Funeral of Pattani Razeek | Photo courtesy of Deutsche Presse Agentur

(Editors’ note: The report below is a follow-up from the last update about Mr. Pattani Razeek’s case, which was published on 17^th August 2011 and can be read here.)

1. Background and key events:

Mr. Pattani Razeek was a Sri Lankan Human Rights Defender who disappeared on 11^th February 2010. At the time of his disappearance, Mr. Razeek was the Managing Trustee of the Community Trust Fund (CTF) (www.ctfsrilanka.org) and an Executive Committee Member of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) (www.forum-asia.org).

For over a year following the disappearance, there was no credible action by the police to investigate the case despite several leads. The chief suspect Shahadbeen Nowshaadh was not arrested until July 2011, despite being identified by police in May-June 2010.  The family, Puttlam Mosque Committee and those campaigning for justice in the case believe that the failure to arrest Nowshaadh is due to the involvement of Minister Rishad Bathiudeen, the Minister of Trade & Commerce under the current Government.

Arrests of Suspects:  The chief suspect, Nowshaadh was arrested by the Colombo Crimes Division (CCD) in Killinochchi on 9^th July 2011 in connection with Mr. Razeek’s abduction. The second suspect, Mushdeen was arrested by the CCD on 15^th July from Kollonnawa.  Soon after Mushdeen’s arrest, Minister Rishad Bathiudeen told a member of the Puttlam Mosque Committee that Mushdeen’s wife approached him to secure Musdeen’s release, but that he had refused to intervene in the case.

Exhumation (28^th July 2011): On 25^th July, Mr. Razeeks’ son, Riskhan was told by the Director, CCD that the police had received information from suspect Mushdeen that Mr. Razeek’s body had been buried in a village in Vallaichchenai and that police would be travelling to Vallaichchenai for further investigations. Riskhan accompanied the police to Vallaicchenai and on 28^th July, a body believed to be that of Mr. Razeek was exhumed from Thuraiaddy Street, Kavaththamunai, Vallaichchenai based on the information provided by suspect Mushdeen.

Riskhan identified the body as Mr. Razeek’s from his hair and underwear. The body had been wrapped in a sheet and buried in a pit about 4 ½ feet deep, inside a half built abandoned house belonging to Mushdeen’s aunt. The exhumation took place in the presence of the Vallaichchenai Magistrate A.M. Riyal, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Vallaichchenai police, several CCD officers, Mundalama police, the Judicial Medical Officer (JMO) Batticaloa Mr. Tikiri Banda Gunethileke, Scene of Crime Officers from Batticaloa, and the suspect Mushdeen. Journalists and civil society members were also present at the time.

Post Mortem: On 28^th July 2011, the body was taken to Batticaloa Hospital by the Vallaichchenai police. The post mortem was conducted on 2^nd August at 10 am at the Batticaloa Hospital. Before the post mortem, Riskan and two of Razeek’s brothers were allowed inside and identified the body as the remains exhumed in Vallaichchenai. The JMO also recorded Riskhan’s statement that he believed M. Nihamath, former Trustee General of CTF, to be responsible for Razeeks’ killing.

The post mortem ended at 1.30pm on 2^nd August, and the body was released to family members based on an order by the Vallachchenai Magistrate. The order mistakenly referred to the exhumation being conducted on 4^th July (instead of the correct date 28^th July), but when this was pointed out to the CCD officers, they assured that this would not be a problem to transport the body or in future court proceedings. Riskan, Ruki Fernando of Law & Society Trust, Mr. Razmi from the Puttalam Mosque Committee and several others noted the discrepancy. Mr. Razeek’s funeral was held on 3^rd August in Sameeragama Puttalam.

DNA Report/Government Analyst Report: Samples of Mr. Razeek teeth, skin, hair, etc were taken by the CCD and sent to the Gene Tech lab for DNA testing on 4^th August 201. Mr. Razeek’s son, Riskhan supplied blood to the Gene Tech Lab on 8^th August 2011.  Stomach samples from Mr. Razeek’s body were sent to the Government Analyst on 5^th August 2011. We do not have court proceedings which indicate whether the postmortem report and the DNA report have been submitted to Court.  However when Riskhan called Genetech regarding the DNA report on 2^nd February 2012, he was informed that the DNA report will be submitted to court in two weeks.

2. Police Inquiries & Court Proceedings

There are currently three police cases (B Reports) pending before the Magistrates Court (MC) in Puttalam (Mr. Razeek’s hometown) and in Pollonnaruwa (place of abduction) based on separate complaints by the Razeek family and CTF. The Puttalam MC case BR177/10 was filed on 16^th February 2010.  The Pollonnaruwa MC case AR 142/2010 had been filed by the police on 4^th March 2010. A further case B 651/11 was filed by the police on 13^th July 2011 to investigate the ransom calls made to the Razeek family following his disappearance.

From 16^th February 2010 until after the arrest of Nowshaadh on 9^th July 2011, Mr. Razeek’s family, the Puttalam Mosque Committee and lawyers and civil society groups campaigning for justice in this case, focused only on proceedings of the case before the Puttalam MC BR 177/10. However, there has been only one hearing of this case since  27^th July 2011 and the submissions on police investigations following the arrest of suspects Nowshaadh and Mushdeen, are being made to the Pollonnaruwa MC in case No.651/2011.

Police Case (B Report BR 177/10/P) pending before the Puttalam MC: Case filed by police on 16^th February 2010 based on the police complaint (No.CIB 01 389 / 187) filed by former CTF trustee Ms. Jensila Majeed to the Puttalam Police on 15^th February 2010.  In around May 2010 police identified Shahabdeen Nowshaadh, a former CTF employee, as the chief suspect in Razeek’s disappearance. Police linked Nowshaadh to the disappearance by tracing calls made from Razeek’s phone number to Razeek’s family after the disappearance. The calls were traced through the phone EMEI number to a phone registered to Nowshaadh. Nowshaadh filed an anticipatory bail application to the Puttalam Magistrates Court on 15^th June 2010. The court rejected his application on 23^rd June 2010 following which Nowshaadh filed a revision petition to the Puttalam High Court details of which are given below. There appears to have been no significant progress in this case until the arrest of the chief suspect Nowshaadh on 9^th July 2011. The last hearing of the case was on 17^th January 2012.

Anticipatory Bail (Revision Petition) (HCR 08/10) concluded in the Puttalam High Court: Following the rejection of his anticipatory bail application by the Puttalam Magistrates Court on 23^rd June 2010, Nowshaadh filed a revision petition to the Puttalam High Court  on 20^th October 2010, challenging the decision of the Magistrate not to grant bail.   In his petition, Nowshaadh admits to meeting Mr. Razeek on 11^th February 2010 and to being in the same area (Pollonnaruwa) at the time that Mr. Razeek disappeared. He also stated that he is a close aid of Minister Rishard Bathiudeen and that his arrest would harm the Minister. This case was dismissed on 28^th July 2011, following Nowshaadh’s arrest by the CCD on 9^th July 2011.

Police Case (B Report A.R 142/2010) before the Pollonnaruwa Magistrate Court:  Case filed by police on 4^th March 2010 based on complaint (CIB 02 33/175) filed by Mr. Razeek’s wife to the Mundalama Police on 12^th February 2010[i].  Proceedings in the B 651/2011 before the Pollonnaruwa MC states that the case (AR 142/2010) was filed by the Pollonnaruwa police regarding investigations carried out in Pollonnaruwa into the disappearance. Proceedings state that police recorded statements from several persons including those who travelled in the van with Mr. Razeek to Pollonnaruwa.

Police Case (B Report B 651/2011) before the Pollonnaruwa Magistrate Court:  B report filed by police on 13^th July 2011, to investigate ransom calls made to Mr. Razeek family, demanding LKR 20 million (approximately USD 170,000) to secure his release. This case is in addition to AR 142/2010 before the Pollonnaruwa MC.  Police submitted that Shahabdeen Nowshaadh and Musdeen had been identified as suspects in Mr. Razeek’s abduction.  On 26^th July 2011, the police submitted that Nowshaadh had made a statement to police that Mushdeen had told him that he had abducted and killed Mr. Razeek. The police also submitted a statement from Mushdeen that he had abducted Mr. Razeek in order to punish him for supporting the LTTE and that he had tied his hands, feet and face with a cloth and left him alone. When he returned 20 minutes later, he realized that Mr. Razeek had died. Mushdeen told police that he buried Razeek in an abandoned house belonging to his aunt in Vallaichchenai.  On 3^rd August 2011, the police submitted a report on the exhumation of a body believed to be that of Mr. Razeek in Vallaichchenai.

On 12^th August 2011, suspect Nowshaadh was produced before the Pollonnaruwa Magistrate and remanded to the Pollonnaruwa Remand Prison. Police submitted that samples of Mr. Razeeks’ body have been given to Gene Tech for DNA testing on 4^th August, 2011. Mr. Razeek’s son Rizkan had provided a blood sample to Genetech on 8^th August 2011. The contents of Razeeks stomach were sent to the government analyst on 5^th August 2011.  The van (no 59-6113) in which Mr. Razeek is believed to have been abducted had been taken into police custody on 1^st August 2011 in Kandy.  The police submitted that so far the investigations have revealed that several more people were involved in Mr. Razeeks abduction.

According to the lawyer representing the Razeek family, on 7^th September 2011 suspect Mushdeen was produced before the Pollonnaruwa Magistrate court and is currently in remand in the Pollonnaruwa Remand Prison.  The last hearing of the case was held on 2^nd February 2012. The next hearing is scheduled on 16^th February 2012.

Bail Application (Nowshaadh) (No. 77/2011) in the Pollonnaruwa High Court: Nowshaadh filed a bail application to the Pollonnaruwa High Court on 13^th October 2011 and was released on bail on 3^rd November 2011. Case concluded.

Bail Application (Mushdeen) in the Pollonnaruwa High Court: Lawyer for the Razeek family has informed us that Mushdeen filed a bail application to the Pollonnaruwa High Court on 2^nd February 2012. The next hearing of this case is scheduled for 16^th February 2012.

Land case before the District Court, Puttalam (No. 57913):  On 7^th December 2011, the Puttalam police filed a land case before the District Court Puttalam to resolve a land dispute between Mr. Razeek’s brother and Mr. M. Nihamath’s relatives who lived near Mr. Razeek’s residence in Mundalama. The next case date is due on 15^th February 2012. Mr. Nihamath’s relatives left the village following the exhumation of Mr. Razeek’s body out of fears for their safety. They have not returned to the village to date. Details of the dispute between Mr. Razeek’s family and Nihamath’s relatives are provided below.

3. NHRC Inquiry

The Razeek family filed a complaint with the NHRC on 15^th February 2011 (HRC/619/10).  There appeared to be no progress in the case until Riskhan was summoned to an inquiry on 4^th July 2011, over a year later. The Inquiry was conducted under no. HRC/621/10/I – iv. On 18^th July 2011, at a special meeting with the family and representatives of lawyers, Puttalam Mosque Committee and members of civil society, the chairman and commissioners of the NHRC committed to conduct the inquiry and to keep the family updated on any further developments in the police case.

At the NHRC inquiry on 26^th July 2011, the Inquiry Officer told Mr. Razeek’s son-in-law, a member of the Mosque Committee and a lawyer that the following a lead given by a suspect that Mr. Razeek’s body was buried in the Oddamvadi area in Vallaichchenai.

At the NHRC inquiry on 20^th September 2011, a CCD officer informed Riskhan and the lawyer that the CCD did not have evidence to arrest or question M. Nihamath in connection with Mr. Razeek’s abduction and killing. The CCD said that several witnesses put forward by the family had refused to make statements to the police. Riskhan told the police, that several CTF trustees and staff had not been questioned by the police and were willing to make statements. The NHRC offered to accept signed affidavits by CTF trustees and staff and submit them to the police.

However on 6^th October 2011, the NHRC refused to accept an affidavit by CTF founder trustees M.S. Rafeek, H.S. Firdous and Jensila Majeed regarding Nihamath’s involvement with CTF and Mr. Razeek’s disappearance and calling for a full investigation into the motives underlying Mr. Razeek’s abduction and killing. The affidavit was rejected on the ground that it did not include a statement that the affirmants would be willing to make statements to the police in this regard. The NHRC asked that an amended affidavit be provided on 12^th October 2011. However, the affirmants have been advised against submitting such a statement by their lawyers since it may impact their credibility as witnesses in the murder trial. There is no further date for the NHRC inquiry.

On 1^st February 2012, the Director of Investigations NHRC, informed a lawyer inquiring into the case, that three complaints had been filed with the NHRC regarding Mr. Razeek’s disappearance;

1. HRC/ 619/10 submitted by Mrs. Noormihar Razeek (Razeek’s wife) on 18^th February 2010
2. HRC 3170/10 submitted by Mr. A. M. U Jaufar (Razeek’s son-in-law) on 15^th September 2010 to the NHRC in Puttalam.
3. HRC 621/2010 submitted by the Executive Director of Forum Asia on 18^th February 2010 by post.

The Director of Investigations also said that the NHRC was keen to continue its inquiry in the case, but that proceedings had stalled due to the failure of Razeek’s family and lawyers to submit affidavits of witnesses who were willing to assist the police investigation in the case. The officer also stated that the failure to submit a DNA report was a matter in which the NHRC could intervene.

4. Meeting with the IGP: At a meeting held at the Defence Ministry on 23^rd August 2011to discuss violent incidents which took place in Puttalam following a Grease Devil attack, Mr. Razmi, Secretary of the Mosque Committee raised Mr. Razeek’s case with the Inspector General of Police (IGP) who was present at the meeting. He told the IGP that the Razeek case was being delayed and a credible investigation prevented due to the intervention of a prominent politician. He also said that there were tensions between the local community and the Northern Muslims over the Razeek case, Mr. Razeek being a member of the local Puttalam community. He asked the IGP to conduct effective inquiries into this case. The IGP told Mr. Razmi that he would look into the matter but no further information is available about what action has been taken to date by the Police.

5. Dispute with M. Nihamaths’ Relatives in Sameeragama

Shortly before Mr. Razeek’s funeral, Mr. Nihamath’s relatives who live in a land near Mr. Razeek’s home in Sameeragama, moved out of the village due to fears for their safety. When they tried to return to the village on around 6^th August, they were prevented from entering their compound by a group of villagers. Riskhan, Azam (Mr. Razeek’s son-in-law) and other family members were also present at the time. Following this altercation, Nihamath’s relatives filed a complaint with the Mundalama police accusing Mr. Razeek’s family including Riskhan and Azam and the villagers of assaulting them and preventing them from entering their home. That evening the police visited Mr. Razeeks home to inquire into the incident.

Razeek’s family informed the Puttalam Mosque Committee about the incident. Nihamath’s relatives also met with the Puttalam Mosque Committee and asked them to intervene in the case. The Puttalam Mosque Committee agreed to intervene, provided the police complaint against Riskhan was withdrawn. Following this the complaint was withdrawn by Nihamath’s relatives.

At a meeting with the Puttalam Mosque Committee and Razeeks’ family, at the Grand Mosque Puttalam, Nihamath’s relatives asked to be allowed to remove their belongings from the compound in Sameeragama. Mr. Razeek’s family said that they could not guarantee the safety of Nihamath’s relatives and asked that the matter be mediated with the villagers by the Puttalam Mosque Committee and the local Mosque Committees in Sameeragama and Perukuwattan.

On 13^th August 2011, a meeting was held at Mr. Razeeks’ home in Sameeragama with the Puttalam Mosque Committee, and the Sameeragama and Perukuwattan Mosque Committees to settle the matter. Following this meeting, Nihamath’s relatives were permitted to remove their belongings on 16^th August 2011.

To date, Nihamath’s relatives have not returned to the village. The land in which they were living, originally belonged to Mr. Razeek’s brother P.M. Mahroof who maintains that Nihamath’s family were allowed to occupy the land based on an agreement between Mr. Razeek and Nihamath. Mr. Mahroof states that he is the owner of the land and has refused to allow the family to re-occupy the land in Sameeragama.

On 21^st November 2011, Nihamath’s family filed a second complaint with the Mundalama police, naming 10 persons in the village including Riskhan as preventing them from returning to their home. Rizkhan and family members went to the police on around 28^th November 2011, Riskhan suggested that the matter be resolved through the Puttalam Mosque Committee. However since there is a dispute regarding ownership of the land, the police filed a case in the District Court, Puttalam on 7^th December 2011.  The case was last heard on 1^st February 2012 and the next hearing is scheduled 15^th February 2012. Pending a final determination in the case, a watcher has been placed in the compound by Nihamaths’ relatives.

6. Threats/Intimidation against the family and Mosque Committee

There have been no known threats against Mr. Razeek’s family or the Mosque Committee since the last update on 17^th August 2011.

However, at a meeting in Puttalam on 8^th December 2011, the mosque committee stated that Mowlavi Abdullah had received a threatening message from number +94773863256 on 12^th Januaary 2011, following a speech made by him to mark the Haj Festival at the Baka Mosque in Puttalam. In his speech, Mowlavi Abdullah stressed that the two communities must not be divided based on Mr. Razeek’s disappearances and that they must work together to defeat the elements which try to divide them. The message sent to Mowlavi Abdullah accused him of being a Muslim Prabhakaran who is trying to evict displaced Muslims from Puttalam. (This is being reported here for the record, as this was not included in the update of 17^th August 2011)

On 16^th January 2012, President of the Puttalam Mosque Committee, Mr. Muzammil was summoned to the office of the Assistant Superintendant of Police and asked to give a statement regarding the killing of policeman in Puttalam in August 2011 in a violent incident following a grease devil attack. Mr. Muzammil was told that a petition had been submitted by the Puttalam Organizer for Minister Bathiudeen accusing the Mosque Committee of inciting the violence in Puttalam on 21^st August 2011 which resulted in the killing of the policeman.

7. Summary / Conclusion:

It appears that the police have not made any significant progress in Mr. Razeek’s case. For several months the police failed to submit a post mortem report in the case. The lawyer for the family believes that a post mortem report was submitted to court but she has not been shown the report and the family has no further information on the progress of the investigation. It appears that the DNA report has not been submitted to court to date.

The date and method used to kill Razeek is not clear.

To the best of our knowledge, the police have made no move to apprehend or question several others implicated in the case including;

• Mr. Irshard, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister Rishard Bathiudeen, who stated publicly, in October 2010, that Mr. Razeek was held by the Defense Ministry;
• Persons travelling in the vehicle with suspect Musdeen, in which according to the suspect, Mr. Razeek was abducted;
• Persons travelling with suspect Nowshaadh, who admitted to meeting Mr. Razeek in Polonnaruwa on the day he disappeared. According to Nowshaadh, he and several others were travelling in a vehicle belonging to the Resettlement Ministry, headed by Minister Bathiudeen at the time;
• Minister Bathiudeen and Mustafa Nihamath, former CTF Trustee General and currently employed at the World Food Program in Colombo. The Razeek family and the Puttalam Mosque Committee believe that M. Nihamath is a key suspect in the case and that his involvement merits further inquiry.  Before the postmortem on 2^nd August 2011, Mr. Razeek’s son Riskhan clearly told the JMO that he believed M. Nihamath to be involved in his father killing. At Mr. Razeek’s funeral on 3^rd August thousands of those present chanted slogans calling for the arrest of M. Nihamath and Minister Bathiudeen.

8. Some key local & international appeals and statements

• The UN human rights office of the High commissioner, Briefing note on Sri Lanka and Malawi, Spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Ravina Shamdasani, on behalf of Rupert Colville, 29^th July 2011, available at, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11273&LangID=E
• Amnesty International, Urgent Action: Remains of Sri Lankan Defender Exhumed (Index Number: ASA 37/010/2011), 29^th July 2011, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/010/2011/en/60e694d6-4055-4943-ae6d-2e2c2456f015/asa370102011en.pdf
• Front Line Defenders, Sri Lanka: ‘UPDATE – Arrest of chief suspect in the disappearance of human rights defender Mr. Pattani Razeek’, 12^th July 2011, available at, http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/15261
• Observatory (OMCT-FIDH), ‘Sri Lanka: Exhumation of a body suspected to be that of the forcibly disappeared Mr. Pattani Razeek’, 29^th July 2011, available at, http://www.omct.org/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/sri-lanka/2011/07/d21358/
• The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), The body of the disappeared human rights activist Pattini Razeek exhumed, 29^th July 2011, available at, http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-099-2011.
• The Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Sri Lanka: Ensure justice in the death of Pattani Razeek, 29^th July 2011, available at http://www.forum-asia.org/?p=10818

9. LLRC Report

The Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission at page 162, specifically mentions the lack of police action in Mr. Razeek’s case[ii]. The Commission states that;

(Paragraph) 5.31 ‘Among the many disturbing allegations concerning missing persons submitted to the Commission by the general public, especially during its visits to conflict-affected areas, the case of Mr. Razik Pattani in Puttlam, is referred to here on account of the Commission’s own disappointing experience concerning that case. It highlights the deplorable absence of conclusive law enforcement action, despite the Commission itself bringing this case to the attention of the concerned authorities of the area. Mr. Razik’s body was reportedly discovered while the Commission was writing its report. Timely action could probably have saved this life.

(Paragraph) 5. 32 Mr. Razik who had been an official of an NGO providing assistance to the IDPs in Puttalam was abducted allegedly due to the fact that he had questioned the manner in which some of the expenditures have been incurred by the NGO as well as the purchase of some properties under the names of some of its directors. When inquires were made from the relevant Deputy Inspector-General of Police in the area as to why there was a delay in arresting the alleged abductor following a court order, he has reportedly said that the police was not aware of the suspect’s whereabouts and if the people know where he was, let the police know so that they could arrest him. It was alleged in this regard that the suspect evaded arrest due to his “political connections”. If this is established, it must be mentioned that such an attitude would completely erode the public confidence, in particular in the Police, and make the maintenance of law and order much more difficult. The Commission is equally concerned that undue political interference has also contributed to the lapses on the part of the Police.’

by Deanne Uyangoda and Ruki Fernando

• Who Killed Razeek?
• Manufacturing claymores in the Sinhala media – Media ethics withering on the vine
• The case of Jaseekaran and the Rule of Law in Sri Lanka
• The ‘Grease Devil’ Phenomena in Sri Lanka: A Brief Collation of Reports
• Mano Ganesan on his experience of the anti-Tamil riots in July 1983

Shortly before their disappearance Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan had been organizing a press conference to be held in Jaffna on 10^th December, international human rights day.  On 10^th December, a group of HRDs from the South who were travelling to Jaffna to attend a peaceful protest to mark human rights day were stopped for several hours by the police and prevented from attending the protest. (Detailed report available at http://groundviews.org/2011/12/14/42-political-activists-and-hrds-detained-and-prevented-from-participating-in-peaceful-protest-in-jaffna-town-on-human-rights-day/)

Background of the Two HRDs

Mr. Lalith Kumar Weeraraj is a political activist and human rights defender who has worked extensively in the North and East of Sri Lanka. He is the Jaffna Coordinator of the Movement for People’s Struggle (MPS) (Jana Aragala Wiyapaaraya) launched by a dissident faction of the Peoples Liberation Front (JVP), a mainstream opposition party in Sri Lanka represented in Parliament. The movement aims at mobilizing people against state repression, human rights violations against the Tamil minority and the problems faced by IDPs in the North. MPS launched their campaign at a meeting at the Hyde Park grounds in Colombo on 13^th December 2011, where they also held a protest calling for the immediate release of the missing activists.

Mr. Weeraraj is also an Executive Committee member of ‘We Are Sri Lankans’ (WESL), a university student based organization aimed promoting and protecting the rights of the Tamil people in order to build national harmony and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Mr. Weeraraj has campaigned for the release of Tamil political prisoners and detainees and against human rights violations and repression of HRDs and civilians in the North.  He also worked closely with IDPs calling for better infrastructure and livelihood opportunities for resettled or relocated IDPs in the North.

Mr. Weeraraj has worked extensively on the issue of disappearences in the North and East.  He helped set up committees of Families of the Disappeared in the Trincomalee, Mannar, Vavuniya, Killinochchi and Jaffna Districts. He was the main organizer of the protest campaigns with families of the disappeared in Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Killinochchi, Colombo and Jaffna between May and November 2011. The last protest in Jaffna was held on 29^th November 2011. Mr. Weeraraja has recently visited several places of detention including the Bossa Detention Center in the South and the Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) Head Quarters in Colombo, the Welikada Prison in the Colombo district and military camps in search of disappeared persons. Through his efforts he was able to locate two persons who were being held at the Boossa Detention Center and the TID Head Quarters.

Mr. Muruganandan is a close associate of Mr. Weeraraj and has been involved in organizing several protests and campaigns against human rights violations including events with the families of the disappeared.  Mr. Muruganandan assisted Mr. Weeraraj in his work for the Movement for People’s Struggle and the WESL.  He assisted in their work on disappearances and against unlawful detentions and contributed through his own resources and local contacts towards the movements activities in Jaffna. Both men were organizing a press conference on 10^th December 2011 to publicize the protest by the Movement for People’s Struggle in Colombo on 13^th December 2011, when they disappeared.

Previous Threats and Attacks

Mr. Weeraraj has faced repeated threats, intimidation and attacks by the military and police in the North due to his human rights work and campaigns. He has been warned on several occasions to stop doing human rights work in the North, particularly work on enforced disappearences and arbitrary detention, which the military considered to be anti-government or political activities.

On 25^th March 2011, Mr. Weeraraj was putting up posters in Mannar town, calling on the Government to provide information on disappeared persons, when he was abducted by a group of men who claimed to be army officers.  Mr. Weeraraj was blindfolded and held overnight, believed to be in an army barrack. The men threatened Mr. Weeraraj and questioned him about his work. The following morning, Mr. Weeraraj was blindfolded and brought back to Pesalai Junction in Mannar and released. Although he tried to lodge a complaint with the Mannar police regarding the abduction, the police refused to record his complaint on the ground he was unable to identify the persons responsible.

On around 10^th April 2011, Mr. Weeraraj and a friend were arrested by the Vavuniya Police while they were putting up posters in Vavuniya about disappearences in the North. The police tore the posters and threatened to shoot Mr. Weeraraj if he tried to put up posters in Vavuniya again.

On 23^rd June 2011, Mr. Weeraraj had travelled to Killinochchi to organize a protest for WESL when he and a friend were abducted by officers from the Killinochchi (Depo Junction) Army Camp and held in an abandoned ice-cream factory, behind the army camp, and interrogated for around 6 hours before being released. The military forcibly took a photograph of Mr. Weeraraj before releasing him.

On 14^th November 2011, Mr. Weeraraj, along with other activists, was severely beaten by a group of unidentified thugs at a protest with families of the disappeared in Jaffna, opposite the Jaffna town bus stand at around 11.00 am. The attack took place in full view of the police and the army who failed to intervene and stop the violence. Mr. Weeraj and several others ran into the house of former parliamentarian Ms. Padmini Sithambaranadan for their safety.  The gang followed them into the house and locked Mr. Weeraraj in a room and beat him severely. Mr. Weeraja was badly injured in the attack. A complaint regarding the incident was filed with the Jaffna Police Station the same day. However no action has been taken to date.

Disappearance on 9^th December 2011

Mr. Weeraraj travelled to Jaffna on 9^th December to organize a press conference for the MPS in Jaffna the following day (international human rights day).  Mr. Weeraraja and Mr. Muruganandan were last seen by relatives, leaving Mr. Muruganandan’s house at Avarangal Jaffna on Mr. Muruganandan’ motorbike (license no NP GT 7852) at around 5.00pm (Sri Lankan time) on 9^th December. Both men have been missing since then and there is no information regarding their fate or whereabouts to date.

At around 11.00 pm on 9^th December, Mr. Weeraraj’s father received a number of threatening phone calls on his mobile phone (no.+94711879124).  The callers threatened to kill Mr. Weeraraja and warned that “either you remove your son from Jaffna or we will do it for you”. Mr. Weeraraj’s father filed a complaint regarding the threatening calls with the Kosgama Police Station (Colombo District) on 11^th December 2011 (CIB 94/133).

Complaints/Action by Family and Civil Society Groups

Mr. Kugan Muruganadan’s family filed a complaint with the Achchuweli Police Station (Jaffna District) on 10^th December 2011. They were not given a complaint number by the police. Mr. Weeraraj’s father filed a complaint with the Kosgama police station (Colombo District) regarding the disappearance on 11^th December 2011 which was recorded under Complaint no: CIB 94/133.  Mr. Weeraraj’s father also filed a complaint with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regarding the disappearance on 13^th December 2011, recorded under Complaint no: LKC/432333.

Parliamentarian Mr Ajith Kumara submitted a written complaint regarding the disappearance to the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on 10^th December 2011.  Mr. Ajith Kumara also filed a complaint about the disappearance with the Jaffna police station on 10^th December, recorded under Complaint no: CIB 232/79.

A complaint was filed with the National Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (NHRC) regarding the missing activists, by Mr. Ajith Kumara on 13^th December (Complaint no: HRC/ 33852/ 2011). A further complaint was filed by Mr. Weeraraj’s father to the NHRC on 16^th December 2011 (Complaint no: H.R.C.3934/11)

Local and international organizations including Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/018/2011/en/523cd9d9-a12b-4013-a31a-5e368272d22e/asa370182011en.pdf), the Asian Human Rights Commission , http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-200-2011, the Sri Lanka Human Rights Centre and the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), and the International network of Sri Lankan Diaspora http://www.srilankandiaspora.com/blog/?p=2138, have expressed shock and concern regarding the disappearences and concern over the safety of the two missing activists.

State Response

The Jaffna police told Mr. Ajith Kumara MP, on 10^th December 2011, that that the two individuals were not in their custody.  However no action appears to have been taken to date to investigate their disappearance.  On 14^th December, Mr. Ajith Kumara made a statement in parliament about the disappearance of the two activists.

On 15th December, Cabinet Spokesperson, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told the media at a Cabinet briefing that ‘Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan have not been disappeared, they are there’. He also said that the two activists had not been detained unlawfully and if they were being held by the police or military they would be produced before a Magistrate and dealt with according to the law. This news item was carried on Sirasa TV News on 15^th December at 7pm; http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/12/18/parent-seeks-hrc-intervention-to-find-whereabouts/; http://soundcloud.com/lanka-views/keheliya).

On 14^th December, Mr. Muruganandans wife found the motorbike license no NP GT7852, in which Mr. Muruganandan and Mr. Weeraraj were last seen, parked inside the Atchchuveli Police Station. Mr. Muruganadan’s wife had visited the police station to collect a copy of her complaint regarding the disappearance.  When she inquired about the motorbike, the police told her that the bike had been found by the Kopai Police on 13^th December, parked near a Hindu temple in Kopai.

Appeal

The families of both Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan and WESL and PSM, believe that the Sri Lanka Army is responsible for the disappearance. The Government has so far failed to provide them with any clear information regarding the two missing men and their whereabouts. The family has heard through unofficial sources that Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan are being held at an unidentified detention center in the Jaffna district but there has been no official confirmation of this fact.

Following the statement by Minister Keheliya Rambukwella to the media, that the two activists ‘have not been disappeared, they are there’, their family and colleagues believe that the two activists are currently in Government custody and home that they will be produced before a Magistrate. They call on the Government to provide credible information regarding the whereabouts of Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Murugan and to treat them according to the law.

• 42 Political Activists and HRDs Detained and Prevented from Participating in Peaceful Protest in Jaffna Town on Human Rights Day
• Disappearance
• Youth activists on human rights in Sri Lanka
• Still waiting for justice in Sri Lanka
• 119, Buddhism and being Sinhalese

This is the second major protest organized in Jaffna in recent years following the protest organized by the Free Media Movement against the attack on Uthayan News Editor G. Kuganathan in August 2011. This protest was also held amid tight security controls and the police attempted to disrupt the protest.

The protest on December 10^th 2011 was organized by a collective of civil society groups and activists including Right to Life, International Movement against Discrimination and Racism (IMADR), Committee to Investigate Disappearances (CID), families of the disappeared and political parties including the Tamil National Alliance, Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP), the Socialist Party, and Communist Party of Sri Lanka (Maoist) to highlight key human rights issues and ongoing violations particularly in the North of Sri Lanka.

42 political activists and HRDs from the South, including NSSP party members, members of the Committee to Investigate Disappearences (CID), political activists from the Communist Party (Maoist), Socialist Party and journalists and members of the fisherman’s association travelled to Jaffna in a bus from Colombo and other parts of the country to join the protest.

Mr. Sivajilingam a former Member of Parliament representing the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which won about 2/3rd of the vote from the North and East during the local authority elections in March 2011, said that on the day of the protest there was unusually heavy security and military presence in Jaffna town. He explained that all buses entering Jaffna town were being checked by police, riot police were seen on the streets and army officers were seen inside the Jaffna police station. For around a week before the protest, several local newspapers in Jaffna including Uthayan and Thinakural publicized the protest organized by leading civil society groups and political parties to mark human rights day in Jaffna.

Bus carrying HRDs Stopped at Navathkuli

At around 9.00 am the bus carrying the HRDs was stopped at a police sentry point in Navathkuli, an entry point to Jaffna Town, around 8 km South of Jaffna on the A9 road.

A policeman entered the bus and seized a copy of Puthiya Samathanamam, a Tamil newspaper published by the NSSP.   Although none of the police officers at the sentry point spoke Tamil and appeared not to be able to read Tamil, they claimed that the newspaper was illegal and contained anti-government material. NSSP members explained that the newspaper was a registered legal publication that had been published since 1996. Following a brief argument the police purchased a copy of the paper and allowed the bus to proceed at around 9.45 am. Mr. Janagan, treasurer of the CID and editor of Puthiya Samathanamam, believes that the police may have informed the authorities in Jaffna that the group was travelling to Jaffna.

HRDs Detained at Vembaddi Junction

The group reached Jaffna and after a brief rest proceeded to the Central Bus Stand where the main protest had been organized. At around 10.30 am the group was stopped by around 20 police officers led by a Sub Inspector at the Vembaddi Junction opposite the Nurses Training College (NTC) in Jaffna town.

Mr. Sundram Mahendran, Secretary of CID, states that the police ordered the group to get down from the bus and searched them. The police searched the bus and confiscated material worth around Rs.30000 including; 99 copies of Puthiya Samathanamam, around 500-600 leaflets calling for investigations into disappearences, several placards and posters including photographs of disappeared persons, and two banners of the NSSP and  the CID. The materials were thrown out of the bus and later loaded into a police vehicle. No receipt was given for the material confiscated by the police.

The group was detained on the road opposite the NTC and surrounded by around 15 policemen. Later around 10 armed army officers joined the police cordon. No one was allowed to leave the place and the police refused to allow anyone to attend the protest despite pleas from leaders of the group and an appeal by TNA parliamentarian Mr. Mavai Senthathirajah, who arrived at the scene shortly after.

No reason or justification was given for this treatment. The police told the group that a protest could not take place in Jaffna without prior police permission. Members of the group argued that no police permission was required for a peaceful protest which did not harm or disturb the public.  The police also said that any gathering of more than five people could not be held without police permission and that any member of the group who tried to leave the place they were being detained, would be remanded.

The group of HRDs was held on the road for over 2 ½ hours until they were released at 12.45 pm. They tied handkerchiefs over their mouths and sat on the road in protest against their unfair treatment. According to Mr. Ranath Kumarasinghe, politburo member of the NSSP, the main purpose of their detention was to prevent the HRDs from joining the protest at any cost.

The SI and an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) who was present at the scene, accused the HRDs of trying to provoke ethnic tensions and undoing what the military had achieved after years of struggle against terrorism. He said that they would be answerable to the nation for their actions.

Attack on Women Protesters

Despite the police cordon, Mr. Janagan, Mr. Mahendran and Mr. Ranath Kumarasinghe were able to escape the police and joined the protest at the central bus stand.

When Mr. Mahendran reached the protest venue he saw that there was a scene of unrest and arguments between the protesters and the police who were trying to disperse the protest. He was told that several activists were forced to leave the venue by the police who threatened to hit those who remained. Mr. Mahendran and Mr. Janagan joined the protest and informed those present that the group of HRDs and activists from the South had been detained by the police at the Vembaddi Junction. They suggested that the protest be shifted to where the group was being held.

As Mr. Mahendran, Mr. Sivajilingam and former TNA MP Mr. S. Gajendran attempted to lead the group of protesters towards Vembaddi Junction, the police the group comprised mainly of mothers and families of the disappeared. Mr. Mahendran saw the police hit and push some women to the ground. The police formed a cordon around the women and prevented them from leaving the area. Following this, Mr. Mahendran and the TNA leaders were forced to return to the protest at the central bus stand. Mr. Janagan went back to where the HRDs were being held at Vembaddi Junction.

The protest at the central bus stand continued, despite police controls and attempts to disperse or disrupt the protest. TNA MPs Appapillai Vinayakamoorthi, Mavai Senthathirajah and former MP S. Gajendran and Mr. Sivajilingam and several HRDS and groups from the North including mothers and families of the disappeared attended the protest. They were crowded into a small space of around 20 yards by police who prevented the protest from expanding. They were determined to continue the protest until the HRDs were released and threatened to sleep on the road  in protest if the HRDs were not released immediately.

Altercation with the Police

At the protest, Mr. Ranath Kumarasinghe and Mr. Sivajilingam informed the Head Quarters Inspector (HQI) of the Jaffna Police that a group of HRDs were being detained and prevented from attending the protest. The HQI asked for their identity cards and Mr. Kumarasinghe produced his media ID card.  The HQI flung the card in his face. When Mr. Sivajilingam protested against his treatment of a senior journalist, the HQI scolded Mr. Sivajilingam and told him not to get involved in matters that don’t concern him. Following a heated argument with Mr. Sivajilingam the HQI later spoke to Mr. Kumarasinghe and promised to release the group. The HQI ordered a police sergeant to call the SI at the Vembaddi junction and ordered him to release the group of HRDs and allow them to join the protest in pairs.

Following this, Mr. Kumarasinghe was surrounded by media persons who wanted information on the incident. While Mr. Kumarasinshe was talking to the media, the HQI rushed up to him and shouted at him for talking to the press. He pushed Mr. Kumarasinghe and ordered him to leave the protest.

Mr. Kumarasinshe returned to Vembaddi Junction expecting the group to be released based on the HQI’s orders. However, the SI refused to release the group and claimed that he had not received any such orders. Although Mr. Kumarasinghe insisted that the HQI had given orders for the group to be released and that he had seen the sergeant making the call to the SI, the police refused to release the group.

Since the SI refused to release the group Mr. Kumarasinghe returned to the protest at the central bus stand in order to speak with the HQI. There was increased police presence the protest by this point  and he was not permitted to rejoin the  protest. Mr. Kumarasinghe  noticed that there were a larger number of Tamil policemen present by this time. By the time he reached the protest he was told that the HQI had gone to Vembaddi Junction and that the HRDs would be released shortly.

HRDs Released

The HRDs were released at around 12.45 pm by the HQI and allowed to join the protest in pairs. As they were leaving Vembaddi Junction, Mr. Gunasena Wijesinghe President of the CID, heard the  ASP say in Sinhala that ‘Vawulage gedera avanang, elila inna onne’  meaning that when you come to our area you must behave in a manner that is suitable to us. He also told the group that ‘this is not Colombo, this is Jaffna’.

The HRDs joined the protest at around 1 pm and continued the protest for around 45 minutes.  Following the protest they held a short meeting to discuss the incident and left Jaffna at around 2.30 pm and returned to Colombo the same night.

Shortly before they left Jaffna, Mr. Mahendran spoke to an Inspector of Police who was at the bus stand and asked him whether they could recover the materials that had been confiscated by the police in the morning. The Inspector scolded Mr. Mahendran and told him that they should consider themselves fortunate that had not been killed and asked him to get out of that place.

Complaints/Campaigns

On 12^th December 2011, civil society groups organized a protest in Colombo against the illegal detention and harassment and intimidation of the HRDs and political activists by police in Jaffna.

On 13^th December 2011, Mr. Mahindran from the CID, Mr. Ajith Rupesignhe from the Communist Party (Maoist), Mr. Mahinda Devage from the Socialist Party and Janaka Silva, Mr. Janagan and Perumal Koominathanan from the NSSP filed a complaint with the Inspector General of Police against the treatment by the police and asked the IGP to conduct an inquiry into the incident and to return the confiscated materials, particularly the photographs of disappeared persons to the group. The Officer in Charge of the Special Investigation Unit recorded the complaint told the group that he had informed the IGP by telephone and obtained a special order from the IGP to the area Deputy Inspector General of Police to inquiry into the incident.  The same group also plan to complaint to the National Human Rights Commission regarding the incident on 17^th December 2011.

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In Memoriam: Charles Nigel De Silva

Prior to Nigel’s passing everytime I heard a song by ABBA I angrily turned it off, Nigel loved ABBA – if he wasnt singing or dancing along he was playing it at full volume. After Nigel passed, everytime I hear a song by ABBA I crank up the volume and sing with as much gusto as I can muster. This is how I remember him.

Charles Nigel De Silva’s life was prematurely ended a year ago at the age of 40. He was a proud Josephian with more extra curricular activities than academic achievements. After leaving school he travelled the world on a cruiseliner working as a chef. He was young, vibrant and living out every opportunity he had. A horrific experience, better left  unsaid, resulted in Nigel later testing as HIV positive around 1998. His life then began to change at a frantic pace. He lost his job, family ties, emotional support and even the roof over his head. There was a time he lived on the streets, passing one day at a time, in absolute despair.

Nigel began effecting change when he began positive speaking. His personal story, brutal honestly and infectious personality were a cool recipe for effective communication to audiences that I have seen rapt with attention, often with tears rolling down their faces promising Nigel they would carry his story forward. He soon began to work solely on HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programmes for various organisations and became a well-respected and trusted colleague within the movement.  He became an asset, a confidante, a much needed out-spoken voice that represented the Sri Lankan Gay HIV positive man.

I met Nigel when all this experience was behind him.  He had found a small place to live and had begun working with EQUAL GROUND, leading their HIV/AIDS prevention programmes targeted at the queer community in Sri Lanka. He was wildly passionate about his work and was instrumental in setting up the foundations of many of the organisation’s active programmes today. His brainchild the counselling helpline is to date the only exclusively queer helpline operated in Sri Lanka by operators who are specifically equipped to deal with issues related to sexual orientation and gender identity. Nigel spent much of his time training the counsellors, recruiting them and teaching everyone in painstaking detail just how important a gesture of support to those confused about their sexuality really is.

Nigel signed his emails off ”yours positively” and chuckled away at those who didnt understand why, and went so far as to celebrate, each year, the day he found out he was positive. He said there is no other way to look at it except from a positive angle. He chose to do this mostly I feel to set an example to the PLHIV and HIV movement that at the time he felt engaged in too much guilt and pity. He rejected pity and demanded compassion, understanding and REAL care and support.

At the same time, Nigel was accutely aware of death. He didnt fear death itself but rather the uphill battle he would face. Sometimes I smile at how cheekily he escaped what I feel he feared the most – dying of AIDS.  Nigel lived his life without medication, no exercise, excessive amounts of Pall Mall cigarettes, and a healthy diet of spice and more spice. He didn’t eat any fruit. He maintained what his doctors called ‘healthy’ relative to his HIV status. He visited the clinic on a monthly basis and always came back smiling with his rations that he promtly distributed to those around him and in need. He was a living example of how HIV was no longer a death sentence. Nigel sometimes spoke of young men like himself that he had buried – he bathed and fed these young men and wept like a father when he buried them. He did this in dignified silence. A dignified silence many did not afford him when he passed, albeit not of HIV or AIDS.

There is enough discourse these days about ‘champions’, ‘leaders’, ‘heroes’ and ‘role models’. Nigel was perhaps more than any of these words can describe. But what i remember and admire about him the most is his spirit of resilience. He had more reasons than all of us to be an angry, deperate, ugly and broken person. He chose not to. He used every negative energy thrown at him as a bouncing board for something inately good. Each one with more finesse than the next. His open heart guaranteed this.

It is often easy to remember Nigey. Most remember him for his work within the HIV/AIDS movement, the positive speaking he did or because they had seen him perform and just had to know if it was a man or a woman. What I remember is that he smelled like eau de cologne in the mornings, he wanted everyone to have a good morning when he greeted them, he said bless you everytime I sneezed. He gave massages if you looked tired, he told the most horrifying ghost stories, he reprimanded wasting food, he listened to aretha franklin, latin love songs and ABBA on loop. He was probably the only activist that hated the word ‘empower’. He was forgiving, and he loved unconditionally. He spoke in a cacophony of sinhala and english, always gesticulating wildly – even the most morose of people had no choice but to warm upto him. He took audible breaths in between ill-timed jokes, each one dripping with more vulgarity than the next. He was gifted in almost every creative aspect, constantly morphing from activist, counsellor, drag queen, artist, positive speaker, flamboyant gay man, doctor and chef! This was the very essence of Nigey, he was no jack of all trades but a true queen of all of our hearts.

I have a foolish fear that he will be forgotten, that his life and premature death had no significance. The two short years I knew Nigel were wrapped up in so much love, laughter and unique friendship that he is impossible to forget. Nigey undoubtedly touched the hearts and minds of many of us, and I believe that people of such resilience are few and far between.  If ever in your lifetime you have the opportunity to be around someone like Nigey you are lucky to learn from them as I have, to realise that we are capable of – insurmountable strength and love.

Nigey I hope you are boogying in heaven in the most garrish pair of platforms, the most lavish pair of wings, dancing to ABBA, and painting rainbows where we never thought we would see them. 

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Photo by Eranga Jayawardena

As another year begins to draw to a close on post-war Sri Lanka, we can take stock of which changes, or the lack of change, we see around us. The full scope of human rights are still not available to civilians living in areas formerly controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which are now tightly controlled by the Sri Lankan armed forces, with strong restrictions prevailing on their right to move freely and their right to assemble, amongst other fundamental rights.

Pressing issues such as hundreds of unsolved cases of disappearances, and the rights of detainees and ex-detainees – particularly those of former LTTE cadres – remain unresolved since 2009, which marked ‘the end’ of the civil war in Sri Lanka.

The cost of living has nearly crippled much of the population, and yet, highways, new roads, and bridges are blossoming all over the island with unprecedented speed and efficiency.

Sri Lanka remains teetering on the edge of change and transition – and yet it does not seem to be going over the edge in a hurry.

Instead, a slow transformation that is difficult to identify, understand and categorise, seems to be taking place before our eyes. It is in this context that the International Day on Women Human Rights Defenders dawns on Sri Lanka, and the world, on the 29^th of November 2011.

Challenges faced by Women Human Rights Defenders

Within almost any socio-political context, Women Human Rights Defenders (Women HRDs) face challenges that are unique to them by default – simply by virtue of being women. Society and social structures, particularly law enforcement, continue to be patriarchal leaving women vulnerable to discrimination and violence on a daily basis.

Not only do these structures actively violate the human rights of women, it leaves women powerless in the aftermath; it leaves them with little power to legally reclaim or fight for their rights.

It is in this context that Women HRDs face a set of tough and distinct challenges – they operate to protect human rights and fight against the violation of human rights in a world where they themselves face discrimination and are often not seen as voices significant enough to be contended with.

An international conference for Women Human Rights Defenders held in Colombo in 2005 identified four major sources of abuse that Women HRDs face around the world: State-based violence and issues of accountability and justice, the growing rise in fundamentalist movements seeking and gaining political power, the use of sexuality-based attacks to intimidate women and harm their bodies and reputations; and the need to address abuse perpetrated by communities and families.

Additionally, women that work as human rights campaigners or activists have the inherent dilemma of balance. Particularly in cultures and societies like that of Sri Lanka, there are social obligations and roles that women are expected to fill as mothers as wives and as daughters. Women who choose to work in the field of human rights are not always understood by their families and loved ones; their profession is not always accepted. Many Women HRDs find themselves facing the tough challenge of balancing their homes and personal relationships with their work.

Women HRDs almost anywhere will doubtlessly admit to the pressure and guilt at seeming unable to give priority to their homes, children, and personal lives in the face of the nature of human rights work. As Aida Edemariam asks in an interview with Gillian Slovo, the daughter of Ruth First and Joe Slovo – both leading figures in the anti-apartheid struggle – ‘What is the cost of trying to change the world, and who exactly pays it?’

Whilst Women HRDs face these issues almost everywhere in the world, they occupy a very special and useful position, as women, and play an important role in the larger picture of defending human rights. As women, they are primarily important in standing for the rights of women in a context where women are still particularly vulnerable to the effects of war, political persecution, and the ongoing issues of gender-based violence and discrimination.

A brief history of Women Human Rights Defenders and their movement in Sri Lanka

Historically, the movement of women HRDs in Sri Lanka has always been closely linked with three key avenues: Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zone and related issues, the war and the impact it has had on women, and an ongoing campaign to end violence against women.

Several historic protests and strikes demanding the rights of workers in factories of Sri Lanka’s Free Trade Zone have been crucial to the development of the human rights movement in Sri Lanka. Through much of it women have been at the forefront of these strikes. The Polytech Factory Strike of 1983, during which several women (acting both as key organisers and protestors) were arrested in an attempt to quell the protest, is even today seen as a landmark moment in the history of this movement. More recently, 21 year old Roshen Shanaka was killed due to injuries sustained during a protest in the Free Trade Zone, inflicted on him by police. Several large protests took place – with Women HRDs once again at the forefront – to demand justice in the face of this atrocity.

Through the late 80s and early 90s, a movement to end violence against women and to promote awareness of women’s rights gathered momentum and began to assert itself with a sense of urgency. These campaigns, spearheaded by women across political and social groups, began to shape the larger movement to protect women’s rights, and to promote the notion that ‘women’s rights are human rights’.

In 1994, Radhika Coomaraswamy – a Sri Lankan lawyer, academic and activist – was appointed as the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women for the United Nations. This was seen as a turning point for the women’s rights movement and the movement of Women HRDs in Sri Lanka, which gained confidence in continuing to strengthen their campaigns.

The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, saw the active participation of many Sri Lankan women from several human rights and women’s rights organisations representing diverse issues and communities.

Subsequently, this newly invigorated campaign to end violence against women followed an interesting trajectory in the years to come, and culminated in the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in 2005.

However, in the 90s, the key issue that overcomes the movement of Women HRDs is the issue of war and women affected by war. Naturally, the tense political climate that prevailed at this time as a result of the conflict ensured that the job of Human Rights Defenders became much more dangerous.

Rajini Thiranagama, a young Tamil Woman HRD, lecturer at the University of Jaffna, and activist and writer, was shot dead outside her home in Jaffna. Her family and those close to her suspect the LTTE, whose brutal strategies she had openly criticised and worked against, primarily through the actions of University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) of which she was a founder member. This brutal killing was met with outrage by human rights defenders everywhere – particularly women HRDs in Sri Lanka.

The fact that women are particularly vulnerable to a host of atrocities in times of war is undeniable. Women, particularly Tamil civilians in the North, are increasingly vulnerable to sexual violence, sometimes perpetrated by State actors including the military, and State supported paramilitary groups, leaving women powerless to complain.

Women become vulnerable as mothers and wives, as their sons or husbands are abducted, disappeared or killed as a result of the ongoing conflict. In the South, a Marxist uprising spearheaded by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was brutally crushed by the government – and the cruel phenomenon of abductions and disappearances became the infamous trait that characterised this struggle.

The mothers and wives of the disappeared from both the North and South emerged as a huge factor influencing the movement of Women HRDs as they stepped forth to demand justice.

The year after Thiranagama’s death, Richard de Zoysa, a Colombo-based journalist, activist and writer, was abducted from his home and killed. There are clear indications that his abduction and murder was State-sanctioned. His mother, Dr. Manorani Saravanamuttu is the founder of The Mother’s Front, one of three organisations founded at this time by women, which even today continue to landmark the story of the movement of Women HRDs. The other organizations are The Organisation of Parents and Family Members of The Disappeared, in which several mothers and wives of the disappeared were involved at a high level and the Association of War-Affected Women, founded by Visaka Dharmadasa – whose son was declared Missing in Action as a soldier of the Sri Lankan Army.

At present, Sri Lanka seems to have come full-circle – as today, in post-war Sri Lanka, the families of the disappeared, particularly women, are becoming an increasingly strong voice in the campaign for justice and rights.

What are the challenges that Women Human Rights Defenders face in post-war Sri Lanka?

Sandhya Eknaligoda, the wife of journalist and cartoonist Prageeth Eknaligoda who disappeared in January 2010, personifies the struggle of Woman HRDs in Sri Lanka today.

Whilst she is at the forefront of an ongoing public campaign that demands justice in Prageeth’s case, she is also the mother of two teenage boys. She juggles her personal life and her fight for justice, along with the pressures of being a public figure in a now public and therefore risky campaign.

Similarly, hundreds of women in the North and North East – particularly from Mullaitivu, Jaffna and Mannar districts, are stepping forward to demand justice for the disappearances and killings they have witnessed in the North.

Sri Lankan Women HRDs today are forced to work in a political climate in which democracy and law and order are quickly deteriorating, in an atmosphere of impunity and a culture that continues to regard women as inferior and inconsequential. With little power to shield themselves against sexual harassment, domestic violence and gender-based discrimination, women continue to fight an age-old battle. Furthermore, a culture of moralistic repression continues to blossom and flourish in Sri Lanka.

In 2005, Colombo played host to a historic gathering of Women HRDs from across the world – organised by the International Coordinating Committee of “Defending Women Defending Rights: the International Campaign on Women Human Rights Defenders” (ICWHRD). At a closing public session of the conference, Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International said, “All of us – women and men – must demand the protection of those who defend women’s rights and women who defend all human rights, insist on justice when they’re attacked, and fight for them to be given the recognition they are due.”

Today, in 2011, it is interesting to note that a country that had the privilege of hosting more than a hundred of the world’s leading women activists and HRDs continues to be a battleground for its own Women Human Rights Defenders.

The writer is a Consultant for the Human Rights in Conflict Programme at the Law and Society Trust.

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30 months after the end of war, more people travel between the once off limits North[i] and the South and many of the travel restrictions have been eased. The dreaded Medawachiya checkpoint is no more, and since 2010, we have not taken a flight or ship to Jaffna, travelling by road instead. Displaced people who were detained for about 6 months have now been allowed freedom of movement and many have been allowed to go back to their places of origin. Many youth detained in “rehabilitation” centres have been released and allowed to go back to their families and communities. Death certificates have been issued to few of the people killed during the war. Few schools, hospitals, and some main roads and bridges have been built and glamorous ceremonies held to open these by government and military officials. Three major elections have also been held in the North.

But much remains to be done for Northern Tamils to be able to live in dignity and for the country to move towards reconciliation.

In the last few months, we had spent a considerable amount of time traversing the major towns and roads as well as remote and interior villages and roads in Northern Sri Lanka. We had managed to reach some interior villages after questioning by suspicious and curious soldiers. We had survived without running water, electricity, beds, long nights battling mosquitoes, long bumpy rides in dusty buses on roads that felt more like tracks in a wild life parks and numerous other challenges.  But the difficulties we encountered pale in comparison to the difficulties people we encountered were facing and often we felt helpless and powerless to help them.

Below are some of concerns regarding the situation in the North and prospects for reconciliation, based on what we saw and heard first hand, complimented by some additional desk research for information and statistics we couldn’t find on the ground and additional references that re-confirm our findings.

1. Fate of those killed, disappeared & injured and their families:

In almost every village in the North we have visited, especially in the Vanni, we met families of those killed or disappeared during the last five months of war in 2009, in the years 2006-2009 and decades of war. In a submission to the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission on 8^th January 2011, the Catholic Diocese of Mannar, led by the Catholic Bishop of Mannar, Rt. Rev. Dr. Rayappu Joseph, asked for clarification about the fate of 146,729 people who were unaccounted for between October 2008 and May 2009, based on government statistics and documentary evidence.[ii] The submission also included a list of 100 people disappeared from the Mannar district between 2007-2009 and list of 166 persons reported as killed from the Mannar district in the last phase of the war. There has been no response received from the LLRC or any government official to these.

Searching and waiting for loved ones whom have disappeared

The lack of official acknowledgment of these killings and disappearances and independent mechanisms to confirm the killings and trace those disappeared are major concerns of Tamils living in the North. The Human Rights Commission and adhoc Presidential Commissions appointed since 2006 (such as the LLRC, Udalagama Commission and Mahanama Tillekeratne Commission) have failed to respond to these needs.

In almost every village we had visited in the Vanni, the former LTTE controlled areas, we also met people injured in the war. We have met people who lost both legs and those who have lost legs and arms and variety of other injuries and related sicknesses. Most of them have not received adequate assistance and struggle to live productively, with some finding it difficult to even continue medical treatment.

2. Detention and release of alleged LTTE suspects:

We also met many families whose loved ones have been detained for long time. According to the government, 876 persons are held in administrative detention at the Boosa detebtion facility in Southern Sri Lanka and 863 of them are Tamil.[iii] No information is provided about the period of their detention and we had heard about cases where detainees have been in detention for more than ten years without being convicted. In addition to the around 280,000 displaced who were detained, the number of those detained in “rehabilitation” centres is believed to be 12,000. There is no fixed and exact official figure, with various government officials and politicians giving different numbers at different times. The government claimed 1000 were in “rehabilitation” centres as of 17^th Oct. 2011 out of 11,951 that were on “rehabilitation” – voluntarily & based on court orders, plus a further 994 that had been transferred from custody of the Terrorist Investigation Department to “rehabilitation” centres. [iv]

In an interview to the Sunday Observer of 9^th October 2011, reproduced in the official website of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation had claimed that “Those who were fully involved with the LTTE were removed to Boossa and there was a fair amount of such people” and that “The TID categorized the people and took away those in the categories A,B & C; LTTE leaders, strict followers, and those who were assigned to recover things and arrest others”.[v] There is no information provided about how many were taken away, their names and details and where they are now.

Given history of enforced disappearances, torture and long detention in Sri Lanka this lack of uncertainty in numbers, together with lack of centralized list of detainees indicating place of detention and transfers, raised serious concerns about security of those in detention.

There is no clarity regarding whether or not or when the 1000 remaining in “rehabilitation” would be released or prosecuted. Different government officials and politicians have given different numbers that would be prosecuted, with no one indicating a time frame.[vi] Despite the lack of clear official statistics about how many entered the “rehabilitation” process, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation implies that most of the 12,000 surrendered in May 2009 after the death of the LTTE leader.[vii] In the same interview, the Commissioner General admits that the maximum period these persons could be kept lawfully in “rehabilitation” is two years – raising concern that the 1000 remaining as of 17^th October 2011, and indeed the majority of those kept after May 2011, are / were being kept illegally.

One of the alarming developments seen since the end of the war has been the threats, intimidation and restrictions placed on detainees released. Those released are being subjected to repeated registration, surveillance, interrogation in their homes and military and police camps. Many had restrictions placed on freedom of movement, such as getting permission of military before they leave their villages. [viii] At least one such person we met had been re-arrested, detained in Kandy for about a month in which process relatives observed signs that he was tortured.

3. Detention, release, “resettlement” and imminent forcible relocation of the displaced:

The mass detention of more than 280,000 Tamils from the North who had borne the brunt of the last phase of the war was amongst the most visible outcomes of the end of the war throughout most of 2009. Probably due to massive international and some local pressure, Tamils detained began to be gradually released, starting with children, elderly, injured etc. and by end of 2009, most people detained were granted freedom of movement.

From end of 2009, those displaced who were released were gradually allowed to go back to their villages in the formerly LTTE controlled areas. However, people are not allowed to go back to resettle in at least 9 villages in the Mullativu district and several more in Mannar, Killinochi and Jaffna districts which are presently occupied by the Navy and Army.

According to the latest Joint Humanitarian Update on the UN OCHA website, based on statistics of the GOSL[ix], as of end of September 2011, more than 120,000 people remain displaced.

65,008 persons who were displaced in the last phase of the war in the North after 2008 remains displaced, with 7,534 in camps and 57,474 being with host families. The update also notes that a further 55,616 remains displaced, having being displaced prior to April 2008. This number includes 8,013 in camps and 47,603 with host families, and is likely to include people from both the North and the East.

One of the new concerns is the Government’s decision announced on 20^th September 2011 that 7,394 persons still living in Menik Farm (at time of announcement) will not be allowed to go back to their villages, but will be settled elsewhere, in Kombavil, a jungle area in the Mullativu district..[x] While we were not able to obtain official information as to what these villages are, information provided by displaced people indicate that the military is occupying 9 villages, not allowing displaced civilians to go back. From what we learnt, these villages includes Puthukudiruppu East, Puthukudiruppu West, Sivanagar, Manthuvil, Malligaitivu, Ananthapuram in the Puthukudiruppu DS Division and Mulliwaikal West, Ampalawanpokkani & Keppappilavu in the Maritimepattu DS Division. Despite go and see visits to Kombavil, many residents had expressed their unwillingness to go to Kombavil, and some had submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission in this regard.

We visited Kombavil twice in the last two months and observed that government appears to be going ahead with plans of compelling people in Menik Farm to resettle in Kombavil, despite people’s concerns. The latest Joint Humanitarian Update confirms that there is no confirmation that these people would be allowed to go back to their own villages or a timeline for such an eventuality, and also confirms that issues such as access to seaside fishing areas, farming/paddy land, access to adequate health services and alternative choices other than Kombavil are yet to be resolved. [xi]

The slow return of some Muslims forcibly evicted from the North by the LTTE and Sinhalese who had left the Northern Province, has also started, and this is indeed a positive development. Some such returns have led to tension between communities, primarily based on land issues and allegations of resource allocations. Preventing such tensions and ensuring that all communities have right to return to an conductive atmosphere where they can rebuild shattered lives, in a way that does not affect the rights and sensitivities of other communities has emerged as major challenge. For example, Tamils around Madhu road in Mannar district claims that there were 22 Sinhalese families in the area in 1990 and that 180 have requested for housing to the Assistant Government Agent of Madhu Division. TNA Member of Parliament, M. A. Sumanthiran has pointed out that that 45 houses have been provided by a state Bank while only 5 have been provided to Tamils in the area. [xii]

4. Militarization:

In the last month, several well known peace activists, senior lawyers and journalists have pointed out that two and half years after war, the whole of Sri Lanka and many facets of life, remains heavily militarized.[xiii]

In our visits to the North, it was clear that the North remains heavily militarized and this continues to be resented by the Tamils in the North, many of whom believe the military is responsible for killing, disappearing, torturing, and sexually abusing Tamils during decades of war. Tamils also see the military presence as an obstacle to restoration of normalcy and civilian life in the North in the post war era. The military continues to be the most visibly present and dominant institution in the North, particularly in the formerly LTTE controlled areas. According to the official website of the Ministry of Defense, a “new Security Forces Headquarters Complex at Kilinochchi, comprised of an air-conditioned conference hall plus a separate auditorium, administrative offices, computer and signal room, mess hall and a few other wings was ceremonially opened” on 21^st October and this had cost Rs. 40.6 million (around USD 369,000)[xiv].  According to TNA MP Sumanthiran, “there is one member of the armed forces for approximately every ten civilians in the Jaffna Peninsula”[xv]. According to military’s own statistics, in Jaffna, there are more than 35,000 troops[xvi] for an estimated 626,329 people[xvii], an average of one military personnel for every 18 civilians, which includes children and senior citizens. Defense Ministry quotes the Secretary of Defense saying that “Military Intelligence Corps had to be increased to 6 battalions from the original 1-2 battalions”[xviii]. Militarization is a dominant part of parcel of live in the North (and East as well), over riding and sidelining elected representatives from the area and civilian administrators. The Governors of both the North and Eastern province are senior military officers and Government Agent of one of the districts (Trincomalee) is also a former military officer. The military plays a dominant rule in controlling civil and religious bodies and community and social life. It has also encroached into law enforcement, resettlement, rehabilitation, development, sports, cultural, shops, restaurants, hair salons, farms, transport and even touristic activities. Examples of some of these are provided below. In all the village level Development Committees in Jaffna, the President is a military officer. [xix] Some village development committees, such as Pachchilaipalli 2, comprise entirely of military officers.[xx]The civil military coordination website claims that it’s Misison includes even the upliftment of people through “spiritual values”[xxi].

5. Degrading and discriminatory registration of civilians in the North:

Civilians in the North have been subjected to repeated registrations by the military during the war and also after the end of the war. But even in 2011, this continues to happen in the Vanni and also Jaffna.

Despite the Attorney General agreeing to suspect registration of civilians in Jaffna & Killinochi districts by the military in February 2011 after a five TNA Parliamentarians of the Jaffna district filed a fundamental rights application, registration continued. Various other forms had also been distributed in Jaffna by the Police for purpose of registering civilians.

6. Occupation of land:

Large amounts of private land, and sometimes whole villages have been occupied by the military and there have been no compensation schemes announced for these long takeover of land. Many such properties continue to be occupied by the military. The military also occupies state land, and bypasses administrative laws and procedures in putting up structures at their own whim and fancy, such as shops, restaurants, farms, monuments etc. One of the most blatant incidents is the occupation of Mullikulam village in the district of Mannar since September 2007 by the Navy, without following any legal procedures and displacing the entire population indefinitely. According to the Civil-Military website for Jaffna, 200 hectares of land is inaccessible for cultivation due to High Security Zones and further 6000 hectares of land is not in use due to effects of conflict[xxii]. According to TNA MP Sumanthiran, “Tamil people inhabited 18,880 sq km of land in the North and East, but after May 2009, the defense forces have occupied more than 7,000 sq km of land owned by Tamil people”[xxiii].

7. Continuing violence in highly militarized North:

Numerically, numbers of those reported as killed, disappeared, arrested and tortured have gone down in 2010-2011 compared to 2006-2009. But people continue to live in fear in the North as killings, disappearances, sexual abuse, robberies, extortion continue to be reported from the North since the end of the war. In a three month period of November 2010 – January 2011, 40 such incidents were reported, predominantly from Jaffna.

In August 2011, the military and police conducted a spree of attacks on civilians and threatened religious leaders in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Mannar, in relation to protests and concerns of the civilian population regarding military complicity in relation to attacks on women by “Grease devils”.[xxiv]

Like before, these incidents seem to happen despite a large and dominant presence of the military on a scale not seen in the rest of the country, bringing about well founded suspicions of the military’s tacit or explicit involvement in these incidents.

One of the most shocking and brutal violence by Police against Tamil civilians was seen on 20^th September 2011, when Mr. Udaya Pushparaja Antony Nithyaraja (31) of Jaffna District was severely tortured by police officers in the premises of the Jaffna Magistrate Courts[xxv].

8. Violence against women:

Many women complain of rape, sexual abuse, including by military officials[xxvi]. Women complain of soldiers visiting houses when there are no men, telephone calls and sms (text) messages etc. There have also been allegations of trafficking. Several soldiers were arrested for rape of women in 2010 in Vishvamdu. Women also have been the prime target of attacks by “Grease devils”[xxvii]

9. Attacks on dissent and threats and restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association:

On 16^th October 2011, a Jaffna University Student Union leader, who was also a well known as an outspoken civil rights activist, was brutally assaulted [xxviii] while on 29^th July 2011, senior journalist and news editor of Uthayan was severely assaulted.[xxix] Both these attacks resulted in victims being rushed to Jaffna hospital for treatment. On 28^th May 2011 one of Uthayan reporters was attacked by armed thugs when he was on his way to work.[xxx] The individuals and organizations have been known critics of the government. On 24^th July 2011, Networking for Rights, an exiled group of Sri Lankan activists and journalists reported that two foreign journalists had been interrogated at midnight in Jaffna by Police and were compelled to leave the region and that the next day, they were attacked and robbed at gun point.[xxxi]

Several human rights defenders in the North have been subjected to threats and intimidations since the end the war. On one occasion, the names of a group of human rights defenders that participated in a human rights training in the North were printed in a mainstream national Sinhalese newspaper, along with the organizers, portraying all as traitors.

Several others have been questioned by military and intelligence and beaten. One was stopped and questioned at the airport in December 2010 and another questioned and slapped on arrival at the airport in September 2011.

On 16^th June 2011, a meeting of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the political party which won comprehensively in successive elections in the North, was broken up by the army and peopling attending the meeting attacked.[xxxii] In June 2011, it was reported in the Sinhalese newspaper “Ravaya” that the military had threatened people in Vanni not to participate in a protest of families of disappeared people and subsequently detained and interrogated two of the organizers. On the night of 1^st April, a Catholic Priest who had spoken out about problems facing civilians in Jaffna at a meeting with the visiting Congress of Religions delegation, had cow dung thrown at him.

Such incidents have also instilled fear amongst human rights defenders, journalists, opposition politicians and anyone holding dissenting views with the government.

Many NGOs and church groups keen to engage in counseling, community organizing and provision of other materials and services to people in the North continue to complain about restrictions and stringent regulations imposed by the Presidential Task Force (PTF). The difficulties in obtaining permission to provide any form of assistance drives away and discourages many groups and individuals keen to help people affected by the war, and this denies desperate people from receiving much needed support.

In many areas of the North, particularly in formerly LTTE controlled areas, the military demand advance notification of any social events and attend such events without invitation. On one occasion, Police officers interrupted the awards ceremony of a cricket tournament and took away a trophy on offer, alleging that it was in the name of a former LTTEer. In actual fact, the trophy in question was donated by family members in memory of parents that were dead.

10. Restrictions on freedom of movement in the North:

Despite the opening up of the A9 road in December 2009 and easing of some travel restrictions between the North and the South, travel restrictions still remain to the North. The Omanthai checkpoint serves as a separation of the North from rest of the country, and the separate and concept of entry / exit is indicated by a board that says “remain here until you are granted entry”.

In July 2011, a Sri Lankan journalist faced restrictions on travelling in the North, including being detained and questioned at an Army camp for several hours. Also in July 2011, days after an official announcement by the government that restrictions on travel for foreign nationals to the North have been lifted, the Ministry of External Affairs has insisted on additional documentation such as pre-planned travel itinerary for a visiting foreign national, who had a legitimate visa to visit Sri Lanka. The military officials allowed her to pass the Omanthai checkpoint, the main entry point to previously LTTE controlled areas, only after she showed a letter authorizing her to travel to specified cities for a specified time period from the Ministry of External Affairs, which according to her had been issued after obtaining approval of the Ministry of Defense. A friend from north who had called the Ministry of Defense was told that foreign nationals can only travel on the A9 road, and travelling to interior villages still required prior permission.

11. Sinhalese – Buddhist domination:

Fears and unhappiness about Sinhalese – Buddhist domination in predominantly Tamil areas was repeatedly expressed by people we met. We ourselves saw many indicators of such attempts. TNA MP Sumanthiran’s report to Parliament raises concerns that “steps are being taken to divide the District of Mullaitivu and create within it the new District Secretariat division of ‘Weli Oya’ and that there are orders issued to “to have Tamil civil servants removed or transferred from the North and to fill the vacant posts with Sinhala trainee civil servants and that one hundred and forty Sinhala civil servants have been relocated to the North as part of this initiative and Tamil civil servants have been ordered to go on compulsory leave, and further, that these drastic measures must be viewed in the backdrop of systematic deliberate exclusion of Tamils in the civil service in selection processes, promotions, trainings and development opportunities”[xxxiii].

Despite the North being predominantly Tamil, many road signs continue to be in Sinhalese. We noticed several such Sinhalese names around Mullativu on the eastern coast of Vanni and around Mulangavil and Adampan on the western coast of Vanni. We also observed several road names in Sinhalese only, named after Sinhalese soldiers.

Even some release letters for detainees, forms collecting socio-economic information are not in the Tamil language in the North.

The North also remains predominantly Hindu and Christian, and thus, the building of several new Buddhist statues and structures have also made Northern Tamils fearful of Buddhist domination of the North.

12. Lack of shelter, livelihoods, healthcare, educational, transport facilities:

30 months after the end of the war, people whose houses were razed to the ground due to no fault of their own, have not been provided houses by the GOSL. The few houses that have been provided have been built through people’s own efforts and with support of their relatives, friends, foreign governments, and private groups. However, all over the Vanni, military has been provided with housing that appears of much better quality than the housing displaced persons are compelled to live.

Some schools damaged in the war are still not repaired and it is common to see classes conducted in open air. Some schools are still occupied by military and some are still closed. TNA MP Sumanthiran sites examples of schools occupied by the military as Keppapilavu GTM school in Keppapilavu, Mulliyawalai, Mullaitivu, the Maththalan R.C.G.T.M. School in Mulliwaikkal, Mullaitivu, Mullivaikkal West K.S.V Mullivaikkal,Mullaitivu Mulliwaikkal East GTM School, Mulliwaikkal Mullaitivu, Vikneshwara Vidiyalayam Pooneryn, Arasaratnam Vidyalayam Manthuvil Puthukkudiyiruppu, Sivanagar Tamil Vidyalayam Puthukkudiyiruppu Mullaitivu and the Myliddy, R.C.T.M.S Mylidy, Kankesenthurai[xxxiv].

Hospital and medical facilities also remain scarce and often, people have to walk long distances and queue up for healthcare. According to the latest Joint Humanitarian Report, many primary medical care units and divisional hospitals in the North are still not functioning. [xxxv] TNA MP Sumanthiran’s October report to Parliament highlights inadequate health services in the Vanni, citing the This avoidable death of patient deaths, such as the death of a girl on 7th October 2011 as a result of untreated rabies[xxxvi].

Livelihood options remain scarce and most people live improvised and poor lives. Although some have been provided livelihood support by UN, church groups and NGOs, many remain improvised. A major o obstacle to develop livelihoods based on local resources has been the military encroachment into livelihood activities. The military regulates fishing, issuing passes to go to sea. Fishermen in Mannar district showed us three separate forms that require 30 signatures plus photos and additional documents, to enable fishermen to go fishing.

Some Northern Tamil fisherman allege that military often gives special privileges to Sinhalese fisherfolk from the South. The report tabled TNA MP Sumanthiran notes that while there are restrictions on fishing by Tamil fishermen in villages in Mullativu district such as in Kokkilaai to Chundikkulam in Kilaakaththai, Maathirikkiraama, Uppumaaveli, Thoondai, Alambil, Semmalai, Naayaaru, Kokkuththoduvaai, and Karunaattukkernee, Sinhala fishermen in the area have received direct permission to fish in this area from the Ministry of Defense. He also claims that while Sinhalese fishermen are given preferential treatment to fish in the North, Tamil fishermen are not given reciprocal permission to engage in fishing in the South[xxxvii]. Mr. Sumanthiran also reported that “people returned by the government to Uduththurai in Maruthenkerny (Vadamarachchi East), were soon after evicted from their houses along the coast and placed in transit camps on the other side of the coastal road. These houses are now being occupied by people brought from the South who are permitted by the Ministry of Defense to engage in diving for coral and star fish”[xxxviii].

In our visits to the North, we saw that the military has also started a large number of business, such as restaurants, shops, farm, hair salons, holiday resorts and tourism projects, denying the local people the opportunity to develop their own initiatives using local resources. The Civil-Military Coordination website lists “Tour Guide Service” amongst the services it offers[xxxix]. It appears that the military is using state resources for some of these activities and the legality of some of these activities is in doubt.

TNA MP Sumanthiran also highlighted the situation of unemployment in the North and East, saying “ The limited opportunities available are consistently given to individuals of the labour workforce from the South. Estimates suggest that unemployment in the Northern Province is between 20% to 30% in the Northern Province, compared to a National average of 4.3%. The reservoir bunds repair and road construction of the A9 road and the secondary road have been handed over to Sinhalese contractors from the South who bring in their own labour force. Only an insignificant number of Tamil labourers are employed by them despite the fact that there are numerous Tamil youth and men who are unemployed in the Vanni”[xl].

13. Impunity, allegations of war crimes, calls for international inquiry and LLRC:

Many human rights violations, abuses, criminal and illegal activities since the end of the war, including some mentioned above, continue unchecked and it appears that rule of law simply doesn’t exist in the North or a different sets of rules and laws apply in the North, distinct from rest of the country.

Allegations that grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law occurred during the last stages of the war, particularly from January – May 2009 is a recurring theme in the post war scenario. Allegations have been leveled against both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. However, with killing of the LTTE chief along with other top leaders, the focus of accountability has focused on the Sri Lankan government, given also it’s national and international obligations as a state. Allegations included the killing of thousands of civilians due to shelling and bombing, targeted shooting, attacks on hospitals, schools, churches, restrictions on essential humanitarian assistance including food and medicine. Civilians, doctors, religious leaders and militants who survived the last months of the war had given a number of first hand eyewitness accounts to the government appointed Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) when it held sessions in the North. University Teachers for Human Rights – Jaffna, a Sri Lankan group with a reputation for detailed reporting of human rights violations during the decades of war, produced a damning report of abuses by both the Government and the LTTE, while international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group also produced detailed reports containing such allegations. The United States of America Department of State also produced a report containing similar allegations. The last and most damning report came from a panel of experts on accountability in Sri Lanka, appointed by the UN Secretary General. Video and photos have also been circulating projecting horrific civilian casualties, including the shooting of unarmed LTTE cadres who had surrendered. A June 2011 50 minute documentary film produced by Channel 4, a British TV channel, and certification of the authenticity of some video clips by UN experts have raised visibility of allegations of war crimes nationally and internationally.

These allegations have led to calls for an independent international inquiry, by several western governments, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, international human rights groups and large numbers of Tamil Diaspora. Even the Indian government, which in the past had shielded the Sri Lankan government from criticisms, recently took a position that concerns being raised with regard to the sequence of events in the last days of the war needs to be examined. The failure of the Sri Lankan criminal justice system and a number of adhoc Presidential Commissions of Inquiry to establish the truth and ensure accountability for large and serious rights violations related to the war as well as unrelated to the war, such as extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse have given credibility for calls for an international inquiry.

The government’s response has been on one hand, a blanket denial that any violations of international human rights and humanitarian law took place in the last days of the war. On the other hand, the government has gone to great lengths to try and convince domestic critiques and the international community that Sri Lanka’s domestic processes, particularly the recently appointed LLRC is capable of dealing with any allegations of human rights and humanitarian law during the war. Questions about independence of the LLRC, whose Chairman and several members have served the incumbent regime and even defended allegations against the regime in international forums have not instilled confidence and hope of those calling for international inquiry. Witnesses had received death threats, one told us that he had been questioned three times by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) between January 2011 (when he gave the testimony) and October 2011 and others have been visited by intelligence officers. The lack of victim and witness protection program, restricted mandate including the scope to look at only the specific period of 2002-2009, and lack of respect paid to victims and families who came forward to testify before the LLRC have further indicated the inability of the LLRC to serve as a credible accountability or transitional justice mechanism. One the damning indictments against the LLRC process is that after more than one year, key interim recommendations by the LLRC has not been implemented by the government, including releasing a list of detainees.

Until and unless there is a credible domestic mechanisms that is seen as independent, particularly by victims, survivors, their families and others who have leveled allegations, calls for international inquiry is likely to continue.

14. Ethnic and north – south polarization; celebrations in the South and mourning in the North:

Despite the fact that LTTE prevented civilians from leaving the war zone, including by shooting at people who tried to escape, the government’s claim that it had undertaken a “humanitarian operation” and “liberated / rescued civilians held hostage by the LTTE” didn’t appear to have any acceptance amongst the Tamils in the North while in other parts of the country, this claim appeared to have gained varying degrees of acceptance.

The visible response in areas outside the North and East of Sri Lanka when the war ended was one of joy and celebrations. This was predominantly the response of the majority Sinhalese community, in line with the position of the government of Sri Lanka. If those who had survived in hand dug bunkers felt some relief when finally the shelling, bombing and shooting stopped, it was not visible. What was visible in the North was tears and mourning for large numbers of Tamils killed, disappeared, injured and displaced.

Monument for the war victory in Puthukudiruppu

This polarization was again visible during the 1^st anniversary of the end of the war. The south celebrated with a grand victory parade, while in the North, the military cancelled the solemn and subdued low key religious – cultural events organized to grieve and mourn for those killed and disappeared. Those who organized and attended these events, including several Catholic priests, were threatened by the military. A Catholic priest who attempted to build some small monuments for those killed in the war was also threatened by the military. Cemeteries and memorials of Tamil militants in the North, where family members used to go to say a prayer, lay a flower and light a candle, were raised to the ground. Even the house of the LTTE leader’s parent’s in Jaffna was vandalized and when his mother passed away, her remains were desecrated. On the other hand, massive and posh looking monuments for Sinhalese soldiers had come up in the North.

Thus, Tamils in the north find that they don’t even have the right to remember and grieve in the new kind of “liberation” they have been dished out.

15. Ethnic and north – south polarization; rejection of Rajapakse government at successive elections in the North:

Three separate elections, namely presidential, parliamentary and local bodies, were held across the country including the North in 2010-2011. None of the three elections could be termed free and fair, with election monitoring bodies reporting intimidations, killings, attacks, and threats and massive abuse of state resources and state media before and during elections. However, the incumbent regime hastened to assure Sri Lankans and the international community that elections were indeed free and fair. Thus, in elections that the incumbent regime insisted was free and fair, the regime led by President Rajapakse suffered heavy defeat in three successive elections in the Tamil dominated Northern Province, including in areas that were previously controlled by the LTTE. The last of these elections, the local government elections in Jaffna, Mullativu and Killinochi saw unprecedented campaigning by the President himself, members of the parliament including the President’s influential brother and son, and other senior ministers. Material assistance and economic development was promised and generously dished out to desperately improvised communities who had their properties and livelihoods destroyed during the war. However, all these failed to convince the Tamil citizens, who voted overwhelmingly for the Tamil National Alliance, the leading Tamil party. However, in Sinhalese dominated areas of the country, the Rajapakse regime won overwhelmingly, with the main opposition United National Party and other smaller opposition parties suffering heavy defeats.

The elections results amply demonstrated the continuing polarization between the North and the South in relation to political aspirations of Tamils. In the northern local elections, government politicians and their supporters campaigned on basis that since they hold the all powerful executive presidency and more than two thirds power in the national parliament, the only way for improvised northern Tamils to rebuild their lives would be to vote for the government in the local elections too. The rejection of this by the Tamil voters, in one way could be interpreted as an assertion that their identity and political aspirations were important more than economic development even in the most desperate of circumstances. From another perspective, it was an assertion that Tamils in the north didn’t consider the brutal war waged by the Rajapakse regime that defeated the LTTE, as a “humanitarian operation” that “rescued / liberated” them (Tamil civilians) from the clutches of the LTTE.

Even after these overwhelming victories in the North and East in the parliamentary and local elections held in April 2010 and July 2011, the TNA is given very little opportunity to actively participate and contribute their perspectives towards development of the region, with the Rajapakse clan and the military determining policy and practice. Thus, there appears to be little prospect that the Tamil National Alliance’s parliamentarians and local government representatives elected by popular vote in the North could wield much influence in decisions that affect the life of Northern peoples.

Thus, a regime that was rejected at three successive elections by popular vote will continue to govern the North and make decisions about priorities that affect the life of people there. This could only change in the longer term with constitutional changes that will provide for significant power sharing and autonomy for the North. In the short term, the only way the popular vote will have a meaning in day to day governance would be if the Sinhalese dominated central government will agree to involve the elected representatives of the North and East in making decisions and determining policies and practices that affect the life of the people there and drastically reduce the military presence and stop the military from interfering in civilian life.

16. Way forward:

As mentioned at the outset, the restoration of normalcy to the North, enabling Northern people to live without fear and in dignity, with equal rights, freedoms, opportunities as their brothers and sisters in the rest of the country will serve as a key to lasting peace and reconciliation in the whole country.

In this regard, a key element will be reduction of the military presence in the north, reducing the role of the military and the restoration of civilian rule. Removal of restrictions on travel, fishing, freedom of association, assembly, expression, movement along with guaranteeing of the right to dissent, grieve, mourn, remember those killed and disappeared, build memorials for dead and disappeared will also be crucial indicators. The stopping of acts that have direct and indirect connotation of Sinhalese – Buddhist domination, ensuring that sign boards, official forms etc. are also in Tamil language, stopping land grabbing and reparation for victims and their families (those who had been killed, disappeared, injured, tortured, detained for long periods without charges, sexually abused, whose houses and land was occupied etc.) are also key steps towards reconciliation.

Accountability for violations that have happened, both in the last phase of the war as well as throughout the three decades of war, and post-war, including some incidents mentioned above, is also crucial. A process of truth telling which involves acknowledges the wrongs that have been done, identifies perpetrators would be essential, even to consider measures such as forgiveness and amnesty.

Recognition of historical grievances and political aspirations of the Tamil community, that led to the birth of the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups leading to three decades of war, and concrete and credible steps towards addressing these would be the another important element that we believe is crucial for Sri Lankans to move on to be able to live with each other without notions of enemy. Given the polarization amongst the Tamils and Sinhalese communities, as evident by starkly contrasting election results in the North and South as well as reactions to the end of the war, such a process is bound to be long drawn out and difficult. However, in the short term, what would be crucial is for the process to be seen as genuine and not leading to yet another initiative that would be abandoned. The support the present regime enjoys amongst the Sinhalese population makes it well placed to undertake such a process, and good starting point might be to resurrect the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) process that this regime itself initiated.

In the end, reconciliation and lasting peace will come through meaningful actions such as ones outlined above, rather than empty promises.

• Final text of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in Parliament opposing the 18th Amendment
• “Sound is no substitute for argument”: Exclusive video of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in parliament against 18th Amendment
• Hansard on 18th Amendment debate, 8 September 2010
• Life in an Open Prison
• Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Breaking the Myth and Bringing the Truth

The power and promise of national exercises like the LLRC lie in the way that they can access the voices of those who have not traditionally been heard, and use them to build a more representative and inclusive collective memory. Yet for Sri Lanka’s Tamil women, the LLRC simply reaffirms bad old habits, writes Jo Baker [i]

In the lead up to the release of the report by Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), strong concerns have been publicly raised about the value of a process that aims to build a clear picture of the conflict, without fully including or representing those who were most directly affected. This has led to important questions regarding who has been heard, how their concerns have been addressed, and whether they will feature fully in a final report and its recommendations. While such questions have focused on vital themes of accountability, ethnic discrimination and political will, often in relation to internationally-agreed standards, they have been resoundingly quiet in a criticalarea: the space and consideration being given to women.

Many governments in countries recovering from conflict are now taking stronger steps to include women in transitional instruments, such as peacekeeping strategies, reparations programmes and truth commissions, to better secure lasting peace and improve their standing at home and overseas. This is underscored by a legal commitment: non-discrimination is an inalienable human rights obligation, and a founding principle of the domestic legal and international legal order. In the mid nineties and early 2000s South Africa and Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) uncovered the shocking, previously unrecognised scale of crimes against women during apartheid and internal conflict respectively, and then responded with reparations and reform to address them. A few years later, commissions in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste built strongly on these improvements by broadly consulting women in their design and procedures, as I explore below.

These steps and others show a growing understanding that women’s concerns, needs and abilities have historically been a low state priority, and that women face greater difficulties in accessing state machinery. They recognise that they generally experience conflict and displacement differently to men and, in outnumbering them as survivors, have greater post-war roles and responsibilities, and different needs. And they show an improved understanding of the ways that truth commissions (TCs) and commissions of inquiry (CoIs) have long worked from a male standpoint, producing a ‘partial and narrow truth’ (Nesiah 2006), and excluding women from an instrument meant to shape future priorities and practices in the country.

It is therefore critical to ask what the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has done to ensure that the LLRC – or any other memory-building or truth telling instrument – serves Sri Lanka’s women as well as its men; particularly minority women, who have been most deeply and directly affected by the war, and who are most deeply and directly discriminated against in general. Many will point to the floods of women who have clamoured to access the LLRC (as they have for a series of Sri Lankan CoIs). But have they truly been able to effectively use these mechanisms on a par with men? And have they been accepted as victims in their own right, or rather as mothers, sisters and daughters of victims? When Sri Lanka’s efforts are measured against international standards on non-discrimination, or against other recent commissions elsewhere in the world, a marked failure emerges by its government to uphold key human rights standards, via its massive exclusion of the female minority voice. Among all the critical assessments of the LLRC and discussions on transitional justice in Sri Lanka, this element should be receiving greater attention. As noted recently by, Valkyrie, a Groundviews columnist, in one of the few commentaries on this issue:

“For the Tamil women … ‘The not telling of the story serves as a perpetuation of [the conflict’s] tyranny’ which has the potential to provoke deep distortions in memory and the organization of everyday life later on. The fact that these are narratives which cannot be heard and cannot be witnessed to, is what constitutes a ‘mortal death blow to the survivors.’” [ii]

The following article looks at the need for gender-sensitive truth commissioning in Sri Lanka. It draws on international standards, examples of best practice elsewhere, and criticism of its past and current CoIs, before proposing ways to place Tamil women more centrally within the transitional narrative. It is abridged from my academic legal paper ‘Reconciling Truth and Gender: Lessons for Sri Lanka’, soon to appear in the coming issue of Sri Lanka’s Law and Society Trust Review, and currently available on my website. Please refer to the original for full referencing.

Part One: Disadvantage, compounded

Before looking at the how the GoSL should be addressing both gender and ethnic discrimination in its truth telling, it will be useful to briefly outline the intensified disadvantage that still confronts women in the country – particularly minority women. The chosen focus for my report was mainly on women from the Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu minority in the North and East, since they make up the majority of the survivors most severely affected by the last chapter of the conflict. This is however a vast and complex topic, and I look forward to the emergence of many deeper and more nuanced studies.

A multiple bind

Minority women in Sri Lanka fall at the crossroads of a sidelined gender and a sidelined ethnicity. During both war and peacetime this has meant greater challenges for them in education, employment and civil participation among many areas, which creates greater dependence and much higher levels of vulnerability. Minority women suffer the discrimination and disadvantages faced by all women in the country, for which the state is directly responsible (please refer to the 2011 Concluding Observations of the CEDAW Committee, its shadow report by the Women’s Media Collective, or The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2011, released last week), for example in the greater barriers to accessing justice through the police or courts. However they also experience the restrictions of stricter community traditions and customs. These tightened during the Sri Lankan war – as they have in other countries’ internal conflicts – with Tamil women cast as bearers of a threatened culture and therefore often more closely monitored. There is evidence that many lost control over how they behaved, dressed and who they married, despite the other forms of ambivalent (and arguably temporary) empowerment brought by the LTTE (De Mel; Rajasingham-Senanayake; Sornarajah; Abeysekera; see Part II Section ii of my report for elaboration).

Vulnerability to violence
Secondly, it is important to consider the particular experience of such women during and after the conflict: a combination of being unable to leave the ‘wrong place, at the wrong time’, being of the ‘wrong’ ethnicity and as is increasingly understood, of the ‘wrong’ gender.
Unlike many conflicts, rape and sexual violence do not appear to have been deployed as a tool in Sri Lanka’s war, but it has nevertheless been reportedly commonly perpetrated by state agents throughout, particularly in areas directly affected by conflict– therefore excessively victimising Tamil women (Wood 2006, 2009).[iii] The military has replaced most civil administrative systems in the North and East despite the well-documented link between militarisation and violations against women. Reports of the increase in sexual assault throughout high-security zones also cite a rise in prostitution, trafficking and STDs, since women – often without male partners, a place to live or a means of income – are being obliged to interact with male Sinhalese soldiers as part of their daily routine (ICG 2011).

Yet their ability to address these issues is low. As women, particularly minority women, they face more intense social pressure and rejection, and since the administration is not perceived to be safe or gender sensitive, protective or judicial action is extremely hard to come by. This produces a discriminatory environment in which minority women can be targeted without consequence. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has reported that young, so-called low-caste women among ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka are more vulnerable to sexual violence, and that they ‘expect’ resistance and entrenched patriarchy “all the way from officials at the police stations, to the hospital personnel and the judiciary.”[iv] Meanwhile other women face uncertainties as to the fate of loved ones, stigmas related to widowhood or their political affiliation, and tremendous new roles and responsibilities, in situations such as displacement, where resources are scarce and security concerns extremely high. Injured and/or traumatized themselves, most such women are primary carers for other maimed and traumatized persons. They thus they bear specific needs and concerns that any post-conflict initiative, without applying a gender-lens, will be entirely unable to effectively address (Iqbal 2010: or please refer to Part II Section iii).

Barriers to expression

Just as the route through the courts has been hampered for such women, so has their route through civic means. Censorship and emergency regulations have affected all Sri Lankans, but those with the least access to the public domain are now even less able to express their needs and grievances, for example, through communal gatherings, which have been severely restricted in certain areas under emergency legislation. As Groundviews’ Valkyrie notes of Tamil women: “oral narratives are their only means at their disposal to record their experiences, trauma and survival mechanisms… these women have no space within the dominant narrative to place their stories on record.” [v] This is taking place in a narrative that is already masculine by default, has been intensely masculinized by conflict, and which – as Valkyrie notes – has seen the needs and experiences of Tamil women politically appropriated by both the State and the LTTE throughout the war. Part of the function of any truth-telling or reconciliation instrument should be to rectify and counter such gross imbalances.

Part Two: Reconciling truth and gender: Lessons for Sri Lanka

With these aspects in mind, I move onto truth commissioning, and why only a dedicated commitment to corrective measures – as understood in Sri Lanka’s international commitments – could begin to serve women equally and legally in a truth telling process. Although this comment may only be the tip of the iceberg in this area, it can at the least, highlight the gap between state practice and international standards, and avenues for further action.  To do so I will draw on accounts of past and current Sri Lankan experiences of truth-telling (or ‘lesson learning’), and practices recommended by human rights and transitional justice experts, with examples from other more successful commissions.

Although Sri Lanka’s CoIs and its LLRC have not explicitly featured truth-telling in their mandates, their aims align with those of many truth commissions:  to gather a credible picture of human rights violations during the course of the conflict through the often-public testimony of victims and witnesses. They are therefore strong indicators of State practice in this area.

Methodology

On the most direct, technical level, sex discrimination has been linked to the greater difficulty of female victims and witnesses, compared to men, in accessing and engaging effectively with truth commissions, resulting in the underreporting of issues that disproportionately affect them. As mentioned, obstacles include lower levels of education, economic independence and experience in the public realm, along with responsibilities that tie them to the home or to insecure forms of informal employment; made worse by the increased vulnerability of women to intimidation or obstruction, and in so many cases now, by displacement, widowhood or disability. Gender-sensitive operalisation and outreach are therefore critical to secure women’s access to truth commissions.

While Sri Lanka’s various inquiry mechanisms have been approached by a large majority of women, with strong efforts made by some commissioners in the 1990s to facilitate their physical access, many have been revictimised by ill-treatment, or the lack of support or protection given by the State. The LLRC and past CoIs have been linked to accounts of reprisal, pro-government bias and intimidation, and there has been no adequate State efforts to counter this, nor to adjust a narrative that has previously branded the mainly female Sri Lankans campaigning for investigations into disappearances as unpatriotic The LLRC has also been roundly criticized for its lack of victim-centred methodology and its failure to address the emotional needs of victims. Reports from the International Crisis Group (2011) and Amnesty International (2011), for example, tell of ‘desultory’, ‘curt and dismissive’ staff chastising women for crying, and requesting written submissions in the place of oral testimony, which has been linked to a particular lack of tolerance for female testifiers. According to the UN Panel of experts, submission forms were in Sinhalese and English only.

To prevent discrimination as internationally understood (see Part 1, Section ii of the original study), a convincing truth mechanism would both need to arrange effective protection throughout and after a commission, and provide women with gender-sensitive guidance for the duration of the procedure. The range of best practice runs from statement-taking and information-gathering by trained female officers, to appropriate levels of privacy in testimony, as detailed at length in World Bank and ICTJ guidelines (2006; Nesiah 2006). Protective psychological measures may include having mental health professionals on standby. Women should be able to choose private testimony, be interviewed away from other family members where possible, and staff should be trained to pick up on the cues that a woman may give if she has experienced forms of violence that she considers shameful. Recent truth commissions have dedicated public and private thematic sessions to women’s testimony of their experiences, expectations and needs, which in the case of South Africa for example, began with special preparatory workshops. This improved the healing function of the commission for women, while allowing them to discuss the shifting gender roles, and the new pressures on female breadwinners. (Nesiah 2006). One of eight national public hearings in Timor Leste’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) was on women and conflict; it included a broad range of women and covered issues from coercive birth control, to humanitarian concerns (Wandita et. al, 2006).  Furthermore, in contrast to allegations that the current LLRC has failed to create a supportive environment or bear the costs of witnesses, best practice dictates that technical assistance overcome difficulties that are more likely to inhibit women. (UN Secretary-General, 2011) This would include compensating their transport or child care costs, for example, or any money lost to absence from work, since so many work in the informal sector.

It has become quite recently understood that women are generally less ready to testify about violations against themselves than those against family members, and women in Sri Lanka have been no different. This has resulted in the severe underreporting and therefore under-consideration of the range of violations against women. To counter this, encouraging measures will be needed to inform the female population about their status as victims, the full spectrum of harms – including gendered harms – and their rights within a commission mandate.

Women often testify at great personal risk, of a physical, psychological, but also a markedly social nature, as mentioned above. While reprisals have certainly affected both men and women in Sri Lanka,[vi] and are ill-guarded against (ensured by parliament’s failure to enact the bill for witness protection in 2008), the stigma associated with sexual violence and other violations is a critical barrier for female testifiers, and can result in their estrangement from family members, and even the mistreatment of their children. This needs to be countered with community-targeted education projects. However it should be noted that in Sri Lanka this stigma can be viewed as led by both community and State, when considering the GoSL’s keenness to deny allegations of war crimes, including those of a sexual nature. This has placed a sector of vulnerable and violated women out of reach of assistance, and outside the national agenda.

A comprehensive outreach strategy is critical to any public truth or inquiry process, and must be sure to address all communities equally in a manner that they understand. According to accounts of the 1994 CoIs, victims would frequently testify without comprehending the goal or the outcome of the inquiry, and the LLRC has been criticized for its minimal public information programme. This speaks of the need for a media strategy to target different groups. For women this would offer reassurance that the process is safe and sensitive, let them know what will be expected of them, and very importantly – what they can ultimately expect themselves. This should involve information about evidentiary thresholds and how to write an adequate application (as recommended by the UN Panel, which cited the LLRC’s lack of Tamil language forms as evidence of its ‘basic modalities’).  NGOs have also condemned proceedings as ‘neither safe nor gender-sensitive’, and have highlighted inadequate Tamil translation and a bias toward hearing (male) community leaders. Past recommendations such as those from the World Bank and ICTJ, have included the wider use of community networks, which Tamil women are more likely to encounter, trust and understand, advertisements in local dialects in publications and programmes commonly read and watched by minority women, along with the use of NGO-run workshops – rather than, for example, using a government mouthpiece. These considerations extend to the dissemination of any final report.

Mandate

Yet the exclusion of women goes beyond procedure and access, to issues that run deeper. By applying a gender lens, scholars such as Vesuki Nesiah have begun to question why “some facts emerge as critical to the historical account and others fade into the backdrop of the private or domestic arena, and where some actors’ agency is recognized and privileged and others fade into the anonymity of spouses, mothers, and sisters” (Nesiah 2006  Mandates).  In arguing that there is no such thing as a gender-neutral truth, such writers argue that a State must acknowledge the human-rights dimensions of women’s experiences and give more space to gendered forms of ostracism and violence. This line of argument has been much influenced by advances in international criminal law, which have contributed to the growing recognition that crimes against women cannot be isolated from a political context.[vii] The realisation of non-discrimination in the operation of truth commissions therefore applies to the scope of violations covered in truth commission mandates, to their defining of a victim and their framing of truth.  Appraisals of past Sri Lankan mechanisms have not shown them to be ahead of the curve, by any means.[viii]  Any Sri Lanka-based CoI tasked with building a truthful picture of the conflict would need a mandate that empowers its commissioners to address and counteract the prioritizing of the male experience.

Some such progress has been seen in truth commissions without gender being explicitly mentioned in mandates. For example, in South Africa (initiated in 1995) and Peru’s TRCs (2001), commissioners pushed the envelope by interpreting gender-neutral language on torture and ill-treatment in a way that could address sexual violence. They began to link it directly to conflict and to the State’s failure to combat sex discrimination, recognising that State forces had targeted vulnerabilities tied to women’s gender.  Rape gained a higher profile as a conflict-related violation, and thanks to the work of women’s activists and academics in South Africa, it was excluded from the list of crimes subject to amnesty. In certain Sri Lankan CoIs too, despite narrow mandates, some commissioners attempted to consider aspects of women’s experiences. The Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces (WSSP) CoI on disappearances in 1994 produced a short chapter on women in its final report that touched on the victimisation of women as abductees/detainees and as those ‘left behind’, and was able to raise some questions regarding  its observations that: “the climate of impunity existing during the major part of the period under scrutiny lead to the victimisation of women as much as men,” and that “some of the personal scores seem to be linked directly with the femaleness of the victim.”[ix]

Yet without dedicated expertise or clear guidelines, these efforts have left much unexplored and under-implemented, and they leave proceedings open to the bias of commissioners.  A narrow understanding of sexual violence for example, has meant that other violations and their effects have been regularly overlooked and their gendered roots and consequences left unexplored. This has advanced, according to Nesiah, a “partial and narrow truth” (Mandates 2006). She and others give the example of South Africa, where women’s experiences under apartheid saw rape receive much attention, but the ‘ordinary violence’ and deprivations that women experienced in the private sphere as a result of apartheid, largely ignored. These ranged from gender-specific violence and intimidation, to black and coloured women’s access to state services and basic provisions for living (for example during forced removals or under the group-area legislation that segregated living and working conditions).

In past Sri Lankan CoIs, most of these issues have barely arisen. The limited recommendations and perfunctory analysis of WSSP commissioners on the situation of women ‘left behind’ falls far short of current best practice, [x] and as with other commissions, women receive barely a mention in the rest of the report. Yet this remains one of the better examples to come from Sri Lanka. Although commissioners controversially decided to look at the rape and murder of girls who had been abducted from their homes by persons looking for their fathers or brothers, and they noted the involvement of gender-based ‘personaI scores’, there was little room to take this further. Its mandate excluded disappearances that arose from personal disputes and other forms of physical injury, which are the areas in which most violations against women tend to fall, and it did not allow for the necessary resources or expertise.  The LLRC has similarly given no explicit space to gender-based crimes, and few have been reported officially.[xi] According to Sri Lankan legal researcher, Ambika Satkunanathan: “We all hear stories, anecdotes… but sexual violence remains one of the least documented violations from this conflict.”[xii]  As a result women are consigned by their state to suffer indefinitely in silence.

In contrast, recently designed truth commissions have begun to build an explicit reference to gender into the legal instrument that creates them, ensuring dedicated staff, resources and guidelines – and many of the procedural improvements described above.  This has produced deeper investigations into the privatized and structural harms that come from conflict, and for the proper cross-distribution of these findings in the report and any follow up action. In Peru for example, a gender unit was partly funded by the UN Office of the High Commission of Human Rights. Although the mainstreaming of gender wasn’t hailed as a complete success, it was well represented in the final report and in its recommendations, which included a chapter on gender analysis and another on sexual violence against women (Guillerot 2006). Though it came as an unpleasant surprise to Peruvian society at the time by establishing the grave scale and range of the violence perpetrated against women during the conflict, the country was able to move forward with a programme of reforms and rehabilitation. In South Africa a similar unit was sparely funded and had to restrict itself to low-cost initiatives, and could therefore only mainly reach women who wished to come forward. (World Bank 2006)

To avoid discrimination a commission must investigate violations that were made possible by the war-fuelled environment of violence and impunity, in public, but also in the private realm where most women, due to social convention, are situated and too often overlooked.  One report for example, notes a growing culture of sexual and gender-based violence in the post-conflict period, with widowed mothers in particular being targeted, not only by the army, navy and military police, but by other male civilians (SuRG 2011). Rather than excluding ‘private harms’ therefore, as instructed by the 1994 CoIs, a mandate would include the impact of such violence in relation to women’s different socioeconomic circumstances; social ostracism, for example, or the effect on her chances of employment, and her family’s welfare. By doing so it would be much less at risk of recommending measures for reform and reparation that only suit men – which is another emerging field of study (see particularly, recent work by Ruth Rubio-Marin).

As a further illustration, given by a World Bank report (2006): to enquire into the gendered implications of disappearance in Sri Lanka would be to explain not only how acts of kidnapping, torture, rape or murder were able to take place, but also to account for the kinds of violation and hurdles to justice that women have experienced as they searched for disappeared relatives. The needs of female-headed households during displacement and periods of militarization would need to be identified, along with any other rights that may be violated due to the loss of their loved ones, whether related to health, employment, family life or education. This route leads to a holistic and healing process that equally addresses survivors, and which satisfies Sri Lanka’s international commitments.  Analysis by Peru’s TRC saw the prioritising of a new Declaration of Forced Disappearance, which the Ombudsman’s Office released if a claim was made and a disappeared person not found. This was recognized and hastened for the disproportionately positive impact it would have on women as the majority of survivors, in terms of their rights to property, inheritance and remarriage. Itholds significant parallels to the difficulties of Sri Lankan families, many female-headed, on obtaining death certificates.

Finally, for these issues to be addressed without sex discrimination, the time span of an inquiry would need to include periods of significance to women. In the case of Sri Lanka, this would include the months following the war, during which reports of human rights violations against IDPs in and outside of internment camps by military personnel were frequent, yet which the LLRC’s time frame excludes.

Composition and consultation

The underrepresentation of Tamil women in the public sphere and in past truth-telling exercises in Sri Lanka goes against best practice on firstly the composition of its panel, and secondly the need for broad consultation with women’s groups, as articulated in soft law provisions such as the UN’s 2005 Updated Principles on Impunity. The design of the mandate and procedure cannot be legitimately inclusive if drafting decisions take place in forums that lack input from women, along with other marginalized groups.

The presence of just one female Tamil commissioner out of eight (alongside just one other male Tamil), makes the LLRC composition ‘seriously deficient’ according to the UN Panel of Experts, and does not represent the diversity of Sri Lankan society – particularly those most directly affected by the conflict. Both Tamil commissioners meanwhile have been reported as less active or vocal than the other six, giving testifiers the impression of being marginalized themselves (CMTPC  2011). Civilian women have perceived a lack of interest or sympathy in their stories in comparison, they allege, to the (mostly male) officials or elite actors invited to take part. They have been berated for grieving publicly, passed over if unable to quickly compose themselves, and commissioners have suggested that in the interests of efficiency, one woman be chosen to represent others. Other reports tell of women being ‘driven away’ en mass. These are strong indications of a gender-related disregard for women’s experiences, and of bias in the methodology for selecting witnesses.

Problems of representation are arguably reflected in the final reports of Sri Lanka’s All Island and the WSSPs CoIs. Both were headed by female commissioners and both, though insufficiently, made some mention of women’s experiences, in contrast to the all-male North East CoI panel. Nevertheless, international standards require that stakeholder groups be proportionally represented (for example in the Beijing Platform for Action – which articulates the UN General Assembly’s definition of gender balance and perspective in special mechanisms). This is increasingly being seen. In Sierra Leone, for example, three out of seven commissioners were women. In Timor Leste two of seven were women, determined through public consultation and special sessions with women NGOs; regional commissioners were typically balanced between men and women, and led district teams of two male and two female statement takers, and a male and female victim support staff member; and the male executive director was supported by a female programme manager – an experienced activist in the field of gender and human rights (Wandita et al 2006).

Yet because gender balance does not guarantee a panel’s full understanding of the complexities surrounding the relationship between human rights, gender and ethnicity, the participation of experts in gender analysis and other related fields (such as anthropology and social psychology) is an important measure to prevent discrimination. In the same vein, the close involvement of women’s groups  is critical from the appointment process onward, and can help facilitate the periodic training of staff in gender sensitization, as well as inspire women’s confidence in the exercise. Before gender training in the Sierra Leone initiative, for example, some staff would question female victims of sexual violence about the clothes that they were wearing when attacked, and why they were outside alone, at night, showing clear discriminatory attitudes (World Bank 2006). Proactive outreach to communities, and coordination with survivors and victim’s groups, as seen in the kind of women-only public consultations and research projects pioneered in Timor Leste and Sierra Leone, can also forge closer links to victims and guard against discrimination by utilizing further expertise on gender – particularly in operational design. In Timor Leste, which was established under the interim UN government, women were mobilized and widely involved as civil groups, as experts on the steering committee and as commissioners at national, regional, and district levels, as well as partners on research projects and healing workshops. The gender training of staff in Sierra Leone, by UNIFEM (the UN’s former women’s agency) and other groups, contributed to broad contribution by women, and a final report that called for significant reforms to improve women’s participation in education, in political and social life, and community initiatives to encourage acceptance of the survivors of rape and sexual violence. Such initiatives are absent, and appear little considered in Sri Lanka during the transitional period.

Report

It is clear that women are affected by discrimination in truth commission mandates and procedures on an individual and a community level. However the product too – the final report – can have a great national impact, and is crucial for the full value of the process to be diffused throughout a society. There is little scope here to consider the kind of historical analysis needed in a truth commission’s report, its evaluation of institutional responsibility or its recommendations in approaching gender, power and victimisation, as covered by scholars such as Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Catherine Turner; Christine Bell and Catherine O Rourke; and  Ruth Rubio-Marin. It is also notable that neither the warrant of the LLRC or the Commission of Inquiry act require the publication of a final report, though one has been promised.  Yet it is important to realize that any discrimination in a truth commission’s mandate, composition and procedure will be carried onward in any reforms or reparations that it proposes, reducing the likelihood of for example, of gender-appropriate health care, rehabilitation, welfare payments or opportunities in the civic sector. And by cutting women from the process, the state is cutting them from the historical record and its benefits; from  consideration in the post-conflict agenda, and in any ‘lessons learned’. As mentioned, the final reports of certain commissions have included a special chapter on gender – some like Peru’s more successful than for example, South Africa, or the short chapter in Sri Lanka’s WSSP CoI. However increasingly, calls are being made for gender to be mainstreamed throughout the whole document to prevent women’s issues being ‘ghettoised’. If the purpose of a truth commission is to build a nation’s collective memory of a period, to leave more than 50% of those affected on the periphery of this memory is a gross act of discrimination, not only at that point in time, but extending far into the future.

Conclusion:

Truth-telling can offer opportunity amid crisis for those whose voices have not traditionally been heard. For Sri Lanka’s minority women, the opportunity is being dishearteningly wasted. By failing to uphold key human rights standards in its memory-building response to the conflict, the GoSL appears content with returning to and retrenching practices that have long violated the spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights held by Tamil women. Sri Lanka’s challenging political climate will limit the practical contribution of the recommendations made above. Yet with greater attention to the equality framework and corresponding best practice, I have tried at the very least, to highlight avenues that can begin to counteract the historical exclusion of Tamil women and place them more squarely, and legally, within the post conflict narrative – while also urging those who challenge Sri Lanka’s transitional justice mechanisms, to do so with sex equality in mind.  I find both aims illustrated in a 2011 report on Sri Lanka by the International Crisis Group – made without overtures to gender – which observes:

Rebuilding relations among those communities and getting to a point where each has some real understanding of what the others have gone through should be a central goal…  It may be several years before the country is able to have a truly inclusive and representative process, but it is something Sri Lankans should be able to look forward to.

Selected bibliography

Abeysekera, Sunila (2007) ‘Implications of Insurgency on Women: The Sri Lankan Experience’ in Ava Shrestha; Rita Thapa eds. The impact of armed conflicts on women in South Asia, Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies

Amnesty International (September 2011) When will they get justice? available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_21824.pdf

Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (2010) The State of Human Rights in Sri Lanka in 2010 available at http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/hrreport/2010/AHRC-SPR-010-2010.pdf

Baker, Jo (22 August 2009), A Thankless Task, South China Morning Post, available at http://www.jobakeronline.com/articles/a-thankless-task/

Coalition of Muslims & Tamils for Peace & Coexistence (15 July 2011) Two Years On: No War but no peace for women still facing the consequences of the war, available at http://cmtpc.wordpress.com/author/cmtpc.

De Mel, Neloufer (2001) Women and the Nation’s Narrative, New Delhi: Kali for Women

Guillerot, Julie (2006) ‘Linking Gender and Reparations in Peru: A Failed Opportunity’ in Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.) What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2006.

International Crisis Group (18 July 2011) Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, Brussels: International Crisis Group

Iqbal, Rajani (23 October 2010) Women in Postwar Reconstruction and Reform in Sri Lanka, a presentation made at the Third Annual Conference of the Tamil Women’s Development Forum in London.

Nesiah, Vasuki (2006) Gender and Truth Commission Mandates (paper presented at Open Society Institute (OSI) forum on Gender and Transitional Justice, February 7, 2006), available at <www.ictj.org

Nesiah, Vasuki et al. (July 2006)  Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies, and Procedures,  for the International Center for Transitional Justice, available at http://ictj.org/ (last accessed 13 Sept 2011)

Rajasingham-Senanayake, Darini (2001) ‘Ambivalent Empowerment: The Tragedy of Tamil Women in Conflict’ in Ride Manchanda (ed) Women, War and Peace in South Asia, Beyond Victimhood to Agency; New Delhi: Sage Publications

Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.) What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2006.

Sornarajah, Nanthini (August 2004) ‘The Experiences of Tamil Women: Nationalism, Construction of Gender and Women’s Political Agency, Part III,’ available at http://issues.lines-magazine.org/Art_Aug04/nanthini.htm#_edn1  )

Sri Lanka Supporting Regional Governance program (SuRG) (May 2011), Post-war support for widowed mothers: a gender impact assessment, Colombo: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

The World Economic Forum (2011) Global Gender Gap Report, available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (4 February 2011) Concluding comments to the combined fifth, sixth and seventh periodic reports of Sri Lanka, CEDAW/C/LKA/5-7, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-LKA-CO-7.pdf

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (11 February 2011)  Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention: Combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Sri Lanka,  CEDAW/C/SR.971, United Nations, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-SR.971.pdf

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (11 February 2011)  Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention: Combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Sri Lanka (continued), CEDAW/C/SR.972, United Nations, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-SR.972.pdf

United Nations Secretary-General (31 March 2011), Report of the Secretary General`s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db7b23e2.html

United Nations Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (8 February 2005) E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1

Valkyrie; (25 April 2011) National security’ in post-war Sri Lanka: Women’s (In) security in the North, Groundviews, available at http://groundviews.org/2011/04/25/national-security-in-post-war-sri-lanka-womens-in-security-in-the-north/

Wandita, G., Campbell-Nelson, K., and Leong Pereira, M., (2006) ‘Learning to Engender Reparations in Timor-Leste: Reaching Out to Female Victims’ in Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.) What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2006.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2006) Variation in Sexual Violence During War  available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/cpworkshop/papers/Wood.pdf  and (2009) Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare? Politics Society; 37; 131,available at http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/CPW/2010-2011/Wood_01.11.pdf

Women’s Media Collective (WMC) (July 2010) Sri Lanka Shadow Report To the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,  Colombo: Women’s Media Collective, available at http://www.womenandmedia.net/legal_statements/Sri_Lanka_NGO_Shadow_Report_to_CEDAW_July_2010.pdf

World Bank (2006) Gender, Justice and Truth Commissions, Washington DC: World Bank

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Long Reads brings to Groundviews long-form journalism found in publications such as Foreign Policy, The New Yorker and the New York Times. This section, inspired by Longreads, offers more in-depth deliberation on key issues covered on Groundviews

• How hard is it to admit fault, Ambassador Wickramasuriya?
• A conversation with Kumudini Samuel
• Violence Against Women and Girls in Sri Lanka: No April Fools joke
• The Islamic Republic of Sri Lanka
• A slumbering LLRC: The image of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?

This was on the eve of the 21^st annual commemoration for disappeared persons held annuallyon the 27^th of October at the site of the monument, with the participation of families of disappeared persons, religious leaders, political leaders, human rights activists and concerned citizens.

This request to destroy the monument was preceded by several attempts by Fr. Prasad and the Parish Council to disrupt and discourage the use of the monument and the commemoration. These attempts included the construction of a wall that obstructed access between the monument and the church premises. Verbal and written appeals have been made by the leaders of the organization of Families of the Disappeared (FOD) to the Parish Priest and the Parish Council to facilitate the continuance of activities that take place surrounding the monument, including and the annual commemoration, but these have apparently fallen on deaf ears. Church leaders have made complaints regarding the monument to the Police and also threatened legal action against the Families of the Disappeared seeking a Court order to destroy the monument.

The main allegation by the Church is that the monument is situated on land belonging to the Catholic Church. This is the first time such allegations have been made in the past 11 years of the existence of the monument. The Church delegation had gone to the extent of accusing the Families of the Disappeared that they had “secretly built the monument in the night” despite it being built for over a period of two months and construction work taking placein broad daylight in full view of the Church premises and its access roads.

The fact that both the allegations made and the request to destroy the monument come from the Archdiocese’s official representative in charge of land issues together with a lawyer indicates that these allegations and the request to destroy the monument is most likely with the approval of leader of the Archdiocese, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith.

What the monument is about:

The monument has photos of Sinhalese youth disappeared and killed in the late 1980s, during the regime of the United National Party. Families and loved ones still don’t know fate of many of them andprobably never will. These are persons who have no grave, no place to light a candle, no place to lay flowers and no place to say a prayer. It is in this context that the monument became a place for families of those killed and disappeared to gather collectively, together with concerned religious leaders, political leaders and citizens to light candles, lay flowers and conduct religious observances.

The monument has also become an important symbol and record of a tragic part of Sri Lankan history  -  – a part that the powerful and victors ignore. Even Presidential Commissions which heard tens of thousands of testimonies relating to disappearances refuse to publish their reports.

More importantly, the monument also provided a space to campaign against the heinous crime of disappearances and raise a voice demanding that it should never happen again, anywhere, to anyone.

The history of the October 27^th commemoration, the monument and the Catholic Church

The monument is built at the Seeduwa – Raddoluwa junction in the Gampaha district (Western Province), at the place where bodies of two disappeared trade union activists, H.M Ranjith and H. Lional, were found in 1989. During a period of severe repression, in which it was usual to find the bodies of those killed everywhere every morning, 17 people had come together to remember Lionel and Ranjith on 27^th October 1991. This continued over the years, drawing more people, including political leaders and activists from all over Sri Lanka and the world, including the present President and Ministers of cabinet. On 10^th December 1999, the foundation stone was laid for the monument, adjoining St. Cecelia’s Church by the roadside. It was opened on 4^th February 2000.

Commemorations at the site of the monument – before the monument was built

In the 1980s, some Catholic Priests who had tried to safeguard youth from being disappeared and killed and buried bodies when no one else dared to do so, were killed and threatened. Every year, Catholic Priests had come forward to conduct religious observances on the 27^th of October, to console grieving families and support these families’ and other activists’ efforts to struggle against disappearances and impunity. Amongst the Catholic Priests present at this year’s commemoration was Fr. Terence Fernando, who was amongst the 16 people who had gathered in 1991 for the first commemoration.

In the past, St. Cecilia’s Church had been very supportive of the commemoration and the building of the monument. The families and their supporters were invited to use the Church premises for activities related to the commemoration. Particularly significant had been the offering of the Church space for traditional alms giving to Buddhist Monks at the end of the October 27^th commemoration. There was a period when the first Sunday service after the 27^th of October was dedicated to the disappeared and their families, with family members invited to share their grief and the whole church community going to light candles at the monument. Over the last few years, I have d seen material displayed and distributed, meals served, and discussions held in the Church premises with the support of the Church.

For 20 years, no question or objection had been raised about the commemoration or the monument, nor had any allegation been made that church owned land was being used for this purpose.

Please not to destroy the monument:

During this year’s commemoration, Mrs. Annie Theresa, a Catholic mother whose son had disappeared in 1989 and had been participating in the commemoration for many years, pleaded with Church leaders not to destroy the monument and to allow the commemoration to continue. “My son has no grave, where can I lay flowers and pray?” she asked. The sister of a disappeared person asked “whenever I pass this way, I get down, lay flowers and go – where will I go if this monument is destroyed?” “The Church has been helping us in the past – why are they doing this now?” asked Mrs. Sandya Ekneligoda, wife of cartoonist Prageeth Ekneligoda, who disappeared in January 2010.

At the end of this year’s commemoration, families and others present held a protest against the request to destroy the monument and signed an appeal to the Cardinal not to destroy the monument.

Monuments, commemorations and Catholic Priests in the North & South 

In the North, the military has destroyed a number of memorials for Tamil militants where mothers and loves ones used to go and pray, light a candle and lay some flowers.

When a Tamil Catholic Priest in the North tried to erect a monument in memory of those killed and gone missing during the war, the military threatened him with death, compelling the Bishop to transfer the priest to ensure his safety.

When Tamil Catholic Priests in the North together with other Christian Clergy and Hindu Kurukkals tried to organize prayer services for those killed and disappeared, they were also threatened by the military and some events had to be cancelled. Military officers had even walked into a Church and stopped a service the Priest was conducting.

In St. Anne’s Church Vankalai (Diocese of Mannar in Northern Sri lanka) where I often visit and stay, is a statue to remember Fr. Mary Bastians, who was, in the presence of witnesses,shot dead by the military and whose body carried away, never to be seen again. His photo is also prominently displayed. Several times, I have participated in the commemorations on the 6^th of January, as the whole village gathers with the Bishop and other Priests to remember his killing and his selfless service for which he sacrificed his life.

Here in Colombo however, Sinhalese Catholic Priests appear to take on the role of the military in the North – demanding that Police destroy a monument of 11 years and a commemoration that has been held for 20 years.

Why destroy the monument and obstruct the annual October 27^th commemoration?

Amongst the many Sri Lankans killed and disappeared due to their commitment to serve the poor and oppressed and raise a voice against injustice, have been Catholic Priests. With few exceptions, such as the one I mentioned above in relation to St. Anne’s Church Vankalai, they are forgotten and not remembered.

Thus, in a way, it is not surprising that some Priests do not appreciate the importance of remembering tragedies, collective grieving and the inspiration and strength drawn through monuments and commemorations to prevent such occurrences in future.

But still, it is not easy to understand why these Church leaders want to destroy the monument and disrupt the commemoration.

Is it purely due to greed for land?

Or are they objecting now, because it is only in the last few years, that many Tamil families from the North and East, and Tamil Catholic Priests from North have started to attend the commemoration and organizers and speakers have become increasingly critical of the present government’s role in the disappearance and killing of Tamils?

Or is it because they want to follow the policy of the government in the North to destroy memorials for those killed and disappeared, disrupt any efforts to build a monument and organize religious observances for those killed and disappeared and threaten those organizing?

In the recent past, in several instances, such as those given below, the Cardinal and Catholic Church in Archdiocese of Colombo have been perceived to be supportive ofthe government instead of the poor, the oppressed and victims of human rights violations and injustices. The Cardinal and Priests in Colombo,

• supported the government in opposing the linking of human rights to GSP+ and attempts to balance trade privileges with the human dignity of all peoples
• joined the government in labeling the report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Secretary General as a conspiracy even when as Church leaders in the North affirmed the report
• stood by government MP Duminda Silva instead of supporting poor slum dwellers facing imminent evictions
• didn’t join and support the struggles of the fishing community of Negombo against a sea plane project that would have damaged the lagoon and the livelihood of the fishing community
• collaborated with the military in suppressing the public expression of grief and outrage over the brutal killing of Free Trade Zone worker Roshane Chanaka by the Police

Are the efforts of these Church leaders to destroy the monument for the disappeared and disrupt the the annual commemoration simply another example of the practice of defending the government against any allegations of abuses?

What is actually at stake?

What are these Church leaders actually trying to destroy?

It is just not a concrete structure, but the memory of loved ones with no grave and resting place, the space and sprit of collective grieving, consciousness, outrage and spirit and resolve not to let heinous crimes happen to anyone anywhere.

By The Way Side

This wreath

With no name attached

Is for you

Who have no grave

As the place of earth

Which embraced you

Could not be found,

This wreath was placed by the wayside

Forgive me

Forgive me

For placing a memorial for you

By the roadside

(A poem at the foot of the monument, by Basil Fernando, a key supporter of the monument from its inception)

• Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas: Five years after disappearance, where are they and what has happened to the investigation?
• Christmas 2008 in Sri Lanka
• Celebrating war victory and banning commemoration of dead civilians: this is “home grown & indigenous” reconciliation and freedom in Sri Lanka?
• Personal experience of the Vanni today
• Violating the Madhu Sancuary – Some brief thoughts

The main points expressed by the Collective were the following:

- The State has an obligation to ensure the protection of women, to set about establishing impartial investigations and strengthen law enforcement, particularly with respect to the ability of the police to maintain law and order.
- “If women are insecure, it is also an indictment on the community and our society at large. We want law enforcement to work closely with communities and strengthen mechanisms that would ensure safety of communities”.
- It is necessary to avoid the “policing of women in the guise of dealing with this issue”, particularly to prevent restriction or confinement. This is important in order to recognise that women have responsibilities and assume an important role in their respective families and communities.
- Comprehensive investigations are required to prevent the repetition of incidents.
- The need to build confidence within our communities and for elected representatives to engage with their constituencies.
- The media has a responsibility to avoid sensational reportage and reduce levels of hysteria.
- The need for communities to work with law enforcement agencies in a manner that strengthens community trust.

Women and Media Collective Press Conference – 17th August 2011 from Centre for Policy Alternatives on Vimeo.

• Violence Against Women and Girls in Sri Lanka: No April Fools joke
• Gender and Journalism
• Going beyond the 13th Amendment: Newspaper coverage of the Sri Lankan’s President’s assurance to India
• Speech by Justice P N Bhagwati at the IIGEP’s final press conference
• Women on Top: Sexuality and rights in Sri Lanka

Fr. Tiruchelvam Nihal Jim Brown | Image courtesy of www.transcurrents.com

Fr. Jim Brown, a Catholic Priest from diocese of Jaffna in Northern Sri Lanka and his associate, Mr. Vimalathas, a father of five people, seem to be just two names and statistics in the long list of disappeared in Sri Lanka, particularly after the escalation of violence and war in the North since 2006.

I didn’t know either before they disappeared, but had got to know about them and the families after they disappeared. I remember the empty and distraught looks on the children of Vimalathas in their small house, who had not realized they will not see and hear from their father again for so long. I remember the hope the parents of Fr. Jim Brown always shares whenever I meet them that their beloved son will return.

Mr. Vimalathas

Background to the disappearance:

Fr Jim Brown and Vimalathas went missing on 20 August 2006 amid escalated warfare between the security forces and separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). They were last seen on a motorcycle at a checkpoint in Allaipiddy, an area tightly controlled by the security forces.

Fr. Jim Brown was a young priest who had loved and served the people of the Allaipiddy parish selflessly. In the face of intense shelling on the night of 12^th August 2006, he had offered the church as a place of refuge to people. However, breaking international humanitarian norms, the church had also been shelled in the early hours of 13^th August, and more than 20 were reported as killed that night and many more injured. Having miraculously escaped death and injury himself, Fr. Jim Brown was at the forefront in trying to lead the people, particularly the injured, to safety. He pleaded with the Navy to let the people leave. According to Catholics priests in Jaffna, Fr. Jim Brown had been threatened by the Navy officers of the area as being LTTE supporter, due to his relentless efforts to protect and support the civilians of his parish. Based on all accounts I had heard from people of Allaipiddy and priests in Jaffna in the last 5 years, Fr. Jim Brown’s disappearance is linked to his efforts to intervene with the Navy to safeguard and assist people affected by the shelling in the area.

Memories of Fr. Jim Brown:

All the people of Allaipiddy were displaced in this incident and when I met some of them in Jaffna some months after the displacement, I remember what one elderly gentleman told me “If not for Fr. Jim Brown, many more of us would have been killed, he sacrificed himself to save us”.

Later, when the first group of displaced people was allowed to return to Allaipiddy, I went to visit them. Access was highly restricted to outsiders, but thanks to pleas of the priest who took me and goodwill of an officer at the check point, we were given a “one hour visa” by the officers at the same check point that Fr. Jim Brown was last seen. The priest taking me had warned me not to say the word “Fr. Jim Brown”. We proceeded to the church that was destroyed and abandoned. We were apprehensive, noting that we were followed by officers from the checkpoint, and remembering that Fr. Jim Brown and Vimalathas were probably also followed from the check point. But despite military presence, the few people who were staying in broken houses and tents flocked to the destroyed church as we entered. Although me and the priest deliberately didn’t say or ask anything about Fr. Jim Brown, the people had a lot to say about him. The lasting memory of that one hour in Allaipiddy was the testimony of several people that some of them would not be alive if not for Fr. Jim Brown’s willingness to provide them with shelter and pleading with the Navy.

Parish of Mandaitivu-Allapidy, which was shelled in August 2006.

The search for Fr. Jim Brown and investigations:

Appeals by church leaders and local and international human rights groups have also not yielded any response. The Commission of Inquiry established by the President in November 2006 listed this case as one of the 16 cases. During the 1^st year commemoration of Fr. Jim Brown’s disappearance in Colombo, and in front of his family and the Catholic Bishop of Jaffna, one of the Commissioners mentioned that the case not yet been taken up for inquiry.

Fr. Jim Brown is not the only Catholic Priest who disappeared. Now, it is more than two years, since the disappearance of another Tamil Catholic Priest from the North, Fr. Franis Joseph, who had tried to negotiate the safe surrender of several LTTE leaders in the last days of the war. Several eye witnesses had seen him with the Army just before he disappeared.

Both these cases have also been raised at the hearings in Colombo and North, of the latest Commission appointed by the President – the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).  After one priest in North raised this at a LLRC hearing, he got a threatening call the next day, asking him whether he knew Fr. Jim Brown and whether he would like the same thing to happen to him.

Priests are amongst the 25 persons in humanitarian service that have been reported as disappeared between 2006-2009 in Sri Lanka. Thousands of civilians have also disappeared. It is not known how many have been found, and whether justice has been done for even one case.

Fr. Jim Brown’s family is also amongst the families of disappeared who faced threats, intimidation and harassments.

Amongst the principles lesson I learnt (or re-learnt) from LLRC hearings is that it is very easy to make people disappear in Sri Lanka, and that it is also equally easy to make investigations and justice disappear! And related lesson is that those who look for those disappeared and justice, will be threatened and also face risk of disappearing!

Do we need to remember the disappeared?

I remember Fr. Jim Brown’s parents question to the Catholic Bishop of Jaffna, “We entrusted our son to your care to serve the Lord and his peoples, what has happened to him?” Sinhalese Catholics – laity, youth, women, priests, sisters, Bishops – who often claim that they can play a important role in reconciliation by building better relations with Tamil Catholics, appear to have forgotten about Fr. Jim Brown, Vimalathas and others, or perhaps they don’t care.

Every year, a few friends together with parents, brother and sister of Fr. Jim Brown, have tried to faithfully remember Fr. Jim Brown. From the hundreds that attended the first commemoration we organized, we had seen over the years that interest had declined. Perhaps there are so many disappeared to be commemorated. But can we afford to forget them?

Will we ever know what happened to Fr. Jim Brown and Vimalathas and thousands of others who have disappeared? And will those responsible be ever identified and brought to justice?

Can we really have reconciliation without acknowledging what has happened to Fr. Jim Brown and Vimalathas and the thousands like them? Could we even have reconciliation within the Catholic Church? What does reconciliation mean to their families and friends of Fr. Jim Brown and Vimalathas and countless other families of disappeared people?

Ruki, 19^th August 2011

• Disappearance
• Christmas 2008 in Sri Lanka
• Destroying monuments for those killed & disappeared: The Catholic Church and the Sri Lankan Government
• Violating the Madhu Sancuary – Some brief thoughts
• Madhu Shrine: the struggle to preserve the sanctity of a sacred shrine and humanitarian space

Funeral of Pattani Razeek | Photo courtesy of Deutsche Presse Agentur

Mr. Pattani Razeek’s case is a rare instance where the body of a disappeared person has been found, based on information given by arrested suspects. The arrest of key suspects is itself a rare occurrence in the thousands of disappearance cases in Sri Lanka. It is even more unusual that people connected to a Minister in the ruling regime would be arrested for a serious crime.

Razeek’s case had generated mass outrage in his home district of Puttalam. Since the disappearance, protests, signature campaigns, posters and leaflet campaigns were conducted. The family and local Muslim leaders played a prominent role in the campaign. Their efforts were supported at the national level by Razeek’s friends and colleagues, who monitored the investigation and court proceedings, the exhumation, post mortem process and the funeral. 62 Sri Lankan civil society activists including Buddhist and Christian clergy, senior lawyers, academics, media personnel and human rights defenders signed a statement calling for justice in this case.

Razeek’s case also generated international outrage and concern. Many regional and international human rights organizations such as the Asian Centre for Progress of People, Asian Federation Against Enforced Disappearances, Asian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, FORUM-ASIA, Frontline Defenders, Minority Rights Group and the Observatory to Protect Human Rights Defenders took up Razeek’s case. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva also made a public call for justice on the case.

On the day of the funeral, shops were closed in Razeek’s hometown Sameeragama and the district capital Puttalam and other nearby towns in protest. Black and white flags were displayed throughout the town as well as banners condemning the abduction and killing and calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice.  Media reports estimated that between 5000 – 7000 people attended the funeral. The outrage expressed at the funeral was particularly directed at Minister Rishard Bathiudeen and former Trustee General of CTF, Mr. Mustafa Nihamath, with thousands chanting slogans calling for their arrest.

Key concerns:

The unwillingness of the Police to question or arrest the chief suspect, Nowshaadh, who was identified by the Police as early as May-June 2010,  has raised concerns about political interference in the case. This was fuelled also by statements by the chief suspect himself, admitting his close connections to Minister Bathiudeen. After a major local, national and international campaign marking 500 days since the disappearance of Razeek, Nowshaadh and another suspect Musdeen were arrested in July 2011 and the body was exhumed based on information provided by Musdeen.

However, it appears that the Police have made no further move to apprehend or question several others implicated in the case including;

• Mr. Irshard, Parliamentary Secretary to Minister Rishard Bathiudeen, who stated publicly,  in October 2010, that Mr. Razeek was held by the Defense Ministry;
• Persons travelling  in the vehicle with suspect Musdeen, in which according to the suspect,  Mr. Razeek was abducted
• Persons travelling with suspect Nowshaadh, who admitted to meeting Mr. Razeek in Polonnaruwa on the day he disappeared. According to Nowshaadh, he and several others were travelling in a vehicle belonging to the Resettlement Ministry, headed by Minister Bathiudeen at the time.
• Minister Bathiudeen and Mustafa Nihamath, former CTF Trustee General and currently employed at the World Food Program in Colombo, whose involvement in key aspects of the case merits further inquiry.

It remains to be seen who actually abducted and killed Razeek, and importantly, who pulled the strings and masterminded the actual crime and the cover up.

It is extremely disturbing to note the delays and reluctance by the police, to question or arrest persons who it is reasonably believed, could shed some light on the abduction and killing of Mr. Razeek. Rumors that one or even both the suspects might be released due to political pressure, has renewed doubts that an independent investigation will proceed towards prosecutions and convictions.

Different views have been expressed about whether tensions between the displaced Northern Muslims and host community in Puttalam were a factor in Razeek’s killing. Key Muslim leaders from the host community, who led the campaign for justice despite threats and intimidations, have claimed that tensions between the communities are a factor in the case. Razeek is from the host community and was the only senior and prominent leader in CTF from the host community, while the chief suspect and others implicated as being involved in the case are all from the Northern Muslim community or known supporters. Northern Muslim leaders have however asserted that this case has nothing to do with the tensions between the two communities. Despite the polarization, it is our view that the present situation provides a unique opportunity for both communities to work together by joining hands to fight for justice for Razeek’s case in a proactive manner, particularly by calling for arrest and questioning of all those implicated or believed to have information. During the funeral, Mowlavi Abdulla stressed the importance of unity between the two communities and called on the Northern Muslims to help the struggle for justice regarding Razeek’s case. A positive and proactive response by Northern Muslim leaders and the community towards this call would be a key factor that could help reduce tensions between the two communities.

It is also not clear whether the takeover of CTF by the Ministry of Defense in June 2011, following complaints by Minister Bathiudeen, is linked to Razeek’s case. The many questions raised during the inquiry about Razeek’s disappearance, the timing and the fact that the inquiry conducted by the Ministry of Defense was based on a complaint by Minister Bathiudeen has led to speculation that there is indeed a link between the two.

After Razeek’s disappearance and even after his funeral, attempts have been made to divert attention from key issues related to the disappearance, killing and investigations, by a stream of anonymous emails and documents,  sent to local and international groups concerned about Razeek’s case, alleging that Razeek and CTF were corrupt and questioning whether Razeek was indeed a human rights defender.

It is in this context that we feel that it is crucial for authorities and all concerned groups and individuals to focus on addressing the crucial and fundamental issue of who abducted and killed Razeek and ensure that the perpetrators are brought to justice through a speedy an independent investigation and judicial process.

Background facts on the case:

Mr. Pattani Razeek, born in January 1955, was a well known human rights defender in Sri Lanka and Asia. At the time of his disappearance, Mr. Razeek was the Managing Trustee of the Community Trust Fund (CTF) (www.ctfsrilanka.org) and was an Executive Committee Member of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) (www.forum-asia.org). Mr. Razeek had also served as a Grama Seweka (Village Government Official) in the Puttalam district.

Description of Disappearance:

Mr. Razeek was last seen near the Jumma Mosque in Kaduruwela, Polonnaruwa (a town in the North‐Central Province of Sri Lanka) at around 3.30 pm on 11^th February 2010. Mr. Razeek was travelling with CTF field staff, when he met a group of people in a van parked behind the Jumma Mosque in Polonnaruwa.  Mr. Razeek approached the group and exchanged greetings in Arabic, indicating that they were Muslim. Mr. Razeek subsequently got into the van, with the group, having told his colleagues that he would be travelling to the Eastern town of Valaichchenai and that he would return to Polonnaruwa the following day.

Calls to Mr. Razeek’s Family, Trustees and Friends

Shortly after Mr. Razeeks’ disappearance, his family and CTF trustees began to receive repeated calls from the abductors using Mr. Razeek’s mobile phone number. The abductors ordered CTF to continue paying Mr. Razeek’s phone bill if they wished to maintain contact with him. Between February and June 2010 the family and trustees received many calls demanding;

• that Rs.20 million be paid as pocket money to the abductors;
• CTF be closed down immediately; and
• the family provide details of CTF assets and that the trustees transfer any properties held in their name to the ‘Nujoom Trust’ a trust set up by Mr. Nihamath (the former Trustee General of CTF) in 2009.

In March 2010, Ms. Rifana, a former CTF employee and close associate of Mr. Razeek, received a call demanding that CTF be asked to pay Rs. 1 million as pocket money to the abductors. Rifana filed a complaint regarding the call with the Puttalam police. The abductors also diverted calls made to Mr. Razeek’s phone from 18^th – 24^th February 2010 to Rifana’s phone number.

CTF and the family agreed to pay the abductors provided they were allowed to speak to or see Mr. Razeek.  On 3^rd April 2010, the family was asked to collect a parcel by the abductors. The parcel which was collected on 4^th April 2010 from the Gunasinghapura Mosque in Colombo, contained Mr. Razeek’s spectacles, keys, watch, driving license, Grama Seveka identity card, bike license and insurance.  These items were sent as proof that Mr. Razeek was being held by the abductors.  On 5^th April 2010, Mr. Razeek’s phone number was disconnected due to non-payment of the bill by CTF. On 11^th April 2010 the family was asked to collect a parcel from the Wattala Mosque, which contained 2 SIM cards. The family was asked to keep one SIM to communicate with the abductors.  The second SIM was to be given to former Trustee of CTF, Mr. Nihamath, who refused to accept it stating that he did not wish to be involved with CTF or Razeek’s disappearance.

The calls temporarily ceased between June and August 2010. On around 15^th August 2010, the family began to receive calls demanding a ransom of Rs.10 million for Mr. Razeek’s release. On 6^th September 2010, the family agreed to pay the ransom but asked to see or speak to Mr. Razeek before the money was paid.  From 6^th September 2010, the calls to Mr. Razeek’s family, friends and CTF trustees abruptly ceased.

Police Inquiry and Court Proceedings

Mr. Razeek’s family lodged complaints with the Police in Mundalama (place of Mr. Razeek’s residence) on February 13, 2010 (no.CIB 02 33/175). CTF lodged complaints with the police in Polonnaruwa on February 14, 2010 (no. MOIB 113/313) and in Puttalam on February 15, 2010 (no.CIB 01 389/187). On February 16 2010, the police filed a case bearing no BR177/10/P in the Puttalam Magistrate Court.

Since the initial complaint, Mr. Razeek’s family has filed several further complaints and statements to the Mundalama, Polonnaruwa and Puttalam police, regarding Mr. Razeek’s disappearance and the ransom calls and threats made against the family.

A Police B report submitted to the Puttalam Magistrates Court around May-July 2010 has identified Mr. Shahabdeen Nowshaadh, a former CTF employee, as the chief suspect in Mr. Razeek’s disappearance. The police have evidence linking Nowshaadh with Mr. Razeek’s disappearance including calls made to Mr. Razeek’s family, on Mr. Razeeks mobile phone number, after his disappearance. The police traced these calls, through the phone EMEI number to a phone registered to Nowshaadh. In his anticipatory bail application, Nowshaadh admits to meeting Mr. Razeek on 11^th February 2010 and to being in the same area (Polonnaruwa) that Mr. Razeek disappeared.

Nowshaadh filed an anticipatory bail application to the Puttalam Magistrates Court on 15^th June 2010. The court rejected his application on 23^rd June 2010. Nowshaadh filed a revision petition in the Puttalam High Court on 20^th October 2010, challenging the decision of the Magistrate denying him anticipatory bail. This case bearing no.HCR 08/10 was dragged before the High Court for 9 months until 28^th July 2011, by which time Nowshaadh had been arrested and was in the custody of the Colombo Crimes Division (CCD).

Despite having identified the chief suspect as early as May/June 2010 the police made no real attempt to apprehend or question Nowshaadh for over a year. On 11^th December 2010, the case was transferred from the Puttalam police to the CCD, following protests by Mr. Razeek’s family and community leaders in Puttalam. However there was no move to arrest Nowshaadh despite information provided by the family and community leaders to the police as to his whereabouts. During this time, Nowshaadh was reported to have moved around freely and has been seen at public events in the presence of Minister Bathiudeen. Mr. Razeek’s family and community leaders believe that the failure to arrest Nowshaadh was due to his close association with Minister Rishard Bathiudeen. In his anticipatory bail application to the Magistrate Court, Nowshaadh claimed to have close links with Minister Bathiudeen.  Nowshaadh stated, in his affidavit to Court, that his arrest would cause irreparable harm to the Ministers’ reputation and work. At the High Court, Nowshaadh was represented by Mr. Saheed, General Secretary to the All Ceylon Muslim Congress (ACMC) of which Minister Bathiudeen is the President.

On 7^th June 2011, Mr. Razeek’s son, Riskhan, received a letter from the Presidential Secretariat informing him that the investigation into Mr. Razeek’s disappearance has been handed over to the Inspector General of Police. On 14^th June 2011 Mr. Riskhan and his relative, Mr. Umar Jaufer, were summoned to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Colombo for inquiry. They were informed that the CID would conduct a fresh investigation into the case and that no person would be arrested or any action taken, until the investigation was complete. The family was not given a timeline for the inquiry, which they were told could take up to a year.

Finally on 8^th July 2011, Nowshaadh was arrested by the CCD in Killinochchi as a suspect in Mr. Razeek’s disappearance. Suspect Musdeen was arrested by the CCD shortly after. The remains of a body believed to be that of Mr. Razeek was exhumed in Kavathamunai, Oddamavadi on 28^th July 2011, based on information given by Musdeen.

NHRC Inquiry

On 15^th February 2010, Mr. Razeek’s family submitted a complaint to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) regarding Mr. Razeek’s disappearance. The complaint was recorded under case no HRC/619/10.  Mr. Razeek’s son made a statement to the NHRC in Colombo on 17^th March 2010. The family received no further communication from the NHRC until over a year later, on 4^th July 2011, when Riskhan was summoned to an inquiry at the NHRC.

On 18^th July 2011, responding to a specific request, the Chairman, Commissioners and senior staff of the NHRC met with the family, Mosque Committee, former CTF Trustees and concerned lawyers, civil society leaders in Colombo. The Commissioners assured that the NHRC would conduct its inquiry and ensure that the family would be kept informed of all developments in the police case, particularly when suspects are produced in courts. However, this has not always happened so far and the family has to depend on unofficial sources for information on the latest developments including the dates on which suspects are produced in courts.

Campaign by family, Mosque Committee and civil society groups

We believe that progress in Mr. Razeek’s case is mainly due to the sustained campaign carried out by the family, local community leaders and local, national and international civil society groups and activists calling for justice in this case.

Soon after Mr. Razeek’s disappearance, the family and local and national civil society groups were advised by Mr. Nihamath against carrying out any public campaigns and international appeals on the case. Several misleading e-mails were also sent to donors and other national and international organizations connected to CTF and Mr. Razeek. As a result, civil society groups at the national and international level did not campaign actively on Mr. Razeek’s case for over 8 months following his disappearance. It was only in the latter part of 2010, that a renewed campaign to search for Razeek was begun, when the family approached the Puttalam Grand Mosque and the Puttalam District organization of Muslim Theologians for help, and later several national and international human rights organizations.

The Mosque Committee organized discussions with the Divisional Secretary of Puttalam, lawyers, religious leaders, civil society groups, CTF trustees, local politicians, the Puttalam police and Mr. Nihamath. The Mosque Committee also held discussions with Nowshaadh’s family and the Northern Muslim community on the request of Minister Bathiudeen.

On 26^th October 2010, the Mosque Committee submitted appeals to the Attorney General, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Secretary to the Ministry of Defense and the Presidential Secretariat regarding the lack of any investigation into Mr. Razeek’s case. The letter from the Presidential Secretariat on 7^th June 2011 is believed to be in response to the complaint submitted in October last year.

25^th June 2011 marked 500 days since Mr. Razeeks’ disappearance. In the 17 months following the disappearance, protests and poster campaigns have been held by community leaders and civil society organizations in Mr. Razeek’s hometown and in the Puttalam District. The campaign for justice in this case has been sustained despite attempts to threaten, intimidate and silence Mr. Razeek’s family and individual and groups organizing or participating in such events. On 24^th June 2011 the Mosque Committee and family organized a signature campaign in Puttalam and distributed handbills appealing to Minister Bathiudeen and the police to surrender Nowshaadh and find Mr. Razeek.

Internationally, appeals relating to Mr. Razeek’s disappearance and killing and the lack of any credible investigation by the local police have been made by several international human rights groups, including at the sessions of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva in March 2011.  Formal complaints have also been lodged with the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders and the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also called for justice in the case immediately after the exhumation of the body.

Obstructions and threats against the family, CTF Trustees and the Mosque Committee

Mr. Razeek’s family and those campaigning for justice in his case have been threatened and intimidated on several occasions. Mr. Razeek’s son, Riskhan and his son-in-law Azam received threatening calls in May 2010. On 15^th May 2010 the abductors threatened Azam’s mother that he would be killed if he did not agree to the abductors demands. A police complaint regarding the threats was filed with the Mundalama police on 16^th May 2010.  Also in May 2010, CTF Trustee Mr. Nafeel was threatened that he would be shot dead in Puttalam if he continued to campaign in Mr. Razeek’s case.

In October 2010, Mowlavi Abdullah, a member of the Mosque Committee, was threatened by Mr. Saheed, Nowshaadh’s lawyer in the anticipatory bail case and Secretary of the ACMC, that he would report Mowlavi Abdullah to the Defence Secretary Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapakse and that he will be shot dead in Puttalam if he continued to intervene in Mr. Razeek’s case.

Rifana, civil society member and former CTF employee received threats in February 2010 that she would suffer the same fate as Razeek if she did not provide information on CTF assets and her relationship with Razeek. In July 2010 the abductors threatened to harm Rifana’s son if she did not comply with their demands.

Members of the Mosque Committee received fresh threats in July 2011 during the campaign to mark 500 days since Mr. Razeek’s disappearance. From 24^th June 2011, Mr. Razeek’s family and the Mosque Committee conducted a signature campaign and distributed handbills in Puttalam and nearby towns and villages. Members of the Mosque Committee have received threats and been accused of misusing Mosque property for the campaign.

On 3^rd July 2011, at around 10.56 pm, Mr. Ajmail, secretary to the Mosque Committee, received a missed call on his mobile phone from no. +94729122269. At around 11 pm he received a message from the same number threatening to destroy him if he continued to campaign for Razeek’s case. Mr. Ajmail filed a complaint with the Puttalam police on 4^th July 2011. He received several more missed calls from the same number on 5^th July 2011. A few days prior to Mr. Ajmail had been summoned to the office of Minister Bathiudeen, after an event organized by the Northern Muslims was cancelled due to protests by the Mosque Committee.

Shortly after Mr. Razeek disappeared, leaflets were distributed in Puttalam, accusing Mr. Razeek of being a CIA agent and a womanizer who was having an affair with a female trustee of CTF. One leaflet, appealed to Minister Bathiutheen to intervene and punish CTF trustees for their involvement with Mr. Razeek.

More recently,  while Muslim leaders were trying to organize the closure of shops on the day of Razeek’s funeral, a group calling itself the ‘Puttalam Traders Association’ distributed a leaflet dated 1^st August 2011, stating that shops can remain open. However, in the end, all shop owners abided by the request of the Grand Mosque Committee and shops were closed in Sameeragama, Puttlam and nearby towns on the funeral day.

In the days leading up to the funeral, there were several rumours alleging that the Mosque Committee was plotting a campaign against the Northern Muslim community in Puttalam, resulting in a police inquiry against the Mosque Committee. There were rumours that the Puttalam Grand Mosque had issued a notice asking displaced Northern Muslims to vacate Puttalam, and based on which, some shops owned by this community, located along the Puttalam – Colombo highway in the village of Erukilampitty, were vacated.   “Navamani” a Tamil newspaper, on 31^st July (Sunday) carried the headline “Tension in Puttalam and Valachchenai”. The Grand Mosque assured all concerned that the rumours were baseless, and as it turned out, the funeral ceremony was conducted peacefully with no cause for unrest between the host community and the Northern Muslims. During the funeral, Moulawi Abdulla called on the Northern Muslims community to join hands to fight for justice for Razeek.

State Response

For over a year, State authorities including the police and NHRC failed to respond effectively to Mr. Razeek’s disappearance. The police were unwilling to arrest the chief suspect Nowshaadh despite clear evidence linking him to the disappearance. Statements and responses by Government ministers, their aids and the State media during this period appear to have been aimed at undermining or preventing an effective investigation into the case.

On 13^th October 2010, at a meeting at Puttalam Zahira Primary School, the Parliamentary Secretary to Minister Bathiudeen, Mr. S. R. M. Irshad, made a public statement, accusing Mr. Razeek of being an intermediary through whom funds were transferred from the CIA to the LTTE during the war. He also announced that Mr. Razeek was being held in the custody of the Ministry of Defense. This claim was not investigated to the best of our knowledge.

The media supportive to the state, have also published misinformation regarding the case including an article in the Lankadeepa, a Sinhala newspaper, on 2^nd July 2010, which quoted police sources as saying that Mr. Razeek had been kidnapped by an extremist Muslim group.

In November 2010, Minister Bathiudeen speaking at a public meeting organized by the Mosque Committee, promised to write to the IGP asking for action to be taken in Mr. Razeek’s case. The Minister also said that if the IGP failed to act within 2 weeks, he would take the matter up with the Defence Secretary. Minister Bathiudeen submitted a letter to the IGP on November 12, calling on the police to take necessary action in the Razeek case. However no action was taken based on this letter and the Minister took no further steps until 27^th June 2011 when he again offered to arrange a meeting with the Defence Secretary regarding the case.

On 25^th June 2011 an event organized by the Northern Muslim community, which Minister Bathiudeen was due to attend, was cancelled due to protests by the Mosque Committee. Following this incident, on 27^th June, Mr. Ajmail, Secretary to the Mosque Committee was summoned by Minister Bathiudeen who accused the Mosque Committee of tarnishing his reputation by linking him to the Razeek case. At this meeting the Minister challenged the Mosque Committee to take up the case with the Defence Ministry and offered to set up a meeting with the Defence Secretary if the Mosque Committee wanted it. Several days after this meeting Mr. Ajmail received threatening calls and messages on his phone. The Mosque Committee also received letters from Mr. Irshaad, Mr. Bathiudeens’ parliamentary secretary and from the organizer of the event that was cancelled on 25^th June 2011. Irshaad in his letter dated 1^st July 2011, accused the Mosque Committee of defaming Minister Bathiudeen and of misusing Mosque resources for Mr. Razeek’s campaign.

Despite the delays, there have been significant developments in the Razeek case since the June 2011 campaign marking 500 days since Razeek’s disaperance. The NHRC inquiry appears to have been re-commenced and two suspects, Nowshaadh and Musdeen were arrested by the CCD on 8^th and 13^th July respectively. Mr. Razeek’s body was exhumed on 28^th July based on information given by Musdeen and the post mortem was held on 2^nd August.

Takeover of CTF management by the Ministry of Defense:

In a parallel development, the Community Trust Fund was taken over by the Defence Ministry in June 2011. CTF has been under investigation by the NGO Secretariat since shortly after Mr. Razeek’s disappearance. The inquiry is based on a petition submitted by Minister Bathiudeen to the NGO Secretariat alleging financial mismanagement and malpractice against CTF and its trustees.

On 9^th June 2011, CTF received a fax copy of a letter by the Defence Ministry appointing the Chairman of an Interim Board of Management which will take over the management of CTF for a period of two years or until the completion of an inquiry by an Investigation Board appointed by the Defence Ministry. CTF received no other communication regarding the takeover and there is no clear indication of the basis or grounds for such action against the organization. Although CTF asked time till 20^th June to comply with the request to handover documents, records etc., the Interim Board went to CTF on 16^th June 2011. The day to day management of CTF, including the disbursement of funds for projects and staff, travel of staff out of the office etc. is strictly controlled by the Interim Board which includes a senior military officer and two government officials.

The NGO Secretariat initiated an inquiry into CTF in December 2010.  The Inquiry Board comprising of Mr. D.W. Abeywickrema, M. Meththapala and Mr. T.G. Ariyadasa conducted two hearings with CTF trustees and directors on 6^th and 14^th December 2010.  CTF trustees, Mr. Firdhaous and Ms. Jensila Majeed, CTF Executive Director, Mr. Fawas and CTF Program Director, Mr. Suhuri were present at the inquiry. Minutes of the Inquiry Board state that the inquiry was based on a petition submitted by Minister Rishad Bathiudeen and Mr. Hunais Farook M.P. to the NGO Secretariat on 12^th November 2010 alleging several points of mismanagement against CTF. Several of the issues raised at the inquiry related to Mr. Razeek’s disappearance and the actions of CTF directors and trustees in the aftermath.

On 27^th December 2010 CTF submitted an official letter to the NGO Secretariat, objecting to the manner in which the inquiry was conducted and asked that Minister Bathiudeen and former Trustee General Mr. M. Nihmath be present at the inquiry. CTF did not receive a response to this letter.

On 22^nd February 2011 a meeting was held at the Temple Trees with Mr. Douglas Nanayakkara, Director of the NGO Secretariat and CTF Trustees Mr. Riskhan, Mr. Firdhaous and Mr. Rafeek and the CTF Executive Director, Program Director and Finance Director. The meeting was organized by Mr. Nimal Weerasekara, private secretary to Mr. Namal Rajapakse M.P. (son of president Rajapakse). At the meeting it was agreed that CTF would continue to function as usual within the ambit of the program plan given to the NGO Secretariat. With regard to the CTF inquiry, Mr. Nanayakkara told the trustees and directors present that the matter had been taken up at the highest level and that CTF would be informed of the final decision. CTF has had no further contact with the NGO Secretariat until the letter from the Defence Ministry on 9^th June 2011.

It appears that the CTF inquiry and subsequent takeover are not independent of Mr. Razeek’s case particularly since the petition which led to the initial inquiry was sent by Minister Bathiudeen shortly after Mr. Razeek disappeared.

Ruki & Deanne, 17^th August 2011

• Who Killed Razeek? And Why? Unanswered Questions Two Years After His Abduction
• Disappearance
• Mano Ganesan on his experience of the anti-Tamil riots in July 1983
• DISAPPEARANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS & POLITICAL ACTIVISTS LALITH KUMAR WEERARAJ AND KUGAN MURUGAN ON 9TH DECEMBER 2011
• The protest by Wimal Weerawansa against the UN in Sri Lanka: Condoned by government?

Downtown Bogota, Plaza de Bolivar

At first glance, Colombia and Sri Lanka have little in common aside from a brutal history of violence. Nevertheless, the few but important similarities mean that by studying how the other moves towards national reconciliation and the reestablishment of Government legitimacy could prove to be beneficial. A case in point is the revolutionary new Victim’s Law approved by the Colombian Congress this past June that just might prove be an interesting case study for Sri Lanka.

Civil War in the Andes

Colombia is a vast country broken apart by soaring mountain ranges, sprawling grasslands and the depths of the Amazon jungle. For the past four decades a vicious war between peasant land movements, paramilitary armies, government forces and armed gangs have plagued the countryside leaving hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced. Fueled by drug money, Colombia’s war morphed overtime into a snake pit of drug lords, organized crime, and the markedly non-political remnants of once powerful movements.

In 2002, newly elected President Alvaro Uribe rejected previous attempts at peace negotiations and launched a relentless military campaign against the strongest of the guerilla groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). At the same time, he extended a hand to the largest paramilitary army—the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)—and made a deal that resulted in the group’s eventual disbandment and disarmament.[i]

Wildly popular until the day he left office, President Uribe successfully drove the FARC further into the jungle and gave Colombians a new lease on life. News of bombs exploding came less frequently and Colombians themselves were much less likely to be kidnapped or killed. Bogota was no longer a city synonymous with death, but rather began popping up on lists of up-and-coming places to live.

The Transition from War to Peace

Nevertheless, this military success came at a cost. President Uribe’s tenure was riddled with scandals engulfing the very highest levels of office. Words such as parapolítica and falsos positivos had to be invented just to be able to explain the allegations of what was occurring. Countless accusations of human right abuses by all sides involved as well as the almost daily murders of witnesses, activists, judges and politicians have so far gone uninvestigated. As a result, Colombia has one of the world’s highest impunity rates at around 96%.[ii]

To name only a few of the more notorious scandals, in 2010: 10% of members of Colombian’s House and Senate—a total of 33 people—were behind bars after being accused of supporting right-wing paramilitary groups; young men from the slums of Bogota were pulled from their homes, shot, and presented by the army as dead FARC members; and the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) was found to have been illegally spying on opposition members of Congress.

Last year’s Presidential polls saw the election of the hard-line former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, who at the time promised to continue the policies of his predecessor. Nevertheless, President Santos has made a move so remarkable that it shows not only a substantial legal, but also a psychological break with the past. On May 26 of this year, the Colombian Congress passed the groundbreaking La Ley de Víctimas y de Restitución de Tierras or the Victim and Land Restitution Law (known popularly just as the Victim’s Law) that has the potential to improve the lives of millions across the country.

First, this bill will provide monetary restitution to victims of violence—or those that suffered from the acts of terrorists; illegally armed groups, and, most significantly, of Government armed forces. Second, the passage of this bill marked a significant rhetorical break from past policy by naming the war being waged in Colombia as an “internal armed conflict” as opposed to just a “terrorist threat”.

What does it mean to be a Victim in Colombia?

Colombia has more than 3 million IDPs and while the country boasts of some of the most advanced laws in the world regarding the rights of the displaced, implementation has so far been seriously lacking. Many of the displaced still have not returned to their communities for fear of continued violence and those who did return have only limited access to state services.

In support of the displaced and others who suffered during the armed conflict, the Victim’s Law was first proposed in 2007 as a way forward in national healing and reconciliation. However, the law stalled for years in the Colombian legislature as politicians argued relentlessly over the definition of a victim. President Uribe and his supporters championed the point of view that refused to include victims of Colombian Armed Forces, and rather only victims of terrorist activities, within the bill. This side originally received the majority of Congressional support, despite viable evidence of Armed Forces involvement in human rights violations. As a result of the disagreement, the bill was never passed.

However, in highly unexpected turn in October 2010, President Santos chose to reintroduce the bill in its current form, which will provide unprecedented compensation to victims of violence—including those that suffered at the hands of the armed forces. This time, the Colombian Congress passed the bill and made reparations available to all victims of the armed conflict, regardless of the perpetrator. Importantly, while former child soldiers are eligible to participate under the law, victims of criminal activity as well as demobilized ex-combatants are excluded.

In Montes de Maria at an Independence Day Celebration organized by Accion Social and aimed at improving community cohesion. Montes is a community that suffered much violence in the 1990's and is now in the process of welcoming back returnees

Making Amends: Reparations and Restitution

In order to achieve transitional justice, this law aims to use the means of reparations, or the making of amends for the loss of a family member by paying money, to the more than 4 million people recognized as victims of the armed conflict. The maximum amount that can be allocated to each beneficiary is 20 million Colombian pesos or around UD$11,400, which is equivalent to about 40 months of minimum wage.[iii] Additionally, victims are entitled through the plan to an education allowance applicable to schooling from the elementary to high school levels as well as to healthcare.

Those eligible include victims whose fundamental rights were denied; those who suffered injury, emotional suffering, loss of liberty, forced recruitment, financial loss, or displacement; as well as those killed or disappeared as a result of the armed conflict. In order to preemptively combat fraudulent claims by non-victims, the Government has imposed harsh prison sentences of up to ten years for any false claims submitted.

Tackling one of Colombia’s most difficult challenges, the law also calls for the restitution or returning of titles to the displaced forced off their land. The total area under question is equal to about 6.6 million hectares. Significantly, the law places the burden of proof on the current landholders, who must prove that they acquired the land legally, as opposed to those displaced from the land. This nuanced approach demonstrates an understanding of both the trauma of displacement, during which many had to quickly flee leaving their documents behind, as well as knowledge of the psychological importance for victims of being able to their return home.

The restitution of land is expected to be an particularly difficult process to implement given the unnerving reports of criminal gangs and other types of armed groups purposefully amassing land in the Northern part of the country—an area where many of the displaced come from—through intimidation.  Nevertheless, this law is a significant first step towards the total resettlement and the normalization of life.

Another contentious issue regarding the law is the timeframe it covers. While some politicians wanted a shorter period beginning the 1990’s, the law as approved covers incidents that occurred as far back as 1985 and will be applicable for new cases that occur until 2021. The extension of the bill to cover incidents until 2021 is an impressive step that recognizes the fact that the conflict is not yet over and that new victims are created everyday. It is expected that the implementation of the bill will cost the Government of Colombia around US$20 billion dollars.

While human rights analysts have pointed out certain flaws in the law, such as the lack of special clauses addressing particularly vulnerable groups like Afro-Colombians and indigenous populations, there is a general hope that the implementation of the law will help to solidify the gains made in building a sustainable peace. As with past measures aimed at providing support to IDPs, the key will be in its implementation as well as the protection provided to witnesses coming forward to declare themselves as victims.

The Power of Rhetoric

Another change that resulted from the Victim’s Law was the sanctioning of the term “internal armed conflict” by President Santos to describe Colombia’s decades long orgy of violence. Those who disagree with this new classification argue that it will confer political legitimacy on the illegally armed groups terrorizing the country. On the other hand, for the millions of victims this switch signals an important break with the past and a long-awaited recognition of the realities in the country.

Initially, the labeling of the situation in Colombia as a “terrorist threat” placed the country closer to the frontlines of the US’s war on terror. The FARC’s prolific use of terrorist tactics and, more importantly, its deep involvement with the drug trade prompted the US to provide millions of dollars worth of military aid to the beleaguered country. Some skeptics believe that this aid would not have come if the US knew that it was involved in an “internal conflict” as opposed to a fight against a terrorist threat with a global reach.

Nevertheless, the United States Embassy has actually lauded the change in rhetoric. Additionally, to assuage those worried about conferring political legitimacy, the law directly recognizes that even though the State is providing compensation for victims of the Armed Forces, it can by no means be construed as recognition of criminal responsibility of the State or of the political legitimacy of the armed guerilla groups.

What does it mean to be a Victim in Sri Lanka?

As of yet, the Sri Lankan Government has not developed a comprehensive plan to compensate the hundreds of thousands displaced, killed, and disappeared during the civil war. The support provided so far has been only on an ad hoc basis regarding specific incidents. It is not clear whether or not the Government is interested in providing reparations to individuals and families. If the Government does decide, as it should, to provide restitution to these victims, the groundbreaking decision by the Colombian Government to give blanket compensation to all victims sets a high—albeit good—standard.

Given the sensitivities posed by the ethnic and political dimensions of the conflict, a single scheme that provides equal compensation for all—regardless of the perpetrator—could be the best way to show a palpable commitment to reconciliation and equality. Unfortunately, looking at the Government’s harsh response to allegations of human rights violations by the armed forces, the idea that the Government will admit that victims of State violence exist—let alone deserve restitution—seems unlikely if not impossible.

Outside of reparations, contentions over land rights in the North and East are a potential source of future discontent unless addressed quickly and efficiently.[iv] Given the common problems of loss of documentation, competing claims, and continued occupation, the Government will find itself needing to address this problem sooner rather than later. Keeping an eye on how the new law proceeds in Colombia could provide a good learning lab for Sri Lanka, particularly the clause that places the burden of proof on current landholders.

Looking towards the Future

Given the precarious security situation in Colombia, the passing of the Victim’s Law was accompanied by an ambitious security plan to combat drug-traffickers, newly emerging criminal gangs, and the remaining guerilla groups. Additionally, the most vulnerable areas of the country are receiving unprecedented levels of investments in social and economic infrastructure in an effort to build Government legitimacy and consolidate security gains through political engagement.

By promoting high-levels community involvement in the process and giving heavy focus to alternative livelihoods in order to ease the transition from reliance on illegal crops, the Government’s commitment to change is impressive, but will require both large sums of money as well as continued public support. Importantly, despite the undeniable gains in security, a least ten activists working on land issues as well as scores of witnesses and activists throughout the country have been killed this year alone.

While it is clear there is much left to be done, the steps made by President Santos have given hope to many anxiously waiting for Colombia to continue on the road to peace. While Sri Lanka is by no means Colombia, such South-to-South exchange of ideas and experiences between countries recovering from conflict could prove to be quite beneficial as people try to rebuild their lives and reconcile with the past.

• Colombo to Colombia: A traveler’s look at parallel causes of conflict in two golden lands
• The Internment – A Collective Punishment?
• Urgent questions to pose to the Leader of the Opposition
• A response to Gomin Dayasiri’s “Return of the Colombians”
• The Anti-Conversion Bill violates the freedom of Conscience and the freedom of expression

For about 21 years, more than 100,000 Internally Displaced People from the Northen Province of Sri Lanka have been languishing in camps.  Mainly from the Muslim community, these people were forced out by the LTTE for crimes of not being Tamil.  In the wake of post conflict debates about reconciliation and rehabilitation, there are now challenges for future resettlement and rehabilitation of this affected community.

June 20^th was World Refugee Day.  For many it is about remembering the plights of many people the world over, who today are without rights, a state and an identity.  You can picture the Palestinians or the Rohingas or the Kurds.  Over the past week, in Sri Lanka, international attention has turned once again to the 300,000 refugees (or internally displaced people) after the end of the conflict in 2009.  Despite all this attention, very little is said about the plight of the other major victims and refugees of the 30 year old conflict, and that is the Muslim refugees in Puttalum

For centuries, the Muslim community has been scattered around Sri Lanka living in co-existence with the other two main ethnic communities (Sinhalese and Tamil) with very close socio-economic interactions among them. Despite the seeds for the minority rights crisis being planted at the time of Independence, the ethnic conflict that began to emerge at the end of the seventies only engulfed engulfing the Muslim community in the eighties.

In the north and east of the country, Muslims and Tamils coexisted with Muslim and Tamil children attending the same school and taking different roles in cultural displays and sporting events.  However as the ethnic crisis developed into armed conflict with Tamil youth taking to arms and the LTTE (Liberation of Tamil Tigers for Eelam) being formed, it became apparent that in the early eighties, in the east of Sri Lanka, there was a conflict of interest between Muslims and Tamils.  Whilst this was initially at a manageable and political level, it slowly disintegrated in 1990 as the LTTE massacred worshipers in a mosque in Batticaloa and other attacks on Muslim civilians (for further details you could read SRI LANKA’S MUSLIMS: CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE” by International Crisis Group).  The LTTE based in the North, gave its presentation of developments. It became an unspoken cliché that Muslims were ‘traitors’ as a result of many Muslims joining the government forces and setting up their own political parties. A number of intellectuals and the printed word began to break a  35 year old tradition which had previously categorised Muslims as part of the Tamil speaking  nation and now identifying the Muslims as different.  There was a total breakdown of communal relations in the East.

In the north however there was a different story. In every way Muslims and Tamils in the North had been traditionally totally integrated into local life as interdependent communities. There were Muslim traders, tailors, iron mongers, labourers and scholars. Several of them had even taken to farming in the Killinochchi area. The Muslims in Jaffna had lived next to each other and therefore densely occupied a small part of this town. As part of the arena of culture and scholarship, Muslims formed an important component of the historic University of Jaffna.

All this was to change on the 23^rd of October 1990, when at about 8am in the morning, a voice blasting through the loudspeaker mounted on a moving vehicle declared that: “Muslims are given 24hrs[i] to exit from the ‘Tamil land’ and they should leave all their possessions behind”. Armed LTTE cadres had gone round every village and handed over letters from their district leaders forcing the chief trustees of all mosques to read out the letters over loud speakers. The letters ordered all the Muslims to vacate their respective villages within 48 hours and hand over all their belongings such as vehicles, radios, sewing machines, water pumps etc to LTTE cadres at a particular village school.  They said the orders were from the LTTE high ranks and anyone trying to disobey would have to face the danger of losing life. Twenty four hours passed, and armed juveniles came round to push the Muslim residents out of their homes: men, women and children were herded through a narrow passage and, at the point of exit from the village they were bodily searched for valuables. Metallic cutters were used to remove jewellery that could not be easily removed, and each family was only allowed to take about 200 rupees (5 US dollars at that time). In some cases, even a change of clothes was not allowed to be taken out.  All possessions were deemed by the LTTE to belong to Tamil Eelam.

By the 26^th of October, it had become apparent that Muslims from Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi (other parts of the Northern Province deemed as land for the Tamils) as well had suffered the same fate.  Approximately 75,000 men, women and children were expelled. (For more details about this, please see UTHRJ; Report 6, Chapter 3, and http://jaffnamuslims.lk/)

In 1989, Mohamed Lateef (name changed) had just got married and had taken ownership of a rice farm and was looking to settle down to a quiet life of farming and raising his family.  That dream quickly shattered in 1990.

“ We were summoned to the mosque where we were greeted with this shocking news of the explusion ultimatum. Most of the people wanted to leave the place on the next day (Saturday). It was a nightmare and we were unable to sleep the night thinking of the agony of leaving the village we were born, keeping behind all our belongings, the junctions that created love and affection, the roads that told us many stories, the schools that taught & gained us employments, the mosques that made us humans, the Madarasa that taught us, books, exercise books, the burial ground that was keeping many of us, the play ground that gave us encouragement and the library.  The following day we started the journey with our children, grasping whatever little things we could carry in our hands. We were refugees. All the roads were full of our people from 9 days old baby to 95 years old man spread at a distance that could not find its end. We wandered aimlessly not knowing where to go and how long it would take us.  All that mattered was a safe place and even that in the current circumstance was uncertain”

Without knowing where they were going, these desperate people moved south in whatever mode of transport they could find. Most of them trekked miles and miles (those from Mannar braved the sea) for days, and those who could not stand the strain perished on the way and the rest reached Puttalam, the biggest Muslim settlement outside the Northern Province.

21 years on, and  Lateef is still in Puttalum with his family, living in the makeshift refugee camp, in  a coconut-leaf hut affording little respite to the elements, relying on daily wage earnings to support his family which has now grown to include 3 children, all born in the Saltern Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp in Puttalum.

“I don’t think about the past.  It just makes me sick.  There is no future for me to think about. I gave up thinking about the future a long time ago.  I just think about the present and how I can give my family at least two square meals a day,” he says wearily.

This incident has been largely forgotten in the annals of the Sri Lankan conflict.  Successive governments have failed to provide adequate reprieve and support for the displaced who find themselves in a political wilderness without much of a voice despite having representation in the government.  Problems with education, proper shelter and sanitation plague the camps and so the displaced people are dependent on menial jobs or handouts from philanthropists or the government and humanitarian organisations.  Unemployment is a massive problem for the majority of them who rely largely on seasonal demand for labour such as work in the salterns and various other odd jobs. They live in Cadjan huts, very often with two to three families crouched into one little hut.   On top of this, it has also become a delicate commercialized, criminalized and corrupt political scene.

“Yes we get support” remarks A.B. Niyas, the camp leader of the Saltern IDP camp, cynically.  “Every so often we get the refugee tourists, who come and see us, take photographs, give us some money, promise additional help and disappear.”

The order of expulsion had shocked the country with the forcible eviction creating a new dimension in the ethnic crisis distancing the three communities in their coexistence and wellbeing. What the Muslims from the north had experienced is a deliberate act of ethnic cleansing carried out by the LTTE.  However the questions to ask of that time are

• Why didn’t the government of Sri-Lankan armed forces move in to protect its citizens (these Muslims) against such an act of ethnic cleansing?
• What didn’t the Sri Lankan population react to this?
• Why did the international agencies keep silent when Muslims were being sent out of their homes on ethnic grounds?
• Why were the Tamil Diaspora silent when this was being enacted in their name?
• Why was the rest of the Sri Lankan Diaspora also silent when this was taking place?

And now, why do the same Diaspora who talk about responsibility and accountability for the end of the conflict, fail to mention these groups of forgotten people?

Puttalam still houses approximately 100,000 displaced persons across 141 welfare centres, from the five districts of the Northern Province. What were then considered to be temporary settlements have now become permanent abodes for these unfortunate victims of the LTTE’s horrific programme of ethnic cleansing.   Over the recent years, Puttalam has also played host to some Tamil and Sinhala IDPs who have been driven away from their homes in Batticaloa and Trincomalee.  The town is beginning to buckle under the pressure of hosting a large IDP population.

As some studies have pointed out, hosting a large IDP population has placed a great deal of pressure on the local services as they were not proportionally developed to meet the needs of the populace. Moreover, it has had a negative impact on the relations between the IDPs and the host community who originally welcomed the displaced people.

Recent incidents in the town have exposed these cracks.  There is now  a new fear that tensions between  the area’s original Muslim inhabitants, who have grown tired of the newcomers taking their jobs and, increasingly, buying their land, could lead to further crisis.

“We did all we could for them when they first arrived,” says Naleer, an amiable businessman and Puttalum Resident. “But they’re placing an unbearable strain on resources. They work cheap, so they’ve taken people’s jobs. They take education, healthcare, too.  They are supported by the government and INGOs on top of this.  We do not get anything from them. The situation has created a lot of hate.“   Many critics go on to say that the refugees are perpetually in this situation of desperation without doing much to help themselves, since they know that there will always be sympathetic support. “ This is a charge that M. Rahman, an activist from a local CBO set up by the displaced people refutes.  “We just want to go back home.  We don’t want to live anywhere else.  We are from Jaffna or Mullaitivu.  We lived side by side with our Tamil neighbors without much problem.  We want to go back to that”

After the Ceasefire Agreement was signed in February 2002, following what amounted to a public apology by the political leader of the LTTE and an agreement signed between the LTTE and main Muslim political party,  a number of these displaced families did  return to their homes in the North only to find their houses  occupied by displaced Tamils, or rebels, or destroyed. Those who stuck it out once again returned to Puttalum when the security deteriorated.

21 years after the evictions, the displaced Muslims still speak affectionately of their old Tamil neighbours and given the chance would return back to their home towns.  34-year-old Fatima Shafeek, a mother of two, vouches for this. “I was born in Jaffna and that will always be my home.  If I am given the chance I will go back“.  There are some though who are adament that they will not go back because they have stopped trusting the Tamils.  It is these who need greater support for healing to begin.

In any return for the displaced people, there are a couple of issues that would need to be considered such as:

1. Safety – Safety and security for the life of the displaced people and the dignity as well as recovery of lost properties to be appropriately discussed and  proper assurance given that this will be dealt with  during resettlement.
2. Basic Needs – Many people returning back would face shortages in basic needs such as water supply, adequate sanitation, basic health services, basic educational facilities, dried ration, compensation and opportunities to recreate employment for unemployed people.
3. Property Rights – As a result of  the expulsion in 1990, all documentary evidences in the government records have been destroyed such as ownerships of the properties etc. In any resettlement, positive and immediate arrangements need to be made to hand over the possessions of properties whilst returning land and compensating for this.  Any planned resettlement of outsiders in lands owned by these northern Muslims would need to be stopped forthwith The Government  to consider that  state lands adjacent to the lands owned by evicted Muslims  should  be given to them in keeping with the increasing demand due to an increase in population.
4. Relief-All relief, compensation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement activities should be done by a task force which includes district representatives of northern Muslims.
5. Education – Many of the schools have been damaged and destroyed due to the war. Special concessions would have be given to Northern Muslims in Education, government employment and livelihood programs.

In this delicate balance that has pervaded the war, there is now a call for restorative justice.  A period of healing has to be honoured.  People have to learn to trust one another. However in the politics that is ensuing, this is quickly being overlooked.  The real plight of people like this is being compromised by a failure to understand the process of restorative justice by all concerned.

Resettlement and rehabilitation of these Puttalam refugees are still major issues that need to be resolved.  It is no doubt that the internally displaced people would like to resettle in their original places, and therefore mechanisms for their right to return should be a major question answered by the government. The Government so far has failed to properly address these aspirations.  Likewise the communities (and the Diaspora that represent these communities) should also be working together to identify solutions at all levels of the spectrum.

There is however now a new generation among the refugees which has no affiliation with the parental roots to their villages in the Northern Province. They would prefer to continue living where they are now

As for Lateef, what does he make of the situation? Well just ask his ten year old son Mujeeb where home is.  He will reply that home is the coconut-leaf shanty in a camp in Puttalam

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• Citizen’s Commission: Expulsion of the Northern Muslims by the LTTE in October 1990
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Following the broadcast of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ on the 14th of June and its public release – for seven days – on Channel 4’s website, there has been an overwhelming international reaction to what has been described as ‘brutal,’ ‘horrific’ and ‘shocking’ footage of war crimes.

In an effort to collate the reportage following the release of the documentary, we have created a bundle that features the most significant news reports, blogs, comments and videos by international networks, which have been published on the web over the last few days. We have clipped several sources that include responses by ambassadors, civil servants and soi-disant advisors to the government.

The news agencies featured in the bundle include the Guardian, New Statesman, Independent, Telegraph, Hindu, Hindustan Times, International Business Times and numerous other sources including leading blogs from Sri Lanka.

Groundviews will continue to curate the bundle and upload new reports as soon as they are published. Please note that each clip in the bundle features a quote from a news report or blog post. The full article, video or podcast can be accessed by clicking the title featured on each clip. You can also subscribe to the RSS feed of our curated news bundle by clicking here.

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It is always intriguing to revisit the ideas of Paul Goodman; not exclusively for his writing on sexuality, film and politics, but also for his pertinacious desire to problematise key aspects of American society during the 1950s and 1960s. Goodman’s ideas on education were provocative and challenged ‘organised’ society by contesting what appeared to him as the distorted constitution of social order. The cant of anarchism is impractical and an idyllic fantasy, but some of Goodman’s ideas are highly persuasive. It would be appropriate to begin what is hopefully a laconic critique of the government’s leadership programme with a quote from an essay Goodman wrote to the New York Review of Books in 1969 titled, The Present Moment in Education; ‘there is an authentic demand for Young People’s Power, their right to take part in initiating and deciding the functions of society that concern them – as well, of course, as governing their own lives, which are nobody else’s business…the young have the right to power because they are directly affected by what goes on…their point of view is indispensable to cope with changing conditions, they themselves being part of the changing conditions.’ This seems improbable when we have to contend and grapple with that abject, conservative and premodern condition: the instructive and authoritative right of the elderly over innocuous, pliable and apparently unlettered ‘youth,’ who require  tyrannical guidance against the malevolence of the world. The political extension of this idea of submission and servility to absolute authority now has its principal specimen in a ‘mandatory’ youth leadership programme and it is the enormity of the latter that we must draw and quarter.

The idea that this form of indoctrination should be forced upon university students, and its acceptance by many in the country, is a remarkable detraction from what we strive to establish – a progressive and pluralistic society. It not only warrants opposition by university students, but also by the citizenry of this country if there is to be a genuine attempt at reclaiming our civil liberties from a government that is increasingly inclined towards manufacturing subservience. The attempt to locate an ‘authentic demand’ for student power in Sri Lanka is onerous, but the potential for the development of a widespread student movement that moves on the issues of indoctrination and the militarisation of  education presents a compelling vehicle of political power and dissent. There is, however, a fundamental flaw with the expression and organisation of student power and politics: it can be completely spontaneous, emotive, unsophisticated and potentially violent, but yet it is almost consistently ephemeral due to the exposure to a culture of fear and impunity and a violent intolerance of dissent. This is perhaps  further aided, to a certain extent, by the quiet acquiescence to authoritarian politics, which has hindered the emergence of a robustly politicised intellectual class. While student unions such as the Inter-University Students Federation (IUSF) deliver meek statements condemning the leadership programme, I have not witnessed  any urgency for the adoption of a more confrontational paradigm of opposition, and it is quite obvious that the involvement of the Defence Ministry and the military has resulted in widespread circumspection. This is perhaps due to the social nexus between that of the army and a majority of citizens; for three decades, the army has been considered as an enforcer and noble guardian, which was conditioned by the jingoistic nature of verbalisation during the war by political leaders and state media. While for the minority that was directly affected by the war and others, this relationship – to put it politely – is ‘problematic.’ However, the blurring of lines in this context is quite clear: the increasingly  visible post-war militarisation of society was preceded by the socialisation of the military during the war. How then could we expect widespread opposition to the ‘noble’ role of the army in this programme?  After all, ‘leaders are not born, the army makes them.’ I wonder, how did the most celebrated leader in Sri Lanka manage with the inadequacy of not being ‘produced’ by the army?

It is, therefore, comprehensible why most of us will struggle to locate a more pronounced language of protest against a programme of indoctrination that aspires to inculcate military values and encourage the sort of discipline that – if allowed to germinate – results in the production of ‘global graduates.‘ I see no qualitative connexion between training programmes of such little substance and the emergence of accomplished graduates. As a result, the legitimisation of more clamourous opposition by student unions, the respective chancellors and vice-chancellors of universities, civil society and university students is found desperately wanting – if not desirable and necessary – in order to contest what appears to be the unqualified attempt by this government to restrict ‘student politics,’ produce a cult of conformity and impose a uniformity with respect to the comportment of university students. While we should concern ourselves in equal measure with the problem of academic freedom in the country, it is necessary to oppose any possible move to restrict the freedom of expression, freedom of association and right to assembly in public universities. I do not feel the need to deal with the content of the programme because it comprises of such astounding idiocy and profligacy, and I believe that the Young Researchers’ Collective has dealt with that aspect adequately. The issues then that force my pen are: the necessity and reasoning of the leadership programme, the deception that led to the false condition of mandatory participation and the contemptible opposition to the programme that we have witnessed thus far.

A few lines are required, firstly, for a tepid exposé on what I believe is the deceit of the Ministry of Higher Education, and secondly, for a brief exegesis on the raison d’état of the leadership programme. There is a certain degree of confusion apropos to whether participation in the leadership programme is mandatory and essential for entrance into university. The Secretary to the Ministry of Higher Education, Dr. Sunil Navaratne, was kind enough to inform the public last week that the programme was ‘not compulsory contrary to popular belief.’ One would expect Dr. Navaratne to be aware of what occurs at the ministry, particularly when the Minister for Higher Education, S.B Dissanayake, appears to have been the source of this ‘popular belief.’ If this is the standard of policy-making, comprehension and administration that prevails within the Ministry of Higher Education, an institution responsible for improving the quality of tertiary education, then it appears that the allocation of the portfolio to that parvenu S.B Dissanayake was not undertaken in complete consideration of the public interest. It is possible that incorrect reportage and miscommunication resulted in this inexcusable error, but then how would Dr. Navaratne and Minister Dissanayake explain the fact that the letters dispatched in Sinhala, Tamil and English by the Ministry emphasise mandatory participation? The second and tenth paragraph of the letter informs the students that the ‘certificate,’ which confirms the completion of the programme, is ‘required for entry to the university’ and the Tamil letter further states that participation in the programme is ‘an essential and mandatory precondition for entrance into university.’ Since the Ministry of Defence was so expeditious to provide an example of ‘public accountability’ last week, it is certainly desirable – on the charge of deceiving the public – for Minister Dissanayake and Dr. Navaratne to tender their letters of resignation immediately.

The political motivations of the leadership programme are quite clear when we consider that it is essentially a retributive reaction to the student protests that occurred in October and November 2010. It also provides an opportunity for the government to restrict the political influence of opposition parties within the university system and student politics, which presents a potential force of mobilisation against the government. A brief recapitulation of the student protests will remind us that they were as much about critical issues confronting the system of higher education in this country – unemployment, reform, privatisation and the provision of adequate facilities for students – as they were about the government’s whimpering about the political influence of the JVP. As a result the collective action that we witnessed during that period apparently occurred for the right reasons, particularly as it was in opposition to proposals put forward by the government that the protestors considered to be inimical to their interests. I do support the establishment of private universities, but at the same time wider educational reform policies – with increased funding and better facilities that allow for expansion – are required for public universities to maintain a competitive edge. In consideration of the importance of reform, it is worth posing these questions: (i) What is the status of President Rajapakse’s commitment to a higher education development initiative that is worth Rs. 3,000 million? (ii) What has happened to the plan for the further investment of Rs. 600 million to transform the Peradeniya, Moratuwa, Colombo, Sri Jayawardenapura, Kelaniya and Ruhuna universities? (iii) How much funding is allocated for the provision and/or redevelopment of comparable facilities and equipment?

I have not read a convincing justification for the stamping out of student politics and if one exists, which I am sure it does not, it is antithetical to the fundamental principles of a liberal democracy. The attempt, by the government, at political or apolitical massification, to wit an action of organised ‘homogenisation,’ is surreptitious. I consider political groupings within the student body and the articulation of their socio-political interests as a positive indicator of civic engagement. As such, the emphasis on ‘physical and mental discipline’ is problematic when individuals are ‘forced’ to participate and one should take particular offence that President Rajapaksa considers it necessary for instruction to be provided on ‘positive attitudes and love for the country‘ in order militate against student protests in public universities. This is an unfortunate view of how citizens are expected to conform to the excesses of this government, and it also appears that there is a gross misunderstanding with respect to the difference between ‘loving’ your country and demonstrating utter contempt and disregard for the policies and actions of your government. An editorial in the Daily News falters in a similar manner with this erroneous reasoning: “…students’ unions…in league with political forces which are hostile towards the state.” I believe that the student protests last year were against the government – the bureaucracy that manages and exercises power through the state apparatus, deliberates on key concerns of citizens and develops policies – and not the state as a sovereign political institution.

The other issue that has received much attention is the problem of ‘ragging,’ which has developed into an institutionalised practise within a majority of universities. Perhaps a greater tragedy is the complicity of lecturers and other university officials who in complete indifference accept ragging as a ‘rite of passage’ within a hierarchical system of senior dominance over freshers/juniors. It is sufficiently amusing – in consideration of the egalitarian pretence of boot camp society – that the instruction of an alternative hierarchical system with a similar call for subordination is the solution to ragging. Is it exceedingly ambitious to request the chancellors and senior lecturers of universities to set about establishing intelligent administration in order address the issue by expelling students who are guilty of physical abuse? I do not consider any other measure – especially one that is not punitive – to be effective and I would go so as far as to argue that ragging should be criminalised. The suspected fons et origo of this controversy is the JVP and much has been written over the last few weeks about the need to mitigate its influence in public universities in order to prevent ragging, protests and violence. The idea that one political party is the cause for an inherent practise is ridiculous and I have to reiterate that systematic action, such as the ban on ragging by the Supreme Court of India, is a possible course of action that needs to be replicated.

The fundamental connexion between academic freedom, critical thinking and the freedom of speech allows for the development of an intellectual society that is provided with the liberty to oppose the status quo: as such, the notions of contrarianism, non-violent or violent opposition to tyranny, participation in political activism, deliberation and individual expression are key components of positive citizenship. I am reminded of two significant student protests that utilised the latter principles for a wider movement of opposition and reform: the Free Speech Movement – a series of protests at the University of California, Berkeley that occurred between 1964 and 1965 against the proscription of political activities on campus and for the freedom of speech – led to the withdrawal of restrictions by the administration. The mass student protest on the 10th of May 1968 in Paris in reaction to traditional society, authoritarianism and capitalism, which almost led to the collapse of De Gaulle’s government after millions of workers joined the protest, was the apogee of student power during the 1960s. It is possible that in Sri Lanka the student body as a ‘centre’ of dissent, particularly when we consider the potential for mobilisation in public universities, could develop a substantive reform and oppositional movement. I find the mobilisation of a mass young intellectual class relevant in a context where the power of opposition political parties to act as a check and balance on the government is insignificant – as Mill stated in his essay On Liberty, “the most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government, is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power.” I have to applaud the Young Researchers’ Collective for taking a stand on the programme, and I wait, perhaps in vain, for an organisation like ‘Sri Lanka Unites,’ which claims to focus on leadership, reconciliation, justice and youth empowerment, to issue a statement. I would hope that responsibility is not a burden, but instead a call to action. Even if a mass student movement fails to pressurise the government to consider a wider educational reform project, the degree of organisation and politicisation could result in the emergence of multiple reform-oriented ‘pressure groups,’ which may fill the void left by a disengaged intelligentsia for the sole purpose of addressing the direction of post-war policy-making and sustaining dissent.

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Within a context such as this The YRC is releasing this document in the hopes that it would deepen the debate and further stimulate thinking around this issue. Though the YRC has been concerned and has closely monitored this issue from the beginning we have chosen to release this document now rather than earlier because there is a need to ensure that the issue continues to be discussed and monitored and that it isn’t allowed to fade from the public discourse.

The attached document is divided into 2 segments – the first captures snapshots of opinions shared with the YRC on this training session and its implications for higher education in the  country. The 2^nd segment is a series of reflection on the issue and raises some questions that have not received as much attention in public discussions on this issue. We are also including a brief overview of the issue and its development below. We look forward to any comments or suggestions that you may have on this. If you are interested in signing up for our mailing list or getting in touch with The Young Researchers’ Collective, Sri Lanka please email us info@theyrc.org]

Perspectives and Commentary on the Leadership Training Programme for University Undergraduates

Even as the first batch of university entrants commenced their university life with the “Leadership and Positive Attitude Development” programme at various army camps across the country, the decision by the Ministry of Higher Education to run a three week course in collaboration with the Defence Ministry did not go unchallenged. The decision has triggered much discussion among university students, parents, academics, employers and others. Student unions have vociferously opposed these moves and a number of students filed fundamental rights petitions challenging the fact that this training is mandatory for university entrance. Although these petitions have been dismissed by the Supreme Court, this issue will have far reaching implications for the administration of higher education in the country.

In this document we have attempted to collate and present snippets from ongoing dialogues that the Collective has been having with people through blogs, social networks and conversations since the leadership training was announced. It highlights diverse opinions about the government’s decision to hold a ‘compulsory’ leadership training for undergraduates in military camps, on the benefit of this type of training and on the process of decision-making and consultation in developing such a programme. In addition the Collective wishes to draw attention to a number of key questions and considerations with regards to the future of higher education in Sri Lanka.

Our analysis consists of two segments; the first is a broad snapshot of the opinions and discussions that were shared with us which we use to contextualize some of the issues surrounding this training programme. The second segment is a series of reflections and questions that we wish to pose in order to deepen the debate and discussion on this issue.

Part I: Conversation Snapshots

1. On the Training Programme being “compulsory”

The compulsory nature of the training programme has raised a fair amount of concern. Students and parents fear that if students don’t turn up for the training they may be forced to forego their university placement. In the view of one teacher, “parents may have severe reservations about sending their children (particularly their daughters) to a military facility, and this may result in students losing the opportunity for a university education, or worse, students deciding to pursue the option of studying in a much vilified “foreign/private university”.

Students have filed fundamental rights petitions in this regard, contesting the compulsory training as they were not informed of this requirement when they applied to university nearly a year ago. “Regarding the government’s decision to conduct training for future undergraduates in military camps, my initial response was disbelief! If the news about such a programme was not enough, added to that is the fact that it is COMPULSORY for university entrance. Unfortunately for those who have no other option, whether they are for or against it, they must make themselves go”. (Student, Colombo)

2. The choice of venue to host the training programme

There is general consensus that leadership training is essential for university students, but views differ on the choice of venue. “Depends on the construction of the programme; overall, I guess it may benefit the participants by improving their team working skill” (Analyst, Colombo)

A management consultant mentioned about the use of theories in business strategy that have their roots in military strategies“…. I’m sure the students will benefit, do u ever think MR govt will do something that the masses in SL will not benefit from? Compulsory military training is a practice in many other countries, why can’t we apply compulsory residential leadership training (not military training)? Many survival strategies (that gets extended to business and even the social sector) were formulated in War / by the Military (am sure you know of Sun Tzu)…, In fact I hope this will help discipline a lot of the Sri Lankan youth…, as against being wishful thinkers wanting to change the country only”.

“If you really want to give them leadership training why do you have to hold that in army camps? Why not in other institutions which are much more transparent? This programme is to brainwash students to suit the needs of the government. Parents should stand against this kind of nonsensical projects of the government”. (Senior Lecturer)

Questions were also raised as to why this could not have been incorporated within the existing university orientation programmes which could save money and contribute towards building greater cohesiveness among students. According to a lecturer from a leading university, “Universities already try to provide these skills in whatever way possible. Why not tap into these existing structures instead of creating another one from scratch? Also when expertise on the above skills is available at universities, why turn to another source? If the existent structure and content of the courses are inadequate (and ‘unmarketable’, as the govt. seems to love saying), then wouldn’t the alternative be to solve those issues and harness the skills of the ELT units and IT experts in doing so?”

Suggestions were also made for alternate methods of training using religious teachings and corporate trainers. “I don’t agree that there should be programmes conducted in the military camps. But students will benefit from a different type of programme. I think leadership training which has been inclusively designed would be something very useful for university students. They should be conducted in different parts of the country allowing the students to also experience the life and culture in these places to broaden their views”. (Freelance Consultant, Colombo)

Another concern that was raised is the impact this might have on post-war reconciliation efforts, especially when students from various ethnic groups participate in this training in army camps. “I don’t see after 3 decades of war, and now finally being in a post war state of ‘supposed’ reconciliation period, how it could be in any way conducive for a student to obtain any sort of training at a military camp. Furthermore, the setting alone is highly insensitive to so many, who have only known and experienced the military at it’s most brutal, and are yet to return to a state of complete normalcy” (Activist, Colombo).

Recovering from a prolonged war, some felt this mandatory leadership training held in military camps was a step in the process of militarization. A lecturer from the Central Province had this to say, “Given that the war has been concluded, the government’s persistent efforts at strengthening the army and increasing its numbers raises the question as to why continued militarization is necessary and / or allowed. The decision to hold compulsory leadership training for undergraduates in military camps seems like quite an extreme step and hints at how militarization of the society is seeping into education and the youth as well (in the guise of something like leadership training).”

Some also felt this was a political move by the government to control the JVP and their political activities within the universities. A researcher from Galle stated that, “This is a strategy to disconnect the relationship between students and the JVP, who are most connected to the students, when they enter University. It is a long term project which helps this type of regime to be in power without any disturbance. Through this programs student will be socialized before they meet JVPers”.

“I think it’s a devious scheme to brainwash students as part of their political agenda. To me it seems that the government is taking a leaf out of the books of the JVP in the 70s and 80s and the LTTE”.
(Senior Lecturer)

3. Content of the Training

Responses from the corporate world highlighted the need for suitable training that equipped undergraduates with important soft skills necessary for professionals. A management consultant who is an arts graduate stated that “most of my colleagues are still without jobs. Poor English language knowledge / lack of leadership, soft skills are the primary reasons I see for this situation. This residential workshop would be a good starting point for this….. It is better if the residential trainings were held in a friendlier atmosphere”.

“… I have seen graduates struggle to establish themselves in work places because they are not taught the most simple things in life like, close you mouth when biting food. Never slurp your tea and so on. I hope this basic training will break the barriers between the rich and the poor mentality, while telling students that life is not limited to the University. There is a whole world that they need to explore and going on the road and behaving like mad hatters is not worth it. They need to be taught how to wear a shirt or a dress in matching colours and a session or two on personnel hygiene. Such as using a deodorant and how to apply a bit of make up are basic necessities in life. All these University students have access to internet and mobiles, therefore taking them one step further won’t do any harm”. (Journalist, Colombo)

A Muslim Father said, “we don’t know the course contents. Nor do we know if the course takes into account cultural sensitivities”.

An undergraduate argued that leadership training is a continuous process and not something that can be fitted into a timetable alone, the student stated, “Whether students will benefit from this programme will depend entirely on how the programme is conducted for those three weeks, which by the way I personally fail to see as a time frame which would be effective. i.e: leadership training and developing a positive mentality are long-term goals which need specific care and also a specific framework. These can never be fitted into a time-table of training, but can only be learnt in the face of situation, from adults and from being in the environment/atmosphere relevant to the next four years of a university hopeful”.

4. Public engagement and consultation

Respondents were in agreement on the need for proper consultation with parties concerned before implementing such a training programme. “There has been no discussion with the stakeholders; teachers, parents, and the students themselves”. (Business Manager)

“Yes they (students) should have been consulted. It leaves them with very little choice, but to attend the programme, when left with such very little time to oppose the decision. Students could have even made alternate plans if attending a state university as in the case wasn’t an option”. (State University Graduate)

The education system in Sri Lanka has seen ad –hoc changes being made with the change of regimes in the past. Some were of the opinion that this is a further extension of this non-consultative process, with little foresight as to its impact on students.

“Generally, in Sri Lanka, state authorities do not, in the least, take into consideration the views and opinions of parents or students on these matters. It’s a top-down system where the impact of policy decisions on students and their parents are not taken into consideration (as evident in several recent examples from secondary and tertiary education – the frequent changing of O/L and A/L syllabi, the blunders in preparing the marking final examinations etc.) This instance is not very different from other such decisions. However, this issue has managed to get some public attention and debate due to the participation of the military and the implications it can/may/could have with regard to the sense of security, identity etc of the different ethnic groups in the country”. (Lecturer, Central Province)

Part II: Reflections by the Collective

In addition to presenting some of the opinions held by the general public, the Collective believes that there are a number of larger issues that should also be raised with regards to the leadership training of undergraduates in military camps.

1. Like many of the respondents, senior government officials have also opined that undergraduates must be trained in soft-skills and etiquette in order to make them more marketable. This is buttressed by another impression of undergraduates as unemployed youth engaging in protests and disruptive campaigns. The solution that has been mooted is to instil discipline in students through this training in order to ensure that they do not engage in protests and other disruptive campaigns. Building a mandatory training programme for undergraduates on the assumption that military style training will solve these issues is akin to using a band aid to treat a cancer. The problems of education and employment are structural and solutions to these problems should be carefully considered and thoughtfully implemented. In this regard we are extremely apprehensive about the lack of transparency, consultation and haste with which this programme has been put together and foisted on students as a mandatory requirement to enter university.

2. It is also worth asking ourselves about the role that graduates are expected to perform in a work environment. What is the role of a graduate in the workplace? What kind of leadership qualities are they expected to show? Without a broad discussion on questions such as this, the value of creating “marketable” graduates through this programme appears to be rather unclear.

3. It is also worth questioning the model of leadership that has dominated these discussions. Why was this particular model of leadership adopted as the best available model of leadership building for undergraduates? Why is the military seen as the best available model for developing the correct skill set required of “marketable” university students?

4. While there will be a number of students who look forward to this training, there will also be a number of students who are uncomfortable with participating in a program conducted in a military camp. It is safe to assume therefore that there will be students attending this training with fear and reservations but due to lack of choice in the matter. For many students who have worked so hard to get into university in the hope that it would increase their chances of employment, there is serious fear that raising their voices about any of these issues would seriously jeopardize their university placement. While this may be an agreeable state of affairs for some, we strongly believe that this should not be the foundation on which a period of study and critical thinking is built.

5. The conditions of the camps and student responses have been documented in several news reports and serious concern has been raised by groups such as the Inter University Student Federation about the safety of students. Similarly the information on the content of the programme that is now emerging in the media is also worth questioning. Who decided on the content? Who was consulted? How were these decisions made? Why is the content not publicly available? What are the students taught about the relationship between this content and their university education? It is not surprising that the lack of transparency in making these decisions has raised serious suspicions that the leadership training is being used as a means of consolidating the power of the State. Nevertheless authorities appear to be very pleased with their progress, despite public disapproval and have voiced their desire to extend the training to 3 months and also design a similar training for school principals.

6. The leadership training for students in military camps is for the duration of three weeks. While the choice of army camps as the venue for such training has raised some legitimate concerns, students will eventually return to their universities and spend the next three or four years in their respective campuses. Thus, the onus is again on the universities to provide the environment for learning and to produce graduates who will contribute to society.

7. The way in which this training for undergraduates has been implemented also raises larger questions as to whether there should be civic involvement in policy making. This programme was implemented without much public discussion or consultation of different groups such as student unions, university teachers, parents or potential students. When policies such as this are implemented it may be useful to consider broadening decision-making discussions. We strongly believe that civic involvement in decision making and policy is an issue that requires further discussion and serious exploration as a means of mitigating the implementation of ad-hoc or ill-conceived projects or programmes.

Ironically the leadership training programme coincides with the strike being staged by university academics led by FUTA demanding proper salaries for academics. The challenges pertaining to university education in Sri Lanka are complex. It is good that it has finally received some public attention. However, it is important to ensure that this catalyzes into a serious attempt to deal with the core problems that have plagued our universities and are severely hampering the capacity of Sri Lankan graduates to contribute to the production of knowledge. The failure to do so will only worsen the crisis faced by our universities.

• Training for University Entrants in Army Camps and at District Level
• University Students, Military and the Leadership Programme: Observations on the First Session
• A turn for the worse? Undergraduate protests and unrest in Sri Lanka
• Exclusive: Syllabi and timetables from compulsory University ‘leadership’ training course
• What Is The Future Of The Eastern University?

Much of the current dialogue in the leadership of our communities attempts to justify past military actions and policy decisions. One community of elders extols the virtues of a successful military campaign against terror, conducted with little limits. A second community of elders focuses on building a separate nation without seeking alternate means of serving the population they supposedly represent.

The Need for a New Conversation

Common to both approaches – largely exclusionary of each other – is a substantive discourse of what the future should look like. Absent from the argument of who committed war crimes and who are terrorists is a discussion of the daily challenges faced by families – from all communities – who continue to suffer from the loss of a father, mother, brother or sister or the loss of shelter or farmland, two years after the war has ended.

The Choices Facing Our Sri Lankan Community

Our worldwide Sri Lankan community has a choice to make; a decision that will influence the long-term future of the country and people we all care about so deeply.

Our communities can continue to face each other with suspicion and skepticism, interacting when necessary by arguing about past conflicts and grievances. Ten years on, the global conversation between our communities will not have changed and the average Sri Lankan will live in very much the same way as they do today.

Alternatively, our communities can choose to focus our energies on re-imagining the relationship we have with each other and start thinking and building a future where we all work hand in hand, side by side as we strive to ensure that the past is not repeated.

The Role of the Past

Regardless of the choice that you or I make, the past cannot be ignored. Asking to forget the past is almost like asking someone to forget their grandfather, grandmother or other ancestors. While neither comfortable nor simple, discussing the past – particularly when lives have been lost – must be a feature of any dialogue that truly honors and respects its participants.

However at the same time our conflicted past must not determine our future. We are not condemned to live in animosity and enmity. On the contrary, the military conflict– and the events leading up to the conflict – must strengthen our resolve to ensure the past is never repeated. The global Sri Lankan community must make a renewed effort to explore new and innovative means of working together to meet the needs of those most affected by the war.

Using Development as a Form of Reconciliation

One way that we can work together is finding points of common interest and common ground. BuildChange (www.buildchange.ca) – a legacy project of the Mosaic Institute and an initiative I am proud to be a part of – is a uniquely Sri Lankan-Canadian experiment to explore what life would be like if the diverse Sri Lankan communities in Canada could work and play together while trying to meet the most immediate needs of war-affected families.

While such an initiative may not be the ‘right’ answer – or an answer that responds to the burning questions inside the leadership of our elders – it is our attempt to make peace personal in a way that is relevant to the average person living in Sri Lanka.

We hope that, no matter where you are, you will join us in committing to a more constructive conversation with each other in the year ahead.

• Finding the Middle Ground
• Traditional solutions for modern day problems
• Can we End this Cycle of Hatred?
• Lionel Bopage: Reflections on the Current Situation in Sri Lanka
• Writing against the RSF/JDS appeal to boycott the Galle Literary Festival

Almost one year ago, Groundviews first featured an interview with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu. At the time, just after the parliamentary elections leading from the decisive presidential election, the government was riding a wave of popular support. In the year that passed, from the reprehensible 18th Amendment and grotesque examples of the government’s wastefulness, democratic governance that instead of improvement and progress, shows decline and decrepitude.

The recipient of the first Citizens Peace Award, Dr. Saravanamuttu (Sara), the Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (the institutional base of this site), in this interview speaks about the enduring challenges facing democracy and human rights in Sri Lanka, nearly two years after the end of war. The conversation begins with an excerpt from Sara’s acceptance speech at the Citizens Peace Award, and a question as to why so very few listen to him in Sri Lanka today, and worse, care to know about that which he flags. Going beyond a simplistic championing of a Mahgreb model for political change in Sri Lanka, Sara explores why even with illiberal governance, so few are willing to rise up for their rights, even after the end of war. This line of questioning leads us to explore whether despite participating in regular elections, many in Sri Lanka are actually more voters than citizens.

Sara is asked as to what he sees as the positive development in the country over the past year, and what he feels are those areas of governance and development that have been the most neglected. Sara touches on what he sees is an enduring fear psychosis that prevents a more open, public debate about issues related to accountability and reconciliation.

Responding to recent frothing palaver in mainstream media and especially the State media over funding NGOs have received, Sara notes that given the repetitive public airing of these concerns over many years, particularly during election campaigns and when international scrutiny on government is most focussed and direct, people would soon begin to wonder why government was not doing anything about it.

Looking at the macro-economic as well as the key political currents in Sri Lanka, Sara flags a future scenario where questions will be increasingly asked of government as to why a richer economic dividend is not forthcoming, and that government in turn will find it increasingly harder to hark back to its war time achievements to gloss over, post-war, its inglorious hash of foreign and economic policies.

Towards the end, Sara answers a question as to whether he is too impatient with Sri Lanka’s progress post-war, and whether it is too much, too soon to ask for government and governance to be different to what is was during war.

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu
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I begin by expressing my deep gratitude for the invitation to address you so as to share some of my thoughts on this important subject. I have, both while I was abroad and following my return to Sri Lanka a few years ago, observed the activities of the Citizen’s Movement for Good Governance (CIMOGG), with admiration for your courage and your consistency. I have also been associated with your energetic President, Dr.A.C.Viswalingam, for many years and have more recently been together with him in a like-minded forum.

The subject we have agreed on arises out of a desire not to yield to the widespread despair as to what civil society can do in the present state of the affairs of our country. It seeks to resist the fatalism of the “kaata kiyannada?” syndrome that is all too easily adopted as an escapist mode. As we made the transition from a feudal society under our own kings into a colonial polity under Western rule which held sway in major parts of our country for four and a half centuries, a culture of acquiescence was inculcated among the people. There were of course notable exceptions such as the resistance of the Kandyan Kingdom till 1815; the rebellions of 1818 and 1848 and the Buddhist Renaissance of the late 19^th century.

Civil society is a modern concept although its origins can be traced in history to early times. There will always be disputes about any definition of what civil society is. In a series devoted to the subject some years ago the BBC proposed this – “A civil society is a public space between the state, the market and the ordinary household, in which people can debate and tackle action’. The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a number of leading research centers as referring to, and I quote,

the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations.

In the 63 years since we regained our independence the concept of a civil society in a democratic nation has barely had time to mature and take root. It has also been enmeshed in the many contradictions and controversies of the nation-building process in our multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. There can therefore be no comparison with the role of civil society in older democracies in the West or with India where a fiercely independent civil society was born out of the freedom struggle and Mahatma Gandhi’s non-violent satyagraha. It is estimated, for example, that there are 1.5 million non-profit, voluntary citizens’ groups in India while the register of our National Secretariat for NGOs states that we have 1350. Nevertheless a number of Sri Lankan civil society organizations played a significant role in the protection of human rights before and after the advent of LTTE terrorism and they included the Civil Rights Movement led by the late Bishop Lakshman Wickremesinghe.

Civil society encompasses the general public of our country outside of the Government and its public service apparatus. NGOs are specific not-for-profit bodies established for specific purposes. NGOs are therefore a part of civil society but are not necessarily representative of it. There is a great diversity among NGOs in Sri Lanka and elsewhere and to conflate NGOs with civil society is misleading. The distinction is an important one and I will return to it. There has unquestionably been an expansion of the space for civil society after the defeat of the LTTE terrorism. In a post-conflict period where reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation are part of the healing and nation rebuilding process, civil society can assist the Government in diverse ways.

Looking around the Global South today we must count our blessings. We are still a participatory democracy with fundamental rights that are justiciable under the Constitution and the right to change our Government through the use of the ballot; we still have free expression through the media, whether mass or social, despite the dead hand of self-censorship, the attacks on media offices and the harassment of journalists; we still have universal access to free education from primary to tertiary level and to good health care and we enjoy the economic benefits of a middle income country. Moreover, based on key indicators such as life expectancy, we enjoy a Human Development Index of 0.658 and are ranked 91 among 169 countries listed in the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 2010. We are thus neither at the top nor the bottom of the class but, as the school report cards used to say, we can do better.

The fact that we may be young as a civil society does not mean we are not a caring society. A news report last month of a poll, by the well-known public opinion research agency Gallup on civic engagement, may even have surprised some of us Sri Lankans. We were ranked 8^th among 130 countries on the likelihood of individuals volunteering their time and assistance to others. The US was ranked 1^st with a score of 60% while we scored 51% and led all of South Asia. The conclusion drawn was that (and I quote from the report) “people with high civic engagement are positive about the communities where they live and actively give back to them.”

We have traditionally been a closely integrated society with inbuilt social security systems that help our less fortunate relatives and friends. A bereavement in a neighbour’s family, the financial distress of a friend or accommodation for a poor or elderly relative meets with spontaneously generous responses even among the poorest. Our society’s responses to the tsunami and now to the floods have been exemplary. Likewise the concept of shramadana and voluntary work in public projects has been a traditional feature embedded in our culture for centuries. It is but a step from this charitable concern for our fellow citizens and constructive community action to civic, non-partisan involvement in issues that impact on the welfare of our society as a whole and our rights as citizens.

Why have we not taken that step so that civil society can be more effective in the good governance of our country in partnership with Government? I suspect the reason lies firstly, in the confusion between non-governmental-organizations or NGOs and civil society. Secondly, there is the conviction that civil society and NGOs are both concepts imported from the West and financed by foreign sources which invariably work against the sovereignty of our country and our national interest. This was especially so since many NGOs advocated a peaceful resolution of the conflict with the LTTE.

The fact that successive Governments have received aid from foreign governments and had conducted peace talks with the LTTE or that several NGOs have indigenous roots and guiding philosophies in tune with our culture has not altered this perception. And, thirdly, there has been such a heavy politicization of our society in over six decades of the practice of partisan politics that every participant in public life and every opinion expressed is viewed through the prism of party politics. We no longer appreciate the fact that honest men and women can disagree and that dissent is a necessary feature in democratic society. Successive governments have adopted the posture that “If you are not for us; you are against us”. These trends existed when the country faced the serious threat of terrorism aimed at the division of the country but have continued even after the successful defeat of that threat. No wonder then that civil society has not been able to flourish as effectively as in other countries.

The highly respected Judge Christopher Weeramantry published a book on “A Call for National Reawakening” in 2006 in which he frankly examined our national strengths and weaknesses. Underlying his recommendations is his confidence in the people of our country when he writes,

I am convinced that there are large numbers of Sri Lankans of the utmost integrity and deepest dedication to the national interest who serve in every department of Sri Lankan life. It so happens that a climate of disregard of standards has grown up so severely in practically every walk of life that the patriotically and altruistically inclined are submerged under the weight of contrary practice and culture too strong for them to prevail against.

That can and must change through a fundamental transformation of attitudes on the part of civil society and the pooling of its efforts towards common causes that protect and enlarge our democratic rights.

Our Constitution refers to both fundamental rights as well as to duties and obligations that all of us have as citizens. Thus Article 28 says, and I quote,

“The exercise and enjoyment of rights and freedoms is inseparable from the performance of duties and obligations, and accordingly it is the duty of every person in Sri Lanka -

(a) to uphold and defend the Constitution and the law ;

(b) to further the national interest and to foster national unity ;

(c) to work conscientiously in his chosen occupation ;

(d) to preserve and protect public property, and to combat misuse and waste of public property ;

(e) to respect the rights and freedoms of others ; and

(f) to protect nature and conserve its riches. “

While this article is not, as Article 29 says, justiciable it must obviously be considered when other articles are interpreted providing as it does a Constitutional basis for civil society action. To support such actions then the long awaited Right to Information Bill must be enacted into law, with whistleblower protection. Civil society action must therefore be in consonance with the duties and obligations of the citizen which includes upholding the rule of law and litigating in the public interest.

Energizing civil society is not a recipe for revolution. It is not even anti-government since civil society has the enormous potential of helping government in its complex task of translating its popular mandate into practice while resisting the pressures of vested interests. Let us begin with civil society using the mechanisms available to it. There are numerous opportunities ranging from the “Letters to the Editor” columns of the daily newspapers, representations to your local M.P. and so on but I will confine myself to three processes which in my view civil society in Sri Lanka does not make adequate use of. They are(1) The office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman) (2) The Parliamentary Committee on High Posts and (3) Public Interest Litigation.

The old office of “Dukganna Rala” under our kings is today known as the Ombudsman associated in modern times with Scandinavian countries where it has been an effective safety valve for maladministration and other abuses. In Sri Lanka this office is described as the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and since 1978 is provided for under Article 156 of our Constitution which states – “156. (1) Parliament shall by law provide for the establishment of the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman) charged with the duty of investigating and reporting upon complaints or allegations of the infringement of fundamental rights and other injustices by public officers and officers of public corporations, local authorities and other like institutions, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of such law.”

The salary and tenure of the Parliamentary Commissioner is determined by Parliament. Originally the Parliamentary Commissioner was confined to hearing cases referred to him by the Public Petitions Committee of Parliament and originating from a M.P. However a 1991 amendment of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Act permits any person subject to a violation of fundamental rights of injustice at the hands of a public officer to make a complaint directly to the Parliamentary Commissioner. Now my point is, how many civil society bodies in fact make use of this mechanism? How many in fact organize themselves to help average citizens to make such direct complaints and follow them up until redress is achieved?

Next is the Parliamentary Committee on High Posts. We frequently hear of unsuitable appointments being made to the public service and strong public criticism of it. We have seldom heard of public petitions against such appointments when they are announced by the High Posts Committee which is required to examine the suitability of persons appointed or nominated as Secretaries to Cabinet Minister; Heads of Sri Lanka missions abroad and Chairmen of Boards, Corporations and other state institutions. The general public is informed of such nominations through advertisements in the media and petitions are called for if there are any objections. At an early stage there were objections filed and one nomination for the Chairmanship of a state corporation was successfully aborted because of charges of fraud that were proven before the Committee. Civil society in general and professional organizations in particular can scarcely complain if they do not petition the Committee and substantiate their objections to the appointment of unqualified political favourites and/or relatives to high posts. The Committee or the Government may not act on petitions even if they are valid but if sufficient publicity is given to the petition and its hearing in the Committee, public opinion will be influenced. Petitions should of course not be made through personal animus but on professional grounds in the public interest. I am convinced that if civil society bodies spend some time and effort on such petitions we will be able to curb if not eliminate the nepotism and the corrupt “jobs for the boys and girls” mentality.

Finally, public interest litigation. While Articles 10-15 of our Constitution guarantees fundamental rights Article 126 enables the Supreme Court to hear cases alleging “infringement or imminent infringement” of fundamental rights. Public interest litigation is best known to be practised in the USA and India. It has led to charges of judicial activism and interference in the separation of powers in governance. In Sri Lanka the main cases of public interest litigation have been about the protection of state assets, transparency and the prevention of fraud. Not being a lawyer I will not enter into the complexities of such litigation and the expansion of interpreting the standing of litigants so that group rights can be pursued. The Eppawala case represents a major achievement for civil society while Mr.Nihal Amerasekera has on his own taken up a number of cases illustrating how an individual member of civil society can effectively use this process. CIMOGG is well aware of the importance of public interest litigation and your website has an article calling on Parliament to pass legislation and on the Supreme Court to simplify its practices and rules in this regard. Of course the questions of the costs of litigation and the law’s delays will be cited as reasons for citizens not to use this route of civil society action. I believe a campaign to organize a panel of lawyers ready to appear pro bono in such cases will help to facilitate matters.

It is important to stress once again that while civil society is the broader entity representing the general public of a country outside the apparatus of government, NGOs are specific bodies or narrower entities established for particular purposes. NGOs have their own responsibilities towards governments and civil society and must guard against arrogance and self-righteous attitudes. They must themselves be subject to the criteria of transparency, incorruptibility and integrity that they demand of the elected representatives in government.

The concept of the ruler governing in harmony with the people is an ancient one. Transparency, inclusiveness and good governance were not invented by Western democracies. The Buddha’s “Dasa Raja Dhamma” or “Ten Duties of a King”, the mandate from Heaven for the Chinese Emperors, the balanced world order in Tudor England and Jean Jacqes Rousseau’s “Social Contract” were all predicated on a harmonious relationship between the ruler and his subjects. Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaign that forced the British Raj to quit India, the Filipino people’s power that toppled the Marcos regime and what we have seen in Tahrir Square in Cairo is civil society in action when that harmony is out of joint. In democracies people do not abdicate their role between elections. Governments do not have a monopoly over the interpretation and implementation of the aspirations of the people and the national interest. Engaging with civil society is not an option for Governments. It is a necessity.

My former boss in the UN Kofi Annan once said – “A strong civil society promotes responsible citizenship and makes democratic forms of government work. A weak civil society supports authoritarian rule, which keeps society weak.”

I wish CIMOGG all success in revitalizing our civil society so that the institutions of democratic governance in our country are protected and strengthened.

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I find this particular claim to be quite difficult to digest. Firstly, because it has been stated by a well -respected human rights activist of Sri Lanka – Sunila Abeysekera, and secondly, because I strongly believe that although on an individual level, people can use the GLF to air their views on many things including politics, claiming that the GLF at large is a space to raise awareness on political issues is only giving it undue credit. It’s like claiming Hollywood to be a hub for activists, just because a handful of actors/actresses advocate for their respective pet causes.

Whilst agreeing that Reporters Sans Frontiers (RSF) and Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka (JDS) calling for a “boycott” of the GLF on the grounds that the international writers attending will “give legitimacy to the Sri Lankan Government’s suppression of free speech” thesundayleader.lk – Appeal To Boycott Galle Literary Festival, is an extreme and somewhat counter-productive measure, I also flatly refuse to accept that the GLF as an entity is one that nurtures or encourages an environment of dissent and political debate. The agenda for the GLF is clearly set as one of commercial gain. Furthermore, given the close linkages that the GLF has with the Government run Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau  (Sri Lanka Tourism), I highly doubt that the organizers would find it in their best interests to ‘rock the boat’ as it were.

In addition, Sunila’s statement that “it is extremely disappointing to find those who defend media freedom in Sri Lanka playing a role in depriving us of an opportunity to express ourselves and our desire for a democratic and peaceful environment in which to live and work, with a broader community from outside the country,” too, I feel gives way too much importance and significance to an event, which in reality, has a rather lukewarm approach to the promotion of human rights related issues, and that too, if at all. Even though the likes of Sunila would be brave enough to maximize on every opportunity cast her way, http://www.thehindu.com/arts/books/article1134417.ece, it by no means speaks for the agenda of the GLF, and what it intends to achieve.

All I ask is that you call a spade a spade. Nothing more. Nothing less. Whilst, I respectfully acknowledge, and am abundantly grateful for the tireless, and often thankless work that Sunila has done in the field of human rights in our country, often at the cost of her personal security, I am saddened to say that this one time, she couldn’t be more wrong.

• Writing against the RSF/JDS appeal to boycott the Galle Literary Festival
• Responding to a facile appeal: Galle Literary Festival and the freedom of expression
• Moving Tamil Dissent Politics Beyond Anti-LTTEism
• Looking back, looking forward: A brief chat with HRW Human Rights Defender Award winner Sunila Abeysekera on war and peace in Sri Lanka
• On Relative Rights