathgoda at around 5 pm on 6^th April following a party meeting.  At around 11 pm that day, Mr. Gunaratnam spoke to the same party member and asked to be picked up from his residence at 5 am the following day (7^th April).  Mr. Gunaratnam has not been seen or heard from since.

The party member who arrived at Mr. Gunaratnam’s residence at around 4.30 am the following day (7^th April),   found that the air had been let out of all four tyres in Mr. Gunaratnam’s vehicle (No. NWKE 9457). On further examination he found that the door locks had been broken. Mr. Gunaratnam could not be found and was not contactable on his mobile phone. A neighbor had told police that 4 or 5 armed men had come to the house at around 4.30am on the morning of 7th April and instructed her to shut off lights and stay indoors. When she had looked out around 5.15am, she had seen nothing unusual.

According to party members, Mr. Gunaratnam’s mobile number (+94-71-3519722) was ringing till around 8 am on 7^th April but was not answered.  The phone is currently disconnected or unreachable.  The GPS coordinates of Mr. Gunaratnam’s mobile phone indicate that the phone was in the Thalawathugoda area on 7^th April morning. However there is no further evidence regarding his whereabouts.

Ms. Attygalle was last seen by a party leader who dropped her at the Kottawa bus stand (Colombo District) at around 6pm on 6^th April. Ms. Attygalle confirmed that she was going to her residence at 32/14/7, High level road, Henawatte, Meegoda (Colombo district).  However Ms. Attygalle did not answer her mobile phone (+94-77-0325567) the following morning though it had been ringing till about 11am. It had been confirmed that Mr. Attygalle had not arrived home on 6^th April.

Police complaints/action taken

On 7^th April 2012, Mr. Ajith Kumara, Member of Parliament, filed a complaint with the Police Head Quarters in Colombo regarding Mr. Gunaratnam’s disappearance, recorded under CIB I 105/19. MP Ajith Kumara also filed a separate complaint with the police head quarters regarding Ms. Attygalle’s disappearance recorded under CIB I 105/20, on 7^th April.

Mr. Gunaratnam’s sister-in-law, Dr. Nandani Somaratne, also filed a complaint with the Pilliyandala Police (Colombo district) on 7^th April, recorded under CIB 306/133.

Mr. Duminda Nagamuwa, a party leader, filed complaint number CIB I 11/135 with the  Kottawa Police on 7^th April regarding the disappearance of Ms. Attygalle.

The Australian High Commission in Colombo has been informed of the disappearance as Mr. Gunaratnam is an Australian citizen. The media, diplomatic community and human rights groups have been informed about the disappearances.

Police spokesperson told media said neither of the two had been taken in for questioning or arrested by the Police.

Prior to their abduction, Mr. Gunaratnam and Ms. Attygalle were engaged in intense negotiations in preparation for the first party convention on 9^th April 2012. Party members had received credible information that Mr. Gunaratnam was under intense surveillance by the Government during this period. As a safety precaution Mr. Gunaratnam and Ms. Attygalle always informed party members of their whereabouts and never switched off their mobile phones.

FSP party members believe that Mr. Gunaratnam and Ms. Attygalle have been abducted by forces linked with the Government since the party has campaigned actively against human rights abuses by the Government, particularly against the Tamil minority in the North.

PSM activists have suffered threats, attacks, intimidation and surveillance due to their work.  PSM activists Lalith Weeraraj and Kugan Muruganandan were abducted on 9^th December 2011 in Jaffna and have not been seen or heard from since[3].  Lalith Weeraraj was repeatedly threatened by police and military prior to his abduction and ordered to stop his work in the North. There has been no information or credible investigation into their disappearance despite widespread protests, local and international campaigns and a habeas corpus petition before the Court of Appeal in Sri Lanka. The families of both men have also suffered threats, harassment and surveillance following their abduction.

Media reports indicate that there have been twenty nine disappearances in Sri Lanka between February and March 2012 and a total of fifty six disappearances over the past six months[4]. There have been repeated incidents of threats, harassment, attacks and intimidation against HRDs and activists travelling to/working in the North apart from the systematic attacks against national level HRDs and journalists during the Human Rights Council Sessions in Geneva in March 2012.

• DISAPPEARANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS & POLITICAL ACTIVISTS LALITH KUMAR WEERARAJ AND KUGAN MURUGAN ON 9TH DECEMBER 2011
• Mobile Phones Connections Cut In Jaffna
• Mobiles Working Again
• Going home…
• Media and Violence

[Editors note: Also read New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka]

Twenty nine disappearances (including an attempted abduction) have been reported in Sri Lankan media between February and March 2012. There have been fifteen in March and fourteen in February. This brings the total number of disappearances reported in the last six months to fifty six.

Nineteen cases were reported while the sessions of the UN Human Rights Council were in progress in Geneva from the 27^th of February to the 23^rd of March 2012.

Out of the twenty nine disappearances in February-March 2012, sixteen of the twenty nine (16/29) appear to have occurred in the Colombo district while eight have been reported from the Northern Province (8/29). Five of those reported from the North are said to be ex-LTTE cadres who had been detained, released from detainment and then abducted. There are also three from the indigenous Wannilaye Aetto (Veddah) community.

Amongst the twenty nine 29 are also two school girls (one of whom escaped) and one university student, businessmen, a Government politician and relatives of politicians and  individuals reportedly to be members  of underworld gangs. Twenty four have been reported as abductions and five are reported as “missing”. Out of the persons who are reported as “missing” are three people from the Veddah community and two people from Jaffna. It was reported that one of the people missing in Jaffna was found dead.

Media reports had presented startling facts about involvement of the government in some of the abductions in March 2012. On 10^th March, Mr. Ravindra Udayashantha, a government politician who is the Chairman of Kolonnawa Pradeshiya Sabawa (local government body in the Colombo district), was saved from being abducted when his political supporters intervened.  The abductors were apprehended by the supporters, were positively identified as being from the Army and handed over to the Police. The number of the vehicle involved in the abduction, the names of the alleged abductors, their photos and even a video clip have been published. However, the abductors were released from police custody afterwards.

On the 26^th of March 2012, former Western provincial councilor Mr. Sagara Senaratne,  brother-in-law of Minister Jeevan Kumaratunga was released within hours of being abducted after the abductors had got “a call” while he was still in the van that he had been abducted in. The driver of Mr. Sagara was a eyewitness to the abduction and it appears that “the call” given to abductors to release Mr. Sagara had come after Mr. Sagara’s driver informed Minister Kumaratunga, who in turn had informed President Mahinda Rajapakse and Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse. Mr. Sagara had claimed that he would not be alive if not for the intervention of the Minister, the President and the Defense Secretary. It is not clear how the Rajapakse brothers and Minister Kumaratunga were able to ensure the release of Mr. Sagara even as he was being taken away by the abductors, without even the involvement of the Police.

In February 2012, Mr. Nethiyas Chandrapala was abducted outside the main court complex in Colombo. Also, in February 2012 Mr. Ramasamy Prabhakaran, a former detainee who had been severely tortured before being released as innocent was abducted two days before the case he had filed against senior police officers was to be taken up in the Supreme Court.

When will we see an end to disappearances in Sri Lanka?

Disappearances in Sri Lanka from Oct. 2011 – March 2012 (based on media reports)

• New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka
• The abduction, assault, arrest and defamation of the Sudar Oli Editor: Questions for the Sri Lankan Government
• Human Rights and Reconciliation Challenged in Dambulla and by Disappearances
• Another abduction in Colombo
• Journalist Pakkiyanathan Vijayashanthan who went missing reported to Badulla Police station

March 3, 2012 marked a very dark ebb in our society as it saw the horrific rape and murder of little Jesudasan Lakshini (13), allegedly at the hands of former EPDP cadre, Kanthasami Jegatheswaran (alias Kiruba) (31), from the Delft Island, Jaffna. Currently being held in remand at the Jaffna Remand Prison, the accused was produced before the Kayts Magistrate this week (30). However, the hearing was further postponed to April 9, 2012, as the Delft Police had failed to conclude their compilation of eye witness statements, said attorney-at-law K.S. Ratnavel, who is appearing on behalf of the victim’s family. The pending statement is the last of four eye witness statements attesting to having witnessed Lakshini being intercepted and taken by the accused on her way to the market, he added. This raises the glaring question as to why the Police was unable to obtain a mere four eye witness statements in the course of almost a month following this incident, unless of course exterior political forces are in play.

The Acting OIC of the Delft Police, SI W.P. Mendis said that the accused was first produced before the Kayts Magistrate Court on March 16, 2012, following which he was ordered to be remanded at the Jaffna Prison till his next court date on March 30, 2012, where both this case, and a previous allegation against him, would be taken up. “Just three months ago, the accused had held a young girl at gun (“plastic” pistol) point in Delft, in an attempt to intimidate and rape her. Following this incident, he was ordered by the Kayts Magistrate to sign in at the Delft Police Station on a daily basis until further notice. He was doing this until the day before the rape and murder of Lakshini.” Why an alleged attempted rapist is allowed back into the community with as little as a “wrap on the knuckles” is quite telling of the political influence the accused seems to be wielding. If instead, he had been subject to due process, Lakshini might still have been alive today.

Furthermore, villagers claim that the pistol had been in fact real and not plastic as mentioned above. If this were true, it raises two grave issues; 1.why is it that the State is yet to carry out a nation-wide disarmament programme of all former paramilitary cadres, e.g. EPDP, TMVP, PLOT etc., and 2. How is it that an armed ex-cadre can walk about freely, brandishing arms at will, within an island fully controlled by the Sri Lanka Navy? Villagers said, that it was only after they made complained about this incident to the Navy, that the Police had arrested him and produced him before the Kayts Magistrate.

The Police have also made a request to the Magistrate, for a blood sample from the accused, to be sent to Colombo for DNA testing. Having collected the sample, the Police have sent it through one of their officers to Genetech, Colombo, for testing this week (March 19).

Having visited Lakshini, a student of Neduntheevu Maha Vidyalayam’s bereaved family last week, a Jaffna –based local organization shared the following details with me.

Delft, being home to approximately 1500-2000 people now, is quite obviously a close-knit community, much like any other small town. However, the Kachchatheevu Feast (St. Anthony’s Church Feast), which is of great religious significance to Christians having drawn over 5000 devotees this year, resulted in Delft being almost deserted at the time Lakshini met with her brutal end.  Lakshini had left home for the fish market at about 8am on that fateful day, with the 100 rupee note her mother had given her to buy fish, clasped in her hand. Later that day, when she hadn’t yet returned home, her family and relations had started to search for her in their neighbourhood. “My relatives saw my child (Lakshini) being picked up by Jegatheswaran (the alleged perpetrator) whilst she was on her way to the fish market. He had told her to come with him that he would get her some fish, as fish was unavailable at the market that day. He was the one who killed my daughter,” said Lakshini’s distraught mother.

The Police was notified about this incident by woman from the village who had discovered Lakshini’s body on her way to chop firewood. “We found Lakshini’s half naked body, lying face down at a bare land approximately 30Ms down a little lane nearby the Pillaiyar Temple, at the 10^th Region of Delft. She was only wearing her Shalwar top, as her trousers had been removed, and she had received multiple injuries to her head. A bicycle, an empty bottle of Arrack (quarter pint), a 100 rupee note and a few coins, and a large stone were found alongside the body of the victim,” elaborated the Delft Police.  As the Kayts Magistrate was due to arrive from Kayts the next day, to initiate an enquiry into her death, villagers had stood guard over her body until the judge arrived to the scene. The Post Mortem Report stated that the child had been raped and later killed as a result of having her head smashed by a rock.

 “I lost my dearest daughter Lakshini. I can’t believe he did this to my daughter. I heard that there was a bottle of alcohol near her body, and that her dress was all disheveled. The money she had been given to buy the fish too was still there on the ground next to her, and her head had been severely injured. I was also told that he had attempted to strangle her. I simply cannot bear the loss of my daughter,” lamented Lakshini’s father tearfully.

As this was not the first incident of assault/abuse of girls in the area that Jegatheswaran has been accused of, on discovering Lakshini’s body, the villagers had stormed into his house, dragged him out onto the street, and started beating him up. Eventually, the Navy had intervened and handed him over to the Delft Police.

Villagers said that Jegatheswaran had  been former EPDP Commander, Napoleon’s right hand man, and also a suspect in the murder of Jaffna based Journalist Mylvaganam Nimalrajan. In addition to the two above mentioned cases, villagers claimed that he had also attempted to abuse two other young girls, a mere two days prior to this incident. The villagers are enraged at the inaction of the Police, even after having lodged multiple complaints against the perpetrator, and are therefore convinced that it is as a result of some political influence that he was released by the Police, thus enabling him to carry out this heinous crime.

“The Accused has only studied till Grade 5, and is from Manipay. He used to sell newspapers for the EPDP in Jaffna during the war. As he had not returned the proceeds from newspaper sales to the EPDP, they had punished him by making him work for their office in Delft. He eventually married a young girl from Delft. We have come under fire by certain parties claiming that we’re not taking any action against him, because of his political affiliation, but this is completely untrue. Not only is he no longer a member of the EPDP, but we also don’t care what party/faction he belongs to, we will do our job regardless of his affiliations,” emphasized SI Mendis.       

It is very rarely that you get to witness the people of Delft go up in arms against any authorities, as they have been under the complete control of the Navy and the EPDP. However, this time they decided to take matters into their own hands, as so they took to the streets demanding that Jegatheswaran must not be permitted to escape and must be incriminated according to the law. “Let us punish him! We want justice! The murderer needs to be severely punished,” is what the people are said to have chanted outside the Police station that day. Angry villagers had also had confrontations with the Police and EPDP members, demanding justice.

Villagers had entered the premises of the EPDP Office in Delft, and demonstrated outside the entrance, at which point many party members had fled the scene. The people had pointed to the fact that Jegatheswaran was a member of the EPDP, and that as a result should not escape from being punished for his crimes. People are demanding that justice be served and the perpetrator receive the maximum punishment.

The Jaffna-based Tamil Daily, Uthayan Newspaper reported the following comments from TNA MP S. Sritharan. “The punishment meted out to this murderer should act as an example and put fear into the hearts of all other such perpetrators. Incidence of sexual abuse seem to be on the rise in the North, with 140 children having been abused in the Northern Province to date. The accused having committed such a crime whilst being a member of a Tamil political party in Delft which is also under the control of the Navy and the Army, is a complete violation of the people’s rights; the very rights he has a duty to protect and uphold.  So, stringent action must be taken by both the Court and the Police this time, so as to ensure that he doesn’t get away. The islands have been under the control of the Navy for more than 20 years, making it that much more unacceptable that an armed man is permitted to freely walk their streets abusing children,” he added.

(Authors note: A much shorter version of this article appeared in The Sunday Times, 1 April 2012)

• Robberies Increase In Jaffna
• 3 years after the end of war: Official statements vs. reality
• Analysis of how Jaffna voted and why the EPDP feels defeated in Sri Lanka’s first post-war elections
• 42 People Surrender at Jaffna Human Rights Commission
• Disappearance

The Sri Lankan government’s denial of things extends well beyond allegations of war crimes. Earlier this year, Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to the US, Jaliya Wickramasuriya “Rapes, this and that not taking any place in Sri Lanka”. Writing about this daft and peculiar statement, Roel Raymond noted,

I don’t understand this. I don’t understand why our diplomats and politicians continue to bristle defensively, refusing to accept fault, scrambling to cover the massive chip on their collective shoulders. How hard can it be to admit one is wrong? How very different would it have been if Ambassador Wickramasuriya had said ‘Yes this is a problem, but we as a nation are committed to ending it’?

On 1st April last year, The Grassrooted Trust led the global V-Day celebration in Colombo at the Barefoot Gallery with a production of ‘A Memory, A Monologue, A Rant and A Prayer: Writings to End Violence Against Women & Girls’, a groundbreaking collection of monologues by world-renowned authors and playwrights. The show was sold out, and The Grassrooted Trust was able to raise and donate LKR 50,000 to the Women’s Devenlopment Center, Kandy.

The show’s success was the catalyst for this year’s ‘වී DAY’, where as promised, we will showcase Sri Lankan stories that discuss not only conventional forms of violence against women and girls, such as rape, battery, incest and sexual slavery, but also more unconventional, far less reported forms of violence, stemming from patriarchy, and cultural hypocrisy.

Under the direction of Anuruddha Fernando and Hans Billimoria ‘වී-DAY 2012 – Writings to end Violence Against Women and Girls in Sri Lanka’, a selection of original writings which will be staged on Sunday, 1st April 2012 at the Warehouse Project, Block # 26, Tripoli Road, Colombo 10. Directions here.

A total of seven pieces, all of which have been written by Sri Lankans living and working in the murky field of sexual and reproductive health and rights in Sri Lanka, will be performed by experienced cast of actors from both English and Sinhala drama traditions. The entire programme will last approximately ninety minutes, including an interval.

Groundviews caught up with Hans Billimoria and a few actors in the play to talk about the production, and the issues it aims to raise.

We talk for around 25 minutes, and address issues of sexuality, the sponsorship of this kind of production by media organisations that have been openly homophobic, the challenge of moving the action from stage to polity and society, over the long-term, the ways in which theatre can help strengthen awareness over this prevalent issue.

Also see video on V-Day produced by Vikalpa here.

• Violence Against Women and Girls in Sri Lanka: No April Fools joke
• The Travelling Circus on video: Looking at war and IDPs through theatre
• The Right to Respond
• Women’s Day 2012: Concerns, challenges and opportunities from Sri Lanka
• Floating Spaces: Theatre and censorship in Sri Lanka

Photo courtesy Vikalpa, from protest against US resolution in Colombo, 27 February 2012

The US-sponsored resolution at the UNHRC had to be defeated. It was not. 24 in favour, 15 against, 8 abstained. Hearts are broken, glasses are shattered, the ‘gods’ have ignored our prayers, there is madness surrounding us; 2012, we are now sure, is when the world comes to an end.

But that was yesterday. Today, the morning after, is once again cold; we need to pick up the pieces, mend our hearts, move on. And there are questions too: what is this resolution? How did we perform? Is it all India’s fault? Where did we go wrong? Are we to be blamed? What now?

Resolution L.2: From US, with love

The resolution titled ‘Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka’ has, during the process of the UNHRC session, undergone considerable change. From being an intrusive and arrogant one sponsored by the US, it now appears rather soft, innocent and caring. The US troops will not be in Sri Lanka tomorrow, no travel or trade embargoes are imposed. The object and purpose is to get the recommendations of the LLRC implemented.

But resolutions, like many other documents, can be interpreted differently. The manner in which it is interpreted depends on the interpreter’s own political predilections. There are numerous objects and purposes; some which are mentioned, some which are not. Interpretations change over time. And that is why all or most interpretations offered today have the potential of appearing to be accurate, or will prove to be accurate, in the future.

For instance, to make the resolution appear soft, the US and other promoters of the resolution can highlight the point that it is only about the implementation of the LLRC recommendations. They can stress in this regard, that they welcome the constructive recommendations of the LLRC, that technical assistance is to be provided “in consultation with, and with the concurrence of” the Sri Lankan Government; that its all about requests and encouragement, etc; that there is nothing intrusive, sovereignty is therefore not violated. There is love.

But others would dispute this. There’s another interpretation which states; that there is no mention of the LTTE which is astounding; that some recommendations are being termed ‘constructive’ because the sponsors have also included their own ‘constructive’ recommendations in place of the not-so-constructive recommendations of the LLRC; that it further internationalizes internal affairs of the State by reference to, for example, provincial-level devolution; that the phrase “requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a report on the provision of such assistance to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-second session” implies in practice, assistance will need to be obtained; that it is not only about implementing the recommendations but also about taking “additional steps to address alleged violations of international law.”  This kind of interpretation, certain elements within the liberal camp would say, is pure nonsense.

But why is it not? Why do both interpretations seem accurate? Why and how can the former interpretation slide towards the latter, and the latter, in turn, appear to be the accurate one?

It is simply because the latter is, firstly, what the promoters of the resolution do not stress in their interpretations. It is the other half of the ‘truth’. Secondly, it is because the latter interpretation is that which will be adopted if the Government does not implement the LLRC recommendations. Promoters of the resolution will find it difficult to stick to the former interpretation if no action is taken; and with that the entire appearance of the resolution, its object and purpose, will begin to change. And with that change will come the following reminder: that the resolution did note “with concern that the [LLRC] report does not adequately address serious allegations of violations of international law.” The gentle touch and caress now feels like a punch; love turns into agony.

All this is not difficult to understand, of course. It is just that admitting the above makes the promotion of the resolution difficult. But also, this is where the politics of human rights, and the politics of the US, come into play. My point here is not an endorsement of the entirety of the observation made by the SL Representative in Geneva, that: the resolution “reflects a blatant case of politicization that takes the Council hostage to the hidden agendas of the mighty.” The UNHRC, being an inter-State body, is obviously political, and as Professor Makau Mutua once questioned at the American Society of International Law: “How can you politicize that which is political?” It is obvious.

Rather, my argument is that it is necessary to understand that there are “hidden agendas” (and of course, all actors have hidden agendas) of the “mighty” the US. States such as the US have better things to do, than to run around the UNHRC to obtain votes from this or that country to get a resolution passed. And when a super-power such as the US and its allies introduce such a resolution and canvass support, they sure know what they are up to (and up against), diplomatically, politically and even legally.

So there needs to be a more holistic appreciation of the politics underlying the adoption of the resolution. It is said to be a first step towards reconciliation; it is also a first step towards other things unmentioned and unmentionable. In other words: there is love, but it’s not unconditional love.

And yet, to conclude: the challenge is to move on, and that second type of interpretation mentioned above need not worry a Government too much if there is a genuine willingness to implement the LLRC-recommendations.

Performing at the UNHRC

We all know that the UNHRC is about human rights (also, human rights formalism), about international law, about bureaucracy, rules, regulations, procedures and technicalities. But it is far more interesting too. The UNHRC is also about politics, about feelings, about anger and frustration, about the ‘West’, the ‘Third World’, about drama and performance. Like all UN bodies, the UNHRC is a grand stage. It is where the language of international law and human rights is craftily used by actors to articulate their myriad grievances; where the beautiful hypocrisy of actors is played out; where we imagine that human rights problems get resolved; where performance does matter. But unlike in 2009 (Geneva-I), ‘performance’ was not Sri Lanka’s strong point in 2012.

At times, grand theoretical expositions are unnecessary to detect and understand the underlying problems of a country, its diplomatic approach or its foreign policy. What Sri Lanka’s diplomatic approach is, what its image is, where Sri Lanka wants to go and where it is going – are questions for which answers were provided in those few minutes during which Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe spoke. Where, for instance, was the Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in Geneva? Instead, why so many local politicians and Parliamentarians? A Minister leading the way, a not-so-comfortable looking Foreign Minister behind him, an accused Minister close by, a former Attorney General to the left, and a couple of more politicians in front: a sight which does absolutely nothing in terms of changing the attitude and foreign policies of other countries (at least in a positive or pro-Sri Lankan way, and that too, just minutes before the vote was taken); a sight which doesn’t inspire confidence.

And of course, this told us what we had known already: about the lack of autonomy, and perhaps influence, wielded by those who are meant to conduct matters of foreign policy in the diplomatic arena; the utter waste of resources given the futile presence of so many politicians in Geneva, not to forget the sheer waste of their time; also, the irresponsibility and the disregard shown for accountability in including certain individuals accused of crimes and with that, the inability and unwillingness to understand how strategically and diplomatically counter-productive it is to include them in delegations to the UNHRC, especially when matters of human rights and the implementation of the LLRC-recommendations are being discussed.

What of the message? Of course, given that the UNHRC is a stage, ‘mega-phone’ diplomacy is not essentially bad if the big and powerful have difficulty in listening to and respecting the concerns of the small and the weak. But much depends not on ‘sound’ alone, but substance too. And in this regard, what Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe had to say did sound unfortunate at times: it almost implied that there will be no reconciliation in Sri Lanka if the resolution is adopted. As he said: “This resolution if adopted will not add value to the implementation process in Sri Lanka; on the contrary, it may well be counter-productive and, as such, those who have been using extreme pressure tactics in garnering support for this ill-timed and unwarranted initiative should be mindful of the responsibility that accompanies it.”

It was also said: “If this proposed intrusion is accepted by this Council, no domestic process would be free to deliver on its mandate unimpeded. Instead, a superimposition of an external mechanism would become the order of the day.” While external mechanisms should not become the order of the day, the problem here is that Sri Lanka has institutions which have not freely delivered for quite sometime. More importantly, that ability to deliver freely has been retarded by certain legal and constitutional developments that took place after May 2009.

Tackling ‘Incredible India’: SL foreign/domestic policy

Geneva-II was also about votes, numbers and mathematical calculations. The way the members voted, their reasons for voting for, against or abstaining, are known. In all this, India did have a major role to play. And in ‘post-Geneva II’, Sri Lanka confronts some significant questions which reaffirm the importance of understanding that inextricable relationship between domestic and foreign policy.

One such question is the ‘Indian factor’; strengthening ties with India. Much depends on how we perceive India now, its role in the region and the wider world, its past and present, and our willingness to understand that not all actors are either black or white.

To begin with, the capitulation was significant. Pressured by Tamil Nadu, India went from being a country which was against country-specific resolutions to supporting a country-specific resolution. The structure of political argument, between India and Sri Lanka, now becomes fascinating. Sri Lanka thinks that India voted against her; India states that it was in fact a vote in support of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, before the vote, stated that India is a responsible member and will vote accordingly given their understanding of the ancient and historical ties; India has now voted (the way responsible members do!) and having done so informs in turn, that Sri Lanka understands why India did so given their long and traditional relationship. Coalition partners of the Sri Lankan Government state that India’s support for the resolution contradicts its (India’s) own foreign policy; but India can reply that it is India’s business to decide what her foreign policy is after all.

How then do we proceed?

There is a lot of anti-Indian sentiment generated everywhere. That cannot be prevented easily. Already, demands have been made by local politicians to re-think the nature of Sri Lanka’s economic ties with India. India, people will not forget, is well capable of making life ‘difficult’ for Sri Lanka, as history will teach you. There is of course the language of diplomacy: Sri Lanka and India are the best of friends; we are like brothers; ours is a historic relationship; it is a special understanding, a very unique relationship, etc, etc. And yet, India is no innocent bystander.

But playing the ‘China-card’ will not always ensure success. India is a geopolitical reality. A balance needs to be struck. As the late Lakshman Kadirgamar once stated: “… ideally the Tamil question within our polity should be so managed as to preclude the need for Indian concern, far less involvement. However, it would be wholly unrealistic for anyone to claim that under no circumstances could India have a legitimate concern with the management of certain aspects of our internal affairs” (Speech delivered at the Hindustan Leadership Seminar, Dec., 2003).

If then, there is a need to understand not only the complexity of SL-India ties, but the very complexity that is ‘India’; its own secessionist problems; the ‘Tamil Nadu factor’; India’s own strategic objectives, such as gaining membership in a restructured and reformed UN Security Council; about how such geopolitical goals bring India and US closer; and how that partnership, in turn, affects SL-India, and SL-US ties, etc.

Along with that, what also needs to be appreciated is the fact that India is not only capable of making life ‘difficult’ for the Sri Lankan Government, but also, making it ‘comfortable’; as it did in numerous ways during the last stages of the war, and especially diplomatically, especially in Geneva, 2009. That relationship which was strengthened during the last stages of the war, well harnessed and further developed in Geneva-2009 (we remember the support of the Indian Representative in Geneva even after the Special Session concluded) should not have been undermined.

And this latter kind of external relationship can only be maintained if internal policies within Sri Lanka are geared towards addressing the questions of power-sharing and the protection of the rights of Tamil people, especially in the North and the East, in a more sincere and serious manner. Sri Lanka either has to ensure that the political promises made to India are kept [especially regarding the implementation of the 13th Amendment – see, for instance, the ANI report, ‘India feels Lanka has done very little on devolution of power’, 24 March, 2012], or that it is able to move forward peacefully, with sincerity and determination, especially with the Tamil political parties and the TNA, in terms of devising a mechanism of power-sharing which is autochthonous. There are decisions here which Sri Lanka is unwilling to make.

India, then, is neither our best friend nor our worst enemy. Thinking of India in such extreme ways obfuscates the complexities surrounding inter-State relationships, and unnecessarily simplifies the challenge of foreign policy making too. Today, ‘nonalignment’ does not mean that India will always be with Sri Lanka (and against the West) on every conceivable diplomatic and political problem Sri Lanka confronts. That was the old way of thinking. Even the very term ‘nonalignment’, as the former Indian diplomat and politician Mani Shankar Aiyar (MSA) has stated, “was appropriate to a world characterized chiefly by the wooing of the rival superpowers to align with one or the other of their blocs” (MSA, A Time of Transition, p. 257). But after the Cold-War, relationships became much more fluid, much more complex; with such changes, ‘nonalignment’ ceases to become a simple question of voting for or against a State.

Political maturity

In addition, the current situation also demands more maturity in terms of assessing Sri Lanka’s diplomatic debacles.

It is, today, a popular argument (made by the SL Foreign Minister, for example) that Sri Lanka had the support of 23 members (i.e. including the 8 abstentions) of the UNHRC. Spin is fine, and is to be expected from all Governments. But where does this kind of spin take us?

Minister GL Peiris argues, for instance, that an abstention amounts to a vote against the resolution. But of course, the same argument can be raised by the opposing party. The US too has the right to claim that an abstention amounts to a vote for the resolution.

But this argument gets more dangerous, and ignores history. If Sri Lanka is pleased with the current performance, how much more pleased should we be with the result in 2009? To put it differently, how much more worrying should the current performance be, when compared with the solid and overwhelming majority Sri Lanka gained in 2009?

And, in proclaiming that Sri Lanka fought with the US (but didn’t it do the same in 2009?) and got the support of 23 members, the SL Foreign Minister ignores (or forgets) that there has been a serious nosedive from 35 (29 + 6 in 2009, following the logic of Minister Peiris) to 23; forgetfulness or ignorance which is quite dangerous, as it fails to appreciate the kind of degeneration that Sri Lanka’s vote-base at the UNHRC has undergone over the relatively short span of three years. And if this degeneration is not taken seriously, not much effort will be made to mend our own policies and re-build relations with other States.

Security 

Closer to home, there are more problems. There is the continuous labeling of the critic, journalist or human rights activist as ‘LTTE-agent’, ‘Tiger’, ‘terrorist’, ‘separatist’ or ‘traitor’. It is not a novel development, but it takes a far more dangerous twist now with the adoption of the resolution. Also, the time has come when we are exposed to the sight of mad politicians who make public utterances which amount to direct and indirect threats to the lives of journalists and human rights activists. It is highly questionable whether the Government is concerned about such developments. Given the dangerous nature of these threats and the manner in which they seem to be receiving the approval of the public (did we not hear people applauding Minister Mervyn Silva?), the mere condemnation of these utterances and open threats is wholly inadequate.

Debate, argument, and political rivalry are essential and are to be celebrated. But in this case, all this turns dangerous and deadly when critics of a Government who call for accountability, human rights protection and devolution are conveniently labeled and transformed into ‘traitors’ and ‘separatists’. Every criticism becomes a criticism of the State, every critic an enemy of the State; no amount of statements made by such a critic in favour of the need to build a plural, democratic and united Sri Lanka seems convincing to the regime if such an advocate also demands accountability and/or devolution. In such a context, even the rejection of all forms of violence (as Parliamentarian MA Sumanthiran has commendably done, in critiquing the armed forces and the LTTE: ‘TNA faults both govt. and LTTE’, Daily Mirror, 21 March, 2012) might not be enough to satisfy the regime. Geneva or no Geneva, the challenge of securing a more tolerant democracy seems to be a gargantuan task.

Moving on

The UNHRC in Geneva may be a place for the great matters of law, human rights, and justice. But it is also a place that makes us feel human; a place for politics, passions, love and joy, agony and tears. It is a place which gives those of us far away (and would you not agree?) that moment to switch on our computers, to watch the live webcast, to have that drink, to shout whatever we liked at those we saw on our screens. And we do this, not because we are less concerned about peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Rather, it is because we know that peace will not come with the beginning or the end of some UNHRC-session, far away in Geneva.

If then, reality should set in. The morning after is as cold as the day before. And after yet another UNHRC-session, we are back to where we were. But then, perhaps before leaving, we might need to answer one more question: we talk about victories and defeat, but who really won or lost in Geneva? It is here then that all those who are less-forgiving would need to engage in the politics of re-imagination. The task is to re-imagine, or better still, to recognize that Geneva is where we all win and lose, and that in every victory there is something to be lost, and that in every defeat, there is something to be won, too. Because after all, we need to be there for each other if progress is to be made. At the moment, we are against ourselves. And that has to be changed.

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• Sri Lanka and its ‘Geneva-problem’
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• GENEVA-II & FOUR-LEGGED FURNITURE
• Restoring Government in Sri Lanka

their names and photographs,
inciting fears of death
squads preparing to drive
white vans to their residences.

The warning by the UN Human
Rights Commissioner to protect
witnesses is welcome, quixotic.
How will her office stop disappearances

when government has rejected
the resolution, said it will push back
reconciliation, which I presume to mean
more islanders vanished, bloodshed,

people living in fear and loathing,
keeping quiet or moving out,
accompanied to the airport
by diplomats from a friendly mission,

leaving their homes to caretakers,
a new life abroad for champions
of human rights at home? And
for those who stay, negotiating

protections, waiting for
a post- midnight call
by an elite team of assassins,
like the ones who shot

prisoners at Nandikadal,
stopping motorbikes
in the intersection
to beat Lasantha to death,

dressed in black with black
glasses, or as drivers
of white vans, in assorted
civilian garb, ordinary

people working
a second job at night,
disappearing themselves
into the morning rush.

• At Your Service
• The day after tomorrow
• Dial a White Van for a pest-free life!
• Students Missing In Jaffna
• A question Sri Lanka’s leaders keep dodging: Where are the disappeared?

Image from www.dbsjeyaraj.com. Photo by Jean-Marc Ferré

The passage of the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution on Sri Lanka raises a fundamental question: what next? When the dust settles and tempers calm, all parties concerned will be faced with the actuality that things have changed quite dramatically. This piece attempts to identify the challenges and opportunities presented by the passage of the Resolution to a number of political entities or individuals.

Sri Lankan government

The Sri Lankan government now faces an awkward situation. Having lost more than one half of the entire membership of the Council including almost all of Latin America, and given the exhortations from even sympathetic members that it should implement the recommendations of the LLRC, the options at the Rajapaksas’ disposal have narrowed. What is clear is that twelve more months of slow or no progress on key issues of demilitarization, devolution, disarming paramilitaries, democracy and accountability will only isolate Sri Lanka further, and augment the likelihood of an international investigation into war crimes. To avoid this, the government will need to demonstrate tangible progress on these key issues, whilst domestic compulsions will determine that those steps be taken without a loss of face. While it is theoretically possible for the Rajapaksas to chart a course that successfully straddles these two concerns, the question is whether it will. If the regime perceives that implementing the LLRC’s recommendations and taking steps to investigate and prosecute soldiers will weaken its hold on power, it may well decide to gamble on Council inaction in March 2013 and beyond. Moreover, the regime may be tempted to continue its nationalist posturing for domestic consumption in search of the popularity it enjoyed just after the war and subsequently lost. For a regime that since May 2009 has overestimated its diplomatic weight and underestimated its friends’ growing irritation with its intransigence, making the right call at this stage will be more important that ever.

The United States

The Resolution against Sri Lanka signals a change in gear of the US – Sri Lanka relationship. For all the diplomatic courtesies about the Resolution being designed to assist the government, the reality is that the US has begun flexing muscle in a bid to signal a coming battle unless Sri Lanka backs down. Commentary within and Sri Lanka has focused much on the text of the Resolution, without examining the text against a broader backdrop. The text was decidedly unorthodox, and perhaps the first of its kind. To be clear, it does not necessarily commit Sri Lanka’s fate to an apolitical bureaucratic process that inevitably leads to a decisive vote at the Security Council. An international investigation, or even a call for a fact-finding mission under the auspices of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] may well have done that, but this Resolution does not. Neither, as evidenced by Clause 3 and the role of the OHCHR, is this Resolution meant as a one-off rap on the knuckles. Instead, it provides for the Council to remain seized of the matter till at least March 2013. However, any future decisions on action will have to be taken by States, leaving the process open to political maneuvering and judgment calls. In other words, by retaining the power to decide whether to initiate an international inquiry into Sri Lanka’s war crimes, the US believes it can exert diplomatic pressure on Sri Lanka to make progress on key issues. Ultimately, for all the reporting responsibility [likely to be expanded through creative interpretation into a monitoring responsibility] of the OHCHR and concerns about India-inspired oral revisions to operative paragraph 3, the US has ensured that it is firmly in control of the UNHRC processes relating to Sri Lanka.

India

India’s unwillingness to convince at least some of the other Asian states to vote with them in favour of the Resolution, coupled with their weak explanation of vote that sounded a lot like it was prepared to justify a vote against, cut a pathetic figure at the Council. The swelling of American influence over the region through extra regional means will trouble India, especially where such influence is used to direct policy in a direction the South Block was hesitant to tread. However, the silver lining for India is the increased bargaining power it will bring to the table if it glibly warns Sri Lanka that Colombo will face heavy costs for continued intransigence. Moreover, India may slowly come to realize, like the US, that Sri Lanka’s China card has been played and overplayed. Its value has been exhausted, and the Sinhala population has not the stomach for more dodgy mega-infrastructure deals, stolen jobs, loans at commercial rates and land grabs. Whether India’s timorous diplomats will sense this opportunity is anyone’s guess, but a betting man can reliably count on the South Block’s specialty – the art of passive bungling.

China           

China’s shadowy diplomacy and its disinterest with permanent friendships or values means that China’s strategy is hard to predict. However, what is clear is that China has a direct interest in the perpetuation of the Rajapaksa family’s hold on power, for no other reason perhaps than the sense that a Ranil Wickremasinghe led regime will be more disposed to friendly relations with the West. That in turn will give Sri Lanka more access to concessionary loans, aid, and an opportunity to move away from Chinese control over Sri Lanka. However, with India now appearing to take a position critical of Sri Lanka, China will remain conscious of the reputational costs of propping up an international pariah, in the event Rajapaksa regime continues to isolate himself from the West. It is for this reason that China has a direct interest in preventing a pitched battled between the West and Sri Lanka, not least in the Security Council where China possesses a rarely used veto. Thus, China may well quietly nudge the Sri Lankan government towards greater engagement with the West, in the knowledge that expending valuable political capital to defend Sri Lanka will hurt its interests.

Tamil National Alliance

The passage of the Resolution was indubitably a modest victory for the Tamil people. The TNA’s stock among the Tamil people will be expected to rise for it’s behind the scenes role in contributing to the conclusion. More importantly, as the beneficiary of American and Indian support, the TNA has managed to slowly accumulate international influence. To retain this international support, the Alliance may engage in many more rounds of talks with the government, if not for any other reason than to enable the TNA, US and India to gauge the post-Resolution attitude of the government to devolution. The TNA’s challenge for the future however will be to maintain international respect and influence without losing traction at home. The fierce hostility directed at the TNA from hyper-nationalists in the Tamil community has caused some discomfort to the party. The TNPF, a breakaway party from the TNA led by Kumar Ponnambalam Junior appears to be gaining significant ground within the University of Jaffna – a traditional hotbed of Tamil nationalism. However, the TNA’s fortunes will depend on how it manages to thwart the TNPF’s outflanking move. That, in turn, will largely depend on its ability to produce results internationally and initiate a grassroots program to communicate its strategy with the people.

The UNP

The UNP – Ranil wing – will be aware that Rajapaksa’s risk taking can potentially wobble the regime. There is a clear nexus between the government’s economic mismanagement and its authoritarian and nationalist bluster. The mishandling of monetary policy, cash-draining prestige projects, the low likelihood of a waiver from US imposed sanctions on Iranian oil, the drying up of concessionary Western aid and dearth of foreign direct investments are all attributable, at least in part, to the government’s actions and omissions. Given the UNP’s established credentials for rescuing the country from economic distress, the regime’s authoritarian nationalism – while bolstering its popularity in the short term – will also gradually and slowly set the conditions for the UNP’s return to power. The lack of impetus on the UNP’s part to put up a functional opposition to Rajapaksa – however damaging to democracy – is also likely due to the patient optimism of the nephew of President Jaywardene, who, after a lifetime in politics, became Head of State at the age of 72.

Navi Pillay

Navi Pillay is not a fan of Sri Lanka’s human rights record, or of the manner in which it conducted itself during the last stages of the war. As one of the earlier voices to call for an independent investigation, Navi Pillay’s views are well known. Pillay has also been the subject of some fairly fierce attacks on her integrity by the Sri Lankan government. Pillay is now tasked with the provision of advice and assistance to the Sri Lankan government on the implementation of the LLRC’s recommendations and on dealing with accountability. Regardless of the attitude adopted by the Sri Lankan government with respect to her advice and assistance, what is clear is that Pillay – a human rights lawyer and activist in the age of apartheid – does not mind a scrap. If she senses a lack of cooperation, Pillay is likely to use the Resolution to provide public advice to the Sri Lankan government, and complain – also publicly – when Sri Lanka ignores her. A former judge at an international criminal tribunal, Pillay’s advice is also likely to focus quite intensively on questions of accountability, thereby drawing further attention to allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. To make matters worse for the government, a scathing report by Pillay in March 2013 could speed up any action contemplated by the US at those sessions, or subsequent ones.

• Sri Lanka and the UNHRC: Implications for India and for Human Rights
• India’s Volte-Face: Winners and Losers
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• Is Sri Lanka in danger of being held accountable by the International Criminal Court?
• Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy: Missing the Woods for the Trees

Photo courtesy JDS/Guy Calaf, Agence France-Presse​

By the time this article is published, the votes on the hotly-contested UN Human Rights Council resolution on Sri Lanka will have been cast and counted.  I am writing this as the debate over the resolutions is taking place in Geneva, and I find myself wondering if the outcome will be meaningful for the lives of hundreds of thousands of victims of our 30 year war.  Don’t get me wrong – I recognise the significance of the UNHRC resolution in terms of its moral and political symbolism, and that it may have profound implications for the Sri Lankan state’s position within the field of geopolitics and international relations.  I know that it will very likely impact the course of Sri Lanka’s national politics – even if I can’t anticipate the precise consequences.  Whilst I’d like to hope that the outcome of the UNHRC vote could lead to the harm and hurts of decades of violence being addressed in a meaningful and effective way, something inside me tells me not to kid myself.  Not wanting to to be heretical, I simply cannot bring myself to have much faith that the UNHRC resolution vote, regardless of the outcome, will make much difference to the lives of people who have been deeply marked by the conflict.

Much of the debate around the current showdown in Geneva has claimed that what is at stake is Truth, Justice and Reconciliation.  Over the past months, I have become increasingly sceptical that a process of international reckoning anchored in Geneva or a process of national reckoning such as the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission process are capable of delivering – even under the best conditions and with sincere efforts – what is desired from them in terms of this holy trinity.  I feel that these are blunt, bureaucratic instruments that are unlikely to produce the sort of truth, justice or reconciliation that is needed by those who are most entitled to it – the thousands upon thousands of us who have suffered direct losses and harm from the war. And they probably cannot really deliver it for the rest of us either.  Instead, I have come to believe that the path to a better kind of peace requires a different sort of approach – one that is deeply personal even as it must engage with the experiences of others.  It is probably something that requires honest and difficult processes for each of us.

Truth
In the past year, public debate about the facts of what happened during the final months of the war has been dominated by commentary on the details of (and even more often on the ‘vested interests’ ascribed to) the  Report of the Expert Panel to the UN Secretary General, the subsequent report of the GoSL Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission’s report, and two high-profile documentaries from Channel 4 in the UK.

I chose not to watch Channel 4′s first ‘Killing Fields’ documentary when it came out in 2011.   I had been inside Menik Farm at the end of the war, and talked with people who survived the ordeal of the final months of warfare.  I had been with the relatives of those who did not escape the violence. What I saw and heard was enough for a lifetime. But what I learned was also messy, complex and inchoate.  The stories were fragmented; they occasionally contradicted each other and were sometime silent on the most difficult events; and of course they changed in small but important ways as time passed. These stories defied compilation, summarising, reduction, and in some cases even communication.  Still, by coming to know the people who told them, I came to hold inside me a mosaic of undeniable visceral truths about what took place in the hell into which over over 300,000 people had been cast.  I doubted that Channel 4 could reveal to me new horrors that I had not already felt.  The subsequent detailed debates in the media and in my social circles about the content and authenticity of the ‘Killing Fields’ documentary rendered my refusal to watch somewhat irrelevant – but seemed to confirm my judgement.

I was, however, struck by two things.  The first obvious issue was how the public discourse shifted so quickly from consideration of what had happened in the Vanni to a debate on the provenance of the footage – the images were shocking, but were they real?  The second was a more serious observation – that the controversy about the legitimacy of the documentary produced in the UK had completely eclipsed the reality that within several hours journey from anywhere in Sri Lanka you could actually meet thousands of people who had been through the events depicted, who had witnessed atrocities, who could vouch for losses they had experienced personally and were still suffering the effects of.

The two subsequent reports by the panel of UN experts and the commissioners of the LLRC suffered from a similar displacement of the voices of the people at the heart of the matter. The latter did see rare instances where some recognisable human experience broke through the procedural and political strictures imposed on the Commission.  Many of the people who took the risk of testifying before the LLRC did so out of a need for their truths to be told, heard and recorded.  The approach to testimony, in this case was quite inadequate for this purpose, as survivors were rarely able to speak on their own terms and were subsequently usually rendered in the report as mere ciphers, rather than as sentient beings.

In Sri Lanka today, our access to the truths of the final stages of the war need not depend so much on the verdicts of forensic experts examining photographs and video or on the credibility of well-referenced reports, as on our will to travel up the A9 to make contact with those who lived through that period.  On this small island, it wouldn’t be too hard to find a friend of a friend to make an introduction.   In social terms, Sri Lanka is still a village where we are never separated by more than a step or two from people with a first-hand perspective on how the war was really waged.  Truly hearing what people have to say (or don’t say) may be more the challenge – but overcoming this barrier is also a matter of will, patience and heart.

A retired friend of mine in Colombo, having viewed the government’s alternative version of the Channel 4 ‘Killing Fields’ documentary asked me if I really thought that the army could have treated people ‘like that’.  It was hard to imagine, he said, that they could have behaved like such beasts.  I had gently to remind him that from where we were standing talking on his balcony we could see the spots where the tortured bodies of suspected JVP members had been burned and hung from a lamppost during the terror of 1989.  He nodded slowly.  The truth of what the armed forces (and armed insurgents) were capable of was already available to him as a Sri Lankan who had lived through an insurrection in his own town.  It was just not very easy or pleasant to admit it to himself.

We ought to know better than to uncritically accept the half-truths and justifications purveyed by propagandists. Thirty years of war should have made us attuned to detecting disinformation, and an even longer history of violence by state forces and insurgents should have made us acutely aware of the systematic cruelty and criminal acts of which both are capable. Whilst those of us who have lived in or near the theatre of war have countless recent examples to caution us, those who are more detached need only to remember the extra-judicial tactics widely abused by the Sri Lankan state during the last JVP insurrection, the LTTE’s forced evacuation of the population of Jaffna to cover its retreat in the mid 1990s, the routine concealment of government atrocities whether in Suriyakanda or Sathurukondan, and the LTTE’s massacres of Muslims or its brutal methods for dealing with competitors and dissenters within the Tamil community. Even those of us too young to remember should be able to recognise the opportunistic and rather transparent methods used by both sides to discredit the few independent accounts of the conflict – allege bias, suggest conspiracy, label as imperialism, claim financial impropriety, question competence, undermine credibility and attack personally when under criticism – and should refuse to be distracted from the moral issues that really matter.

The unpleasant truths of what transpired during the final stages of the war – and indeed in the thirty years that preceded that – are not outside our grasp.  In fact, you might say that we already have some of that knowledge within us, and need only allow ourselves to recognise it.

Justice and Reconciliation
The question of what to do with the truth is more complex and difficult.  On the one hand, those of us who have suffered (and those of us who support survivors) have a desire to see perpetrators of violence punished or held accountable.  Yet, our thirty year war was more than a series of individual acts of murder, damage and destruction.  The violence was not just cyclical, but also structural.  Even as we abhor and condemn the cruelty of individuals who tortured, maimed, oppressed and killed – we have to acknowledge that they often did so within the context of terrible personal histories, forced enlistment, draconian chains of command, powerful ideologies of persecution, realities of repression and militarisation, and actual existential threats.  This is not to absolve individuals of responsibility, but rather to place their actions in perspective.

Perhaps most important to note is that the perpetrators of violence also carried out their terrible acts with the tacit or explicit support of millions of ‘civilians’.  It’s not a stretch to say that there is blood on all of our hands – from at least some point in the history of our long conflict.  We all bear some degree of responsibility for the commission of atrocities, even in our failure to oppose them in deed or thought.  All of us have probably paid taxes that bought bombs and bullets that killed people.  Most of us have voted for, endorsed or simply accepted leaders who bear direct responsibility for violence and loss.  Many of us have turned a blind eye to ethnic prejudice and even harboured it within ourselves. Others of us have justified unlawful killings as a ‘necessary evil’, rationalised collateral damage as ‘unavoidable’ or rejoiced (perhaps secretly) at the deaths of hate figures.  Still more of us have denied, minimised or ignored the suffering of tens of thousands who have been displaced, dispossessed or discriminated against.  Each of us has sustained the war machine in some way – I know that I have.  Whether or not we chose to acknowledge this at the time, it is not a defence now simply to say that we did not know.  All these acts are not equivalent under the law, but they have all contributed to enabling the harm inflicted on others. In moral terms, do they not belong to the same plane of violence? If so, who amongst us is then to cast the first stone? Is it enough to charge only those of us who pulled the triggers or those of us who ordered the bombers?  What do we about the rest of us?

Perhaps our approach to justice should not only be about holding others to account, but also judging ourselves.  If we wish for others to atone for their sins and omissions, then so must we.  Answering the question of how we can each do this is not easy, and is likely to be very personal.

In my own journey, I am trying to do this by seeking ways of responding to the circumstances of those whom the conflict has left in pain or in serious hardship.  I’m learning that this is far easier said than done.  People do not want sympathy or pity, nor I am equipped to help them get them what they really need – information about missing family members, replacement of lost livestock and decades worth of accumulated capital, decent work that will remove the necessity for parents to work in the Middle East, better health services for disabled children, help adapting to life after military service, the freedom to return to their own land and a hundred other difficult and important things.  Many people also want to be heard and have their losses acknowledged publicly.  This last part is something that I am able to help with, facilitated by friends and acquaintances – to be present, too listen to stories, to witness respectfully, to share with friends and occasionally to write about issues that matter to them. This is only a start and itself does not mean much, but I hope that it might form a basis for real relationships that may allow me to play some useful role in the future.

It feels far too early and presumptuous to talk about reconciliation.  It seems to me that the desire and means for overcoming anger, animosity and mistrust must come from within each of us as individuals, rather than be transacted at the level of community leaders or national figures (who of course, could set a good example).  The experience of being with people who have suffered enormous losses has made me realise that reconciliation is not a destination, but rather a deeply personal ongoing process of transcending and managing painful histories.  When I look at those women and men whom I admire deeply for their attempts to put aside their own hurts to relate to those of others – none of them talk explicitly about reconciliation.  They just get on with the work of recognising and connecting with the humanity in others, even those whom they have many reasons to dislike or even hate.

I feel that that we cannot afford to hold our collective breath and hope that the wrongs of the past will be resolved by war crimes tribunals, independent panels or government commissions – any more than we can wish the consequences of our violent history to simply fade from memory.    Regardless of the outcome and consequences of the vote on the resolution at the UNHRC in Geneva, acknowledging truth and enabling justice are processes that we ourselves must take responsibility for individually.  It may only be through this that we might be personally or collectively graced by reconciliation or real peace.

• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• Sri Lanka and the UNHRC: Implications for India and for Human Rights
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• Sri Lanka and its ‘Geneva-problem’
• Bridging comedy and conscience

As the three Sri Lankan human rights defenders who have come most under attack by the state media in Sri Lanka in the past week, because of our active involvement with the on-going session of the UN Human rights Council in Geneva, we feel compelled to issue this statement of clarification.

We do not deny that we are critical of the conduct of the government of Sri Lanka, and the institutions and agencies under its control, whenever disregard for the human rights obligations imposed on the government by virtue of its being signatory to almost all international human rights conventions comes to our attention. As the President of Sri Lanka, and his Special Envoy on Human Rights well know, the three of us have offered our services to this government to ensure human rights accountability in the past. For example, all of us served on the National Advisory Council appointed by Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe, when he held the portfolio for Human Rights.

Nor do we deny that we work with a range of human rights organizations, nationally, regionally and internationally, to draw attention to human rights violations in Sri Lanka as well as to the culture of impunity and the lack of accountability for violations of the past and of the present. This is our right, as human rights defenders, and we have exercised that right for many years, under various governments, in spite of a barrage of attacks and intimidation from various quarters, including state and non-state entities.

It is indeed regrettable that at a time in the history of our country when we have the opportunity to transform our society, to move from a post-war to a post-conflict phase, and to enjoy the support of the international community to rebuild a just, humane and prosperous Sri Lanka in which all its citizens can live together with peace and dignity, the government and its media have seen it necessary to launch into an unprecedented and utterly personalized attack against the three of us. There is no attempt to challenge us substantively on any point. None of the comments attributed to us, were actually ever made by any one of us; there are many who were present at the side events where we have spoken who can testify to that.

This attack is totally counter-productive in terms of the government’s campaign to resist the Resolution on Sri Lanka, which has been tabled at the Council. In fact, in Geneva today, there is more focus on the attacks and acts of intimidation of Sri Lankan human rights defenders than there is on the negotiations around the Resolution. Those who accuse us of bringing the country into disrepute would do well to examine both their own motives and the consequences of their actions. Instead of carrying on with advocacy for defeating the Resolution, Sri Lanka’s ambassador to the Council, Ms. Tamara Kunanayagam has had to spend hours of her valuable time talking to delegations, to the President of the Council and to officials of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights about the campaign of intimidation and attack against Sri Lankan human rights defenders at the Council and in Sri Lanka.

As human rights defenders working to defeat impunity in Sri Lanka and to build a strong system of justice and accountability for human rights violations, whether committed in the past or in the present, we remain committed to our ideals and to our goals. For us, whether there is a Resolution on Sri Lanka at the UN Human rights Council or not, our work to defend human rights in Sri Lanka must, and will, go on.

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• THE BIG LIE ABOUT THE US RESOLUTION
• Focus on Human Rights
• HAS MAHINDA RAJAPAKSA BEEN A TRAITOR TO SRI LANKA?

Photo courtesy of Reuters/Dinuka Liyanawatte

[Editors' note: The article below was sent to us by a regular contributor to the site whose name we have redacted due to security considerations.]

With the airing of Channel 4’s new film, Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields: War Crimes Unpunished, a follow-up to their first one Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields first broadcast nearly a year ago, there is bound to be a renewed interest in the matter of alleged war-crimes concerning the Sri Lankan Government. Because, let’s face it: Channel 4’s first video came and went, and while there were about two weeks of discussion around it, mostly everyone eventually forgot about it.

Now, with the emergence of the new film and its alarming new footage, released in time with the Human Rights Council meetings in Geneva, we are forced to remember what we forgot then:

1. That it is undeniable that Tamil civilians were maimed and killed during the last stages of the war, despite what we were told by the authorities, perhaps in larger numbers than we had ever imagined – and perhaps unnecessarily.
2. That there is perfectly good evidence pointing to extra-judicial executions of imprisoned LTTE fighters by members of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, during these last few days.
3. That there is a good possibility that civilians were, at best, neglected and deprived of adequate food and aid, and at worst, deliberately ignored while they lay dying, starving and wounded.
4. That there is strong evidence indicating that multiple Government-allocated ‘No-Fire-Zone’s were repeatedly bombarded by the Sri Lankan military, in an attempt to run out the remainder of the LTTE, at best carelessly, at worst deliberately.
5. That it is fairly obvious that the various spokespeople for the Government of Sri Lanka at the time knowingly lied about the number of civilians trapped in the narrow strip of land in Mullaitivu, caught in the final battle between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE, hugely downplaying the severity of the situation and blatantly denying civilian casualties and deaths.
6. That it’s fairly clear that the Government deliberately kept independent observers out of this area in the final days of the war, even those that could have helped protect and care for civilians.

Channel 4’s films on Sri Lanka are not shining examples of good journalism. They give an unmeasured, sensationalist view of a very complex and difficult issue. Jon Snow is melodramatic. A lot of their information, including the crucial interviews, is somewhat vague and difficult to recognize as credible. On one hand, they reek of propaganda themselves at times, and seem strangely unconvincing in the way they present their information at other times. On the other hand, the footage, recorded mostly on camera phones, if you believe it’s authentic, speaks for itself. It’s hard to look away. This time, it may be harder to forget.

One can understand anyone in Channel 4’s position is in an impossible position, attempting to make films about ‘the truth’ of what happened during those last few months of the war in Sri Lanka. After all, how can they reveal their sources for the sake of credibility? How can they interview Tamil civilians and run the interviews with faces unmasked, and names at the bottom of the screen? It is impossible for us to hear directly from the victims of this ordeal, or those who were there to witness it first-hand, because of what this film is trying to say: it’s trying to say that the Government of Sri Lanka, from the very top down, including the President himself, is guilty of very serious war crimes, crimes against humanity and human rights violations. Which Tamil civilian would willingly appear in such a film, for fear of their life? Which Sri Lanka Army soldier would candidly step forth to speak of his experiences, unafraid? Who can protect the people we need to hear from? Given these circumstances, it’s very nearly possible to forgive Channel 4 for some of the seeming carelessness. Perhaps it is not carelessness then, but the impossibility of the task they are trying to accomplish: the task of making and broadcasting internationally a film that criticizes the Sri Lankan Government and accuses it of breaking the law.

You can say what you like about these films, but the fact remains that they are as close as we’ve gotten to finding out more than merely what we were told by the Mahinda Rajapakse regime. The fact remains that Channel 4 has gotten closest to giving the world an opportunity to choose what they believe about what happened during the last stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka. And so we must all choose.

What is ‘the truth’? Will we ever know? Is it important to know? There are no easy answers.

Yes – I think the truth is always important, and if not in its entirety, it’s important to know as much of it – from as many different viewpoints – as possible. Yes, I believe the truth is not singular; it is plural, in cases like these. And that’s where we’re going wrong: all we know now is what one entity is telling us, and therefore things – opportunities – like the Channel 4 films can be useful and important.

The Channel 4 film forces us to remember. Let’s not forget what happened, even as we stand amidst new highways, roads and the boom of infrastructural development around the island; amidst a renewed flourishing of the tourism industry; amidst promises that our economy is on its way to being one of the best in the region: that not even three years ago, this country underwent a monumental change that would, by default, transform and shape our identity as a nation in the years to come. Let’s not forget that, despite this change being upon us, those who rule our country have refused, bluntly, to this day, to accept or acknowledge that we all suffered, we all paid a price, and that we all lost something along the way. It has refused to drop the triumphalism, even for a second, and reflect, to spend even a moment in introspection, examining truly why we had a civil war, why it ended the way it did and who can answer to the people whose lives were permanently compromised because of it. Let’s not forget that there’s been a veil of mystery surrounding what happened in April and May 2009, in particular what happened to the civilians that were caught in the cross-fire of the final battle. Let’s not forget, that even now, Tamil civilians in the Vanni continue to live in temporary housing, and still live under a series of restrictions on movement, livelihood and other rights, imposed upon them by the Sri Lankan Army, who are stationed in the North and North East in something that strongly resembles a military occupation, demanding total control of all operations in the area, dominating the economy and occupying buildings and property that rightfully belong to the civilians. Let’s not forget that there is corruption at almost every level of government, and we are all, our families, our businesses, vulnerable to the whims and fancies of the powers that be. Let’s not forget that there are still hundreds of detainees held in custody, in terrible conditions, to this day, with no trials and no idea of when they’ll be out, or if they will, or the unexplained disappearances of young Tamil men, many of whom were last seen surrendering to the Sri Lankan Army in the last days of the war. Let’s not forget the slain journalists and media-workers, Tamil and non-Tamil and all of those who continue to live in fear, live in exile, or are simply not alive at all anymore.

We are tiring now, we all are. I can hear people – people who did not support the way the war was finished, or the way the call for accountability has been ignored, or the way the facts were distorted and then conveniently swept under the rug – I can hear even these people mutter words about ‘moving on’. ‘Anyway, the war is over. What’s done is done. We need to find a way to move forward’ they say, exhausted. But why is it, that so often moving on and moving forward in this country, in this culture of ours, seem inextricably connected with forgetting?

Let’s not forget. Forgetting is easy and, let’s admit it, when it comes to matters like this one, forgetting feels nice. It allows us to carry on with our day-to-day lives, attempting to keep our heads above the water and solve our mundane problems. It allows us to momentarily convince ourselves that everything is OK, and that we are a nation that is indeed, moving on. We’re good at forgetting, us Sri Lankans. And there are a lot of plans, and a lot of people’s ambition that depend solely on this very characteristic, this flaw, of ours. We’re told accountability is not important; the truth is not great. Do we believe these things? Do we have choice?

The fact is, yes, we do have a choice. You must choose what to believe and hold on to those beliefs and convictions, steadfast. You have a right to ask, to demand even, that you are given some answers. We are all legally obliged, as tax-playing, law-abiding citizens, to ask that we are told the truth. If you don’t care about civilian casualties and deaths, then care about the fact that you were lied to.

There’s no saying we will ever know the total and absolute truth. And there is certainly no saying that Channel 4’s graphic new film has all the answers. But it’s important that we watch it: take the information at hand, and filter it through your own sensibilities, and your own sense of logic and reasoning. Think carefully about what you believe, not what you want to believe. This film is not the game-changer, but perhaps, if nothing else, it will create the space for a more intelligent and intellectually measured debate and conversation about the facts at hand; perhaps, it will remind us that it is important to remember, to not forget just because we are asked to. Perhaps it will compel us to be sure that we never look away again.

• Watch Moving Images at Kandy International Film Festival (KIFF)
• Between The Artist and Hugo: Nostalgia for what cinema is really about
• Interview with Asoka Handagama
• “We need a revolution in Sri Lanka!” – A brief chat with Sam de Silva
• Giving the middle finger: Sri Lanka’s conflicting responses to war crimes allegations

I’d been in Sri Lanka just three weeks when I first heard of someone disappearing. It was May 2009 and I got an anonymous email telling me that Stephen Sunthararaj, a human rights worker from northern Sri Lanka, had been abducted at gunpoint and taken away in a white van in the heart of Colombo. He had previously been detained by the police – on suspicion of what, it is not clear – then released for lack of incriminating evidence just before his abduction. I tried to contact one or two ministers, I think, but didn’t get through and my work once more turned to the war then still raging in the north. I bitterly regretted not following up the case. Months later I met a Westerner who had known Stephen Sunthararaj. At the mention of him at dinner, he wept.

Fast forward to this year. Five weeks ago Ramasamy Prabagaran, a businessman and, like Stephen, a Tamil, was snatched in front of his wife and three-year-old daughter just as they were getting home. He too was spirited away in a white van; he too has not been seen since. When we visited his home, his wife, Shiromani, with holy ash from the Hindu temple on her forehead, was able to welcome us with a smile. But her voice was anguished as she told of how the men wrestled with him as he screamed and tried to hang onto the gate, of how cars and people passed and did nothing to help. How would the enchanting young daughter, Nikita, be affected now and if her father doesn’t come back?

I haven’t met the abducted man, who’s known as Praba. It seems he’s reasonably well-off. A muscular man whose exercise treadmill we saw in the front room. A man photographed on holiday in Switzerland and meeting top Indian cricketers. He belongs to a small ethnic group – Tamils of Indian origin, who had nothing to do with the separatist war. But he had nevertheless been held by the security forces for over two years, accused of Tiger involvement, bitterly denying it, and – according to a government medical officer’s report – showing signs of severe torture – “inflicted intentionally”, as it put it. “They are trying to make me a Tiger but I am not a Tiger,” he cried during a fleeting meeting with his wife during that time. But in September he was at last freed for lack of evidence. Two days before his complaint of torture came up in court, he was abducted. Where is he now?

There is a feeling of helplessness surrounding such events. This is the second time in nine months that I have covered the issue as a journalist.

Unfortunately “white vans” are the subject of a sort of grim humour in this small, intimate city. You talk with friends about someone doing something risky. Then you say: I hope a white van doesn’t come for him. The history of these sinister vehicles with false number plates goes back at least 20 years. But the war has now been over for three – yet the vans continue their cruel operations.

Human rights campaigners documented 32 unexplained abductions and disappearances between October and February. There was another this week, plus an apparent attempted abduction. The victims have been of all ethnic groups: Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim. Only five victims escaped, while seven bodies were found and the rest have vanished.

Arumugan Weeraraja is a labourer who struggled to educate his son, Lalith. He asked him not to get involved in politics. But Lalith, and a friend, Kugan, did. They organised demonstrations by families of disappeared people from the former war zone. In December they themselves were disappeared in Jaffna in the north, as if being taught a grim lesson for daring to speak up. No locals dared testify about what they witnessed. “I’ve asked at all the police stations, but none can help me,” said the father, tearfully, at a news conference.

A shocking thing has been the brazenness of several incidents. Both Stephen, a few years ago, and Praba were taken after being cleared in court cases. Another man was whisked away from the very arms of prison guards outside the Colombo Law Courts.

It isn’t just government critics who have vanished, or those it was seeking to implicate in terrorism. Some victims are those whom the authorities and the highly partial media denounce as being part of the criminal underworld. Even some figures until recently associated with the government are disappearing, especially since October when there was a fatal shooting incident involving two rival government strongmen.

When I met the genial police spokesman, Superintendent Ajith Rohana, he said time and again that the police were trying to solve these cases and the government wasn’t involved. I asked him whether we aren’t now talking about death squads in Sri Lanka. “Not at all. We totally deny that allegation,” he insisted.

But if unaccountable gangs roam around in vans, removing people who are usually never seen again – regardless of who sent these men, what are they other than death squads?

In its report in December, the internal war commission set up by President Rajapaksa said, quoting one witness: “Disappearance is far worse than death… When a person has disappeared, it is an eternal suffering.”

So I would ask the Sri Lankan leadership: Where is Ramasamy Prabagaran? Where are Lalith and Kugan? Where is Stephen? Where are Prageeth, Upali and others whose cases I reported earlier – and so many others beyond that?

I wonder if I will get answers – and whether their distraught families will.

[Editors note: This is article expands on the BBC Radio podcast first broadcast on 13 March 2012. Watch video of this story on the BBC here.]

• New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka
• Defending the Country
• Doesn’t she have the right to live with her daughter?
• A brief note on the attack on J.C. Weliamuna
• Media and Violence

Image from LankaStandard

India’s hasty decision to support the United States of America led Resolution on Sri Lanka came as a big surprise. While a few rumours flagged the possibility of an India “for” vote a couple of days before the actual announcement by the Prime Minister, they were largely ignored. The prevailing orthodoxy was that India would likely abstain, and that the vote would carry with a narrow majority. That orthodoxy has now been questioned, and with India coming on board, the possibility of a landslide victory for the US is more likely. This brief piece sets out to identify the political “winners” and “losers” from the fallout of India’s decision, barring last minute twists in the tale. The merits of the Resolution are not discussed in this article. Its aspirations are rather more modest, and only seeks to identify the manner in which coming events will contribute to the image of specific political personalities and entities.

Winners

The United States of America and Hilary Clinton

The Obama presidency has been marked not merely by the transformation of US foreign policy doctrine, but also by a remarkable efficiency and competence in the handling of knotty foreign policy issues. America’s foreign policy has seen victory after victory – from the vanquishing of public enemy Osama bin Laden to the restrained behind the scenes work in Egypt, the multilateral Security Council authorized R2P effort in Libya and the junta’s apparent change of heart in Burma. Now, shortly after proclaiming that their foreign policy focus would shift to the Asia-Pacific region, the US are on the cusp of a major foreign policy coup. Netting India’s support for an opening gambit Resolution on India’s problematic neighbour – when all indications were that India would tread a different path – serve to burnish its credentials as the sole remaining superpower despite China and Russia’s growing aspirations.

Karunanidhi

Largely vilified in Tamil Nadu for his failure to bring sufficient pressure to bear on the central government to take a stronger message to Sri Lanka during the last stages of the war, Karunanidhi entered the “HRC19” debate later than his nemesis Jayalalitha. Having entered it, he relied on a familiar ruse, threatening to pull out of Congress if the centre failed to heed his call. A token fast was also thrown in for good measure. In 2009, Congress called his bluff and Karunanidhi was forced to take the fall. Public anger against his vacillation and lack of commitment to the wellbeing of Sri Lankan Tamils contributed to the landslide against him in Tamil Nadu state elections. This time around, Karunanidhi’s grandstanding appears to have paid off. He will bank on the expected volatility of the Tamil Nadu electorate to redeem himself as the saviour of Sri Lankan Tamils, restoring his fledgling image and his electoral fortunes.

Tamil National Alliance and Mr. R. Sampanthan

The TNA has been dogged by a growing creed of extremist Tamils in the diaspora and within Sri Lanka. Mr. R. Sampanthan in particular has been publicly ridiculed for his earnest efforts to retain the support of India, and to a lesser extent, the United States of America. Feeding on public anger against India within the Tamil community for its part in Sri Lanka’s war effort, criticisms of Mr. Sampanthan have focused on his supposed faith in India and the US. An India vote for the US resolution on Sri Lanka will help Sampanthan – and his close confidante M. A. Sumanthiran – portray themselves as clever diplomatic operators. The growing rapport between the US State Department and the TNA, and the TNA’s willingness to alienate vociferous elements within the Tamils for the sake of better relations with the United States and India, will appear to have paid dividends.

Losers

The Sri Lankan government and President Mahinda Rajapaksa

If India does vote against Sri Lanka at the Council, that vote will mark the successful alienation by the government of one of its strongest allies on the international stage. India supported Sri Lanka’s military, supported Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resolve to end militarily annihilate the LTTE, and supported Sri Lanka’s diplomatic efforts during and after the war to stave off international pressure on war crimes. However, India’s support did come at a small cost – that of a promise made by the government that the 13^th amendment would be implemented in full and going beyond, that meaningful steps would be taken to devolve power. The government failed to deliver, risking censure from a regional power. Yet, the government very probably gambled that the China threat and the timorous apprehension that has characterized post-1987 Indian foreign policy would prohibit strong Indian action against Sri Lanka. This miscalculation will cost the government dearly.

India’s foreign policy Mandarins/ the South Block.

The decision by India to vote in favour of the US led Resolution appears to have been taken at the highest levels of India’s governing hierarchy. What was well-known prior to Dr. Singh’s announcement was that any decision taken by India would have to have had the concurrence of Sonia Gandhi. However, the course charted by India’s Kerala dominated foreign policy elite would have led directly to an abstention at best, and possibly a vote against. India’s hesitant foreign policy on Sri Lanka has hitherto sought and obtained a number of far-reaching commitments from the Rajapaksas, with very little to show besides the donation of few bicycles and houses in Northern Sri Lanka. However, India’s precarious position vis-à-vis Chinese intrusions into Sri Lanka and America’s roving eye resulted in foreign policy paralysis. The culmination of this impotent strategy was the public humiliation of External Affairs Minister S. M. Krisha recently, where his version of Rajapaksa’s commitments to India were publicly repudiated by the President. Yet, India unfailingly appeared to support a “no policy policy” on Sri Lanka. Noises were made about India’s “no country-specific resolution” policy at the Council. Retired Indian intelligence officials and others suggested publicly that India would and should abstain. Those views appear to have been overturned by a recent decision taken at the highest levels. India’s diplomats will now find themselves in unfamiliar territory – wielding a stick they never thought they had the strength to carry!

• Sri Lanka and the UNHRC: Implications for India and for Human Rights
• Exploring the Myth that the Tamil vote will be the decider at the Presidential Elections
• TNA MP Mr. R. Sampanthan remembers the events of July 1983
• A Plea from a Muslim woman in a Western Country
• Messiah

Image courtesy India Ink blog by New York Times/Rajanish Kakade, Associated Press

As the 19^th session of the Human Rights Council progresses, the discourse on Sri Lanka with reference to Human Rights is reaching its annual climax. It is annual in the sense that it has been reaching the said level of climax each year ever since the United Nations Human Rights Commission took up the issue after the completion of war in Sri Lanka. In the first two sessions Sri Lanka managed to defeat the Resolutions forwarded by the Western countries with the support of its allies from various quarters of the world, most prominently from China and Russia. India, a part of Sri Lanka’s support system, continued to assist Sri Lanka beyond the platform of the UNHRC despite the opposition from its South Indian Tamil constituency[1].  However, India’s silence amidst the mounting protests by Tamil Nadu MPs has created sense of uncertainty for Sri Lanka which is more to do with Sri Lanka’s fate at the UNHRC platform and future of the reconciliation process than on the bilateral relations of both countries. Simultaneously, there is a bigger question whether whatever decision by India or by the UNHRC would actually be able to render justice and safeguard the rights of the citizens in Sri Lanka.

The current protests from Tamil Nadu and its political élite who support the US resolution[2] have managed to form a wide spectrum by going beyond the usual gang of DMK and AIADMK by encompassing other political parties such as CPI (M) and BJP. In some sense it explains the deepening and widening emotions in the Tamil Nadu at the people’s level. As we wait for voting at the UNHRC on March 23, various nuances in New Delhi-Tamil Nadu exchanges provide an interesting case study to observe the domestic and foreign policy nexus. UPA’s response to the MPs’ protests which came in the form of EAM’s statement in the Parliament[3] and PM’s letter to DMK leader Karunanidhi[4] highlights the advantages in engaging the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) constructively and the need “to achieve a forward looking outcome […] rather than deepening confrontation and mistrust between the concerned parties”[5] . EAM’s statement also includes a reference to “the full implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution” in order “to achieve meaningful devolution of powers and genuine national reconciliation”[6]. The Minister also goes onto emphasise on the need to concentrate on the implications on “historically friendly relations with a neighbouring country”[7]. In its initial responses to the demands from Tamil Nadu MPs to support the US resolution, Pranab Mukherjee, the Leader of the House stated that India “normally do[es] not support any country-specific resolution”[8].

None of the responses from New Delhi suggest of a possible vote in favour of the resolution. However, three scenarios can be anticipated given the options for India.

1. A vote against Sri Lanka by India and a possible victory for the coalition led by the US would have negative impacts on the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka due to the rate of growth in Sinhalese nationalism which encroaches into all the progressive spaces within the country.
2. There is also the possibility of abstaining. Reference to the traditional behaviour of India as not supporting ‘country specific resolutions’ and its behaviour regarding Syria during the first voting, would make one assume that India might choose to abstain at the voting.

Since New Delhi would want to reconcile with the Tamil Nadu in the face of General Elections in 2014 and would not want to take a drastic policy decision like ‘voting in favour’ when for a long time it continued to play the role of the ‘observer’ and maintain a ‘hands-off’ policy, it would be sensible to assume that it would abstain than vote in favour. Even in a situation where the GoSL manages to defeat the Resolution, India’s decision to ‘abstain’ would be as bad as a decision to ‘vote in favour’. Such a decision would not only be evidence for India’s disappointment at the duplicity of the GoSL, but also would give implications for India’s approval of the direct involvement of the western powers including the US in the affairs of Sri Lanka. Even though Chinese and Russian support would ensure guard against a drastic act of intervention, an unhappy India in the immediate neighbourhood would do no good to Sri Lanka. Although the political leaders of Sri Lanka appear to have realised this truth, there is a little evidence to suggest that they are working towards strengthening their credibility in the eyes of the Indians. By prolonging national reconciliation in Sri Lanka, the political leadership in Sri Lanka is discrediting the Indian role of providing diplomatic assistance and assuring the international community of a steady process of reconciliation in Sri Lanka. One wanders whether the Sri Lankan polity has understood the complexities in the Indian policy making, when even an experienced diplomat like the Sri Lankan High Commissioner to New Delhi makes simplistic statements linking the Tamil Nadu MPs with the LTTE.

3. Vote against. A vote against can take place in two ways.

1. A vote against in order to support Sri Lanka would give recognition to the GoSL’s narrative and no one would see a change of the course of action. It is a continuance of the current soft policy and can also be a bad domestic policy which could further alienate Tamil Nadu from the centre.
2. A vote against the resolution with a forewarning to Sri Lanka is the other option. India can warn Sri Lanka or the GoSL of possible negative outcomes if the national reconciliation process fails to reach the expected levels. A strong caution to the GoSL can also be a ‘face-save’ act regarding the Tamil Nadu polity.

What would be the ultimate impact on Human Rights in general and on the rights of Tamils and the dissent in Sri Lanka? Would they get justice? ‘Human Rights’ as they are practiced in the context of international relations have never been a-political. As theorists such as Zizek and Tariq Ali rightly point out, politics and power embedded in the western Human Rights regime have facilitated the western powers to use the discourse as a tool of neo-imperialism and an “ideology of military interventionism”[9]. Apart from the misuse of the Human Rights discourse by the western powers which instigate such comments, the debate on the ‘Asian Values’ which prioritises socio-economic and cultural rights to civic and political rights provides only a partial explanation. ‘Human Rights’ remain incomplete without both sides; civic and political rights as well as the socio-economic and cultural rights. There is a plethora of literature which discusses the limitations of state-centric institutions such as the UNHRC in addressing the violations of human rights of the individuals by the state which is also the guarantor of basic human rights to the individuals. There are a plenty of case studies as well in this regard. Sri Lanka is one of them. However, the power dimension entrenched in the western human rights regime and the duplicity in practice allow perpetrators of human rights violations go scot free. The counter-discourses which propagate the imperialistic character of the western human rights regime also fail to address the ‘imperialistic’ behaviour at another level – that of the states in the developing countries on their own citizens, usually the minorities and the dissent. Therefore, there is a bigger question whether a vote in favour or against or abstain at the UNHRC would really help the Tamils in Sri Lanka unless there is a genuine interest from within.

• India’s Volte-Face: Winners and Losers
• Geneva 2012: The signs missed, lessons unlearnt
• Human Rights in Sri Lanka: Impunity against Accountability and Justice
• Speaking lies to power: Sri Lanka’s PM and the LTTE in India
• Restoring Government in Sri Lanka

Placard in Sinhala reads ‘Barack, you’re a burden for us’. Photo courtesy Priyantha Wickremarachchi/Ceylon Today

The US recently tabled a draft resolution against Sri Lanka is so incredibly weak that President Mahinda Rajapaksa must be breathing a sigh of relief. It is no wonder that the US feels confident that it has the votes in needs. Besides, it is possible that the resolution will be watered down even more in the coming days—making this exercise seem that much more formulaic and pointless.

The resolution requests that the government of Sri Lanka implement the recommendations from the Final Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). In order to achieve this objective, it asks the government to present an outline or roadmap as “expeditiously as possible” so that everyone will know how much progress Sri Lanka is making towards genuine national reconciliation and to addressing purported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

The resolution mentions that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) could help the Sri Lankan government with this. Lastly, the resolution asks for OHCHR to report back to the Council so that its members can be aware of all of the collaboration that has taken place between the Sri Lankan government and OHCHR; OHCHR should present a report about this at the Council’s 22^nd session, which is well over a year away.

Do people honestly believe that the government of Sri Lanka is going to voluntarily cooperate with OHCHR?

As expected, there is no reference to an independent international mechanism to probe alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law during the war’s final phases. Getting something that strong passed through the Human Rights Council would have been an epic achievement. Alas, epic achievements and substantial resolutions continue to elude the Council.

The US draft resolution looks more like an abbreviated version of something that should come out of a session of the UN’s (perennially disappointing) Universal Periodic Review, rather than the Human Rights Council.

Again, the draft resolution is even weak when it comes to the recommendations of Sri Lanka’s own Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). This resolution is so toothless that it is almost embarrassing that a country like the US has tabled it. A resolution this light must have a good chance of passing later this month, although it will have little effect on human rights and national reconciliation within Sri Lanka.

According to the draft resolution, Sri Lanka would not have to make any meaningful commitments that are binding. Nor would Sri Lanka be forced to move too quickly. Rather, this is a resolution that puts the pressure back on an already fragmented opposition.

Coming out of Geneva, nobody wants to look like a “loser.” Everyone wants to emerge victorious. What is really going on here? Was the Obama Administration trying to show a more muscular foreign policy on East Asia’s doorstep in the name of the extraordinarily malleable term “human rights?”

It now looks like everyone—including the US, the government of Sri Lanka, and the Council itself—will leave Geneva blemished. The US will be claiming victory because they said they would pass a resolution and it looks like they will probably do that.

Although, how much will this resolution really hurt the Rajapaksa government?

Sure, having a resolution passed against it is a clear criticism of the Sri Lankan government’s approach towards human rights and national reconciliation. But does it do much else? If it is passed, will this resolution really change policy in Colombo?

As an absolute minimum, Sri Lanka must be on the formal agenda for the 20^th session of the Human Rights Council this June. If that does not happen, the US will emerge as the “biggest” loser. Right now, the Council’s 19^th session looks like another example of the US government ineffectively using “human rights” as a foreign policy tool. Given all of the diplomatic resources it dumped into this initiative, the US looks rather weak right now. In order for that to change, a lot needs to happen between now and March 22nd.

Of course, it is possible that the US never intended to table a meaningful resolution to begin with.

*A version of this article first appeared in The Morningside Post.

• THE BIG LIE ABOUT THE US RESOLUTION
• Examining Sri Lanka’s Diplomacy Machine
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• Focus on Human Rights
• Counter-productive propaganda and human rights in Sri Lanka

The year 2009 was when the Western group of States at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) made a serious diplomatic blunder, by attempting to pass a resolution against Sri Lanka. The West missed the plot. This was just days after a bloody three decades long war had ended in Sri Lanka; just days after a group which was listed as a terrorist group in their own countries had been comprehensively defeated; at a time when they themselves had already begun a ‘War on Terror’; and soon after they were proven once again to be hypocritical defenders of human rights, given their convenient abstention from voting during the UNHRC Special Session on Israel. It was a serious diplomatic defeat for the West, a significant diplomatic victory for Sri Lanka and its allies.

Rise of ‘Eastphalia’

In addition, the victory attracted considerable attention through out the world. An interesting interpretation was offered by Sumit Ganguly, David P. Fidler (leading the Indiana University Centre on American and Global Security) and Sung Won Kim (of the Legal Affairs Division, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Korean Republic). In a paper which argued that with the shift in power to the East, the centuries old ‘Westphalian’ concept is being slowly supplanted with a new ‘Eastphalian’ alternative, they stressed, inter alia: “… Sri Lanka’s ability to gain Chinese and Indian support in the [UNHRC] to defeat Western-backed resolutions critical of Colombo’s bloody crushing of the Tamil Tiger insurgency is perhaps also a sign of Eastphalia’s arrival.” (‘Eastphalia Rising?’, World Policy Journal, Summer, 2009). It was then a significant set-back, one that the US and its allies cannot forget. The UNHRC is a human rights debating forum; that we all know. But the UNHRC can be a useful forum too. The US knew that. The UNSG-Panel of Experts knew that too. Otherwise its members would not have written about the importance of revisiting the place in their Report.

Draft US resolution

Contrary to what the main Opposition-party, the UNP seems to think, what is happening in Geneva-2012 is as significant as the situation Sri Lanka faced in Geneva-2009. The vocabularies have slightly changed, the context is somewhat different (but a continuing one), but the country is faced against a Western block which is out to slowly change the outcome of 2009.

Through the draft resolution proposed by the US against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in Geneva, we are made to believe that the US wants the Sri Lankan Government to implement the recommendations contained in the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) Report, and to address serious allegations of violations of international law by conducting independent prosecutions. The US says that it is quite concerned about justice, reconciliation and peace in Sri Lanka. It appears that the US is playing the role of a concerned and benevolent father of the family of States in the international community.

Defeating US-hegemony

But the US, as we all know, is no Papa Bear. And there are a few problems about the politics of this proposed resolution. Yes, what is needed is the implementation of the LLRC-recommendations. What is unnecessary, however, is what India has correctly pointed out: a country-specific resolution to get it implemented soon after the Report was released.  The proposed resolution is not one that attempts to place the US forces on Sri Lankan soil tomorrow. That we can understand. But there is more ‘arrogance’ and ‘insensitivity’ than ‘concern’ written all over the haste with which the US is demanding the Sri Lankan Government to produce a ‘comprehensive action plan’ as regards the implementation of the LLRC’s recommendations.

And yes, there has to be a critical discussion concerning some of the contents and the recommendations of the Report. But the US cannot set deadlines when it comes to the matter of implementing recommendations of the LLRC. That critical engagement about the contents of the LLRC Report (especially those aspects pertaining to human rights and humanitarian law) should, firstly, take place in a spirit of dialogue; and not by attempting to introduce a resolution that binds a Government to some international time-table, especially one set by a country which has no moral right to extract commitments from other countries on human rights protection.

The US, as critical legal scholar Martti Koskenniemi pointed out soon after the killing of Osama, is a “completely impossible international player.” It reduces small and weak States, in particular, to a state of helplessness in the world; for, its hypocrisy, its arrogance, its “impossibility” cannot be easily dealt with. But the UNHRC does provide opportunities when that impossibility can be met squarely. Like in 2009, Geneva-2012 provides another opportunity to tell the US where to get off. If then, the choice before Sri Lanka and many others at the UNHRC this March would be clear. Any moves made by the US, any resolutions introduced, would need to be defeated.

Correcting Sri Lanka’s arrogance

But then, there has to be some mechanism, some process, through which Sri Lanka needs to be told where to get off too. Uncritical, anti-Western ‘patriotism’ doesn’t take us very far. That should begin (and perhaps it has) with a stringent domestic, internal, critique of the Government’s policies. If so, the critique of the Left, the TNA and other political formations becomes extremely useful. Most important would be peoples-movements, the voices of its citizens. While internal pressure and demand for course-correction is essential, international pressure in the form of greater discussion and dialogue will prove useful (that is, without engaging in this hurried and absurd business of resolution-passing at the UNHRC to get recommendations of domestic reports implemented).

What is astounding in much of what the Sri Lankan Government is doing is that it acts as if there is absolutely no link between a country’s domestic policies and its foreign policy. That is a fundamental mistake. The political leadership is still unable to grasp that link in any serious manner; and ultimately, the burden falls on the diplomats who have to represent the country and defend its Government’s horrendous policies.

Sri Lanka has Ministers and Monitors in charge of, and overseeing, the subject of External Affairs. It has an educated Minister, but one who is either utterly unprincipled, inefficient or clearly lacking any influence in the matter of foreign policy making. There is no clear substitute either. All seem to be ‘Ministers’, ‘Monitors’ or ‘Special Representatives’ of some form or the other. As Sri Lanka’s former Ambassador to Geneva very correctly pointed out, too many cooks can certainly spoil the soup.

But there’s a further problem here. What is to be noted in that old saying, in relation to Sri Lanka, is not only the fact that there being too many ‘cooks’, but also the fact that they are dealing with one big ‘soup’. That seems to be what we are in, today; hence, the current complications and confusion, within and without. Whether Sri Lanka’s diplomats engage in their task of defending the country with any enthusiasm in this prevailing environment, or whether they really can be expected to do so, is a serious question.

Sri Lanka got an opportunity, soon after the war, to strengthen and perhaps build on the support base it was able to create in Geneva-2009. This would have happened (with very little complications and a lesser number of foreign trips) had there been more principled and responsible domestic policies adopted by its political leadership. Taking note of the changing global political environment is essential. Sri Lanka has to think far more broadly, have a clearer grasp of who its closest allies are, but while recognizing that the US/West, however hypocritical that block may be, cannot be ignored and dismissed with arrogance. The US, in particular, can always be critiqued on the issue of human rights protection and promotion. As even Fareed Zakaria admitted, the US has every kind of power but what it sorely lacks in this ‘Post-American’ world is legitimacy. But what needs to be remembered is that Sri Lanka lacks the same too, and as long as it does, Sri Lanka cannot be easily expected to play the role of the ‘innocent underdog.’

Sri Lankan goal: running away

What does Sri Lanka want to achieve in this ‘post-war’ phase of its history? What are its goals? How can State-sovereignty be used for better purposes, for the betterment of the people? These are fundamental questions that it needs to answer. A close observation suggests that we are going in circles. The same problems and issues come up, over and over again. Those problems that Sri Lanka promised would be addressed are still being improperly and inadequately addressed; from accountability, to human rights protection and power-sharing. To understand the sheer ridiculousness of the situation, one need not go that far. Sri Lanka has reached a stage where other countries are demanding the implementation of a Report handed over by a Commission appointed by its own Government; the LLRC. For example, very soon, there will be (as reported) another updated version of the Channel 4 video released to the public. And the same, stale, rhetoric will be dished out by the regime. What was amusing was this: even the LLRC wasn’t ready to but it.

Very soon, the Government would need to take serious note of its rottenness. It is today the popular argument that while national sovereignty ought to be defended staunchly, popular sovereignty of the people will decide what changes the internal political and social structure should undergo. Fair enough. The people will decide. But then, what the community of people within the country would do internally, the community of States might decide to do externally too; not by military intervention only, but through various other means. We can defend ourselves; but how strong that defence would be depends in turn on how strongly our friends and allies are ready to stand by us. For that, we need to take corrective measures. Running away is not an option today.

A final word from Kafka

From Kafka’s ‘The Departure’ comes a beautiful section:

At the gate he stopped me and asked: “Where is the master going?”
“I don’t know,” I said, “just out of here, just out of here. Out of here, nothing else, it’s the only way I can reach my goal.”
“So you know your goal?” he asked.
“Yes,” I replied, “I’ve just told you. Out of here – that’s my goal.”

Here. Geneva. March, 2012. Again, October, 2012. Again, 2013. And how did Kafka, Master Kafka, know about the goals of our leaders?

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• THE BIG LIE ABOUT THE US RESOLUTION
• GENEVA-II & FOUR-LEGGED FURNITURE
• Restoring Government in Sri Lanka

Photo courtesy The Star

The US resolution at the UN HRC in Geneva has deepened the schisms in Sri Lankan society. That resolution will have the same polarising function as did the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), in defining each political tendency in the popular mind for a while to come. The dominant elements of the centre-right Opposition, the UNP (apart from its ‘Reformists’, that is) opine that there is nothing wrong, or particularly anti-Sri Lankan, with a resolution that calls on the  state to implement its own LLRC recommendations. The TNA has, after a sporadic show of realism, finally taken the line of the Tamil Diaspora’s pro-Tiger lobby by calling on the member states of the UNHRC to support the resolution. For the most part, the cosmopolitan civil society commentators are cheering the resolution on. On the left, the JVP opposes the resolution but opposes the government still more, on economic issues and terms the government’s anti-resolution mobilisation, a tactic.  The breakaway Movement for People’s Struggle, is strangely silent. The left within the government is firmly against the resolution.

The reasoning of the Opposition’s leading ideologues is suspect. The problem with the resolution is not that it calls for the implementation of the LLRC recommendations. The problems are (a) where the Resolution is coming from, (b) the body of the text that precedes the seemingly innocuous points about the LLRC and (c) the sleight of hand where it expresses disappointment about the LLRC report and goes beyond it to issues of ‘accountability’.

Certainly the implementation of reform recommendations of the LLRC report must be fast-tracked and a compressed time–frame committed to by the government. However, this commitment must be made to the Parliament. The Government of the Republic of Sri Lanka is primarily responsible to the citizens of Sri Lanka. That is what popular sovereignty in a res publica, a republic, is about. The popularly elected government of Sri Lanka is not responsible in the first or last instance to any international forum or intergovernmental body comprised of governments responsible to their respective citizenries. Sri Lanka’s Opposition may do well to move a resolution demanding a time frame and suggesting one for the implementation of the LLRC report. The push or indeed drive for implementation of reform must be from within our society, with the international solidarities and multipliers of our choosing.

I rather doubt that the vast majority of Sri Lankan people want Karunanidhi, Jayalalitha and Vaiko, still less the Tiger flag waving demonstrators who will camp in Geneva from March 5^th to the 23^rd, to help guarantee and hasten the implementation of the LLRC reforms. With support like this, the LLRC does not need enemies.

None in Sri Lanka and India, who were supportive of the war against the LTTE, are on the side of the resolution. Conversely, there is an overlap between those who practised appeasement of the LTTE, were against the war, were fellow travellers of the Tigers (e.g. Vaiko, the TNA) or were lukewarm and vacillating with regard the war and considered Mahinda Rajapaksa a greater enemy than Prabhakaran, are all supportive of the resolution. This congruity and presence of Tiger flag bearing demonstrators outside the UN HRC in Geneva will not be lost on the vast mass of the Sri Lankan people. The people will also remember who in the world community stands with and who stands against a Resolution which has so greatly roused the enthusiasm of the Diaspora Tigers.

As for accountability, the number of civilians killed by the US bombing campaign named Rolling Thunder, commencing February 1965, was 182,000. The number of children who died in the sanctions on Iraq, according to Denis Halliday, the administrator of that programme who resigned in disgust, was 5,000 a month. Guantanamo, the vast prison camp located on the soil of a foreign country against the wishes of that country, still remains open despite a presidential pledge to close it.  The National Defence Authorisation Act has provisions only describable as draconian.

These are the guys whose draft resolution seeks to preach to us about the observance of international law in the fight against terrorism? Of course it must, but who are they to tell us that when they are serially responsible for one of the most egregious violations of international law, ranging from the invasion of sovereign states on false pretexts, to the practice of ‘extraordinary rendition’. Doesn’t the hypocrisy just get to you? And if it does not, what does that say about you?

In my closing remarks at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva after the special session on Sri Lanka in May 2009, I equated the allegation of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Sri Lanka, with the charge that Iraq possessed WMDs and asked whether we should buy a used car from the guys who sold the world the Goebbelsian Big Lie on WMD.

A stable functional piece of furniture usually needs four legs. If it is to rest firmly, it needs these four legs to be even. Politics and political discourses in Sri Lanka remind me of furniture which either doesn’t have four legs or which have one or more legs shorter than the others.

Analogous to the four legs of a piece of furniture, the four pillars that a strong successful state and a good society must rest upon equally, are national sovereignty, popular sovereignty, individual rights and self-determination.

National sovereignty means that a nation-state (or a pluri-national state) is a political unit or community entitled to its unity and territorial integrity, and has the right to determine its own path, regulate its own affairs, without external domination, intervention or interference in its internal affairs.

Popular sovereignty means that the right to rule rests with the people, who decide who rules, how and for how long. If the rulers violate this social contract, this sacred trust, the people have the right to replace, even overthrow them. The Sri Lankan Constitution makes explicit that as a republic, sovereignty is vested in the people, who exercise it through a regularly and periodically elected Executive president and legislature.

Individual rights pertain to the sovereign individual person; to the equality of every citizen, who is inalienably possessed of a stock of rights and freedoms which must not be transgressed upon.

Self-determination refers to the right of a collective to determine its own destiny. The structural coordinates of that collective or community impose limitations upon the degree to which the right of self determination is exercised. The right to set up an independent state belongs to a nation, not a national minority. An established nation-state possesses the right of self determination. The entire nation and not one part of it, is the legitimate agency of self determination. A nation which is under colonial occupation or annexation has the right of self determination (e.g. Occupied Palestine). An ethno-national minority, on the other hand, has a structurally more limited right to self governance and self administration, which may be termed the right to autonomy.

A society must rest on the equal recognition of all four of these principles, rights and fundamental values. Though at different points of history, one or the other may find itself emphasised due to the threats posed and the tasks at hand, all four must be held in equilibrium; never abandoned or counter-posed to one another.

Today the country is tragically dividing between those who accuse the Government of mounting protests against the US resolution at the UN HRC resolution against Sri Lanka as a diversion from issues of the rising cost of living and those who claim that the demonstrations against the rising cost of living are wittingly or not, part of a foreign plot to de-stabilise the government which is defending national sovereignty.

That’s a debate easily resolved. If the government is using protests against the HRC resolution to mask the cost of living, that’s no excuse not to protest against such a resolution. Rather, it is a reason to protest either independently against that intrusive resolution while also protesting against the cost of living, or moving in parallel with the government on this issue while proceeding against it on the domestic front. Any other stance and tactic would only be tantamount to support of a move against one’s country; a move which has doubtless incensed the vast majority of or citizens.

Conversely, if oppositional protests are helping de-stabilise the government and undermine our defence of national sovereignty, then the answer surely is to cease and desist from those policies and actions that generate those protests, and to never meet such protests with responses that can only trigger more protests and international criticism which directly help those who would seek to undermine our sovereignty.

None of this is to say that all is well in Sri Lanka.  Far from it, but that will be settled one way or another, by the sovereign citizens of Sri Lanka at a time and on issues of their choosing and with the solidarity of allies of their choice.

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• THE BIG LIE ABOUT THE US RESOLUTION
• Restoring Government in Sri Lanka
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• Sri Lanka and its ‘Geneva-problem’

Image courtesy Vikalpa from rally held in Colombo on Monday, 27th February. Unclear what the poster means, but the general thrust of it seems to gel with Chaminda’s submission.

The following is an excerpt from a statement recently made by Ambassador Eileen Chambarlain Donahoe JD PhD, top US diplomat to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC):

The case of Sri Lanka is different and difficult. It is essentially dealing with large-scale civilian casualties, allegations of government involvement in large-scale civilian casualties during a civil war that took place over many years, but ended in 2009. It’s not an ongoing crisis. And for that reason, it’s slightly more challenging. In the circumstances of the world today the fact that it’s not a crisis makes it slightly more difficult.

The comment was of particular interest to this writer, as it corresponded to what he noted in a short presentation made at a Sri Lanka-related conference at the Eidgenössische Techniche Hochscule (ETH) in Zürich back in November 2011.The writer may quote the following section:

The military defeat of the LTTE is a fait accompli. Some two-and-half years after Colombo’s victory, and even in extremis, a decision to bring perpetrators of excesses into book will in no way help reverse the war victory, and the resulting psyche of a victorious vanquisher of separatism, which strongly characterises the post-war political situation in Sri Lanka and the manner in which the Rajapaksa administration functions. The allegations levelled against Colombo do not concern an on-going issue. They concern developments in Sri Lanka’s internal politics in the recent past, over excesses committed in the course of a military offensive that was, in principle, endorsed by key players in the international system. Despite the relatively strong consensus among Western states over the allegations, it by no means puts Colombo under pressure to change its internal policies and foreign policy priorities, let alone force itself back into a process of negotiations over contentious constitutional issues that concern the political aspirations of ethnic minorities.

The strategy is clear: while acknowledging the reality that Sri Lanka is no longer an ongoing issue, efforts are being taken to justify a UNHRC resolution in the name of reconciliation, human rights and accountability.

The last leg of the Sri Lankan war, or Eelam War IV as it has come to be known, was an anti-secessionist counter-insurgency operation launched by a sovereign government against its secessionist foe – a classified terrorist organisation in both the EU and USA. Throughout its existence, the LTTE acquired a notorious reputation by the recruitment of child soldiers, deadly suicide bomb attacks and high profile assassinations.

This was complemented by its unwaveringly adamant devotion to its stated original goal, a separate independent Tamil state in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka.

The island status of Sri Lanka was never conducive to this goal, either in terms of global trends or more relevant regional geopolitics. Circumstances were unfavourable for a tiny ‘statelet’ to be created in the northern tip of an island that had been governed as a single unit by the British for over a century, and whose post-Independence polity was extremely conscious of the preservation of the unitary structure of the state. The LTTE’s fatal error lay in a repeated misreading of this reality.

In hindsight, it appears that the LTTE also misread the support it received from India during the early years of the Jayawardene administration, when Indira Gandhi led the central government across the Palk Straits. Delhi’s tacit support to the LTTE at this time was a shrewd political strategy with its own reasons (strenuous Indira-JRJ ties, JRJ’s revival of close ties with the West, and probably the civic rights curtailment of the late Sirima Bandaranaike, Indira’s bosom friend, added hay to the fire), and once the dynamics of leadership were changed, the policy was also changed, and Delhi was back to its normal posture, working with the Jayawardene administration. If someone believes that Delhi had a consistent policy of supporting Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka, that assumption, to say the least, is something more than flawed.

Over the 1990s, the LTTE was offered repeated possibilities of seeking a settlement through political means, within the available space for accommodation. Political settlements to disputes of this nature cannot, as some may so desire, be sought beyond the realm of realism. They require practical, pragmatic and workable steps.

It was clear from the outset that neither Presidents Premadasa nor Kumaratunga, despite their concrete steps to talk to the LTTE, were in a position to show the slightest inclination to accommodate the LTTE’s ultimate demand – in its raw state.

The only way in which the LTTE could have found some solace was by carefully reviewing its strategy, and adopting a cooperative approach. This was precisely what it so vehemently condemned and ridiculed in 1987, at Premadasa-LTTE talks, at CBK-LTTE talks, concerning the subsequent political reform package, and, most importantly, during the Norwegian-facilitated talks of 2002-03. In the latter case, unprecedented efforts were made to expose the LTTE to mechanisms of political accommodation in divided societies. LTTE delegations even toured Marihamn in the Åaland Islands, which stand at the intersections of Swedish and Finnish rule.

But no such international exposure was capable of making the LTTE come to terms with the momentum of the day, and integrate itself fully into the political process. Instead, it conducted itself in such a way that the ‘peace process’ gradually turned out to be the beginning of its end. This was highly advantageous to the government of Sri Lanka, more than any military campaign it had launched until then.

To clarify the point, let’s consider the challenge of international exposure. The LTTE was not used to the niceties of excessive exposure to the media and the wider world, as governments generally are. It did not have the political maturity to interact with the world, at a time when the world was coming towards it. Peace processes impose codes of conduct upon terrorist/militant groups, and restrict their operational freedom. This was also the case of Irish republicanism during Northern Ireland’s long peace process. At two occasions in 1994, President Clinton issued US entry visas to Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams, to the absolute outrage of the British government, then headed by Prime Minister John Major. The first visa, issued on 29 January, was supported by Irish American politicians and the National Security Council, but opposed by the State Department. The second visa was granted on 23 September. The visas were generally viewed in Washington DC as a means of dragging SF into the political process, and making it pass the no-return line on its way to become part and parcel of the peace effort. This was, however, a very ambitious project. It was no easy game for SF, and its acceptance of the peace process was in itself a conflicting choice, as indicated by the subsequent sequencing of Provisional IRA ceasefires and repeated cycles of violence.

SF leaders ultimately chose the most advisable option before them – that of supporting the peace process – and maintaining that they will strive to achieve their goal for a united Ireland only through constitutional means. In Northern Ireland, dissident republican activism is never a threat to be miscalculated. Post-Good Friday 1998, such dissident factions were determined to sow the seeds of anti-peace violence, as it was shown by the Omagh bomb that exploded just four months later.

SF stood by the peace process, and to cut a long story short, benefitted from the changing electoral balance of the early 2000s, and emerged as the prominent nationalist/republican political party in Northern Ireland. Its political engagement led to the St Andrew’s talks in 2006, and subsequently enabled it to share power in the Northern Ireland Assembly. A dominant two-party system has emerged in Northern Ireland today, with SF sharing the reins of power with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).

Despite the substantive differences between the cases of Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, the allusion here is to the manner in which SF handled its unprecedented international exposure in the 1990s to its benefit. The Provisional IRA subsequently followed suit, by expressing commitment to the peace process, and putting all its weapons ‘beyond use’ in 2005, in the presence of members of the International Commission on arms decommissioning (set up as part of the 1998 Agreement). While Irish republicanism thus entered a new era with its place at the forefront of Northern Ireland’s regional polity, the LTTE is now history. The rise of massive public opposition to the post-2002 peace process, the LTTE’s outright condemnation of the proposals for an interim governance arrangement (the so-called Oslo proposals), and its continuous inclination to play hard ball with Colombo during the latter part of the Kumaratunga administration and the early part of the Rajapaksa administration, were among the key facts that led to what happened in May 2009.

The decimation of the LTTE was not the sole brainchild of the Rajapaksa presidency. It is more accurate to note that it was the LTTE itself that cut its grave under its own feet, earned the wrath of the defence establishment, the government and most importantly, the large majority of the people of Sri Lanka.

Let’s come back to the present-day debate on a UNHRC resolution against Sri Lanka. What is happening today is an effort to single out Sri Lanka, put her in a box with a tag as perpetrator of wartime atrocities. This (largely Western) attitude towards post-war Sri Lanka is extremely inconsistent, unjust and problematic. The island nation is not the first to have fought a counterinsurgency operation with heavy casualties. Probing such casualties is something that only time – and not pressure from the West – is competent of. The Chilcott Commission or any such mechanism is not comparable here. Sri Lankan forces did not invade a foreign land or breach the basics of international law. Instead, they were engaged in an essentially internal operation, and any probing into questionable deeds will only occur in accordance to how questionable internal security conduct has been probed elsewhere (the long-drawn Bloody Sunday investigation, the Historical Enquiries Team established in 2005 to examine atrocities from 1968 to 1998 and the March 2010 decision to abolish it within the following three years provide comparative examples). Some, especially those who were directly affected by the war (and most likely to have voted TNA eyes-closed at recent elections) may find this too sour to swallow, but this is the plain reality of the day.

The Western critique of Lanka and Tamil diaspora political activism are indeed mutually beneficial, as one provides the other with political fodder. They are complemented by a mostly exiled microcosm of Sri Lankan society – composed of all ethnic and religious groups – hell-bent upon demonising the government and its political leadership. The incentive for such action may lie in benefits such as increased funding for (oftentimes pseudo-) research initiatives, foreign travel, residence permits and citizenship in Western countries.

The phenomenon of Sarath Fonseka is also intertwined to all this. It is interesting to note the timing of the US affirmation that Mr Fonseka is a political prisoner, as Sri Lanka is just about to be discussed at the UNHRC. The entire Sarath Fonseka saga, to summarise, is the story of a man whom nobody wished to appoint as Army Chief – who was subsequently appointed, and thereafter maintained a head-on toughness in his dealings. His was a struggle for political power, but politics was for him unfamiliar ground, to the traps of which he fell prey. In no way is he a political prisoner, and his arrest, trial, imprisonment and future are all segments of a complex political game, in which his very imprisonment has proved to be beneficial to his foremost political benefactors (this however is the topic of another article, or a book, for that matter).

The US statement that the LLRC report is inadequate to address issues of accountability, and criticism over a credible action plan on implementing its recommendations point at a fundamental problem in the international system, that of prescriptive Western pontificating on how accountability issues are to be addressed in countries of the global South. Sri Lanka’s strategic position in China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy and Colombo-Teheran ties (at the hour of sanctions on the latter) are among the reasons that have prompted the US State Department to seek ways of keeping Colombo contained.

Bob Blake’s recent affirmation in Colombo that his government will support the UNHRC resolution on Sri Lanka (often interpreted as ‘against’ Sri Lanka) is a prime example of this approach. Contrary to what some are inclined to believe, Western (and especially US) ‘concern’ is not about the rights of a particular ethnic group, civilian victims or prisoners of war (which are all inevitable consequences of war, especially anti-secessionist counterinsurgency operations). Instead, theirs is a concerted strategy to keep Colombo on its toes and ensure that Washington DC is placed at a vantage point to keep an eye on the region.

The challenge before Colombo is that of sailing through such tricky geopolitics with tact. Prescriptive Western formula can only create disruption and worsen existing problems. By no means does this imply that all is rosy in Lanka, but a Western-backed UNHRC resolution is no remedy for any existing ills. It is indeed advisable for Colombo to take every possible measure to keep such prescriptions at bay, and ensure that they are duly blocked.

It goes without saying that intelligent domestic policy – and not only diplomatic lobbying – is the best-recommended medication to the ailment.

• Poll: Prospects for Peace in Sri Lanka in 2007
• Peace in Northern Ireland – Lessons for Sri Lanka?
• Peace in Sri Lanka: Negotiating with the Northern ‘Separatists’?
• The Darusman Report: Reflections on the real challenges ahead for Sri Lanka
• Sri Lanka and the UNHRC: Implications for India and for Human Rights

If the time ever does come for a comprehensive evaluation of security policies and legislation adopted during the privation and emergencies of war and the peacetime ‘stability’ of a post-war context, it would only be fair to conclude that the unpleasantness of the former far exceeds the unpleasantness of the latter, but it is still just that – unpleasant.

It has not been that long since we read about the callous disregard for human life in a number shootings, which occurred in August 2011, where the police and military used live ammunition to ‘control’ protests that occurred outside police stations and military camps. That particular period passed us by with one protester shot dead in Pottuvil by the military, two protesters injured when the military shot at a demonstration in Kinniya and a few protesters injured when they were shot at by the police in Puttalam. If these incidents seem somewhat remote and indistinct, there is always the equally tragic incident in the Katunayake Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in July 2011, when a protester was killed as a result of live ammunition used by the police along with the grievous assault of other protesters. The incident itself resulted in an inordinate amount of coverage by the press due to the swingeing but short-lived demands for counteraction against the enormities of policing in the country. However, if there were any expectations of a turn around over the policy of using live ammunition against civilians, the brutal killing of a protester in Chilaw by the Special Task Force two days ago demonstrates that once bitten, this Government is never twice shy.

While there was absolutely no demand for introspection and inquiry following the shootings in Puttalam, Kinniya and Pottuvil, the FTZ killing in Katunayaka resulted in a presidential inquiry with the submission of an investigative report by Mahanama Tillakaratne to President Rajapaksa on the 6^th of August 2011. Quite predictably, that particular report did not lead to any sort of critical action by the President. And why not? As one of the most corrupt institutions in the country and one that is responsible – even in a post-war context – for the violation of fundamental rights, custodial killings, encounter killings and outright murder, there is very little else that could result in the lowering of public confidence in a critical organ of the state responsible for civilian security and public order. In this context, it is inconceivable and utterly reprehensible that President Rajapaksa and the Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, were unable to consider wider punitive measures and not mere transfers for what was a clear act of police brutality, as well as the urgent reformulation of policies on policing, which at present appear to favour manslaughter and the disproportionate use of force over the proper and legal containment of unrest and responsible management of public protest.

There is, of course, another aspect to the inaction of the government. The unwillingness to follow through with reform could be due to the fact that it is politically expedient to maintain a force for repression in order to militate against an attempt at subversion by citizen enemies. The government is, after all, quite fond of the “you’re either with us or against us” line of thinking, which has – over the last few years – translated into action on the streets and the old practice of vituperative verbal attacks against civil society activists. So, is public security really a concern for this government? If public security is a concern, why are protesters killed on the streets by the military and police? Or is it about repression in order to impede the upstart of larger dissenting movements? If public order is a goal, is it not inevitable that the insidious killing of protesters by the police and military will increase the likelihood of violent confrontations in the future? If there are no gross human rights violations and if there is justice in a post-war context, how are we supposed to interpret the killing of protesters, the brutality of police and military action, and the lack of investigations, convictions and reform? There is a point at which frequent incidental deaths at demonstrations become disconcerting, particularly when it occurs as a result of sadistic and disproportionate policing methods, and when the expectation of justice is an exercise in futility. Is justice a concern for this government? If it is, many are still waiting for its swift hand. However, it would be unfair to portray the incidents highlighted above as clear cases of state brutality since the protesters themselves could have instigated the violence, but this still does not legitimise the use of live ammunition. Surely, if there were enough reasons – in terms of a vital threat to public order – the use of rubber bullets, water cannons, tear gas and effective policing would suffice. The only justification for the use of live ammunition would be if the protesters possessed weapons and demonstrated intent to kill.

In usual form, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) has launched an investigation into the incident in Chilaw, and while the façade of accountability progresses, the family of the protester who was killed was offered money in return for their silence on the matter – an offer that they rejected. Why is the CID conducting an investigation if other officials – allegedly attached to the police – are trying to pay-off family members in order to impede the investigation? Why is there no investigation into this particular development? Perhaps the disbursement of funds is considered usual procedure when dealing with grievances of this nature, and a substitute for an actual investigation, but is this really the puerile conduct that the police force is willing to embrace in order to save face? It is also quite disappointing that many officials have failed to question the use of live ammunition, and in the case of Chilaw and others like it, the Inspector General of Police, N.K Ilangakoon, seems to be unwilling to put forward a directive disallowing the use of live ammunition on protesters, which – as a result – implies that the IGP actively supports the disproportionate use of force and the violation of fundamental rights.

Too often the defence establishment has faltered and only few have taken Gotabhaya Rajapksa to task for his failures, negligence and fervent statements on policy, which have considerable implications for the way in which the government responds to critical issues in this country given the extent of centralisation. It is precisely because of the precedent set with the failure to ensure proper conduct in the response of the security forces and police to civilian protests – in Navanthurai, Pottuvil, Kinniya, Puttalam, Katunayake and elsewhere – and to institute proper reforms following violations that we have to contend with brutal incidents such as the one in Chilaw. The government seems to have no qualms about the continued use of the military in enforcing public order despite the fact that its interventions have been an unmitigated disaster, and it – wittingly or unwittingly – simply disregards the demands for necessary action that should extend beyond a flippant investigation and, god forbid, the appointment of another commission of inquiry.

And to whom should we rightfully assign overall responsibility and blame for these successive failures in security policy? Gotabhaya Rajapaksa must resign, and so too must the Inspector General of Police. Will you see to it, Mr. President?

• Dealing with law and order as an issue of the Presidential elections
• The duty to talk loudly about Police Reforms
• Protests in Katunayake Free Trade Zone: No police in sight
• The limits of the Mahinda Chintanaya: FTZ workers and Buddhist monks rise up against government
• How bad is the crisis for Mahinda Rajapaksa?