From 19 – 27 May 2010, Groundviews ran a special edition on the end of war in Sri Lanka. Over this week alone, the site received over forty-thousand readers and exclusively featured over eighty-thousand words of original content, one video premiere, over a dozen photos, generating over one hundred and fifty-thousand words of commentary.

By popular request, The End of War in Sri Lanka: Reflections and Challenges, a compilation of content that appeared online in PDF form, was first released in May 2010. In mid-2010, it was published in print form. Today, we are relaunching the book as a free iBook on Apple iTunes. It is available as a direct download in 32 countries and regions, and readable on both the iPad 1 and 2 using iBooks. Ironically, Apple’s Sri Lankan iTunes store does not list the book, but you can easily download it to your Mac or PC using this link (138Mb iBook). Once downloaded, importing it to iTunes and synchronising it with your iPad is a cinch, and takes just a few seconds.

In his review of the book, Prof. Sasanka Perera, Professor of Anthropology and Head, Department of Sociology, University of Colombo, noted:

Therefore the pieces contained traverse a wide terrain that includes the rational, clinical, accommodating, hopeful, hope-less, post war scenarios of the future, politics of diasporas and so on… To me, that variation is the reality of our post war existence. Our experience is not linear; our perceptions not black and white across the board; our take on the past and the future not a monolithic reality. What is unfortunate is that the reality of this variation has not emerged in the popular and the dominant discourse on war, conflict and peace in the country.

Another review by Channa Wickremesekera, a military historian and novelist based in Melbourne Australia noted,

The most cursory glance at some of the websites that showcases opinions from those whose first language is truly Sinhalese will show that it is still the Wimal Weerawansa’s rather than Kalana Senaratne’s who make opinions of Sri Lankans, even in cyberspace. They are still dancing the victory dance, expecting the Tamil in the room to join in singing Sinhala bailas or to leave the room altogether… Groundviews, I am sure, has no pretensions to having the power to shift heaven and earth which is what, it appears at times, is required to change the direction the country is heading in. Yet, despite that seeming impotence, the collection of articles also presents a pleasing prospect. It shows that there are still at least a few of us who recognise that the end of the war has not ended the conflict as long as we do not deal with the Tamil in the room, fairly and justly. It may make a few other decent people stop and think, even feel. That would be a modest victory but a victory nevertheless.

The new iBooks edition of the book takes over 40 contributions, including high definition video and high resolution photography, and beautifully presents them on the iPad. Content automatically resizes for orientation, presenting text in a clear, crisp format. Photos by Aufidius, Deshan Tennekoon, Sharni Jayawardene and others can be viewed as thumbnails, and pop out in high resolution. Alongside the article by its producers who were the first to visit the Vanni after the end of the war, the trailer of the award winning documentary The Truth That Wasn’t There plays in high definition. iBooks on the iPad also offers the ability to annotate the text and easily email these notes (which Apple calls study cards). When connected to the Internet, each article has a link to access the online version, with all the comments generated still archived.

It is quite simply a new way to engage with content, and Groundviews is pleased to offer, for free, a book that is of enduring value to scholars, historians, political scientists and the average reader. Using poetry, prose, photography and video, The End of War in Sri Lanka: Reflections and Challenges for the iPad demonstrates the potential not just of the device and Apple’s iBook Author to bring content alive, but also the power of new media to present inconvenient truths in a compelling manner.

• Groundviews now formatted for iPad
• Sri Lanka’s and South Asia’s first citizen journalism iPhone app
• Long Form journalism: An invitation to contribute
• Launch of Groundviews 2.0: New features, enhanced readability, comprehensive search
• Send us content for publication

Photo courtesy asianews.it

“I was on my motorcycle going through this area behind a couple on a motorcycle. The woman was pregnant and they were out probably to do some shopping. The couple was coming fast. They signalled to me and I moved aside to let them overtake. I suddenly saw the couple fall down for no discernible reason and the man writhing in agony. He had been hit by a bullet from the army’s side. I stopped and the pregnant woman pleaded with me to take her husband to the hospital. Most people passed us by engrossed in their own problems and such things had become a daily occurrence. The man whose lower jaw had been blown off was vomiting blood and the situation looked hopeless. What had happened was that when we passed that area on motorbikes, it was our custom to dip our heads as low as possible to minimise our chances of being hit by an army sniper. Because the man had ridden fast and taken a curve in overtaking me, he lacked the balance to dip his head as a precaution.

The stricken man’s wife was helpless. To carry the man to the medical post at Valaignarmadam required a third person on the bike so that the injured man could be sandwiched between us. My bike being too small for that, I asked the wife to help the man onto the bike so that he could sit behind leaning his head on my back. In this manner I took the man to the hospital. By the time I reached there he was dead. It was then that I noticed my own state. A good part of my person was drenched in blood and covered in flies. The flies formed also a thick layer upon the dead man. This brought home to me the absolute squalor of the place.

I was once travelling on the main road when unexpectedly I saw an RPG shell fired by a soldier across the lagoon landing in front of me. I considered and decided that there was no point in stopping and rode on and another RPG shell fell behind me. I warned people travelling in the opposite direction not to proceed as there was an ambush waiting. But no one seemed to take notice. How does one explain such behaviour? On the one hand there is constant danger from shelling and from small weapons fire and ideally children should be inside bunkers. But on the other, you see children playing on the beach and even flying kites, indifferent to sudden death that strikes unawares.”

UTHR(J), Special Report No: 34, Let Them Speak: Truth about Sri Lanka’s Victims of War, December 2009

Moderating the session with Dr. Abuelaish Izzeldin, the author of I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity at the Galle Literary Festival this year was memorable not so much for what Dr. Izzeldin said, but for the audience reaction. It may have been the only session where the speaker was applauded after every response and received a standing ovation at the end of the session.  From the vantage point of the elevated stage, I could see dozens – women as well as men – in tears, or fighting hard against them. The questions had a predictable preface – Dr. Izzeldin’s book made people cry.

With a redesign of The Nation in the offing, columnists were asked to limit their submissions to around 800 words. Around 580 of this column reiterate an inconvenient truth about the human cost of victory. There are hundreds of families, not unlike Dr. Izzeldin’s, not far from where you read this. Dr. Izzeldin survived. Many in Nandikadal did not. Dr. Izzeldin went on to write a book. The horrific stories of those caught between the advancing Sri Lankan Army and the frothing madness of the LTTE aren’t as well-known, even though they are in the public domain. Perhaps grief is easier when its focus is farther away in geography, time or identity? Perhaps the optics and politics of grief, recognition and memorialising – the monuments, statues, renaming of roads, commemorations, garlanding – that take place in the South for war heroes are accepted as more authentic and necessary than the grief of a family in the Vanni whose children were killed or conscripted?

Dr. Izzeldin was visibly moved when he spoke. I remain unconvinced he has come to terms with his own catastrophic loss, and hope he finds peace. For us in this country, we are told we are at peace. Moved by the violence of distant lands, we care not to read our own stories. There are many. Grief is not the exclusive domain of anyone, or any one community. But grief today is unequally recognised, and the space to grieve is unequally framed. If a family in Gaza is able to move us to tears, can 580 words depicting a larger horror move us to tears too?

And if we don’t care enough to read, to ask, to know and to grieve, we must acknowledge that we too are authors of violence.

###

This article was first published in The Nation newspaper on 29 January 2011.

• Like Slaves In Jaffna
• Inquiry into a Sri Lankan Man’s Stolen Bicycle
• A recent trip to Vavuniya: For the future looks dark and gloomy
• Let this be the moment that defines us
• War IDPs

Photo, courtesy JDS, is of Sri Lanka’s President reading the LLRC report on a ‘haansi putuwa‘ at his official residence.

Though not without flaws and lacuna, the long awaited LLRC report does not disappoint, and reaches high standards, ranking with the best reports emanating over the decades from official and semi-official/autonomous Sri Lankan commissions, reviews and probes. It is a serious, thoughtful, carefully written and constructed text, striking in its fair-mindedness and balance. It deserves constructive engagement with, by all concerned Sri Lankan citizens and those in the world community who are concerned about and with Sri Lanka.

Let us first dispense with the flaws and gaps, of which there are chiefly two. Firstly, the Report echoes the conventional wisdom, as does the Norwegian (NORAD) post-mortem, that the CFA was the result and in the context of the military weakness of the Sri Lankan state. This is factually incorrect since it ignores the chronology of events, in which the deadly LRP missions which were taking down the Tiger command structure, followed and not preceded the disastrous Agni Kheela operation and the devastating raid on Katunayake airport. Thus the lopsided character of the CFA which heavily favoured the LTTE did not reflect the real balance of forces and was not inevitable. Secondly, the LLRC Report draws a veil of silence over the even more lopsided post-tsunami relief mechanism, the PTOMS, which was negotiated at the tail end of the Chandrika presidency and was frozen in its dangerous middle tier, by the Supreme Court, responding to a petition by the JVP. These errors and omissions should not, however, detract from the essentials merit of the Report.

The Report is Janus-faced in the best, original sense of the term. It looks back at the war and the context of the conflict and provides a perspective of the kind of society we need. It constitutes the only road map so far, to a durable peace and a better future. It does not stop at a vision, sometimes more implicit than explicit, but pinpoints wrongs and shortcomings that require rectification while listing reforms that cry out for urgent implementation.

Responses to the LLRC report have been of two sorts.  One is that it is basically laudable and balanced, containing recommendations which should be promptly acted upon.  This response then subdivides between those who are hopeful of action and others who are pessimistic or cynical.  The second response is that the LLRC report is far from satisfactory, and is a whitewash or to change the metaphor, a sweeping under the carpet of war crimes and accountability issues.

To my mind the first response –with its optimistic and pessimistic subsets– constitutes a reasonable reaction, while the second does not.  I say this because those who dismiss the report as His Master’s Voice make the fundamental mistake of being teleological in their approach. Having concluded a priori, that the Sri Lankan state and armed forces were guilty of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, they fault the LLRC Report for not having arrived at the same conclusion, and dismiss it out of hand, echoing calls for an international inquiry.

These critics overlook or fail to undertake at least five basic tasks. They fail to grapple or even make reference to the rigorous reconstruction and argumentation that leads the Report to conclude that despite episodic crimes, civilian casualties were not, for the most part, intentional. They ignore the fact that this finding is the same as that which was arrived at by at least two impeccably non-state, independent sources, the oldest civil society think tank in Sri Lanka, the Marga Institute and its respected founder and outstanding liberal thinker Godfrey Gunatilleke, as well as a joint commission of three private sector business confederations. They fail to examine and disprove the extensive and solid argument on international humanitarian law in the LLRC report.  They disregard the listing of specific cases, based on testimony, which require independent investigation. They ignore the chapter on Human rights, which, unlike that on international humanitarian law, is quite critical of the status quo.

The Report also cuts like a surgeon’s knife through the old questions as to what the grievances of the Tamil community are, which of them are genuine and legitimate and how they differ from the grievances of the Sinhala community. This is done in excellent segments entitled ‘Grievances of the Tamil Community’ ‘The Historical Background relating to Majority-Minority relationships in Sri Lanka’ and ‘The Different Phases in the Narrative of Tamil Grievances’ (pp291-294, 369-370).

Perhaps the single most important contribution of the LLRC Report is its clear and unambiguous identification of the causes of the Sri Lankan conflict and crisis, the resolution of which remains the central challenge before the country. The LLRC has, in short, undertaken a diagnosis and provided a prescription.

“The Commission takes the view that the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people. The country may not have been confronted with a violent separatist agenda, if the political consensus at the time of independence had been sustained and if policies had been implemented to build up and strengthen the confidence of the minorities around the system which had gained a reasonable measure of acceptance. A political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict…” (p 291, articles 8.150, 8.151)

The LLRC Report justifies its most ambitious claim, which is to provide a post-war programme and pathway.

“… To this end, the success of ending armed conflict must be invested in an all-inclusive political process of dialogue and accommodation so that the conflict by other means will not continue… However, if these expectations were to become a reality in the form of a multi-ethnic nation at peace with itself in a democratic Sri Lanka, the Government and all political leaders must manifest political will and sincerity of purpose to take the necessary decisions to ensure the good-faith implementation of the Commission’s recommendations... While not being an exhaustive agenda to address, let alone cure, all ills of post conflict Sri Lanka, the recommendations of the Commission could nevertheless constitute a framework for action by all stakeholders, in particular the Government, political parties and community leaders. This framework would go a long way in constructing a platform for consolidating post-conflict peace and security as well as amity and cooperation within and between the diverse communities in Sri Lanka.” (Preamble, pp.1-2)

Overall, perhaps the most vital contribution of the Report is its potential to re-balance the Sri Lankan policy (and political) discourse, re-constituting a tragically vacated middle ground or centre space. Indeed, the LLRC report is that rarity: a welcome example of an enlightened Middle Path, at a time of strident affirmations of dogmatic fundamental positions.

• A slumbering LLRC: The image of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
• The official report of the LLRC
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• The LLRC report and ‘accountability’ in Sri Lanka
• The Final Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission: A Response

Readers will find no big surprises after reading the final report of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).

It is very much what most people were expecting. A document that looks to the future, exonerates the military, does not touch on the question of accountability and includes some touchy-feely language about the country’s need to move forward, celebrate its diversity and be grateful for the defeat of terrorism.

Essentially, all civilian casualties were the result of people caught in the crossfire or were the LTTE’s fault. “The protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority” by the Sri Lankan armed forces, the Commission has determined. The report also claims that military operations moved at a “deliberately slow” pace because Sri Lanka’s military personnel were so careful and cognizant of the dangers to civilian life during the final phases of the conflict.

While the LTTE deliberately targeted civilians, it appears that Sri Lanka’s military did not, according to the LLRC report. That assertion goes against what most people seem to think, including the report produced by the United Nation’s Panel of Experts. In order to determine “questions of State responsibility,” the LLRC report goes on to note that an “international tribunal” would be unhelpful because there just is not enough evidence about what actually happened during the final phase of the conflict. Essentially, it would be nearly impossible to “re-create” what actually occurred in a court of law. The Commission found that it was just too challenging to give even an estimate of civilian casualties during the end of the war.

The Commission also found it difficult to determine what happened regarding the shelling of hospitals. Although, it is clear to the Commission that Sri Lankan military personnel never intentionally went after civilians in the No Fire Zones(NFZs) either.

The report talks about remuneration for victims/survivors, especially civilians. Again, this is not a big surprise either. Most people thought that the LLRC Report would recommend that the government “throw some money” at a few people.

Although, the responsible entity for doing so, the Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA) is currently suffering from a lack of funds so it is uncertain how that will play out in the years to come.

The Commission’s analysis of the current challenges facing Sri Lanka appears to be slightly more realistic than the rest of the report. Land issues, minority rights and the possibility that militarization in the North might be a bit too much are all mentioned. And yet “The Commission however recognizes the fact that considering the protracted nature of the conflict spanning a period of thirty years, resolving all such issues would naturally take time and require significant resources and financing.”

So, Sri Lankans and the international community must be patient, of course. Wait, wait, wait—there is always something to wait for in the pursuit of accountability in Sri Lanka. And of course the Commission has found that the most responsible way to approach accountability and the pursuit of national reconciliation would be to establish some additional “independent” bodies to help achieve this. The Commission has even suggested that the Sri Lankan government conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of the Channel 4 documentary “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields.” Evidently, authentication by United Nations specialists is insufficient. While the video does contain certain inaccuracies, it still provides credible evidence that widespread violations of human rights and international law were committed by Sri Lankan military personnel.

There is some fluffy prose about promoting a trilingual Sri Lanka and finding a political solution to address the long-term grievances of the Tamil people. Sri Lanka is still loaded with ethnic tension. Does anyone really believe that a “trilingual Sri Lanka” in the next ten years is a feasible goal?

So, the question is not whether or not the LLRC is insufficient. (It is obviously a weak report, and, in some ways, undoubtedly weaker than what even the most pessimistic people were expecting). The question is whether people sitting in Western capitals (like the US, UK and Canada) who were demanding “accountability” are going say that this report is good enough.

Was the statement made by US Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, a genuine articulation of US policy that the Obama administration will pursue aggressively? How hard will the US and other countries push Sri Lanka on the question of accountability over the next twelve months? Does Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper really care about accountability in Sri Lanka? (Or does he just care that Tamil Canadians think it is important to him).

Many people were waiting for the publication of this report. Sri Lanka, the UN’s Panel of Experts report and the LLRC should be topics of enormous interest at the Human Rights Council’s 19th session in Geneva this March.

It is unclear how events will unfold early next year in Washington, New York, Geneva, London, Ottawa and elsewhere. It would be nice to see a country from the Global South speak out strongly against the LLRC report as well.

What is clear is that if President Rajapaksa is able to get through the next two cycles of the Human Rights Council unscathed, accountability and the idea of an international mechanism will become afterthoughts.

Sri Lanka is currently struggling with numerous problems related to human rights, media freedom, governance and national reconciliation, which the current regime shows no interest in resolving. Yet a balanced, accurate recounting of what actually transpired at the end of the war is vital. Human Rights Watch has already come out with a strong statement condemning the report and others from international organizations will inevitably follow.

It is hard to imagine that a reasonable person (who has been following events in Sri Lanka closely) could buy “the story” that is the LLRC. But if other countries are placated by this biased, inaccurate and disappointing report loaded with lacunae, it will be incumbent upon Sri Lankan citizens and civil society leaders to demand more transparency and better governance from their politicians.

International mechanisms and should never be the first option when it comes to accountability, in Sri Lanka or anywhere else. Yet, it has become increasingly clear that Sri Lanka’s domestic institutions are inadequate—particularly as it relates to the rule of law, the judiciary, media freedom and the protection of individual liberties. There is some skepticism about how much consensus could be garnered at the Human Rights Council, as is the case with any multilateral body.

Irrespective of how the Commission was formed, or how biased the Commission might be, President Rajapaksa was given a chance (and rightfully so) to prove that Sri Lanka was capable of looking into credible allegations of war crimes in 2009. People waited patiently for the LLRC to produce its final report.

The production of a mediocre report would have at least given the Sri Lankan government a chance to make a “decent” argument in with foreign governments, in Geneva and other in other international forums. Yet the LLRC is painfully inadequate, especially when it comes to the veneration of the armed forces and the Commission’s inordinately generic and general comments about the behavior of Sri Lankan military personnel at the conclusion of the war.

The publication of the LLRC report is one more sign that Rajapaksa’s regime thinks it can do whatever it wants and face no consequences for its actions.

There is a good chance that the regime is right.

It will take significant political will, leadership and courage if Rajapaksa’s regime is going to be held accountable at the UN’s Human Rights Council, or anywhere else. The US government has just come out and said that they have some serious concerns about the report.[1] “Concern” is one thing, real action is another.

US State Department Spokesman Nuland’s recent statement not only decries the fact that the report is insufficient. She goes on to say that, in addition to fulfilling all of the recommendations in the LLRC report, the Sri Lankan government should deal with the issues (and there are many) that the report did not include.

It is hard imagine that the Rajapaksa regime will comply with this request with alacrity, if it does at all. If other influential governments come out with similar or far more critical responses to the LLRC, it will be interesting to see how the Sri Lanka government will respond. Of course, sovereignty will lie at the heart of their defense, but they will need a more nuanced riposte than that. Rajapaksa’s regime has proven itself to be extremely effective when it comes to consistent, coherent messaging and the manipulation of high-level diplomatic visits in Sri Lanka.

Yet, one would hope that the efficacy of the tactics and strategy that they have used quite well in the past would wane with the publication of this underwhelming report.

Nuland’s comments are an encouraging sign. Hopefully, they will be followed by concrete action by Washington and many others, including those Sri Lankans who have already suffered so much and deserve a better, impartial, more detailed account of what actually happened in April and May of 2009.

[Editors note: A version of this article first appears in the Journal of Foreign Relations.]

• Examining Sri Lanka’s Diplomacy Machine
• A tragi-comedy? The UN Advisory Panel and war crimes in Sri Lanka
• Waiting for the end of the LLRC
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Can GOSL Implement LLRC Recommendations?

on his back, that sloshed
set of poetry he cannot avoid

carrying, an appendix,
reptilian brain, fascination

with naming elements
of the crime, breadth

of carpet strafing
of civilians in tents

on banks of the lagoon,
while tails for the ball

are rented
and we sit down

to quail and goose,
although elements

of the meal have
no political meaning.

They are foods for festive
or special occasions: here

fundraising, so ordinary
citizens can travel

to see the miscreant
dictatorship, dressed

in civvies, mixed in
with the crowd,

not in a killing field,
drawn up in advance,

but the larger and
harder-to-manage

masses of the post-war
streets, and report

what they find
before the police visit.

• Ayelasah
• Beauty
• Does cricket have a citizenship?
• Sri Lanka’s Flood Response: In Dimbulagala, people protest and plead
• Do candidates need armed security to ask for people’s votes?

Photo courtesy Lankapuvath

Michael Roberts’ recent Groundviews piece on the government’s rehabilitation programme of alleged former LTTE combatants is generally approving of that programme, not only directly but also indirectly in making the kinds of criticisms that actually add to the approbation. Professor Roberts has added his distinguished academic authority to a set of circumstances that perhaps justifies a more discriminating analysis. His uncritical and at times inaccurate and misleading observations therefore require a response, providing also the opportunity to critique, both the policy and legal perspectives involved. In this article I will attempt to remedy the lacunae in my previous piece on this issue, published here[1] in late 2010, which did not discuss the legal dimensions nor use testimonies of persons released from rehabilitation centres[2] to substantiate certain assertions made in that article.

Statistics: Do we know how many persons have been rehabilitated?
In a section titled ‘Numbers’ Roberts discusses the number of persons who were held at rehabilitation centres. He mentions three categories of persons who were sent to rehabilitation centres- those who surrendered voluntarily, those who were identified as former LTTE cadres and those arrested in other parts of the country from 2006-2008, thereby implying that the process of identifying persons as former combatants came to a halt soon after the end of the war. What he fails to note is that more than 6 months following the end of the armed conflict the government continued to identify persons who were perceived to have had some link with the LTTE, who were then sent to rehabilitation centres. For instance, there were numerous reports that persons were separated from their families and taken away during the IDP return process in late 2009. This continued in areas of origin of the IDPs after they returned home. Further, detainees held at centres such as Boosa have been transferred to rehabilitation centres and vice versa. The population at the rehabilitation centres therefore has been fluid.

Since July 2009, when ICRC access to the rehabilitation centres was stopped, no independent agency has visited the centres to undertake protection monitoring, i.e. ascertain whether the rights of the inhabitants were violated in any manner during their detention. Since news reports and articles often mention IOM’s access to rehabilitation centres, with the implication that it constitutes oversight of an international agency, it is important to state that IOM is not a protection agency and only provides support to the re-integration process of alleged ex-combatants. The rehabilitation process was conducted entirely by the Sri Lanka armed forces acting under the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Another point to note is that although the Bureau of the Commissioner-General for Rehabilitation (CGR) comes within the purview of the Ministry of Prison Reforms and Rehabilitation, the decision making authority in relation to releases, determination of the period of detention etc. lie entirely with the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, there is no independent means of verifying the actual total number of persons who have subjected to the rehabilitation process and released. For instance, while certain government reports state that around 1000 remain in rehabilitation, former Attorney-General Mohan Peiris at the Convention Against Torture Committee (CAT) hearings stated that only 869 currently remain in rehabilitation centres.[3]

Surrendee, Detainee, Rehabilitee: Does Terminology Matter?
All persons held at rehabilitation centres have been labelled ‘surrendees’ by the government although many did not surrender but were taken away by the armed forces from IDP camps or were detained at some point during, at the end of, and after the last stages of the armed conflict. Many were also forcibly recruited by the LTTE with some being forced into combat by the group only for a few days or even hours during the final stage of the war.

Until the state of emergency (SOE) and thereby the Emergency Regulations (ER) lapsed on 31 August 2011, ER 22 governed the status of the surrendees. Regulation 22 (2) defined a ‘surrendee’ as anyone who surrendered in relation to an offence under certain laws, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. It further required the person to give a written statement that s/he surrendered voluntarily. The government however has labelled not only those who voluntarily surrendered but also those who were arrested as surrendees. Regulation 22 (13) also enabled a court to impose rehabilitation as a sentence upon conviction. This begs the question, under which law did the government subject those who didn’t voluntarily surrender to rehabilitation? The CGR Maj. Gen. Chandana Rajaguru has stated that ‘there is another category of people who had been produced before Courts and had received rehabilitation as the verdict. They are with us, and are around 1,000 in number. We intend to keep them only for one year’.[4] If rehabilitation was imposed by the courts as part of a judicial order then these persons should have been tried and convicted of an offence. To date, trials of around 1000 persons who were captured or surrendered after the end of the armed conflict in May 2009 have not been held and concluded, unless they were held in secret. Therefore, what are the court orders that Maj. Gen. Rajaguru speaks of and under which law were they issued? Maj. Gen. Rajaguru further states they intend to hold these persons for only one year. If a court has made a certain order stipulating the rehabilitation of an individual then how would the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence or the CGR have the authority to determine the period of rehabilitation? Would it not constitute the usurpation of judicial authority?

The screening process: A combatant unless proven otherwise
Senior Legal Advisor to the Cabinet and former Attorney-General Mr. Mohan Peiris stated at the CAT Committee hearings in Geneva on 9 November 2011 that Sri Lanka did not choose to charge persons thought to be LTTE cadres and jail them, but instead chose the restorative justice approach because the former would not have promoted true reconciliation. In response to a CAT Committee member’s query whether the government gave these persons ‘an offer they could not refuse’, Mr. Peiris stated that these persons were asked whether they were willing to submit themselves to rehabilitation and if so were asked to commit their acquiesce to writing. The other option he said for those who didn’t want to undergo rehabilitation, i.e. those who said ‘I don’t want to be rehabilitated- I want to remain a terrorist- charge me, indict me, jail me’, was to be left to the mercy of the criminal justice system. At no point does the former Attorney-General who was in office during the last stages of the war, consider the likelihood that some of those identified as LTTE cadres may have had no formal link with the group while others might have been forcibly recruited for a few days or even a few hours. There might have even have been those who should have been indicted for war crimes instead of being subjected to the rehabilitation process.

Who is a combatant? The ICRC note on ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’ recognizes that ‘As with State parties to armed conflicts, non-State parties comprise both fighting forces and supportive segments of the civilian population, such as political and humanitarian wings. The term organized armed group, however, refers exclusively to the armed or military wing of a non-State party: its armed forces in a functional sense.’ It goes on to state that ‘Individuals who continuously accompany or support an organized armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation in hostilities, are not members of that group within the meaning of IHL. Instead, they remain civilians assuming support functions, similar to private contractors and civilian employees accompanying State armed forces’. Within this framework those who were part of non-combat divisions and did not directly participate in hostilities would not be considered combatants under international humanitarian law.

The National Action Plan of the ‘National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka’, drafted by the government through a multi-stakeholder process that was supported by many international agencies, contained a sliding scale that provided a guide to categorizing those who required rehabilitation as opposed to those who should have been subject to prosecution, based on various factors including the period spent with the armed group. Yet, this Plan never received cabinet approval and was not implemented. Instead, the government considered all persons as LTTE cadres and subjected them to rehabilitation. This also means that it is possible there are those who should have been prosecuted but instead have been subjected to rehabilitation. While the intelligence agencies no doubt undertook their own method of screening, it is quite possible that such a process violated the rights of persons held at the rehabilitation centres. For instance, as discussed further in the section below, the screening process continued throughout the duration of the rehabilitation process. This meant that persons who were at the rehabilitation centres had no certainty regarding their legal status, i.e. they did not know whether they were going to be released after rehabilitation or sent to a detention centre. While Roberts lauds the government’s ‘enlightened policy’ the reality is that there is no transparent state policy on rehabilitation process.

Determination of the period of rehabilitation: Indefinite administrative detention?

ER 22 stated that a ‘surrendee’ could be held for a period of twelve months and at the end of this period:

• The person could be released following a review by the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence; or
• The period of rehabilitation could be extended for a period of three months at a time so long as ‘the aggregate period of such extensions shall not exceed a further twelve months’; or
• Three months after the surrendee being assigned to a rehabilitation centre s/he could be investigated to determine if the person committed any offences as stipulated in Emergency Regulation 22 (2) and the person could be charged with an offence.

Therefore, the subjection of an individual to the rehabilitation programme did not mean the person was precluded from being arrested for an offence at any point during the rehabilitation process, i.e. even the day before the expected date of release. Hence, the surrendee had no certainty regarding his/her legal position, i.e. whether s/he might be prosecuted, until the completion of the rehabilitation period. Hence, an individual who was held at a rehabilitation centre for the maximum period of 2 years could, the day prior to his release, be arrested. Until an individual was released from the rehabilitation centre s/he had no clarity or certainty regarding his/her plight. There have been reports of individuals who were identified for release being sent to Boossa detention centre a few days prior to the expected date of release.

The CGR Maj. Gen. Chandana Rajaguru has stated in an interview that ‘people who had come from Puthumatalan started their rehabilitation in October 2009’[5]. Although Puthumathalan was captured by the armed forces in April 2009, with persons suspected of being affiliated to the LTTE taken into custody or asked to surrender, according to Maj.Gen. Rajaguru these persons began the rehabilitation process only in October 2009. From April to October 2009 until they were subjected to rehabilitation, which at the time was governed by ER 22, under which law were these persons held? According to testimonies of those released from rehabilitation centres, none were informed of the laws under which they were being held nor produced in court during this period, which leads one to the conclusion that they were arbitrarily detained contravening not only international laws but also Articles 12 and 13 of the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution of Sri Lanka.

There have also been instances in which rehabilitees have been transferred from a rehabilitation centre, where the maximum period of detention is 24 months, to a detention centre such as Boossa where persons are held on detention orders issued for a maximum period of 18 months under the PTA, and previously the Emergency Regulations. Transfers from rehabilitation to detention centres usually take place towards the end of the maximum period for which a rehabilitee can be held- 24 months. In some cases persons have been transferred from the rehabilitation centre to a detention centre and thereafter produced before a magistrate and remanded in custody. By transferring a person from a rehabilitation centre to a detention centre or placing the person on remand, the government can hold an individual in administrative detention indefinitely.

The Post-State of Emergency Legal Framework
Following the lapsing of the SOE and thereby the ERs, the government issued new regulations under section 27 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which empowers the Minister of Defence to make regulations under the Act ‘for the purpose of carrying out or giving effect to the principles and provisions of the Act’. Of these the Prevention of Terrorism (Surrendees Care and Rehabilitation) Regulation No.5 of 2011 deals with both adults and children subjected to the rehabilitation process. The lapsed ER 22 has been reproduced in this regulation.

Another regulation issued under the PTA titled Prevention of Terrorism (Extension of Application) Regulation No.3 of 2011 extends until specified dates the application of a number of regulations, including the regulation on the appointment of the CGR, that were made under the state of emergency that prevailed until 30 August 2011. The regulation issued under the PTA states that the specified ERs made under the SOE will continue to be in force notwithstanding the lapsing of the SOE which resulted in the lapsing of emergency regulations made under section 5 of the Public Security Ordinance (PSO). It should be noted that regulations issued under a SOE cannot continue to be in force when the SOE lapses because only the proclamation of a SOE empowers the President to issue ERs. Therefore, in the absence of a SOE emergency regulations cannot be extended or kept in force via ‘normal’ legislation, such as the PTA. Hence, the regulation extending the CGR’s tenure is invalid since the extension of the application of the ER appointing him is ultra vires.

Lack of Procedural Safeguards and Oversight Mechanisms
At no point during the rehabilitation process did surrendees enjoy procedural safeguards; they were not provided with information on the timeframe of rehabilitation or the right to legal representation to contest the lawfulness of the rehabilitation process. Coupled with the lack of oversight mechanisms this places surrendees in a particularly precarious position with their fate decided by one individual- the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. Heads of various missions, as stated in Roberts’ piece, have undertaken visits to the centres but one can hardly claim that a short tour of the facility conducted by the armed forces by persons who do not speak Tamil who rely entirely on (sometimes questionable) interpretation constitutes keeping ‘a weather eye on the programme’.

Donor Support for the Rehabilitation Process
According to publicly available data, except during the initial stages, donors have not supported rehabilitation centres or activities therein. This was a conscious decision made, albeit reluctantly, after they became aware of the legal ramifications of financially bankrolling centres at which persons were being arbitrarily detained. Instead, they provide financial support to re-integration activities that take place following release from rehabilitation centres. Likewise, as stated earlier, IOM is not involved in the rehabilitation programme but supports re-integration activities.

Vocational Training and Livelihood Needs
Although the government claims it has provided vocational training to all those held in rehabilitation centres, according to released persons only a handful appear to have received any form of training at all. Many stated that of thousands of persons only a limited number, around 20-30, were chosen for each training course at any given time, i.e. training was not provided to all persons held at rehabilitation centres. The most pressing need of those released from rehabilitation centres is livelihood opportunities. Although IOM provides a grant to enable them to kick-start income generation activities, some released persons have experienced delays in accessing these grants while others have utilised the grant to engage in one-off economic activities that do not provide a sustainable income. In other instances, due to lack of guidance and support in the form of market knowledge etc. some have undertaken income generation projects which they are not qualified to run and thereby have incurred losses, most often resulting in the loss of the capital as well. Also, the fixed grant provided by IOM does not cover all costs related to a certain income generation activity, which prevents some from engaging in the activity productively.

Post-Release Monitoring and Surveillance
During the past year it has been reported that those released from the ‘rehabilitation’ centres have been instructed by the local government agent, the Grama Sevaka (GS) to register with the Civil Affairs Office (CAO), which is run by the military, and thereafter report to the Office weekly, fortnightly or monthly, a decision dependent entirely on the area military commander. Some former rehabilitees have reported that during these visits to the CAO they were asked to sign documents that were in Sinhala, a language they don’t understand, and interrogated. They said they were asked the same questions that were posed to them in the rehabilitation centres- of which section/battalion/unit were you a member? Who was your commander? How long were you in the LTTE? Do you know where weapons are hidden? etc. Some who were forcibly recruited by the LTTE lament that these questions only remind them of a period they wish to forget when they are trying to move forward with their lives, while other expresses anger about the constant harassment and suspicion with which they are viewed that they say makes them feel like second class citizens. Post-release monitoring and surveillance are being conducted outside existing legal frameworks, in an ad hoc manner by multiple military/intelligence agencies, that visit homes of former rehabilitees often and interrogate them. Most often the officers/visitors do not identify themselves. Former rehabilitees are given no information on the likely duration of surveillance and reporting and some have been subjected to travel restrictions.

The continued monitoring and harassment by the security services restricts the ability of this population to successfully re-integrate into the community, as they continued to be viewed with suspicion by the community due to their imagined links with the armed forces which their regular visits to COA and/or army camps and constant visits by security agencies to their homes elicit. There were also those who complained that they were unable to engage in income generation activities due to regular visits by the intelligence agencies and/or army to their place of employment, which not surprisingly caused problems at their workplaces, particularly in the case of those who are self-employed and provide services to homes, such as electricians, plumbers and masons.

*****

I would like to conclude by addressing a question posed by Roberts about the releases conducted with pomp and ceremony by the government. He asks and answers the question thus– ‘how do ex-Tiger fighters and their kinfolk view such moments? The plausible answer is that these ceremonial functions are akin to a graduation ceremony and a momentous point in their life, even conceivably a “transformational” landmark’. The reality is that none of those interviewed appeared to view the graduation ceremony as a transformational landmark. Instead, all felt a sense of relief to be released from what they, at one point, felt would be a never ending ordeal, and reunite with their families. At the same time they also felt trepidation about the future- about their ability to find employment and re-build their lives free from harassment and surveillance in an environment in which they were still viewed as persons who have to be watched and monitored by the state.

• Cluster munitions, inhumane IDP camp conditions and the White Flag incident: More disturbing leaks from UN report
• A first hand perspective of Sri Lanka’s largest IDP camp: Are they really ‘our people’?
• Lifting of Emergency: Exposing the Sham Exercise
• ‘National security’ in post-war Sri Lanka: Women’s (In) security in the North
• A Kunanayakam by any other name?

30 months after the end of war, more people travel between the once off limits North[i] and the South and many of the travel restrictions have been eased. The dreaded Medawachiya checkpoint is no more, and since 2010, we have not taken a flight or ship to Jaffna, travelling by road instead. Displaced people who were detained for about 6 months have now been allowed freedom of movement and many have been allowed to go back to their places of origin. Many youth detained in “rehabilitation” centres have been released and allowed to go back to their families and communities. Death certificates have been issued to few of the people killed during the war. Few schools, hospitals, and some main roads and bridges have been built and glamorous ceremonies held to open these by government and military officials. Three major elections have also been held in the North.

But much remains to be done for Northern Tamils to be able to live in dignity and for the country to move towards reconciliation.

In the last few months, we had spent a considerable amount of time traversing the major towns and roads as well as remote and interior villages and roads in Northern Sri Lanka. We had managed to reach some interior villages after questioning by suspicious and curious soldiers. We had survived without running water, electricity, beds, long nights battling mosquitoes, long bumpy rides in dusty buses on roads that felt more like tracks in a wild life parks and numerous other challenges.  But the difficulties we encountered pale in comparison to the difficulties people we encountered were facing and often we felt helpless and powerless to help them.

Below are some of concerns regarding the situation in the North and prospects for reconciliation, based on what we saw and heard first hand, complimented by some additional desk research for information and statistics we couldn’t find on the ground and additional references that re-confirm our findings.

1. Fate of those killed, disappeared & injured and their families:

In almost every village in the North we have visited, especially in the Vanni, we met families of those killed or disappeared during the last five months of war in 2009, in the years 2006-2009 and decades of war. In a submission to the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission on 8^th January 2011, the Catholic Diocese of Mannar, led by the Catholic Bishop of Mannar, Rt. Rev. Dr. Rayappu Joseph, asked for clarification about the fate of 146,729 people who were unaccounted for between October 2008 and May 2009, based on government statistics and documentary evidence.[ii] The submission also included a list of 100 people disappeared from the Mannar district between 2007-2009 and list of 166 persons reported as killed from the Mannar district in the last phase of the war. There has been no response received from the LLRC or any government official to these.

Searching and waiting for loved ones whom have disappeared

The lack of official acknowledgment of these killings and disappearances and independent mechanisms to confirm the killings and trace those disappeared are major concerns of Tamils living in the North. The Human Rights Commission and adhoc Presidential Commissions appointed since 2006 (such as the LLRC, Udalagama Commission and Mahanama Tillekeratne Commission) have failed to respond to these needs.

In almost every village we had visited in the Vanni, the former LTTE controlled areas, we also met people injured in the war. We have met people who lost both legs and those who have lost legs and arms and variety of other injuries and related sicknesses. Most of them have not received adequate assistance and struggle to live productively, with some finding it difficult to even continue medical treatment.

2. Detention and release of alleged LTTE suspects:

We also met many families whose loved ones have been detained for long time. According to the government, 876 persons are held in administrative detention at the Boosa detebtion facility in Southern Sri Lanka and 863 of them are Tamil.[iii] No information is provided about the period of their detention and we had heard about cases where detainees have been in detention for more than ten years without being convicted. In addition to the around 280,000 displaced who were detained, the number of those detained in “rehabilitation” centres is believed to be 12,000. There is no fixed and exact official figure, with various government officials and politicians giving different numbers at different times. The government claimed 1000 were in “rehabilitation” centres as of 17^th Oct. 2011 out of 11,951 that were on “rehabilitation” – voluntarily & based on court orders, plus a further 994 that had been transferred from custody of the Terrorist Investigation Department to “rehabilitation” centres. [iv]

In an interview to the Sunday Observer of 9^th October 2011, reproduced in the official website of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation had claimed that “Those who were fully involved with the LTTE were removed to Boossa and there was a fair amount of such people” and that “The TID categorized the people and took away those in the categories A,B & C; LTTE leaders, strict followers, and those who were assigned to recover things and arrest others”.[v] There is no information provided about how many were taken away, their names and details and where they are now.

Given history of enforced disappearances, torture and long detention in Sri Lanka this lack of uncertainty in numbers, together with lack of centralized list of detainees indicating place of detention and transfers, raised serious concerns about security of those in detention.

There is no clarity regarding whether or not or when the 1000 remaining in “rehabilitation” would be released or prosecuted. Different government officials and politicians have given different numbers that would be prosecuted, with no one indicating a time frame.[vi] Despite the lack of clear official statistics about how many entered the “rehabilitation” process, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation implies that most of the 12,000 surrendered in May 2009 after the death of the LTTE leader.[vii] In the same interview, the Commissioner General admits that the maximum period these persons could be kept lawfully in “rehabilitation” is two years – raising concern that the 1000 remaining as of 17^th October 2011, and indeed the majority of those kept after May 2011, are / were being kept illegally.

One of the alarming developments seen since the end of the war has been the threats, intimidation and restrictions placed on detainees released. Those released are being subjected to repeated registration, surveillance, interrogation in their homes and military and police camps. Many had restrictions placed on freedom of movement, such as getting permission of military before they leave their villages. [viii] At least one such person we met had been re-arrested, detained in Kandy for about a month in which process relatives observed signs that he was tortured.

3. Detention, release, “resettlement” and imminent forcible relocation of the displaced:

The mass detention of more than 280,000 Tamils from the North who had borne the brunt of the last phase of the war was amongst the most visible outcomes of the end of the war throughout most of 2009. Probably due to massive international and some local pressure, Tamils detained began to be gradually released, starting with children, elderly, injured etc. and by end of 2009, most people detained were granted freedom of movement.

From end of 2009, those displaced who were released were gradually allowed to go back to their villages in the formerly LTTE controlled areas. However, people are not allowed to go back to resettle in at least 9 villages in the Mullativu district and several more in Mannar, Killinochi and Jaffna districts which are presently occupied by the Navy and Army.

According to the latest Joint Humanitarian Update on the UN OCHA website, based on statistics of the GOSL[ix], as of end of September 2011, more than 120,000 people remain displaced.

65,008 persons who were displaced in the last phase of the war in the North after 2008 remains displaced, with 7,534 in camps and 57,474 being with host families. The update also notes that a further 55,616 remains displaced, having being displaced prior to April 2008. This number includes 8,013 in camps and 47,603 with host families, and is likely to include people from both the North and the East.

One of the new concerns is the Government’s decision announced on 20^th September 2011 that 7,394 persons still living in Menik Farm (at time of announcement) will not be allowed to go back to their villages, but will be settled elsewhere, in Kombavil, a jungle area in the Mullativu district..[x] While we were not able to obtain official information as to what these villages are, information provided by displaced people indicate that the military is occupying 9 villages, not allowing displaced civilians to go back. From what we learnt, these villages includes Puthukudiruppu East, Puthukudiruppu West, Sivanagar, Manthuvil, Malligaitivu, Ananthapuram in the Puthukudiruppu DS Division and Mulliwaikal West, Ampalawanpokkani & Keppappilavu in the Maritimepattu DS Division. Despite go and see visits to Kombavil, many residents had expressed their unwillingness to go to Kombavil, and some had submitted a petition to the National Human Rights Commission in this regard.

We visited Kombavil twice in the last two months and observed that government appears to be going ahead with plans of compelling people in Menik Farm to resettle in Kombavil, despite people’s concerns. The latest Joint Humanitarian Update confirms that there is no confirmation that these people would be allowed to go back to their own villages or a timeline for such an eventuality, and also confirms that issues such as access to seaside fishing areas, farming/paddy land, access to adequate health services and alternative choices other than Kombavil are yet to be resolved. [xi]

The slow return of some Muslims forcibly evicted from the North by the LTTE and Sinhalese who had left the Northern Province, has also started, and this is indeed a positive development. Some such returns have led to tension between communities, primarily based on land issues and allegations of resource allocations. Preventing such tensions and ensuring that all communities have right to return to an conductive atmosphere where they can rebuild shattered lives, in a way that does not affect the rights and sensitivities of other communities has emerged as major challenge. For example, Tamils around Madhu road in Mannar district claims that there were 22 Sinhalese families in the area in 1990 and that 180 have requested for housing to the Assistant Government Agent of Madhu Division. TNA Member of Parliament, M. A. Sumanthiran has pointed out that that 45 houses have been provided by a state Bank while only 5 have been provided to Tamils in the area. [xii]

4. Militarization:

In the last month, several well known peace activists, senior lawyers and journalists have pointed out that two and half years after war, the whole of Sri Lanka and many facets of life, remains heavily militarized.[xiii]

In our visits to the North, it was clear that the North remains heavily militarized and this continues to be resented by the Tamils in the North, many of whom believe the military is responsible for killing, disappearing, torturing, and sexually abusing Tamils during decades of war. Tamils also see the military presence as an obstacle to restoration of normalcy and civilian life in the North in the post war era. The military continues to be the most visibly present and dominant institution in the North, particularly in the formerly LTTE controlled areas. According to the official website of the Ministry of Defense, a “new Security Forces Headquarters Complex at Kilinochchi, comprised of an air-conditioned conference hall plus a separate auditorium, administrative offices, computer and signal room, mess hall and a few other wings was ceremonially opened” on 21^st October and this had cost Rs. 40.6 million (around USD 369,000)[xiv].  According to TNA MP Sumanthiran, “there is one member of the armed forces for approximately every ten civilians in the Jaffna Peninsula”[xv]. According to military’s own statistics, in Jaffna, there are more than 35,000 troops[xvi] for an estimated 626,329 people[xvii], an average of one military personnel for every 18 civilians, which includes children and senior citizens. Defense Ministry quotes the Secretary of Defense saying that “Military Intelligence Corps had to be increased to 6 battalions from the original 1-2 battalions”[xviii]. Militarization is a dominant part of parcel of live in the North (and East as well), over riding and sidelining elected representatives from the area and civilian administrators. The Governors of both the North and Eastern province are senior military officers and Government Agent of one of the districts (Trincomalee) is also a former military officer. The military plays a dominant rule in controlling civil and religious bodies and community and social life. It has also encroached into law enforcement, resettlement, rehabilitation, development, sports, cultural, shops, restaurants, hair salons, farms, transport and even touristic activities. Examples of some of these are provided below. In all the village level Development Committees in Jaffna, the President is a military officer. [xix] Some village development committees, such as Pachchilaipalli 2, comprise entirely of military officers.[xx]The civil military coordination website claims that it’s Misison includes even the upliftment of people through “spiritual values”[xxi].

5. Degrading and discriminatory registration of civilians in the North:

Civilians in the North have been subjected to repeated registrations by the military during the war and also after the end of the war. But even in 2011, this continues to happen in the Vanni and also Jaffna.

Despite the Attorney General agreeing to suspect registration of civilians in Jaffna & Killinochi districts by the military in February 2011 after a five TNA Parliamentarians of the Jaffna district filed a fundamental rights application, registration continued. Various other forms had also been distributed in Jaffna by the Police for purpose of registering civilians.

6. Occupation of land:

Large amounts of private land, and sometimes whole villages have been occupied by the military and there have been no compensation schemes announced for these long takeover of land. Many such properties continue to be occupied by the military. The military also occupies state land, and bypasses administrative laws and procedures in putting up structures at their own whim and fancy, such as shops, restaurants, farms, monuments etc. One of the most blatant incidents is the occupation of Mullikulam village in the district of Mannar since September 2007 by the Navy, without following any legal procedures and displacing the entire population indefinitely. According to the Civil-Military website for Jaffna, 200 hectares of land is inaccessible for cultivation due to High Security Zones and further 6000 hectares of land is not in use due to effects of conflict[xxii]. According to TNA MP Sumanthiran, “Tamil people inhabited 18,880 sq km of land in the North and East, but after May 2009, the defense forces have occupied more than 7,000 sq km of land owned by Tamil people”[xxiii].

7. Continuing violence in highly militarized North:

Numerically, numbers of those reported as killed, disappeared, arrested and tortured have gone down in 2010-2011 compared to 2006-2009. But people continue to live in fear in the North as killings, disappearances, sexual abuse, robberies, extortion continue to be reported from the North since the end of the war. In a three month period of November 2010 – January 2011, 40 such incidents were reported, predominantly from Jaffna.

In August 2011, the military and police conducted a spree of attacks on civilians and threatened religious leaders in Jaffna, Vavuniya and Mannar, in relation to protests and concerns of the civilian population regarding military complicity in relation to attacks on women by “Grease devils”.[xxiv]

Like before, these incidents seem to happen despite a large and dominant presence of the military on a scale not seen in the rest of the country, bringing about well founded suspicions of the military’s tacit or explicit involvement in these incidents.

One of the most shocking and brutal violence by Police against Tamil civilians was seen on 20^th September 2011, when Mr. Udaya Pushparaja Antony Nithyaraja (31) of Jaffna District was severely tortured by police officers in the premises of the Jaffna Magistrate Courts[xxv].

8. Violence against women:

Many women complain of rape, sexual abuse, including by military officials[xxvi]. Women complain of soldiers visiting houses when there are no men, telephone calls and sms (text) messages etc. There have also been allegations of trafficking. Several soldiers were arrested for rape of women in 2010 in Vishvamdu. Women also have been the prime target of attacks by “Grease devils”[xxvii]

9. Attacks on dissent and threats and restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly and association:

On 16^th October 2011, a Jaffna University Student Union leader, who was also a well known as an outspoken civil rights activist, was brutally assaulted [xxviii] while on 29^th July 2011, senior journalist and news editor of Uthayan was severely assaulted.[xxix] Both these attacks resulted in victims being rushed to Jaffna hospital for treatment. On 28^th May 2011 one of Uthayan reporters was attacked by armed thugs when he was on his way to work.[xxx] The individuals and organizations have been known critics of the government. On 24^th July 2011, Networking for Rights, an exiled group of Sri Lankan activists and journalists reported that two foreign journalists had been interrogated at midnight in Jaffna by Police and were compelled to leave the region and that the next day, they were attacked and robbed at gun point.[xxxi]

Several human rights defenders in the North have been subjected to threats and intimidations since the end the war. On one occasion, the names of a group of human rights defenders that participated in a human rights training in the North were printed in a mainstream national Sinhalese newspaper, along with the organizers, portraying all as traitors.

Several others have been questioned by military and intelligence and beaten. One was stopped and questioned at the airport in December 2010 and another questioned and slapped on arrival at the airport in September 2011.

On 16^th June 2011, a meeting of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the political party which won comprehensively in successive elections in the North, was broken up by the army and peopling attending the meeting attacked.[xxxii] In June 2011, it was reported in the Sinhalese newspaper “Ravaya” that the military had threatened people in Vanni not to participate in a protest of families of disappeared people and subsequently detained and interrogated two of the organizers. On the night of 1^st April, a Catholic Priest who had spoken out about problems facing civilians in Jaffna at a meeting with the visiting Congress of Religions delegation, had cow dung thrown at him.

Such incidents have also instilled fear amongst human rights defenders, journalists, opposition politicians and anyone holding dissenting views with the government.

Many NGOs and church groups keen to engage in counseling, community organizing and provision of other materials and services to people in the North continue to complain about restrictions and stringent regulations imposed by the Presidential Task Force (PTF). The difficulties in obtaining permission to provide any form of assistance drives away and discourages many groups and individuals keen to help people affected by the war, and this denies desperate people from receiving much needed support.

In many areas of the North, particularly in formerly LTTE controlled areas, the military demand advance notification of any social events and attend such events without invitation. On one occasion, Police officers interrupted the awards ceremony of a cricket tournament and took away a trophy on offer, alleging that it was in the name of a former LTTEer. In actual fact, the trophy in question was donated by family members in memory of parents that were dead.

10. Restrictions on freedom of movement in the North:

Despite the opening up of the A9 road in December 2009 and easing of some travel restrictions between the North and the South, travel restrictions still remain to the North. The Omanthai checkpoint serves as a separation of the North from rest of the country, and the separate and concept of entry / exit is indicated by a board that says “remain here until you are granted entry”.

In July 2011, a Sri Lankan journalist faced restrictions on travelling in the North, including being detained and questioned at an Army camp for several hours. Also in July 2011, days after an official announcement by the government that restrictions on travel for foreign nationals to the North have been lifted, the Ministry of External Affairs has insisted on additional documentation such as pre-planned travel itinerary for a visiting foreign national, who had a legitimate visa to visit Sri Lanka. The military officials allowed her to pass the Omanthai checkpoint, the main entry point to previously LTTE controlled areas, only after she showed a letter authorizing her to travel to specified cities for a specified time period from the Ministry of External Affairs, which according to her had been issued after obtaining approval of the Ministry of Defense. A friend from north who had called the Ministry of Defense was told that foreign nationals can only travel on the A9 road, and travelling to interior villages still required prior permission.

11. Sinhalese – Buddhist domination:

Fears and unhappiness about Sinhalese – Buddhist domination in predominantly Tamil areas was repeatedly expressed by people we met. We ourselves saw many indicators of such attempts. TNA MP Sumanthiran’s report to Parliament raises concerns that “steps are being taken to divide the District of Mullaitivu and create within it the new District Secretariat division of ‘Weli Oya’ and that there are orders issued to “to have Tamil civil servants removed or transferred from the North and to fill the vacant posts with Sinhala trainee civil servants and that one hundred and forty Sinhala civil servants have been relocated to the North as part of this initiative and Tamil civil servants have been ordered to go on compulsory leave, and further, that these drastic measures must be viewed in the backdrop of systematic deliberate exclusion of Tamils in the civil service in selection processes, promotions, trainings and development opportunities”[xxxiii].

Despite the North being predominantly Tamil, many road signs continue to be in Sinhalese. We noticed several such Sinhalese names around Mullativu on the eastern coast of Vanni and around Mulangavil and Adampan on the western coast of Vanni. We also observed several road names in Sinhalese only, named after Sinhalese soldiers.

Even some release letters for detainees, forms collecting socio-economic information are not in the Tamil language in the North.

The North also remains predominantly Hindu and Christian, and thus, the building of several new Buddhist statues and structures have also made Northern Tamils fearful of Buddhist domination of the North.

12. Lack of shelter, livelihoods, healthcare, educational, transport facilities:

30 months after the end of the war, people whose houses were razed to the ground due to no fault of their own, have not been provided houses by the GOSL. The few houses that have been provided have been built through people’s own efforts and with support of their relatives, friends, foreign governments, and private groups. However, all over the Vanni, military has been provided with housing that appears of much better quality than the housing displaced persons are compelled to live.

Some schools damaged in the war are still not repaired and it is common to see classes conducted in open air. Some schools are still occupied by military and some are still closed. TNA MP Sumanthiran sites examples of schools occupied by the military as Keppapilavu GTM school in Keppapilavu, Mulliyawalai, Mullaitivu, the Maththalan R.C.G.T.M. School in Mulliwaikkal, Mullaitivu, Mullivaikkal West K.S.V Mullivaikkal,Mullaitivu Mulliwaikkal East GTM School, Mulliwaikkal Mullaitivu, Vikneshwara Vidiyalayam Pooneryn, Arasaratnam Vidyalayam Manthuvil Puthukkudiyiruppu, Sivanagar Tamil Vidyalayam Puthukkudiyiruppu Mullaitivu and the Myliddy, R.C.T.M.S Mylidy, Kankesenthurai[xxxiv].

Hospital and medical facilities also remain scarce and often, people have to walk long distances and queue up for healthcare. According to the latest Joint Humanitarian Report, many primary medical care units and divisional hospitals in the North are still not functioning. [xxxv] TNA MP Sumanthiran’s October report to Parliament highlights inadequate health services in the Vanni, citing the This avoidable death of patient deaths, such as the death of a girl on 7th October 2011 as a result of untreated rabies[xxxvi].

Livelihood options remain scarce and most people live improvised and poor lives. Although some have been provided livelihood support by UN, church groups and NGOs, many remain improvised. A major o obstacle to develop livelihoods based on local resources has been the military encroachment into livelihood activities. The military regulates fishing, issuing passes to go to sea. Fishermen in Mannar district showed us three separate forms that require 30 signatures plus photos and additional documents, to enable fishermen to go fishing.

Some Northern Tamil fisherman allege that military often gives special privileges to Sinhalese fisherfolk from the South. The report tabled TNA MP Sumanthiran notes that while there are restrictions on fishing by Tamil fishermen in villages in Mullativu district such as in Kokkilaai to Chundikkulam in Kilaakaththai, Maathirikkiraama, Uppumaaveli, Thoondai, Alambil, Semmalai, Naayaaru, Kokkuththoduvaai, and Karunaattukkernee, Sinhala fishermen in the area have received direct permission to fish in this area from the Ministry of Defense. He also claims that while Sinhalese fishermen are given preferential treatment to fish in the North, Tamil fishermen are not given reciprocal permission to engage in fishing in the South[xxxvii]. Mr. Sumanthiran also reported that “people returned by the government to Uduththurai in Maruthenkerny (Vadamarachchi East), were soon after evicted from their houses along the coast and placed in transit camps on the other side of the coastal road. These houses are now being occupied by people brought from the South who are permitted by the Ministry of Defense to engage in diving for coral and star fish”[xxxviii].

In our visits to the North, we saw that the military has also started a large number of business, such as restaurants, shops, farm, hair salons, holiday resorts and tourism projects, denying the local people the opportunity to develop their own initiatives using local resources. The Civil-Military Coordination website lists “Tour Guide Service” amongst the services it offers[xxxix]. It appears that the military is using state resources for some of these activities and the legality of some of these activities is in doubt.

TNA MP Sumanthiran also highlighted the situation of unemployment in the North and East, saying “ The limited opportunities available are consistently given to individuals of the labour workforce from the South. Estimates suggest that unemployment in the Northern Province is between 20% to 30% in the Northern Province, compared to a National average of 4.3%. The reservoir bunds repair and road construction of the A9 road and the secondary road have been handed over to Sinhalese contractors from the South who bring in their own labour force. Only an insignificant number of Tamil labourers are employed by them despite the fact that there are numerous Tamil youth and men who are unemployed in the Vanni”[xl].

13. Impunity, allegations of war crimes, calls for international inquiry and LLRC:

Many human rights violations, abuses, criminal and illegal activities since the end of the war, including some mentioned above, continue unchecked and it appears that rule of law simply doesn’t exist in the North or a different sets of rules and laws apply in the North, distinct from rest of the country.

Allegations that grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law occurred during the last stages of the war, particularly from January – May 2009 is a recurring theme in the post war scenario. Allegations have been leveled against both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. However, with killing of the LTTE chief along with other top leaders, the focus of accountability has focused on the Sri Lankan government, given also it’s national and international obligations as a state. Allegations included the killing of thousands of civilians due to shelling and bombing, targeted shooting, attacks on hospitals, schools, churches, restrictions on essential humanitarian assistance including food and medicine. Civilians, doctors, religious leaders and militants who survived the last months of the war had given a number of first hand eyewitness accounts to the government appointed Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) when it held sessions in the North. University Teachers for Human Rights – Jaffna, a Sri Lankan group with a reputation for detailed reporting of human rights violations during the decades of war, produced a damning report of abuses by both the Government and the LTTE, while international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group also produced detailed reports containing such allegations. The United States of America Department of State also produced a report containing similar allegations. The last and most damning report came from a panel of experts on accountability in Sri Lanka, appointed by the UN Secretary General. Video and photos have also been circulating projecting horrific civilian casualties, including the shooting of unarmed LTTE cadres who had surrendered. A June 2011 50 minute documentary film produced by Channel 4, a British TV channel, and certification of the authenticity of some video clips by UN experts have raised visibility of allegations of war crimes nationally and internationally.

These allegations have led to calls for an independent international inquiry, by several western governments, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, international human rights groups and large numbers of Tamil Diaspora. Even the Indian government, which in the past had shielded the Sri Lankan government from criticisms, recently took a position that concerns being raised with regard to the sequence of events in the last days of the war needs to be examined. The failure of the Sri Lankan criminal justice system and a number of adhoc Presidential Commissions of Inquiry to establish the truth and ensure accountability for large and serious rights violations related to the war as well as unrelated to the war, such as extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual abuse have given credibility for calls for an international inquiry.

The government’s response has been on one hand, a blanket denial that any violations of international human rights and humanitarian law took place in the last days of the war. On the other hand, the government has gone to great lengths to try and convince domestic critiques and the international community that Sri Lanka’s domestic processes, particularly the recently appointed LLRC is capable of dealing with any allegations of human rights and humanitarian law during the war. Questions about independence of the LLRC, whose Chairman and several members have served the incumbent regime and even defended allegations against the regime in international forums have not instilled confidence and hope of those calling for international inquiry. Witnesses had received death threats, one told us that he had been questioned three times by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) between January 2011 (when he gave the testimony) and October 2011 and others have been visited by intelligence officers. The lack of victim and witness protection program, restricted mandate including the scope to look at only the specific period of 2002-2009, and lack of respect paid to victims and families who came forward to testify before the LLRC have further indicated the inability of the LLRC to serve as a credible accountability or transitional justice mechanism. One the damning indictments against the LLRC process is that after more than one year, key interim recommendations by the LLRC has not been implemented by the government, including releasing a list of detainees.

Until and unless there is a credible domestic mechanisms that is seen as independent, particularly by victims, survivors, their families and others who have leveled allegations, calls for international inquiry is likely to continue.

14. Ethnic and north – south polarization; celebrations in the South and mourning in the North:

Despite the fact that LTTE prevented civilians from leaving the war zone, including by shooting at people who tried to escape, the government’s claim that it had undertaken a “humanitarian operation” and “liberated / rescued civilians held hostage by the LTTE” didn’t appear to have any acceptance amongst the Tamils in the North while in other parts of the country, this claim appeared to have gained varying degrees of acceptance.

The visible response in areas outside the North and East of Sri Lanka when the war ended was one of joy and celebrations. This was predominantly the response of the majority Sinhalese community, in line with the position of the government of Sri Lanka. If those who had survived in hand dug bunkers felt some relief when finally the shelling, bombing and shooting stopped, it was not visible. What was visible in the North was tears and mourning for large numbers of Tamils killed, disappeared, injured and displaced.

Monument for the war victory in Puthukudiruppu

This polarization was again visible during the 1^st anniversary of the end of the war. The south celebrated with a grand victory parade, while in the North, the military cancelled the solemn and subdued low key religious – cultural events organized to grieve and mourn for those killed and disappeared. Those who organized and attended these events, including several Catholic priests, were threatened by the military. A Catholic priest who attempted to build some small monuments for those killed in the war was also threatened by the military. Cemeteries and memorials of Tamil militants in the North, where family members used to go to say a prayer, lay a flower and light a candle, were raised to the ground. Even the house of the LTTE leader’s parent’s in Jaffna was vandalized and when his mother passed away, her remains were desecrated. On the other hand, massive and posh looking monuments for Sinhalese soldiers had come up in the North.

Thus, Tamils in the north find that they don’t even have the right to remember and grieve in the new kind of “liberation” they have been dished out.

15. Ethnic and north – south polarization; rejection of Rajapakse government at successive elections in the North:

Three separate elections, namely presidential, parliamentary and local bodies, were held across the country including the North in 2010-2011. None of the three elections could be termed free and fair, with election monitoring bodies reporting intimidations, killings, attacks, and threats and massive abuse of state resources and state media before and during elections. However, the incumbent regime hastened to assure Sri Lankans and the international community that elections were indeed free and fair. Thus, in elections that the incumbent regime insisted was free and fair, the regime led by President Rajapakse suffered heavy defeat in three successive elections in the Tamil dominated Northern Province, including in areas that were previously controlled by the LTTE. The last of these elections, the local government elections in Jaffna, Mullativu and Killinochi saw unprecedented campaigning by the President himself, members of the parliament including the President’s influential brother and son, and other senior ministers. Material assistance and economic development was promised and generously dished out to desperately improvised communities who had their properties and livelihoods destroyed during the war. However, all these failed to convince the Tamil citizens, who voted overwhelmingly for the Tamil National Alliance, the leading Tamil party. However, in Sinhalese dominated areas of the country, the Rajapakse regime won overwhelmingly, with the main opposition United National Party and other smaller opposition parties suffering heavy defeats.

The elections results amply demonstrated the continuing polarization between the North and the South in relation to political aspirations of Tamils. In the northern local elections, government politicians and their supporters campaigned on basis that since they hold the all powerful executive presidency and more than two thirds power in the national parliament, the only way for improvised northern Tamils to rebuild their lives would be to vote for the government in the local elections too. The rejection of this by the Tamil voters, in one way could be interpreted as an assertion that their identity and political aspirations were important more than economic development even in the most desperate of circumstances. From another perspective, it was an assertion that Tamils in the north didn’t consider the brutal war waged by the Rajapakse regime that defeated the LTTE, as a “humanitarian operation” that “rescued / liberated” them (Tamil civilians) from the clutches of the LTTE.

Even after these overwhelming victories in the North and East in the parliamentary and local elections held in April 2010 and July 2011, the TNA is given very little opportunity to actively participate and contribute their perspectives towards development of the region, with the Rajapakse clan and the military determining policy and practice. Thus, there appears to be little prospect that the Tamil National Alliance’s parliamentarians and local government representatives elected by popular vote in the North could wield much influence in decisions that affect the life of Northern peoples.

Thus, a regime that was rejected at three successive elections by popular vote will continue to govern the North and make decisions about priorities that affect the life of people there. This could only change in the longer term with constitutional changes that will provide for significant power sharing and autonomy for the North. In the short term, the only way the popular vote will have a meaning in day to day governance would be if the Sinhalese dominated central government will agree to involve the elected representatives of the North and East in making decisions and determining policies and practices that affect the life of the people there and drastically reduce the military presence and stop the military from interfering in civilian life.

16. Way forward:

As mentioned at the outset, the restoration of normalcy to the North, enabling Northern people to live without fear and in dignity, with equal rights, freedoms, opportunities as their brothers and sisters in the rest of the country will serve as a key to lasting peace and reconciliation in the whole country.

In this regard, a key element will be reduction of the military presence in the north, reducing the role of the military and the restoration of civilian rule. Removal of restrictions on travel, fishing, freedom of association, assembly, expression, movement along with guaranteeing of the right to dissent, grieve, mourn, remember those killed and disappeared, build memorials for dead and disappeared will also be crucial indicators. The stopping of acts that have direct and indirect connotation of Sinhalese – Buddhist domination, ensuring that sign boards, official forms etc. are also in Tamil language, stopping land grabbing and reparation for victims and their families (those who had been killed, disappeared, injured, tortured, detained for long periods without charges, sexually abused, whose houses and land was occupied etc.) are also key steps towards reconciliation.

Accountability for violations that have happened, both in the last phase of the war as well as throughout the three decades of war, and post-war, including some incidents mentioned above, is also crucial. A process of truth telling which involves acknowledges the wrongs that have been done, identifies perpetrators would be essential, even to consider measures such as forgiveness and amnesty.

Recognition of historical grievances and political aspirations of the Tamil community, that led to the birth of the LTTE and other armed Tamil groups leading to three decades of war, and concrete and credible steps towards addressing these would be the another important element that we believe is crucial for Sri Lankans to move on to be able to live with each other without notions of enemy. Given the polarization amongst the Tamils and Sinhalese communities, as evident by starkly contrasting election results in the North and South as well as reactions to the end of the war, such a process is bound to be long drawn out and difficult. However, in the short term, what would be crucial is for the process to be seen as genuine and not leading to yet another initiative that would be abandoned. The support the present regime enjoys amongst the Sinhalese population makes it well placed to undertake such a process, and good starting point might be to resurrect the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) process that this regime itself initiated.

In the end, reconciliation and lasting peace will come through meaningful actions such as ones outlined above, rather than empty promises.

• Final text of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in Parliament opposing the 18th Amendment
• “Sound is no substitute for argument”: Exclusive video of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in parliament against 18th Amendment
• Hansard on 18th Amendment debate, 8 September 2010
• Life in an Open Prison
• Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Breaking the Myth and Bringing the Truth

This is the continuing story of Gajaman Nona, an accomplished Sinhala poet, who was born in 1758. Emerging from a time capsule, GN finds herself in year 2011. The lady, who during her lifetime experienced dire poverty and took care of her four children with much difficulty, finds that her economic circumstances remain much the same 250 years into the future. However, unlike in the 18^th and 19^th centuries, a little investigation reveals that in 2011, there are more ways than one to make a ‘respectable’ living. Armed with information gleaned from perusing the newspapers and conversations with a group of people who appear to be untiringly working for the well-being of fellow human beings, GN decided to establish a NGO. Although she cannot quite decide what this NGO should be doing, being industrious, she doesn’t allow the lack of a clear aim to deter her and establishes ‘Rough Guide Inc.’, an organization which, as the title suggests, seeks to help fellow-citizens navigate their way through the difficulties encountered in their quest to live happy and fulfilled lives in Sri Lanka. She decides that the best way to launch her NGO is to undertake a fact-finding mission, a fashionable much-used strategy by people working for the well-being of others. The war victory celebrations in the country (she doesn’t quite understand what they are celebrating although the government keeps mentioning Tigers) and constant talk about the North and the Vanni makes her decide that her first fact-finding mission would be to Jaffna and the Vanni. Her insights on the situation in Jaffna and the Vanni and suggestions to those who wish to visit these areas are given below.

Suggestions to the traveller to the North: Results of the fact-finding mission

1. GN, who was travelling in her brand new four wheel drive with Rough Guide Inc. boldly painted on the sides of the vehicle, got the shock of her life when she was stopped at Omanthai, where a board which reads ‘entry-exit point’ is very prominently displayed, and her driver was instructed to alight from the vehicle and sign in/register at the army point. While her driver was registering a young army officer walked up to her, asked for her national identification card and wanted to know who she was and what she did. Her annoyance turned to confusion at being questioned because she was under the impression that the state of emergency no longer existed, everyone, including foreigners, could travel freely to the North and Sri Lanka was well on its way to becoming the miracle of Asia- a beacon of democracy and economic growth in South Asia. She tried to ask the young men in vain why they were stationed there registering people but they had no rational response. Indeed, this encounter did make her wonder whether the North was another country…

Suggestion: When you travel North, particularly if you are travelling in a vehicle that clearly shows you are from a NGO, please be prepared to answer questions from young army officers, who are probably quite bored and looking for chit-chat with anyone who passes by.

2. On the drive along the A9 GN spotted several shops that were being run by friendly young men from the military- strangely enough not many shops run by local civilians. Since GN had heard a lot about all the good development work that was being done by the government as part of the ‘Northern Spring’ initiative she assumed this must be part of that programme. After all, the civilians after years of armed conflict and displacement probably had no capital to start up small businesses anyway, and it would not make economic sense to let the business opportunity go to waste. So she thought it was valiant and resourceful of the military to enter the commercial sector in order to fill the void. Also who better than the military to show civilians how to run efficient businesses.

Suggestion: Please do your bit and contribute to the military economy of the North to uplift the lives of the conflict-affected civilians by stopping at these road-side shops and having a bite to eat or buying a t-shirt with ‘Kilinochchi Reawakening’ emblazoned on it.

3. Since President Mahinda Rajapakse in his speech at the 2^nd celebration to mark the war victory mentioned ‘freedom from terror’ and ‘freeing thousands of civilians in the North, who were held as hostages’, GN expected to see the people in the North living freely in prosperity. Instead, to her surprise, she passed army camp after army camp, soldiers on the road and even soldiers in what seemed to be private houses. When she tried to speak to a few citizens who were gathered at a local grocery shop just outside Kilinochchi town and asked them about the situation in their areas, she noticed a young soldier sidling up to them to listen in on the conversation. After observing this for a few minutes she turned around and asked the young man whether he was happy being stationed in the North, the soldier who responded by saying that he missed home and his family, in the same breath told her not to cause trouble and to be on her way. She couldn’t understand why the soldier was worried as the people were very unwilling to speak openly with a stranger anyway. She might have been mistaken but she thought she saw fear in their eyes when she asked them whether they were enjoying their new found freedom.

Suggestion: Those visiting the North, particularly the Vanni, please refrain from bothering the local population by talking about politics, the war, the ethnic conflict or the situation in their areas because walls have ears. In fact, it is best that you do not talk to the local population at all, particularly because there are so many people battling with each other to speak on behalf of the Tamil people- from NGOs, the different sections of the Tamil diaspora and Tamil politicians to the government. Best save the Tamil people the trouble of speaking for themselves.

4. Curiosity made GN travel further into the interiors of the Vanni in her brand new four-wheel drive. Once again, she thought she would be able to visit the areas in which the final battle was fought but was told that since she was an NGO she could not proceed further without clearance from the MOD.  She couldn’t understand why everywhere she went in the North everyone was asking her to obtain the permission of the Ministry. What does the Ministry do in the North? Does the Ministry run the North? Is there a parallel government that begins at the entry-exit point at Omanthai that is run by the MOD? She decided she had to investigate the matter further as she found it all quite, quite confusing. Here she was, thinking that the Northern part of the country had been liberated from the Tigers, yet soldiers were constantly asking her for MOD authorization. Did the government sign the North away to the MOD at the end of the war? But isn’t the Ministry only a part of the government rather than THE government in the North?

Suggestion: In order to avoid constant altercations with the security forces, please ensure you have clearance from the Ministry of Defence or in the alternative, take the guided tour of the North that is very helpfully being conducted by the Ministry. This way you will be able to access areas that are out of bounds to ordinary citizens and those working in NGOs and other organisations such as the UN, and be able to see the areas liberated from the clutches of the LTTE.

5. Since GN had heard that people who had returned home from IDP camps were facing difficulties as they had to live in temporary shelters and had limited access to water, sanitation, health and education and even livelihoods, she thought she would investigate further and try to unearth the ‘true’ story. Yet, when she approached a village in the interior she was stopped at an army check point and asked where she was going. When she told them she was on her way to see the living conditions of the IDP returnees she was promptly refused permission to proceed further. As GN is not one to give up easily, she travelled to the nearest army camp and asked to see the officer-in-charge (OIC) and inquired why she had been refused permission to travel further. The OIC asked her the reason for her travel, and when she very honestly told him that she wanted to see how the IDP returnees were living, was told that it was because of people like her that untrue stories were being spread outside the country about the government of Sri Lanka. He firmly told her that if she had anything to contribute, like for instance, funds to build roads, bridges or houses, they and the Presidential Task Force (PTF) might consider allowing her to work in the area. Otherwise he asked her to return home and not cause further trouble. When she returned to her vehicle, her driver, a young Tamil man, who looked quite shaken and worried, advised her that in the future she should not approach army officers and challenge/question them as it could lead to trouble both for herself and Rough Guide Inc.

Suggestion:  Word of advice to NGOs and those wishing to work in the Vanni- if you want to gain entry to the area it is best you do not undertake fact-finding missions or engage in any programmes, such as awareness raising or psycho-social care, that are likely to cause discomfort to the government. Instead provide hard cash and support the PTF’s and army’s efforts to ‘rebuild’ the North.

6. From the Vanni GN sped away to Jaffna hoping to see something different, perhaps happier people looking forward to the future. Once again she was surprised to see the heavy presence of the army. She was quite taken aback to note that all the soldiers, both in the Vanni and in Jaffna, spoke only in Sinhala. In fact, GN had been quite worried initially about travelling to the North as she doesn’t speak Tamil and was wondering how she would communicate with the people or even ask for directions if she got lost. With the presence of Sinhala speaking soldiers at every junction, she realized that it was entirely possible to navigate one’s way through the North without any difficulty. She remembered reading that several Tamil speaking policemen had been trained recently but didn’t come across any of them. Perhaps they had been posted to other parts of the country.

Suggestion: Do not be afraid that you will have to learn Tamil to travel to the Northern part of the country, which is predominantly Tamil speaking, as guides in the form of Sinhala speaking soldiers are at every point to assist you. Even persons who are afraid they might get lost do not need to worry. There are plenty of signs in (only) Sinhala that will enable you to find your way.

Stay tuned for more adventures in GN’s new life as the head of a NGO travelling the country to bring solace to the disadvantaged and disempowered.

###

Gajaman Nona is the latest entrant to Banyan News Reporters on Groundviews, which uses satire to raise awareness on and interrogate corruption, war crimes, impunity, censorship, civilian displacement, abductions, torture, extra-judicial killings, human rights violations, “national security” and humanitarian aid. To understand why satire is such a powerful expression and mechanism during violent conflict and severe media repression, read Bridging comedy and conscience.

• Civilian displacements in the Vanni
• Celebrating war victory and banning commemoration of dead civilians: this is “home grown & indigenous” reconciliation and freedom in Sri Lanka?
• Permission To Travel Out Of Jaffna
• A short note from the Vanni
• Security Forces North & East Operations

The power and promise of national exercises like the LLRC lie in the way that they can access the voices of those who have not traditionally been heard, and use them to build a more representative and inclusive collective memory. Yet for Sri Lanka’s Tamil women, the LLRC simply reaffirms bad old habits, writes Jo Baker [i]

In the lead up to the release of the report by Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), strong concerns have been publicly raised about the value of a process that aims to build a clear picture of the conflict, without fully including or representing those who were most directly affected. This has led to important questions regarding who has been heard, how their concerns have been addressed, and whether they will feature fully in a final report and its recommendations. While such questions have focused on vital themes of accountability, ethnic discrimination and political will, often in relation to internationally-agreed standards, they have been resoundingly quiet in a criticalarea: the space and consideration being given to women.

Many governments in countries recovering from conflict are now taking stronger steps to include women in transitional instruments, such as peacekeeping strategies, reparations programmes and truth commissions, to better secure lasting peace and improve their standing at home and overseas. This is underscored by a legal commitment: non-discrimination is an inalienable human rights obligation, and a founding principle of the domestic legal and international legal order. In the mid nineties and early 2000s South Africa and Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) uncovered the shocking, previously unrecognised scale of crimes against women during apartheid and internal conflict respectively, and then responded with reparations and reform to address them. A few years later, commissions in Sierra Leone and Timor Leste built strongly on these improvements by broadly consulting women in their design and procedures, as I explore below.

These steps and others show a growing understanding that women’s concerns, needs and abilities have historically been a low state priority, and that women face greater difficulties in accessing state machinery. They recognise that they generally experience conflict and displacement differently to men and, in outnumbering them as survivors, have greater post-war roles and responsibilities, and different needs. And they show an improved understanding of the ways that truth commissions (TCs) and commissions of inquiry (CoIs) have long worked from a male standpoint, producing a ‘partial and narrow truth’ (Nesiah 2006), and excluding women from an instrument meant to shape future priorities and practices in the country.

It is therefore critical to ask what the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has done to ensure that the LLRC – or any other memory-building or truth telling instrument – serves Sri Lanka’s women as well as its men; particularly minority women, who have been most deeply and directly affected by the war, and who are most deeply and directly discriminated against in general. Many will point to the floods of women who have clamoured to access the LLRC (as they have for a series of Sri Lankan CoIs). But have they truly been able to effectively use these mechanisms on a par with men? And have they been accepted as victims in their own right, or rather as mothers, sisters and daughters of victims? When Sri Lanka’s efforts are measured against international standards on non-discrimination, or against other recent commissions elsewhere in the world, a marked failure emerges by its government to uphold key human rights standards, via its massive exclusion of the female minority voice. Among all the critical assessments of the LLRC and discussions on transitional justice in Sri Lanka, this element should be receiving greater attention. As noted recently by, Valkyrie, a Groundviews columnist, in one of the few commentaries on this issue:

“For the Tamil women … ‘The not telling of the story serves as a perpetuation of [the conflict’s] tyranny’ which has the potential to provoke deep distortions in memory and the organization of everyday life later on. The fact that these are narratives which cannot be heard and cannot be witnessed to, is what constitutes a ‘mortal death blow to the survivors.’” [ii]

The following article looks at the need for gender-sensitive truth commissioning in Sri Lanka. It draws on international standards, examples of best practice elsewhere, and criticism of its past and current CoIs, before proposing ways to place Tamil women more centrally within the transitional narrative. It is abridged from my academic legal paper ‘Reconciling Truth and Gender: Lessons for Sri Lanka’, soon to appear in the coming issue of Sri Lanka’s Law and Society Trust Review, and currently available on my website. Please refer to the original for full referencing.

Part One: Disadvantage, compounded

Before looking at the how the GoSL should be addressing both gender and ethnic discrimination in its truth telling, it will be useful to briefly outline the intensified disadvantage that still confronts women in the country – particularly minority women. The chosen focus for my report was mainly on women from the Sri Lankan Tamil Hindu minority in the North and East, since they make up the majority of the survivors most severely affected by the last chapter of the conflict. This is however a vast and complex topic, and I look forward to the emergence of many deeper and more nuanced studies.

A multiple bind

Minority women in Sri Lanka fall at the crossroads of a sidelined gender and a sidelined ethnicity. During both war and peacetime this has meant greater challenges for them in education, employment and civil participation among many areas, which creates greater dependence and much higher levels of vulnerability. Minority women suffer the discrimination and disadvantages faced by all women in the country, for which the state is directly responsible (please refer to the 2011 Concluding Observations of the CEDAW Committee, its shadow report by the Women’s Media Collective, or The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report 2011, released last week), for example in the greater barriers to accessing justice through the police or courts. However they also experience the restrictions of stricter community traditions and customs. These tightened during the Sri Lankan war – as they have in other countries’ internal conflicts – with Tamil women cast as bearers of a threatened culture and therefore often more closely monitored. There is evidence that many lost control over how they behaved, dressed and who they married, despite the other forms of ambivalent (and arguably temporary) empowerment brought by the LTTE (De Mel; Rajasingham-Senanayake; Sornarajah; Abeysekera; see Part II Section ii of my report for elaboration).

Vulnerability to violence
Secondly, it is important to consider the particular experience of such women during and after the conflict: a combination of being unable to leave the ‘wrong place, at the wrong time’, being of the ‘wrong’ ethnicity and as is increasingly understood, of the ‘wrong’ gender.
Unlike many conflicts, rape and sexual violence do not appear to have been deployed as a tool in Sri Lanka’s war, but it has nevertheless been reportedly commonly perpetrated by state agents throughout, particularly in areas directly affected by conflict– therefore excessively victimising Tamil women (Wood 2006, 2009).[iii] The military has replaced most civil administrative systems in the North and East despite the well-documented link between militarisation and violations against women. Reports of the increase in sexual assault throughout high-security zones also cite a rise in prostitution, trafficking and STDs, since women – often without male partners, a place to live or a means of income – are being obliged to interact with male Sinhalese soldiers as part of their daily routine (ICG 2011).

Yet their ability to address these issues is low. As women, particularly minority women, they face more intense social pressure and rejection, and since the administration is not perceived to be safe or gender sensitive, protective or judicial action is extremely hard to come by. This produces a discriminatory environment in which minority women can be targeted without consequence. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) has reported that young, so-called low-caste women among ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka are more vulnerable to sexual violence, and that they ‘expect’ resistance and entrenched patriarchy “all the way from officials at the police stations, to the hospital personnel and the judiciary.”[iv] Meanwhile other women face uncertainties as to the fate of loved ones, stigmas related to widowhood or their political affiliation, and tremendous new roles and responsibilities, in situations such as displacement, where resources are scarce and security concerns extremely high. Injured and/or traumatized themselves, most such women are primary carers for other maimed and traumatized persons. They thus they bear specific needs and concerns that any post-conflict initiative, without applying a gender-lens, will be entirely unable to effectively address (Iqbal 2010: or please refer to Part II Section iii).

Barriers to expression

Just as the route through the courts has been hampered for such women, so has their route through civic means. Censorship and emergency regulations have affected all Sri Lankans, but those with the least access to the public domain are now even less able to express their needs and grievances, for example, through communal gatherings, which have been severely restricted in certain areas under emergency legislation. As Groundviews’ Valkyrie notes of Tamil women: “oral narratives are their only means at their disposal to record their experiences, trauma and survival mechanisms… these women have no space within the dominant narrative to place their stories on record.” [v] This is taking place in a narrative that is already masculine by default, has been intensely masculinized by conflict, and which – as Valkyrie notes – has seen the needs and experiences of Tamil women politically appropriated by both the State and the LTTE throughout the war. Part of the function of any truth-telling or reconciliation instrument should be to rectify and counter such gross imbalances.

Part Two: Reconciling truth and gender: Lessons for Sri Lanka

With these aspects in mind, I move onto truth commissioning, and why only a dedicated commitment to corrective measures – as understood in Sri Lanka’s international commitments – could begin to serve women equally and legally in a truth telling process. Although this comment may only be the tip of the iceberg in this area, it can at the least, highlight the gap between state practice and international standards, and avenues for further action.  To do so I will draw on accounts of past and current Sri Lankan experiences of truth-telling (or ‘lesson learning’), and practices recommended by human rights and transitional justice experts, with examples from other more successful commissions.

Although Sri Lanka’s CoIs and its LLRC have not explicitly featured truth-telling in their mandates, their aims align with those of many truth commissions:  to gather a credible picture of human rights violations during the course of the conflict through the often-public testimony of victims and witnesses. They are therefore strong indicators of State practice in this area.

Methodology

On the most direct, technical level, sex discrimination has been linked to the greater difficulty of female victims and witnesses, compared to men, in accessing and engaging effectively with truth commissions, resulting in the underreporting of issues that disproportionately affect them. As mentioned, obstacles include lower levels of education, economic independence and experience in the public realm, along with responsibilities that tie them to the home or to insecure forms of informal employment; made worse by the increased vulnerability of women to intimidation or obstruction, and in so many cases now, by displacement, widowhood or disability. Gender-sensitive operalisation and outreach are therefore critical to secure women’s access to truth commissions.

While Sri Lanka’s various inquiry mechanisms have been approached by a large majority of women, with strong efforts made by some commissioners in the 1990s to facilitate their physical access, many have been revictimised by ill-treatment, or the lack of support or protection given by the State. The LLRC and past CoIs have been linked to accounts of reprisal, pro-government bias and intimidation, and there has been no adequate State efforts to counter this, nor to adjust a narrative that has previously branded the mainly female Sri Lankans campaigning for investigations into disappearances as unpatriotic The LLRC has also been roundly criticized for its lack of victim-centred methodology and its failure to address the emotional needs of victims. Reports from the International Crisis Group (2011) and Amnesty International (2011), for example, tell of ‘desultory’, ‘curt and dismissive’ staff chastising women for crying, and requesting written submissions in the place of oral testimony, which has been linked to a particular lack of tolerance for female testifiers. According to the UN Panel of experts, submission forms were in Sinhalese and English only.

To prevent discrimination as internationally understood (see Part 1, Section ii of the original study), a convincing truth mechanism would both need to arrange effective protection throughout and after a commission, and provide women with gender-sensitive guidance for the duration of the procedure. The range of best practice runs from statement-taking and information-gathering by trained female officers, to appropriate levels of privacy in testimony, as detailed at length in World Bank and ICTJ guidelines (2006; Nesiah 2006). Protective psychological measures may include having mental health professionals on standby. Women should be able to choose private testimony, be interviewed away from other family members where possible, and staff should be trained to pick up on the cues that a woman may give if she has experienced forms of violence that she considers shameful. Recent truth commissions have dedicated public and private thematic sessions to women’s testimony of their experiences, expectations and needs, which in the case of South Africa for example, began with special preparatory workshops. This improved the healing function of the commission for women, while allowing them to discuss the shifting gender roles, and the new pressures on female breadwinners. (Nesiah 2006). One of eight national public hearings in Timor Leste’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) was on women and conflict; it included a broad range of women and covered issues from coercive birth control, to humanitarian concerns (Wandita et. al, 2006).  Furthermore, in contrast to allegations that the current LLRC has failed to create a supportive environment or bear the costs of witnesses, best practice dictates that technical assistance overcome difficulties that are more likely to inhibit women. (UN Secretary-General, 2011) This would include compensating their transport or child care costs, for example, or any money lost to absence from work, since so many work in the informal sector.

It has become quite recently understood that women are generally less ready to testify about violations against themselves than those against family members, and women in Sri Lanka have been no different. This has resulted in the severe underreporting and therefore under-consideration of the range of violations against women. To counter this, encouraging measures will be needed to inform the female population about their status as victims, the full spectrum of harms – including gendered harms – and their rights within a commission mandate.

Women often testify at great personal risk, of a physical, psychological, but also a markedly social nature, as mentioned above. While reprisals have certainly affected both men and women in Sri Lanka,[vi] and are ill-guarded against (ensured by parliament’s failure to enact the bill for witness protection in 2008), the stigma associated with sexual violence and other violations is a critical barrier for female testifiers, and can result in their estrangement from family members, and even the mistreatment of their children. This needs to be countered with community-targeted education projects. However it should be noted that in Sri Lanka this stigma can be viewed as led by both community and State, when considering the GoSL’s keenness to deny allegations of war crimes, including those of a sexual nature. This has placed a sector of vulnerable and violated women out of reach of assistance, and outside the national agenda.

A comprehensive outreach strategy is critical to any public truth or inquiry process, and must be sure to address all communities equally in a manner that they understand. According to accounts of the 1994 CoIs, victims would frequently testify without comprehending the goal or the outcome of the inquiry, and the LLRC has been criticized for its minimal public information programme. This speaks of the need for a media strategy to target different groups. For women this would offer reassurance that the process is safe and sensitive, let them know what will be expected of them, and very importantly – what they can ultimately expect themselves. This should involve information about evidentiary thresholds and how to write an adequate application (as recommended by the UN Panel, which cited the LLRC’s lack of Tamil language forms as evidence of its ‘basic modalities’).  NGOs have also condemned proceedings as ‘neither safe nor gender-sensitive’, and have highlighted inadequate Tamil translation and a bias toward hearing (male) community leaders. Past recommendations such as those from the World Bank and ICTJ, have included the wider use of community networks, which Tamil women are more likely to encounter, trust and understand, advertisements in local dialects in publications and programmes commonly read and watched by minority women, along with the use of NGO-run workshops – rather than, for example, using a government mouthpiece. These considerations extend to the dissemination of any final report.

Mandate

Yet the exclusion of women goes beyond procedure and access, to issues that run deeper. By applying a gender lens, scholars such as Vesuki Nesiah have begun to question why “some facts emerge as critical to the historical account and others fade into the backdrop of the private or domestic arena, and where some actors’ agency is recognized and privileged and others fade into the anonymity of spouses, mothers, and sisters” (Nesiah 2006  Mandates).  In arguing that there is no such thing as a gender-neutral truth, such writers argue that a State must acknowledge the human-rights dimensions of women’s experiences and give more space to gendered forms of ostracism and violence. This line of argument has been much influenced by advances in international criminal law, which have contributed to the growing recognition that crimes against women cannot be isolated from a political context.[vii] The realisation of non-discrimination in the operation of truth commissions therefore applies to the scope of violations covered in truth commission mandates, to their defining of a victim and their framing of truth.  Appraisals of past Sri Lankan mechanisms have not shown them to be ahead of the curve, by any means.[viii]  Any Sri Lanka-based CoI tasked with building a truthful picture of the conflict would need a mandate that empowers its commissioners to address and counteract the prioritizing of the male experience.

Some such progress has been seen in truth commissions without gender being explicitly mentioned in mandates. For example, in South Africa (initiated in 1995) and Peru’s TRCs (2001), commissioners pushed the envelope by interpreting gender-neutral language on torture and ill-treatment in a way that could address sexual violence. They began to link it directly to conflict and to the State’s failure to combat sex discrimination, recognising that State forces had targeted vulnerabilities tied to women’s gender.  Rape gained a higher profile as a conflict-related violation, and thanks to the work of women’s activists and academics in South Africa, it was excluded from the list of crimes subject to amnesty. In certain Sri Lankan CoIs too, despite narrow mandates, some commissioners attempted to consider aspects of women’s experiences. The Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces (WSSP) CoI on disappearances in 1994 produced a short chapter on women in its final report that touched on the victimisation of women as abductees/detainees and as those ‘left behind’, and was able to raise some questions regarding  its observations that: “the climate of impunity existing during the major part of the period under scrutiny lead to the victimisation of women as much as men,” and that “some of the personal scores seem to be linked directly with the femaleness of the victim.”[ix]

Yet without dedicated expertise or clear guidelines, these efforts have left much unexplored and under-implemented, and they leave proceedings open to the bias of commissioners.  A narrow understanding of sexual violence for example, has meant that other violations and their effects have been regularly overlooked and their gendered roots and consequences left unexplored. This has advanced, according to Nesiah, a “partial and narrow truth” (Mandates 2006). She and others give the example of South Africa, where women’s experiences under apartheid saw rape receive much attention, but the ‘ordinary violence’ and deprivations that women experienced in the private sphere as a result of apartheid, largely ignored. These ranged from gender-specific violence and intimidation, to black and coloured women’s access to state services and basic provisions for living (for example during forced removals or under the group-area legislation that segregated living and working conditions).

In past Sri Lankan CoIs, most of these issues have barely arisen. The limited recommendations and perfunctory analysis of WSSP commissioners on the situation of women ‘left behind’ falls far short of current best practice, [x] and as with other commissions, women receive barely a mention in the rest of the report. Yet this remains one of the better examples to come from Sri Lanka. Although commissioners controversially decided to look at the rape and murder of girls who had been abducted from their homes by persons looking for their fathers or brothers, and they noted the involvement of gender-based ‘personaI scores’, there was little room to take this further. Its mandate excluded disappearances that arose from personal disputes and other forms of physical injury, which are the areas in which most violations against women tend to fall, and it did not allow for the necessary resources or expertise.  The LLRC has similarly given no explicit space to gender-based crimes, and few have been reported officially.[xi] According to Sri Lankan legal researcher, Ambika Satkunanathan: “We all hear stories, anecdotes… but sexual violence remains one of the least documented violations from this conflict.”[xii]  As a result women are consigned by their state to suffer indefinitely in silence.

In contrast, recently designed truth commissions have begun to build an explicit reference to gender into the legal instrument that creates them, ensuring dedicated staff, resources and guidelines – and many of the procedural improvements described above.  This has produced deeper investigations into the privatized and structural harms that come from conflict, and for the proper cross-distribution of these findings in the report and any follow up action. In Peru for example, a gender unit was partly funded by the UN Office of the High Commission of Human Rights. Although the mainstreaming of gender wasn’t hailed as a complete success, it was well represented in the final report and in its recommendations, which included a chapter on gender analysis and another on sexual violence against women (Guillerot 2006). Though it came as an unpleasant surprise to Peruvian society at the time by establishing the grave scale and range of the violence perpetrated against women during the conflict, the country was able to move forward with a programme of reforms and rehabilitation. In South Africa a similar unit was sparely funded and had to restrict itself to low-cost initiatives, and could therefore only mainly reach women who wished to come forward. (World Bank 2006)

To avoid discrimination a commission must investigate violations that were made possible by the war-fuelled environment of violence and impunity, in public, but also in the private realm where most women, due to social convention, are situated and too often overlooked.  One report for example, notes a growing culture of sexual and gender-based violence in the post-conflict period, with widowed mothers in particular being targeted, not only by the army, navy and military police, but by other male civilians (SuRG 2011). Rather than excluding ‘private harms’ therefore, as instructed by the 1994 CoIs, a mandate would include the impact of such violence in relation to women’s different socioeconomic circumstances; social ostracism, for example, or the effect on her chances of employment, and her family’s welfare. By doing so it would be much less at risk of recommending measures for reform and reparation that only suit men – which is another emerging field of study (see particularly, recent work by Ruth Rubio-Marin).

As a further illustration, given by a World Bank report (2006): to enquire into the gendered implications of disappearance in Sri Lanka would be to explain not only how acts of kidnapping, torture, rape or murder were able to take place, but also to account for the kinds of violation and hurdles to justice that women have experienced as they searched for disappeared relatives. The needs of female-headed households during displacement and periods of militarization would need to be identified, along with any other rights that may be violated due to the loss of their loved ones, whether related to health, employment, family life or education. This route leads to a holistic and healing process that equally addresses survivors, and which satisfies Sri Lanka’s international commitments.  Analysis by Peru’s TRC saw the prioritising of a new Declaration of Forced Disappearance, which the Ombudsman’s Office released if a claim was made and a disappeared person not found. This was recognized and hastened for the disproportionately positive impact it would have on women as the majority of survivors, in terms of their rights to property, inheritance and remarriage. Itholds significant parallels to the difficulties of Sri Lankan families, many female-headed, on obtaining death certificates.

Finally, for these issues to be addressed without sex discrimination, the time span of an inquiry would need to include periods of significance to women. In the case of Sri Lanka, this would include the months following the war, during which reports of human rights violations against IDPs in and outside of internment camps by military personnel were frequent, yet which the LLRC’s time frame excludes.

Composition and consultation

The underrepresentation of Tamil women in the public sphere and in past truth-telling exercises in Sri Lanka goes against best practice on firstly the composition of its panel, and secondly the need for broad consultation with women’s groups, as articulated in soft law provisions such as the UN’s 2005 Updated Principles on Impunity. The design of the mandate and procedure cannot be legitimately inclusive if drafting decisions take place in forums that lack input from women, along with other marginalized groups.

The presence of just one female Tamil commissioner out of eight (alongside just one other male Tamil), makes the LLRC composition ‘seriously deficient’ according to the UN Panel of Experts, and does not represent the diversity of Sri Lankan society – particularly those most directly affected by the conflict. Both Tamil commissioners meanwhile have been reported as less active or vocal than the other six, giving testifiers the impression of being marginalized themselves (CMTPC  2011). Civilian women have perceived a lack of interest or sympathy in their stories in comparison, they allege, to the (mostly male) officials or elite actors invited to take part. They have been berated for grieving publicly, passed over if unable to quickly compose themselves, and commissioners have suggested that in the interests of efficiency, one woman be chosen to represent others. Other reports tell of women being ‘driven away’ en mass. These are strong indications of a gender-related disregard for women’s experiences, and of bias in the methodology for selecting witnesses.

Problems of representation are arguably reflected in the final reports of Sri Lanka’s All Island and the WSSPs CoIs. Both were headed by female commissioners and both, though insufficiently, made some mention of women’s experiences, in contrast to the all-male North East CoI panel. Nevertheless, international standards require that stakeholder groups be proportionally represented (for example in the Beijing Platform for Action – which articulates the UN General Assembly’s definition of gender balance and perspective in special mechanisms). This is increasingly being seen. In Sierra Leone, for example, three out of seven commissioners were women. In Timor Leste two of seven were women, determined through public consultation and special sessions with women NGOs; regional commissioners were typically balanced between men and women, and led district teams of two male and two female statement takers, and a male and female victim support staff member; and the male executive director was supported by a female programme manager – an experienced activist in the field of gender and human rights (Wandita et al 2006).

Yet because gender balance does not guarantee a panel’s full understanding of the complexities surrounding the relationship between human rights, gender and ethnicity, the participation of experts in gender analysis and other related fields (such as anthropology and social psychology) is an important measure to prevent discrimination. In the same vein, the close involvement of women’s groups  is critical from the appointment process onward, and can help facilitate the periodic training of staff in gender sensitization, as well as inspire women’s confidence in the exercise. Before gender training in the Sierra Leone initiative, for example, some staff would question female victims of sexual violence about the clothes that they were wearing when attacked, and why they were outside alone, at night, showing clear discriminatory attitudes (World Bank 2006). Proactive outreach to communities, and coordination with survivors and victim’s groups, as seen in the kind of women-only public consultations and research projects pioneered in Timor Leste and Sierra Leone, can also forge closer links to victims and guard against discrimination by utilizing further expertise on gender – particularly in operational design. In Timor Leste, which was established under the interim UN government, women were mobilized and widely involved as civil groups, as experts on the steering committee and as commissioners at national, regional, and district levels, as well as partners on research projects and healing workshops. The gender training of staff in Sierra Leone, by UNIFEM (the UN’s former women’s agency) and other groups, contributed to broad contribution by women, and a final report that called for significant reforms to improve women’s participation in education, in political and social life, and community initiatives to encourage acceptance of the survivors of rape and sexual violence. Such initiatives are absent, and appear little considered in Sri Lanka during the transitional period.

Report

It is clear that women are affected by discrimination in truth commission mandates and procedures on an individual and a community level. However the product too – the final report – can have a great national impact, and is crucial for the full value of the process to be diffused throughout a society. There is little scope here to consider the kind of historical analysis needed in a truth commission’s report, its evaluation of institutional responsibility or its recommendations in approaching gender, power and victimisation, as covered by scholars such as Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Catherine Turner; Christine Bell and Catherine O Rourke; and  Ruth Rubio-Marin. It is also notable that neither the warrant of the LLRC or the Commission of Inquiry act require the publication of a final report, though one has been promised.  Yet it is important to realize that any discrimination in a truth commission’s mandate, composition and procedure will be carried onward in any reforms or reparations that it proposes, reducing the likelihood of for example, of gender-appropriate health care, rehabilitation, welfare payments or opportunities in the civic sector. And by cutting women from the process, the state is cutting them from the historical record and its benefits; from  consideration in the post-conflict agenda, and in any ‘lessons learned’. As mentioned, the final reports of certain commissions have included a special chapter on gender – some like Peru’s more successful than for example, South Africa, or the short chapter in Sri Lanka’s WSSP CoI. However increasingly, calls are being made for gender to be mainstreamed throughout the whole document to prevent women’s issues being ‘ghettoised’. If the purpose of a truth commission is to build a nation’s collective memory of a period, to leave more than 50% of those affected on the periphery of this memory is a gross act of discrimination, not only at that point in time, but extending far into the future.

Conclusion:

Truth-telling can offer opportunity amid crisis for those whose voices have not traditionally been heard. For Sri Lanka’s minority women, the opportunity is being dishearteningly wasted. By failing to uphold key human rights standards in its memory-building response to the conflict, the GoSL appears content with returning to and retrenching practices that have long violated the spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights held by Tamil women. Sri Lanka’s challenging political climate will limit the practical contribution of the recommendations made above. Yet with greater attention to the equality framework and corresponding best practice, I have tried at the very least, to highlight avenues that can begin to counteract the historical exclusion of Tamil women and place them more squarely, and legally, within the post conflict narrative – while also urging those who challenge Sri Lanka’s transitional justice mechanisms, to do so with sex equality in mind.  I find both aims illustrated in a 2011 report on Sri Lanka by the International Crisis Group – made without overtures to gender – which observes:

Rebuilding relations among those communities and getting to a point where each has some real understanding of what the others have gone through should be a central goal…  It may be several years before the country is able to have a truly inclusive and representative process, but it is something Sri Lankans should be able to look forward to.

Selected bibliography

Abeysekera, Sunila (2007) ‘Implications of Insurgency on Women: The Sri Lankan Experience’ in Ava Shrestha; Rita Thapa eds. The impact of armed conflicts on women in South Asia, Colombo: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies

Amnesty International (September 2011) When will they get justice? available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_21824.pdf

Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (2010) The State of Human Rights in Sri Lanka in 2010 available at http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/hrreport/2010/AHRC-SPR-010-2010.pdf

Baker, Jo (22 August 2009), A Thankless Task, South China Morning Post, available at http://www.jobakeronline.com/articles/a-thankless-task/

Coalition of Muslims & Tamils for Peace & Coexistence (15 July 2011) Two Years On: No War but no peace for women still facing the consequences of the war, available at http://cmtpc.wordpress.com/author/cmtpc.

De Mel, Neloufer (2001) Women and the Nation’s Narrative, New Delhi: Kali for Women

Guillerot, Julie (2006) ‘Linking Gender and Reparations in Peru: A Failed Opportunity’ in Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.) What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2006.

International Crisis Group (18 July 2011) Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever, Brussels: International Crisis Group

Iqbal, Rajani (23 October 2010) Women in Postwar Reconstruction and Reform in Sri Lanka, a presentation made at the Third Annual Conference of the Tamil Women’s Development Forum in London.

Nesiah, Vasuki (2006) Gender and Truth Commission Mandates (paper presented at Open Society Institute (OSI) forum on Gender and Transitional Justice, February 7, 2006), available at <www.ictj.org

Nesiah, Vasuki et al. (July 2006)  Truth Commissions and Gender: Principles, Policies, and Procedures,  for the International Center for Transitional Justice, available at http://ictj.org/ (last accessed 13 Sept 2011)

Rajasingham-Senanayake, Darini (2001) ‘Ambivalent Empowerment: The Tragedy of Tamil Women in Conflict’ in Ride Manchanda (ed) Women, War and Peace in South Asia, Beyond Victimhood to Agency; New Delhi: Sage Publications

Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.) What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2006.

Sornarajah, Nanthini (August 2004) ‘The Experiences of Tamil Women: Nationalism, Construction of Gender and Women’s Political Agency, Part III,’ available at http://issues.lines-magazine.org/Art_Aug04/nanthini.htm#_edn1  )

Sri Lanka Supporting Regional Governance program (SuRG) (May 2011), Post-war support for widowed mothers: a gender impact assessment, Colombo: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

The World Economic Forum (2011) Global Gender Gap Report, available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (4 February 2011) Concluding comments to the combined fifth, sixth and seventh periodic reports of Sri Lanka, CEDAW/C/LKA/5-7, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-LKA-CO-7.pdf

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (11 February 2011)  Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention: Combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Sri Lanka,  CEDAW/C/SR.971, United Nations, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-SR.971.pdf

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (11 February 2011)  Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention: Combined fifth to seventh periodic reports of Sri Lanka (continued), CEDAW/C/SR.972, United Nations, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/CEDAW-C-SR.972.pdf

United Nations Secretary-General (31 March 2011), Report of the Secretary General`s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db7b23e2.html

United Nations Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (8 February 2005) E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1

Valkyrie; (25 April 2011) National security’ in post-war Sri Lanka: Women’s (In) security in the North, Groundviews, available at http://groundviews.org/2011/04/25/national-security-in-post-war-sri-lanka-womens-in-security-in-the-north/

Wandita, G., Campbell-Nelson, K., and Leong Pereira, M., (2006) ‘Learning to Engender Reparations in Timor-Leste: Reaching Out to Female Victims’ in Ruth Rubio-Marin (ed.) What Happened to the Women? Gender and Reparations for Human Rights Violations, Social Science Research Council, New York, 2006.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2006) Variation in Sexual Violence During War  available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/cpworkshop/papers/Wood.pdf  and (2009) Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: When Is Wartime Rape Rare? Politics Society; 37; 131,available at http://www.polisci.upenn.edu/CPW/2010-2011/Wood_01.11.pdf

Women’s Media Collective (WMC) (July 2010) Sri Lanka Shadow Report To the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,  Colombo: Women’s Media Collective, available at http://www.womenandmedia.net/legal_statements/Sri_Lanka_NGO_Shadow_Report_to_CEDAW_July_2010.pdf

World Bank (2006) Gender, Justice and Truth Commissions, Washington DC: World Bank

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Long Reads brings to Groundviews long-form journalism found in publications such as Foreign Policy, The New Yorker and the New York Times. This section, inspired by Longreads, offers more in-depth deliberation on key issues covered on Groundviews

• How hard is it to admit fault, Ambassador Wickramasuriya?
• A conversation with Kumudini Samuel
• Violence Against Women and Girls in Sri Lanka: No April Fools joke
• The Islamic Republic of Sri Lanka
• A slumbering LLRC: The image of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?

Whatever the death toll during the last stages of Eelam War IV in 2009 the official government data in that year acknowledged that 11,696 (9078 male and 2024 female)[i] of those who survived had identified themselves or been identified as members of the LTTE — whether combatants or active functionaries. There were others who had been arrested elsewhere in the island (that is beyond the battlefields), often on flimsy evidence, in the years 2006-09. Muralidhar Reddy stresses that “once bracketed in the category of a combatant, irrespective of the degree of their involvement in the war, there was no mechanism for those detained to prove their innocence.”[ii]

In parenthesis let me add that grapevine information from Tamil sources indicate that in April-May 2009 quite a few Tigers seem to have successfully merged themselves with the population that was deemed civilian and placed in the IDP camps in Menik Farm and elsewhere. Several commentators with some familiarity with the IDP camps have indicated that these detention centres were like the proverbial colander and that a significant number – estimates vary widely from 1,000 to 10,000 — slipped out of the IDP camps in mid-2009 and found their way abroad. It is alleged that at least 500 of this lot were “hardcore LTTE.”[iii]

The focus in this essay, however, is on those held in tight security arrangements as Tigers. Unlike those in the IDP camps, these detainees had no access to mobile phones and were under stricter military control. Technically they could be regarded as POWS, but the government, in what must be considered an enlightened policy, chose to treat them as Tigers-in-rehabilitation. The commencement of this policy could be dated to October 2009 when the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation was established. It is this programme that is reviewed here in what is no more than a preliminary survey from afar.

As preface I emphasise that it is quite amazing that no pro-government newspaper or agency provided an in-depth clarification of this programme till Ranil Wijayapala provided a description through a Q-and-A session with the new Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, Major-General Chandana Rajaguru in the Sunday Observer, 9 October 2011. While the BCGR (which works within the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reform maintains a web-site (namely, http://www. bcgr.gov.lk/), it is unlikely that many people have visited this source or that its data is widely known. I was among those in the dark till last week.

Though government newspapers from time to time highlighted the public ceremonies where ex-combatants were released, this coverage does not seem to have secured much mileage. To the best of my knowledge there have been no U-Tube or CD presentations of the rehabilitation programmes and the graduation ceremonies of release widely disseminated in the internet circuit of universal access. In a word, the prosaic governmental measures of publicity seem to have done a disservice to the work of several well-intentioned officials. Let me clarify why I make this remark by first distilling the information provided in the Rajaguru-Wijayapala dialogue, the mission statements and other data within the BCGR website and data from elsewhere.

Numbers: In differentiation from the figure of 11,800 persons identified as Tigers in mid-2009, Rajaguru[iv] now refers to a rounded figure of 12,000. But, guided in part by th interview as supplement to grapevine informaiton one has to supplement this figure with (a) Tigers captured or arrested in the years 2006-08 and (b) those arrested in the course of intelligence operations subsequent to May 2009. On this foundation I speculate that the figure of Tigers in government custody in the course of years 2009-10 was in the range 11,800 to 13,000. There is, clearly, a need for greater precision in official figures in this field.

This cluster of Tamil Tigers was kept in 24 centres, with four centres catering to the females (2024 less the children). From this total, 594 individuals below sixteen were classified as children and 273 from this lot were sent to attend Hindu College at Ratmalana for schooling[v] and it is this highly specific exercise that received a public airing in BBC’s Hard Talk Programme through the energy of Stephen Sackur.[vi]

The rest were placed under six categories after investigation of some sort: leaders, staunch combatants, fetchers & carriers, political cadre, supporters and labour-conscripts.[vii] A foreign INGO official[viii] who had some interaction with the military once indicated to me in mid-2010 that the Army considered about 15-20 percent of this mass to be hardline LTTE. The implication was that they could be incorrigible and in need of strict supervision if not prosecution in some instances. The answers provided by Rajaguru enable one to conjecture that many of these hardliners and staunch followers would have been incarcerated at Boosa in the south rather than elsewhere.

If all this indicates a tough regime and POW status for these Tiger personnel, other details, a series of events, the details in the BCGR website and the character of the agencies involved in training and alleviating the lives of these Tiger detainees, simply destroy such a verdict. In fact the government insisted on designating the ex-Tigers as “rehabilitees” and proceeded to institute a number of programmes to effect a transformation in their thinking and prospective circumstances. Let me elaborate.

Costs: This was a costly exercise involving the basics of food, clothing and dormitory shelter, plus the organisational costs of training, transport et cetera. At the outset in 2009 and 2010 the government claims that it forked out Rs. 150 million a month though this has gradually wound down to the present figure of Rs. 50 million a month as more and more were “released to their families.” As these ex-Tigers were released several centres have been phased out and by June 2011 there were only 8 remaining.[ix] Rajaguru indicated that a total of Rs.1.3 billion has been spent by GoSL thus far.[x] An IOM representative remarked in February 2011 that they required 15 million US dollars for the programme; [xi] and a British embassy official indicated that “UK [had] contributed £1.5 million to fund vocational training for former child soldiers in partnership with UNICEF and the Sri Lankan Government.”[xii]

A critical component of expenditure was provided by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). IOM’s website includes a mission statement that says: (a) “At present, IOM’s interventions focus on assisting the government to resettle displaced populations in their villages of origin and to reintegrate former combatants, thus supporting national efforts in building peace and stability;” and (b) underlines the importance of  “IOM and state actors [enhancing their] institutional capacity to combat human trafficking and irregular migration” so that  “IOM in partnership with relevant stakeholders offers voluntary returnees a tailor-made return and reintegration package.”[xiii]

As this statement indicates, the IOM has also been heavily involved in financially supporting the resettlement of civilian IDPs from the Menik Farm and other camps. In this task it has been a conduit for monies channelled from the governments of USA, Australia, Netherlands, Norway, Japan and UK. In the Australian case this includes considerable monies coming from AusAid; while the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australia (DIAC) became one of the agencies working through IOM.

I do not have firm evidence that donor countries have financed the rehabilitation of ex-combatants. But it is of some significance that the ambassador for the Netherlands visited the Tellippalai centre on 16^th November 2010, while the British HC, John Rankin, visited Poonthottam RC at Vavuniya on 22 June 2011.[xiv] This indicates that several countries kept a weather eye on the programme and kept in touch with the IOM for this purpose. It is because of this connection, therefore, that one canpresume that the grand function at Temple Trees on 30 September 2011, which saw the graduation so to speak of 1800 rehabilitees, had a ‘crop’ of foreign dignitaries seated up front, while a few participated in the distribution of certificates.[xv]

Organisation & Rehab-Programmes: While the military supervised the detention centres, Rajaguru’s interview indicates that much of the training was in the hands of uniformed personnel from the National Cadet Corps, many of whom were teachers by profession. Critically, the programmes depicted in skeleton form in the BCGR web site indicate that there were a wide variety of paths deployed to assist the re-orientation of the detainees and to fit them for future life. The statement on the front page of the web site proclaims that:

[the detainees] were provided training in areas such as [the] use of English language, leadership skills, management of small business enterprises, clerical and administrative know-how. Vocational training comprised computer technology, masonry, plumbing, carpentry, arts & crafts, music and drama, food preparation etc. The rehabilitation programme was planned to enable the beneficiaries to engage in self-employment activities following reintegration into society and become fully productive members of civil society.

If my recollections are correct, those Tigers who were university students were released to the Vice Chancellor of Jaffna University quite early in the piece, perhaps in late 2009.[xvi] According to Rajaguru’s recent interview other adults who had foregone their schooling because of the war were permitted to study and sit for either the O-Level or A-Level examinations. One news item indicates that 175 sat for the GCE O/L examination in 2010 (38 passed in all the subjects), while 361 sat the GCE A/L examination (222 passed).[xvii]

What is praiseworthy in this policy has been the emphasis on vocational and technical education rather than the standard clerical streams. In my reading, the education system in Sri Lanka over the past 50 years has been quite sterile because of its overemphasis on paper qualifications and its encouragement of white collar status. Arguably, in the south and centre of the island it has been a process geared to the production of a steady stream of recruits to the radical chauvinist Left associated with the JVP and the JHU.

From this standpoint, then, the vocational, technical and petty business leanings in the BCGR programmes are just what the Tamil peoples and the country-at-large requires for the near future. Critical to this orientation has been the engagement of some mercantile companies in the training programme: Abhina, Holcim, David Pieris Motor Company, Venntures, Virtusa, VUSAA and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry for instance.

Arbitrary examples of this line of training in reverse temporal order drawn from the long list on the BCGR site are:

• Learning Basic Principles of Entrepreneurship development and training conducted by Survivors Association held at Pampemadu for 40 Rehabilitants … 22 Sept. 2011.
• Palmyra leaves related Handicrafts creations training course continue at Poonthottam PARC facilitated by Survivors Association for 35 Rehabilitants from 6th July to 6th October 2011.
• Leather work training course from 28th February to 10th June 2011 at Thelippalai PARC…. 28 Feb. 2011.
• 2nd Batch Training Course of IDM Computer Training Program was Commenced at Maradamadu Tamil Primary, Technical collage [sic] … 22 Feb 2011.
• 5th batch of David Peris motor mechanic training course was completed… 25 January 2011.
• Masonry related vocational training program Commenced at Dharmapuram PARC for 200 beneficiaries for 15 days. Facilitated by National Apprentice and Industrial Training Authority (NAITA) and Sponsored by Holcim Cement.…. 23 August 2010.
• Vocational training course held at Handwerk Vocational Training Centre, Payagala, facilitated by FCCISL [attend 60 beneficiaries]…. 9-25 August 2010.

In an imaginative leap the BCGR also utilised the actress Anoja Weerasinghe’s social commitment to provide training in dance and drama for some of the former Tigers with the result that a dancing troupe has eventuated and are said to be in great demand.[xviii]

“Release” with Tamasha: Recent official announcements proclaimed that “over 9,500 youth who took arms have been reunited with their families after following rehabilitation in 24 State-run centres;”[xix] though another 1000 or so were still in detention in early October 2011. This release of Tiger personnel has occurred gradually from mid 2010 onwards.[xx]

Several of these moments of “release” have been presented with considerable fanfare in local newspapers aligned with the government. On one occasion the state arranged for public marriage ceremonies for former Tiger rehabilitees and their partners. The largest of these tamashas was held at “Temple Trees” on 30 September 2011 when 1800 ex-Tigers “passed out,” so to speak, as free citizens in front of their relatives and an assemblage of foreign and local dignitaries. A cultural performance (presumably by one of their own troupes) entertained the large crowd, while the High Cpommissioner for Australia, Kathy Klugman, and other ambassadors handed out certificates.[xxi]

Clearly there is a self-congratulatory and propaganda aspect when the GoSL organises such high-profile functions. Generalized cynicism or hostility to the Rajapaksa regime should not, however, lead one to underestimate the implications of such a process. The critical question is this: how do the ex-Tiger fighters and their kinfolk view such moments? The plausible answer is that these ceremonial functions are akin to a graduation ceremony and a momentous point in their life, even conceivably a “transformational” landmark. This is a verdict that I present on a priori reasoning.

Both the images presented in the government media and the responses of released Tigers in brief interviews carried out by pro-government media personnel indicate their delight at the new situation; while video interviews on the BCGR website praise the training received. The outside world may well be skeptical about seeing this evidence as a representation of generalized satisfaction among the former Tigers because it has been mostly purveyed by tame reporters in government run newspapers.[xxii]

The GOSL has not matched its enlightened policy with an enlightened presentation of self in the face of a suspicious world. What is required in such moments is the encouragement and scope for fearless commentators of the Ruki Fernando, Indi Samarajiva and Mutthukrishna Sarvananthan kind, as well as journalists from the Sunday Leader, to speak unmonitored with rehabilitees of their choice.[xxiii] This should have been seconded by the promotion of independent agencies to pursue studies of the process of reintegration at the local level over a period of months. It would seem that the official world is hidebound within a mind-set attached to top-down control and lacks imagination in propaganda techniques, or combines both tendencies, in ways that encourage shortcomings in the dissemination of what could well be a remarkable story.[xxiv]

Monitoring and Process of Reintegration: Rajaguru makes it clear that security concerns also governed the manner of “release” from detention:

Most of them have families. …. We reintegrate people only when have an address of known relatives. We locate them and then only we reintegrate them to society. This is being done by the military intelligence when we provide them with the information given by the rehabilitate (sic). So, they are going back to the people they know. There is no case of any individual being released without background being checked.

These individuals were not just cast adrift. It would appear that the process of resettlement was organised with the cooperation of IOM who used donor funds to provide them with equipment and tool kits. As critically, attention has been paid to the provision of micro-financing, while local banks have been induced to grant “low interest loans with grace periods and a repayment period of ten years.” This line of post-release support is depicted by Rajaguru as a “period of re-insertion” and a process of “community-based rehabilitation” that merges with the resettlement of other IDPs in those parts of the Vanni that were deserted by the inhabitants under the guns of the LTTE as the latter retreated in 2008 and early 2009.

While there is much that is commendable in this subsequent programme, one must exercise caution in accepting these official pronouncements at face value. Such concepts as “reintegration” do not work like mantra and require examination through ethnographic studies of individual biographies and broader processes over time. A study conducted by a triumvirate (de Croos et al 2011) who explored the subjective experiences of 15 former detainees depicts an alarming picture. Several stated that they had received little training. “All ex-detainees stated that the CID and Army visited their homes at least once a week or once every fortnight and checked on their whereabouts and details.” Not all had received IDs and everyone had been instructed to seek permission if they travelled beyond their village. [xxv]

Such restrictions, needless to say, have generated frustration and resentment. The investigators met “three mothers of former detainees from the same villages, two of whom had already left Sri Lanka for safety reasons.” This meant tightening screws of surveillance and spiralling levels of dissatisfaction.

Several of those interviewed also stated that the level of surveillance had increased significantly following the ‘disappearance’ of a woman ex-combatant from the village in late 2010. This person was a senior LTTE carder (sic) who had been released and had returned home to the village. Many believe that she has been taken to India for safety. Following her release, several ex-detainees have been questioned by intelligence officers regarding her whereabouts. Her father and sister were also taken into custody briefly and questioned but were later released.

This is not a pretty tale at all. It reveals that the training provided in the rehabilitation programme is not as comprehensive as it has been made out to be; and that the results are erratic at best.[xxvi] As vitally, the longer-term prospects of goodwill are being seriously undermined by the overwhelming concerns with security. Having classified detainees into several categories in the security centres, the paranoid surveillance methods treat all those released alike. They also seem to be restraining freedom of movement and thus freedom of trade.

Given the extensive networks of army cantonments in the north, given the recruitment of some ex-Tigers into the networks of military intelligence[xxvii] and given the degree to which a wide spectrum of the Tamil population is “conflict saturated” and alienated by the extremism of the Tamil diaspora,[xxviii] the prospects of any guerilla activity re-emerging in the north are minute. The ham-handed vigilance that has been highlighted by Croos et al is therefore as silly as counter-productive.

In brief, the left-hand is removing what the right-hand has sought to achieve. It is not only a question of some unhappy rehabilitees, but the ripples of dissatisfaction that are being generated through the networks of kin, friends and locality. Such ripples will invariably link up with those political figures speaking up for the Tamils. That is as it should be: local politicians must represent their constituency.

What we now require are more in-depth locality studies of resettlement in the Vanni by independent university or research agencies deploying social scientists with the requisite language and ethnographic skills. Such studies should embrace both the civilian IDPs and rehabilitees; and should have some longitudinal temporality built into them.

Our assessments will then be better grounded. It would seem that the rehabilitation programme has been erratic in its processes. Though one can congratulate the government of Sri Lanka for the measures taken to release and help the former Tiger personnel,[xxix] the forms of surveillance that have been set up are extreme and undermine the broader goal of reconciliation. The pleasure revealed by the rehabilitees at their graduation ceremonies will wane if and when they are subject to harassment by local-level minions or restricted in the pursuit of their career goals. They (or some of them) and the Tamils around them will be confirmed in the impression that they are second-class citizens – a subjective reading that has been prevalent in Tamil society for many decades. Rehabilitation of former Tigers and reconciliation between Tamils and the other ethnic communities will only develop solid foundations if political and administrative measures confirm to Tamils their dignity as citizens of equal worth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abeywickrema, Mandana Ismail 2011 “Rehabilitation and Re-Integration of Former LTTE Cadres,” Sunday Leader, 9 January 2011.

BCGR  n. d. “Reuniting Rehabilitated ex-combatants with their families and Reintegrating them into Society,” http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/

Karunanayake, Samanmali 2010 “Ex-LTTE cadres recalled to a life of fruitfulness,” Daily News, 11 October 2011.

Croos, Fr. J., Deanne Uyangoda  & Ruki Fernando 2011 “Threats, Harassments and Restrictions on Former Detainees and Their Families in Vanni,” 11 May 2011, http://www.globalpeacesupport.com/ globalpeacesupport. com/post/2011/05/14/

Daily News 2010 “Ex-LTTE cadres well looked after — IOM Chief,” Daily News, 18 December 2010.

DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010a “Exclusive Interview with Thirunavukkarasu Sridharan,” South Asia Defence & Strategic Review Sept-Oct 2010, pp. 46-49.

DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010b “Civilian casualties, IDP camps and asylum seekers,” South Asia Masala online, 9 Dec. 2010 http:// asiapacific.anu. edu.au /blogs/southasiamasala/2010/12/09/civilian-casualties-idp-camps-and-asylum-seekers/

DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010c “The 13th Amendment to the Constitution must be properly implemented” says Dharmalingam Siddharthan, www.transcurrents.com, 23 December 2010.

Ferdinando, Shamindra 2011a “Dy British HC says re-integration of ex-combatants important part in reconciliation process,” Island, 27 May 2011.

Ferdinando, Shamindra 2011b “Military visitors see facility rehabilitating LTTE cadres,” Sunday Island, 12 June 2011.

Ferdinando, Shamindra 2011c “LTTE rump ignores ex-combatants undergoing rehab,” Island, 17 June 2011.

Haviland, Charles 2011 “Tamil Tiger releases hit by rehabilitation problems,” BBC News, Colombo 3 Jan. 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12108479).

Irin News 2010 “Sri Lanka: former female fighters strive for a better life,” 29 Sept. 2010 (http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=90613).

Nadesan, Noel 2011 “Australia’s positive role in Sri Lanka,” http://noelnadesan.wordpress.com/ 2011/10/11/australia%E2%80%99s-positive-role-in-sri-lanka/

Radhakrishnan, R.K. 2011 “Former LTTE combatants rehabilitated,” The Hindu, 4 Feb. 2011 (http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/ article1155465.ece).

Sackur, Stephen 2010a “A Sri Lankan re-education for Tamil child soldiers,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/8721974.stm.

Sackur, Stephen 2010b “Former child soldiers rebuilding their lives,” Hard Talk pod cast, in three parts, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qf5U5NB9Mk0.

Sriyananda, Shanika 2011 “LTTEers reintegrated bright brush strokes emerge,” Sunday Observer, 9 October 2011…. http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2011/10/09/fea03.asp

Wamanan, Arthur 2011 “Rehabilitation: Beginning a new life,” Nation, 24 April 2011.

Wijayapala, Ranil 2011 “Rehabilitation, resettlement of ex-LTTEers, a success,” Sunday Observer, 9 October 2011.

Long Reads brings to Groundviews long-form journalism found in publications such as Foreign Policy, The New Yorker and the New York Times. This section, inspired by Longreads, offers more in-depth deliberation on key issues covered on Groundviews.

• Response to Michael Roberts’ ‘Turning Former LTTE Personnel into Sri Lankan Citizens?’
• Reconciliation through ‘Rehabilitation’ & ‘Reintegration’ of Ex-LTTE members in Sri Lanka: Separating Fact from Fiction
• Exclusive: Syllabi and timetables from compulsory University ‘leadership’ training course
• Picking up the Tamil Tigers’ scent
• University Students, Military and the Leadership Programme: Observations on the First Session

On 20^th September 2011 the Government of Sri Lanka had announced that Menik Farm, hosting 7394 persons (2097 families) will be closed down.[i] The solution imposed on these people has been to send them to Kombavil, an interior village in the Mullativu district.

Although the government claims the people are not allowed to go back due to landmines, the latest Joint Humanitarian Update[ii] has stated that “8.5 Grama Niladhari Divisions (GNDs) that currently remain closed due to continued military occupation and thus, remain inaccessible for humanitarian mine action and resettlement”.[1]

It is people living in these areas that are being forced to go to Kombavil.

Kombavil is a remote area, in the interiors of Puthukudiruppu, in middle of overgrown shrub jungle. When we were there, we observed that houses were very small and appear very basic. Workers confirmed that these houses would standard size of 12 feet by 15 feet, irrespective of family needs. The government had decided to send a first batch of 100 families to Kombavil on 5^th October, but workers in Kombavil said it would be difficult to complete even the basic semi permanent shelters and toilets before 5^th October.

When we visited Kombavil, it was clear that no infrastructure was in place. Fisherfolk would certainly face serious problems if they are compelled to live there. Infact, the people of Kombavil told us that even many of villagers from Kombavil have not yet been allowed to return after displacement.

The people are unhappy that after two and half years, instead of being allowed to go back to their own villages, they are being sent to an area they have never been to or known. Widows have expressed concerns about security and difficulties they would face in such an unknown area in rebuilding their lives and establishing livelihoods without support of men. Fears have also been expressed that no possibilities for fishing and farming exist in the proposed area and that no facilities exist for schools, places of worship, water etc.

There had been “come and tell visit” in which officials had briefed people about the plans to send them to Kombavil instead of their home villages. There had also been a “go and see visit” in which people to be sent to Kombavil were taken to see Kombavil. However, it is clear that these were just to present information after decisions had been taken, and not occasions where people affected could discuss options and alternatives.

Essentially, this is a decision imposed on these people, without any consultation and certainly not voluntary.  In a petition submitted to the IDP Project Office for the Vavuniya district of the National Human Rights Commission on 29^th Sept. 2011, people concerned have stated that “we want to go to our own homes and resettled”.

• Vaharai starves – International Community is Silent
• Tsunami and asbestos
• Double standards?
• Alliance Of Parties In The East?
• Forcible resettlements in East

Image courtesy Amber

Police attacks on civilians in Komarasankulam (Vavuniya district)

11 men were arrested by the Vavuniya Police in Komarasankulam at 10.30 pm on 20^th August 2011.  The men were severely beaten before arrest and at least two persons were tortured inside the Vavuniya Police Station. Another man was arrested when he visited the police station on 21^st August to recover his vehicle, which had been taken into custody during the incident on the 20^th. Two men who were tortured by the Vavuniya police received treatment at the Vavuniya Hospital. The rest were produced before the Vavuniya Magistrate on 23^rd August and remanded to the Vavuniya Prison.  All 12 men have since been released on bail. The next hearing is scheduled for 12^th October 2011.

Incident in Komarasankulam

At around 9.30 pm on 20^th August, two men wearing shorts and t-shirts and carrying a bag were seen opposite St. Mary’s Church in Komarasankulam. People telephoned the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Sithamparapuram Police Station, said that suspected ‘grease men’ had entered the village and asked for protection. The OIC accused the people of fabricating these stories and  put down the phone.  Around 10 minutes later, a Sergeant from the Sidhambarapuram police, came to the church and inquired into the incident. However by this point, the suspicious men had left the scene.

A short while later, people saw the same two men coming back towards the church on a motorbike with the headlights off.  When the men saw the people gathered on the road, they turned and drove away from the village. A witness states that he and another boy from the village chased the bike up to Kalnatinakulam. They saw the men travelling back towards them on the bike. They stopped and questioned the men who said that they were police officers but did not produce any identification. Since the men claimed to be police, the witness and the other boy left them at Kalnatinakulam and returned to the Church. On the way, they saw a police jeep from Sithamparapuram drive into the Komarasankulam school premises. They returned to the Church and told the people what they had seen.

Around 10-11pm people who had gathered at the Church decided to search for the suspicious men and walked towards the Komarasankulam school premises. They found the motorbike used by the two men on the main road near the school. The bike was registered in the Sabaragamuwa Province, around 200km away from Vavuniya. The people began to search for the two men and found them hiding in a bush near the school grounds. The people demanded to know why the men were in the village and asked for proof that they were police officers. The men continued to insist that they were police officers but refused to produce any identification. While they were arguing, the police jeep drove out of the Komarasankulam school premises up to the crowd. The police Sergeant identified the two men as police officers and asked the people to release the men to his custody. The same Sergeant had visited the church earlier that night. The people refused and demanded that the men produce some identification to prove that they were in fact the police. As the argument continued and the men refused to provide any identification or reason for their presence in the village, the people grew agitated and began to beat the men with sticks. The Sergeant was also injured as he tried to protect the two men.

At this point, the Parish Priest in Komarasankulam, arrived at the scene and tried to stop the people from beating the men. The people refused to hand over the men or to allow the Sergeant to be taken to hospital for treatment. They stood in front of the Police vehicle and prevented the jeep from being moved. They also refused to allow the Sergeant to be taken to hospital by motor bike.

Later on, the OIC and 3 or 4 officers from the Sithamparapuram Police arrived at the scene. The people had surrounded the two men and refused to hand them over to the police, or to allow the police vehicles to be moved. At one point, the police tried to take the men away in a three wheeler, but this vehicle was also registered in the Sabaragamuwa province and the people were suspicious and refused to allow the vehicle to pass.

10 minutes later, around 20 officers from the Madukandha Army Camp arrived at the village and surrounded the people. There were around 150 villagers including women and children gathered at the time. The Army was able to negotiate with the people and the two men were released to Army custody.

Later, about 50-60 policemen from the Vavuniya Police Station arrived at the scene. Although the conflict had largely subsided by this time, the police carried riot gear and were armed with tear gas and batons. People saw the police  making sticks and poles out of branches and trees and many fled the scene. Around 75 men and boys who remained were surrounded by the police and ordered to sit on the floor. No one was allowed to leave the place. The Army moved aside when the police arrived and said that this was a matter to be resolved by the police. The Police were in uniform and civilian clothing and some of those present recognized the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) of the Vavuniya Police among them.

Two priests from Vavuniya arrived at the scene at the same time as the police. The Parish Priest tried to negotiate with the police and explain that the conflict had been resolved and therefore, not to take the men to the Police Station. The police pushed the priest and threatened to take the priest also to the Police. Two boys from the village who had been translating for the police tried to help the priest. The Police immediately attacked the two boys, pushed them inside the Police vehicle and severely beat them. As the crowd became agitated, the Police began to beat the people with sticks and poles. According to one witness, when he tried to reach the Parish Priest, the police grabbed his head and pushed him into the jeep. When the priest tried to protect him, the police abused him and warned him not to intervene. One boy, who grabbed the priest’s hand as he was being dragged into the jeep, was beaten and fractured his leg.

Arrests

Many were able to escape when the police began to attack the people, but 11 men, including an 18 year old student, were arrested that night (20^th August). The police pushed the men inside the jeep and around 15 officers stood at the front of the vehicle so the men could not see out of the vehicle. They were driven around for around an hour and severely beaten inside the jeep before being taken to the Vavuniya Police Station at around 1am (21^st August).

At the police station the men were ordered to crawl on their knees for around 30 meters up to the station. The boy whose leg had been broken was also forced to crawl despite his injuries. The men were stripped to their underwear, searched and their personal belongings were taken by the police. The police recorded their details and 10 of them were put into a single overcrowded cell.  Another man whose father was Sinhalese was held separately. Once they were inside the cell they realized that a Catholic brother/seminarian was among the group arrested.

On 21^st August, a three wheeler driver from a neighboring village was arrested when he visited the police station to claim his vehicle which had been taken into police custody during the attack in Komarasankulam the previous night.

Torture

At around 2 am on 21^st August, two officers from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) came to the cell and called out two persons including the seminarian. The witness states that the officers appeared to be drunk. Both men were pushed in to the interrogation room and fell to the floor. There were five officers, two in police uniform and others in civilian clothing.

One victim states that: “the officers dragged me up and asked ‘will you hit the police’ when I tried to tell them that I did not hit the police, they asked me to shut up. When the officers began to hit me, I tried to shield my face with my hand. The officer ordered me to put my hand down and hit me with his fist, on my forehead, cheeks, chin and my ears. When he hit my ears I felt an electric shock pass through my body. I saw the seminarian being beaten by other officers in the same room. An officer hit me on the head with a baton. When I fell down, they trampled me and continued to beat me. They put me on a table and two officers held my hands and another beat the soles of my feet and my head with a baton. They pushed me on the floor and trampled and kicked my head. They questioned me about a robbery that took place in the village over three years ago. I said that I did not know anything about the robbery. When I tried to stand up, an officer kicked me in the head and I fell backward. Another officer grabbed me and slammed me against the wall. While I was being tortured, another senior officer in uniform entered the room. I thought that he was the OIC and begged him to release me. The officer picked up a baton and hit me on the head.”

According to the other victim, the seminarian, three Police officers hit him with batons on the head, face, ears hands and legs. He was not able to defend himself since all three were hitting him at once. They hit his left ear very badly and his ear drum burst as a result. For about two weeks he was unable to hear from his left ear. He still suffers pain on his face and head and continues to get medical treatment.

According to the first witness, the Police only stopped beating them, when the OIC entered the station and shouted at them to stop beating the prisoners. The OIC was not at the station when they were brought in. He believes that the OIC heard their screams and had seen the other detainees who were also injured from the beating earlier that night. Once the OIC arrived the police took them back to the cell at around 3 am (21^st August).

The seminarian states that they were locked in a small room, which had hardly any room to move about, and the squatting toilet also was inside the cell. They were not given food or water and had to drink from the tap used for the toilet. The detainees were taken to the Vavuniya Hospital at 4 am on 21^st August.

Vavuniya Hospital

At the hospital, the detainees were checked by the Judicial Medical Officer (JMO). She told one victim, who had been tortured by the police, that he had no visible injuries and did not need to be admitted for treatment. A Tamil male nurse convinced the JMO that the victim was in pain and may have suffered internal injuries, following which he was admitted for treatment. The seminarian was also admitted for treatment.

The JMO asked the victim how he had acquired the injuries and he told her that he had been tortured by the Vavuniya police. The victim saw the JMO speak to a person who he understood to be the OIC of the Vavuniya Police over the phone and ask him in Sinhalese, what she should state in the medical certificate. The JMO report which was given to the witness on 26^th August states that his injuries were due to an ‘assault by unknown persons’.

At the hospital, the victim had to lie on a bench and was not given any treatment until around 2 pm when he was given a painkiller. At around 4 pm he was given a bed and his feet were fastened by shackles to the bed. The two men who had been beaten by the villagers and the police Sergeant were also being treated in the same ward. The Sinhalese doctors would speak to the police officer and the two men but did not treat or speak to the witness. He was not given food or water until his mother brought him lunch on 22^nd August. He was asked to collect water from a tap outside the ward. Since he could not walk due to his injuries, he borrowed water from another patient to take his tablets.

On 21^st August, three intelligence officers from the Criminal Investigation Department visited the witness and took his statement. They made him sign the final statement, but he is not aware of its contents since the statement was written in Sinhalese, a language he doesn’t read.

A jailor from Vavuniya prison was stationed at the accident ward to monitor those visiting the witness and the seminarian. On 22^nd August, a friend visited the victim in the hospital but when he tried to speak to the victim he was told that the victim was in Police custody and he must obtain permission before speaking to him. A Catholic nun who visited the seminarian in the hospital was allowed to speak to him, but when the seminarian received a phone call, the jailor scolded them and asked the visitors to leave.

The victim was transferred to Ward 1 on 23^rd August. An x-ray was taken of his injuries but he was not given any treatment or checked by the doctors. He believes that the Sinhalese doctors were reluctant to treat him since they believed that he was a criminal who had attacked the police.

The seminarian states that he was admitted to the ENT ward and shackled to the bed. Different jailors were assigned in the ward to monitor his visitors. Some of the jailors tightened the restraints until it was very painful, and also chased away those visiting him and did not allow him to use the phone. Some others were friendlier, inquired what had happened and allowed visitors.

Court Proceedings

On 22^nd August around 150, parents, wives, relatives and friends of the 12 men gathered at the Vavuniya Court, believing that the men would be produced in Court that morning. Only one person was produced in Court as two were in Vavuniya hospital and 9 others had been taken to Anuradhapura prison. Relatives were told by the police, that the men had been taken to the Anuradhapura Remand Prison on 21^st August and could not be brought as there was no transport to bring them to Court in Vavuniya. The Judge gave permission for the seminarian to be released on bail as soon as he was discharged from the hospital.

On 23^rd August, 10 men were produced in the Vavuniya Court. They were represented by about 14 lawyers from the Vavuniya Bar. The police accused the men of beating and injuring a police officer on duty. Lawyers for the men argued that this was not a planned attack against the police and that the men had beaten the ‘grease men’ and the police were injured accidentally. The police objected to the men being released on bail and threatened that if the men were released, the police would not go to Komarasankulam on duty. They also warned that the police would not be responsible if anything should happen to the men once they were released.  Following the objections by the police, the Judge ordered the men to be remanded to the Vavuniya Remand Prison.

The men were produced in Court on 24^th and 25^th August. On the 24^th, the Judge refused bail but the following day he rejected police objections and ordered the men to be released on personal bail. The next hearing of the case is scheduled for 12^th October 2011.

Release

The victim had received treatment at the Vavuniya Hospital since 21^st August. On 25^th August he was discharged from hospital and taken to the Vavuniya Remand Prison where he was held in a cell for around 2 hours, until the jailor obtained a Court Order releasing him on bail. The victim was released at around 5 pm on 25^th August and returned home to Komarasankulam. On 26^th August, he received his medical certificate, signed by the JMO, which states that his injuries were caused by “unknown persons”, despite his statement on 21^st August that the injuries were due to torture by the Vavuniya police.

The Catholic Seminarian, who was tortured by the Vavuniya police, was released on bail on 22^nd August. However he continued to receive treatment at the Vavuniya Hospital and was shackled to a hospital bed when a Catholic nun visited him on 23^rd August.

Current Situation

The victim states that he lives in fear of a further attack or arrest by the police.  When the police objected to bail, they warned that they would not be responsible if anything were to happen to the men in the next 21 days. The victim is afraid to stay at home and as of 29^th August, had not returned to work out of fear for his life. He states that he can be easily recognized by the police since he was kept in the same ward as the injured policemen and the suspected grease men. He still suffers from severe pain, headaches and dizziness as a result of his injuries.

List of those arrested on 20^th night (all male)

1. Saranraj, 18 years, student Komarasankulam Maha Vidhyalaya
2. Robington, 21 years, Security Guard, Human Rights Commission
3. Jegetheesan, 25 years, Sales Executive at Browns Company, Vavuniya (Brother of Saranraj)
4. Vimalraj, 28 years, Mason
5. Denniston, 28 years, Barbershop owner
6. Emilraj, 29 years, Demining officer,
7. Gnanaruben, 32 years, Catholic Seminarian (Brother of Vimalraj)
8. Chandralal, 35 years, Demining FSD
9. Pushpaseelan, 38 years, MSF Logistics Assistant
10. Venthakoon, 38 years, Laborer
11. Selvam, 45 years, Mason
12. Local three wheeler driver from neighboring village – arrested the following day.

Army attacks against civilians in Josephvaz Nagar, Thottaveli and Pesalai (Mannar district)

On 22^nd August night, the military attacked around 800 civilians in Josephvaz Nagar, Thottaveli located in the Mannar District in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. The people had set up a vigilance committee and placed make shift barriers to guard the village against grease devils. The military objected to such measures by the people and following an assault on some vigilantes at around 11.15 pm, where a military jeep was stopped at a barrier, several military jeeps entered the village and hundreds of officers attacked the people with guns and batons. The Parish Priest, Vicar General of the diocese and another priest were also threatened in the attack. At a meeting with the people following the attack, Mannar Commander, Brigadier Maithree Dias threatened to arrest the priests, accused them of instigating the people to attack the military and threatened to shoot any person who attempted to surround a military camp or vehicle in the future.

Vigilance Committee in Thottaveli

On 19^th August, the Parish Priest of Thottaveli informed the Erukulampitty Police that villages were scared about grease devils in the village and were planning to organize vigilance committees to prevent attacks in the village. On 21st August, the Head Quarters Inspector (HQI) of Mannar met the villagers and the Parish Priest in Josephvaz Nagar to discuss the grease devil issue. On both occasions, the Police requested that no violence should be used except in self defense. The Police also requested that if anyone was caught as suspected grease devils by villagers, they should be handed over to the police. The Parish Priest and villagers agreed to the conditions and vigilance committees were set up with police permission to guard the village between 6pm and 6 am each day.

Grease Devil Sightings

On 21^st and 22^nd August, between 6-8pm, two women had each seen a strange man, in different locations (in separate incidents), in Thottaveli, and suspected the person to be a grease devil. In the incident on 22^nd August, the woman saw a grease devil enter her house and shouted for help. The woman was in a state of shock and was not able to speak and explain anything to the others.  The villagers chased the man who was able to get away.

Attack on Civilians in Thottaveli

A witness states that on 22^nd night, he entered JV Nagar at around 11.00 pm, and passed a small makeshift barrier set up by the vigilance committee at the entrance to the village. The barrier was about 1 foot in height and made of logs and stones. On his way to the village, the witness saw a lorry with a tin roof parked opposite the Our Lady of Martyrs Church in Thottaveli, with its headlights switched off. A short while after the witness passed the barrier he saw the same vehicle try to enter the village with around 10 army officers inside. The villagers refused to allow the vehicle to pass and asked the Army officers why they wanted to enter the village at that late hour. The officers said that the entire area was under their control and that no one could stop them from entering the village at any time. They said that there was no need for a vigilance committee and that they would protect the village. The people said that the vigilance committee had been set up with police permission.

While the villagers were arguing, two officers got down from the vehicle and started beating the people near the barrier with guns and batons. Three villagers were injured in the attack. The others ran towards the Church, which is about 300 meters from the barrier, shouting that the army had entered the village and was attacking the people. They rang the Church bell signaling an emergency and around 300-500 people gathered near the Church. The Parish Priest also rushed to the Church on his motor bike and as he was parking his bike the Army vehicle stopped near the Church and the Army officers began to beat the people who had gathered there.

The Parish Priest spoke to the officers and tried to explain that the people had been given permission by the police to set up the vigilance committee. He told them to check with the police HQI about the arrangement and questioned them as to why they had attacked villagers who had not tried to harm the officers or their vehicle. The army insisted that would provide protection to the village and that they could enter the village at any time. The witness saw an Army officer making several phone calls and asking for reinforcement to be sent to the village to control the situation. Fearing that the situation would worsen, the Parish Priest called the Vicar General (VG) a senior Church leader in Mannar diocese (covering Mannar and Vavuniya districts) and then rushed to Erukalampitty Police Station. He hoped that the police would intervene and resolve the dispute between the military and the people. Another Catholic priest who was visiting his home in Josephvaz Nagar Nagar also arrived at the Church around this time.

When the Parish Priest reached the police station, there were only three officers at the station and they refused to come to the village at that time. The police tried to call the HQI Mannar and since he did not answer, the message was conveyed to another police officer. As the Parish Priest was leaving the police station around 15-20 Army officers came towards him in a threatening manner, with iron rods and sticks, shouting abusive words. The Army went away, and an attack was prevented when the Police intervened.

The Vicar General who then came with two more priests met the Parish Priest in front of the police station and they started to go to Josephvaz Nagar. The priests were stopped by Lt. Col. Sujeewa who refused to let them go towards the church. They proceeded after the intervention of the VG.

According to a witness, the Parish Priest returned to the village on his motorcycle at high speed and shouted to the people to leave the place. Behind him, the witness saw another army vehicle being driven at high speed towards the Church. Around 20 officers got down from the vehicle and started beating the people. Women and children were also in the crowd and were attacked. The people including the witness began to run from the scene. As the witness tried to enter his family compound, he was chased by three officers. One man who crossed in front of the witness was beaten on his back by an officer. The witness saw another injured person fall unconscious near the entrance to his compound. As he was trying to open his gate, the witness was beaten with a gun. The officers tried to chase him into the compound and continued to hit him as he tried to close the gate. A few minutes later, three officers entered the compound and ordered the witness to come with them. The witness’s wife and her parents were inside the house and his wife came out and told the officers repeatedly that he is her husband. The army finally left the compound but warned the witness that they knew how to deal with people like him. The witness stayed inside his house and estimates that around 20 Army vehicles entered the village.

At the Church, the Vicar General and the other priests tried to stop the army from beating the people but were unable to stop the violence. The Vicar General was also pushed by an Army officer but was saved by a senior officer who intervened. The officers did not allow the people near the Army vehicle, and several people had told the witness that they saw a masked man dressed in black sitting inside the vehicle. They believed that this was the grease man who had entered the village earlier that night. By this time several people had gathered near the Church and tried to ring the Church bell to signal that the people were being attacked. The people who rang the bell were severely beaten by the Army. The witness’ father, who lives near the church, saw Army officers deliberately damage the Parish Priest’s motorbike that was parked near the Church.  People estimated that there were between 15 – 23 army trucks in the village with hundreds of officers.

Meeting with Brigadier Dias around 1.30 am, 23^rd August

By around 1.30 am on 23^rd August, the violence had subsided and the Mannar area commander, Brigadier Maithree Dias, also came to the spot. He addressed around 300 people who had gathered at the church for safety. The Brigadier scolded them and accused the Catholic priests of instigating villagers to attack the military. He threatened to arrest the priests and shoot anyone that tried to come near a military camp or vehicle. He pointed to iron bars nearby that were being used for the construction of a new church, and accused the people of collecting weapons to attack the Army. He threatened to arrest around 8-10 boys who were preparing for their Advanced Level Examination in August and said that he would prevent them from completing the exam. The HQI of Mannar Police had also arrived at the scene based on a call made by Brigadier Dias. The Brigadier asked the police to arrest the priests, and the police said that they would make the arrest if the military would make a complaint.

Finally Brigadier Dias ordered the people to apologize for attacking the military and for breaching the peace. Several community leaders, who wished to prevent a further attack, stood up and apologized for the actions of the people. The military made video recordings of these statements as proof that the people had attacked the army. At around 2.30 am the people were ordered to leave the Church in single file and return to their homes. At least two people including a school teacher were attacked as they left the Church.

Several people were injured in the attack but were too afraid to visit a hospital for treatment. Several people told the witness that the military beat them with poles wrapped with barbed wire which increased the injuries.

Aftermath of the attack – 23^rd August 2011

On 23^rd August, in the afternoon, a military vehicle came at high speed into the village and parked near the Church. 3-4 officers got down and ran into the Church premises and left several minutes later. The officers went to the house where the Parish Priest was having lunch with another priest. A senior officer entered the house and spoke to the priests and asked about their health and spoke briefly on the previous nights incident. The military went back to the Church before leaving the village. The people believe that this operation was intended to scare or intimidate the villagers. On 23^rd August evening the villagers gathered in several groups in family compounds and set up guards around each compound for their safety.

Attacks on Civilians in Pesalai

A similar incident took place in Pesalai on 21^st August 2011 when a grease devil was seen inside the village by people who had organized to guard the village. When the man was chased by the people, he was seen running into a Navy checkpoint. The people surrounded the checkpoint and asked the military to produce or release the grease man.  Some villagers had claimed they saw the man changing his clothes inside the checkpoint. Over 700-1000 people were gathered near the checkpoint by this time. The military began to attack the people and 10-15 persons were admitted to the Mannar Hospital with serious injuries. Several more did not visit the hospital out of fear. The people asked the police for protection but were refused.

Meeting with Brigadier Dias on 24^th August

On 24^th August, a meeting was held at a Church in Pesalai (Mannar District). Brg. Dias, the Navy Commander for Mannar, the Divisional Secretary for Mannar and parish priests of Pesalai and Thottaveli (Josephvaz Nagar) participated with many people from both villages.

Brig Dias repeatedly threatened the people and said that the Army will shoot people if they caused trouble or tried to surround an Army camp or vehicle. He accused the priests of instigating people to violence. The Divisional Secretary asked the Parish Priest at Josephvaz Nagar Nagar to speak and he gave his account of the violence on 22^nd night. When he did so, Brigadier Dias threatened the priest and said that “I will talk and deal with you later”.

Following the attack on 22^nd August, there is an increased military and police presence in Josephvaz Nagar. The HQI and Army have visited the Parish Priest and taken down his personal details and contact numbers and inquired about the other Churches and villages that he goes to conduct religious services.

• JAFFNA: BRUTAL ASSAULT OF CIVILIANS IN NAVANTHURAI
• Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas: Five years after disappearance, where are they and what has happened to the investigation?
• Christmas 2008 in Sri Lanka
• Celebrating war victory and banning commemoration of dead civilians: this is “home grown & indigenous” reconciliation and freedom in Sri Lanka?
• Civilian cost of a humanitarian operation: miseries of liberated peoples of Musali and Naanatan divisions in Mannar waiting to go home

Image credit Jeremy Suyker, via Foto8

The Government recently unveiled a policy regarding land in the North and East through the introduction of a Cabinet Memorandum (memo) titled ‘Regularize Land Management in Northern and Eastern Provinces,’ which was subsequently followed by a Land Circular (circular) titled ‘Regulating the Activities Regarding Management of Lands in the Northern and Eastern Provinces’ (Circular No: 2011/04) issued on 22^nd July by the Land Commissioner Generals Department in Colombo in order to operationalise the memo.

Since then, there have been reports of notices and forms being issued in areas of the North and East for people to register their land under the Bimsaviya project to ensure title registration of their property. At the time of writing, it was unclear whether this specific process was the same as the one set out under the circular. Contradictory information was received from the different divisional secretariat units (DSs) where the forms were distributed; increasing confusion regarding the process and the rights of those owning and claiming land in the North and East.

The memo and related circular mentioned above are the most recent policy initiatives undertaken by the Government with regard to land in the North and East. This current policy initiative if implemented will have far-reaching implications for key issues including how land claims can be decided, how land is to be alienated, and types of ownership and control that can be provided, which in turn will impact the process of post-war normalisation and development projects. The focus is on state land but the policy initiative will have implications for private land.

Given the complexity of land issues in the North and East and the fundamental importance of land to multiple processes including reconstruction of permanent houses, rehabilitation of war-affected families, return to one’s land, development and strengthening co-existence, there is an urgent requirement for the Government to provide a policy framework to deal with the issue of land taking on board the rights, vulnerabilities and needs of affected communities and in line with legal obligations and human rights standards. While some of the land issues such as lack of awareness relating to ownership, competing claims, loss of documentation, secondary occupation of land by other civilians or state actors, including the military, may not be unique to the North and East, the context of the war resulted in complicating and increasing the scale of these problems. This article will highlight key concerns relating to this current initiative, for more information on the process and recommendations please see our report here.

Key Concerns: Given the complexity of land issues in conflict-affected areas, the necessity to formulate policies and processes to address these problems is all too apparent. Hence, the overall aim of this current initiative needs to be welcome. However, this circular contains particular provisions, which are problematic and unclear and may exacerbate fear and apprehension among affected communities. Some of the key concerns include:

• The policy aims to advantage the land claims of those who left during the war, but the circular does attempt to recognise the rights of other civilians who secured control over these lands and have developed them land. In such situations the circular suggests that alternate land can be provided for the original claimants. However, given that the circular also recommends that land transaction taken during the period of the war be ruled void as it was under “terrorist influence” the status of these claims is by no means clear. Thus, there is a risk that landowners and claimants, including some of whom secured government documentation for ownership, may be dispossessed.
• The involvement of the military in the different committees set out in the circular is particularly problematic.
• The policy fails to reference the National Land Commission that has not yet been established as per the Thirteenth Amendment.
• The lack of information on this process, both among government officers who are meant to take this process forward and to the general public, is a fundamental problem. The Government’s failure to develop a public awareness program has intensified the confusion and apprehension among the general public in the North and East. The memo does make reference to the Diaspora; hence, the publicity strategy for the circulation needs to be both national and international.
• There is a lack of clarity on who needs to apply for this process or whether all land owners and claimants in the entire North and East should comply.
• Lands acquired for national security and development purposes are exempt from the process laid out under the circular. Hence, there is lack of clarity on how the land rights of affected families will be guaranteed and how they will be compensated and restituted.
• There are stipulated, brief time periods for applications of land claims and appeals, which may prove inadequate.
• There was limited consultation of actors from the two provinces during the planning stages, and mainly limited to government officers. It is not clear whether the process is flexible to address problems that may crop up during the implementation.

Way Forward

While there is a need for new policy initiatives to address issues related to land in a post-war context, there are many concerns with the present process. These concerns need to be addressed immediately by the Government, ensuring that any process established to decide land claims is fair, just and equitable and is not perceived by communities as favouring any particular group.

Efforts need to be made in order to ensure that this policy initiative does not exacerbate land-related tensions and that solutions are found to address land needs of affected communities. There is a likelihood that problems may come up in the future if such processes do not factor in concerns highlighted in this article. In moving forward with the present process and any other land related initiatives, it is paramount that the authorities implement existing constitution and legal obligations, take on board the needs of communities and be transparent and inclusive in the formulation and implementation of any initiatives.

###

Both authors are Senior Researchers at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, the institutional anchor of Groundviews.

• Dr. Devanesan Nesiah on post-war / post-LTTE Sri Lanka
• Daily Security Report from UN – The plight of the North & East
• Reply to the Rebuttal of my article by the SJC87 Initiative
• Human Shields In The Battle Of Sri Lanka
• The End of Displacement in Sri Lanka?

Image from Channel 4

Introduction

The UK based Channel 4 documentary, “Killing Fields”, possesses an interesting characteristic. It has the power of accentuating the prejudices and biases of viewers. The reaction found on a variety of forums is arguably more illuminating than the documentary itself.

Those who feel the Sri Lankan government has done no wrong, are further convinced that there is an international conspiracy and the entire documentary is fake. There are those who are convinced that the Sri Lankan armed forces are evil. There are also those that believe the documentary is evidence of the need for a separate Tamil nation and are busy distributing DVDs to Western politicians. The remainder are horrified by the footage and can not watch the entire documentary.

With the broadcast of the “Lies Agreed Upon” [1]  documentary by the Sri Lankan television station Ada Derana [2] , we now have two very one-sided documentaries. Only together can any semblance of balance be achieved.

Callum Macrae, producer and director of the Channel 4 documentary, defiantly asserted, “… this film was accurate, this film was carefully researched, this film did not take sides in that war, we were as critical of the LTTE as the Sri Lankan government.” [3]  The question remains, is the Channel 4 documentary a work of journalism, advocacy or propaganda?

The promotion, introduction and narration of the Chanel 4 documentary contain a number of factual errors and omissions [4] . Let us examine the factual errors relating to displaced civilians propagated by the narration by Jon Snow.

Displaced Civilians

Jon Snow blames the government entirely for the displacement of civilians:

“These were civilians driven from their homes by government forces who appeared to see all Tamil civilians as virtually indistinguishable from the fighters of the Tamil Tigers.”

On January 28, 2009, Human Rights Watch reported:

“The LTTE has long prevented civilians under its control from fleeing to government-held areas. As the LTTE has retreated into its stronghold in the northern Vanni area since the start of a Sri Lankan army offensive in October 2008, the rebel group has forced civilians deeper into territory they control. An estimated 300 local staff members of the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are trapped in the Vanni because the LTTE refuses to allow them to leave for safe areas. Altogether, an estimated 250,000 civilians are now trapped in the small part of Mullaittivu district that remains under LTTE control.”  [5]

Human Rights Watch states “the rebel group has forced civilians deeper into territory they control”. This directly contradicts the claim by Channel 4 that “[t]hese were civilians driven from their homes by government forces…”.

If you pay close attention to Jon Snow’s narration you will notice that figures relating to the number of displaced civilians is consistently inaccurate.

January 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“By the end of January 2009, the remaining Tamil Tigers and as many as 400,000 civilians were now trapped by Sri Lankan government forces.”

However, many sources contradict this claim.

BBC:

“Monday, 26 January 2009

The military says it is now advancing into the 300 sq km (115 sq mile) triangle of land in which the Tamil Tigers are still operating. There are thought to be about 250,000 civilians in the area in which the rebels are still operating.” [6]

Human Rights Watch:

“January 28, 2009

Altogether, an estimated 250,000 civilians are now trapped in the small part of Mullaittivu district that remains under LTTE control.”  [7]

Washington Post:

“Thursday, January 29, 2009

The United Nations and the ICRC said 250,000 civilians have fled to dense jungle terrain where fighting is raging in the 115 square miles still controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, known as the Tamil Tigers.” [8]

The UN Advisory Panel report also contradicts the claim by Channel 4:

“125. At the outset of the final phase, on 13 January 2009, the Government website reported that, according to independent verifications, the number of civilians in the Vanni was between 150,000 and 250,000. The United Nations estimate at the time was 250,000 (although its subsequent estimates were higher).”  [9]

The higher subsequent estimate is captured in footnote 54:

“100. From as early as 6 February 2009, the SLA continuously shelled within the area that became the second NFZ, from all directions, including land, air and sea. It is estimated that there were between 300,000 and 330,000 civilians in that small area.54

Footnotes
54 United Nations Documents generally reference a number of 300,000 whereas the Additional Government Agent estimated that there were 330,000 civilians left in the area.”  [10]

At the end of January the United Nations estimated 250,000 civilians and then later revised it to 300,000.

February 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“By the 12th of February, the old No-Fire-Zone had been virtually abandoned and the government announced a new one about 7 miles long on a narrow sand-spit. As many as 400,000 people flooded there and found themselves trapped …”

AFP:

“Feb 1, 2009

The United Nations says up to 250,000 non-combatants are trapped in the area. The Sri Lankan government says the figure is closer to 120,000.”  [11]

BBC:

“Page last updated at 16:21 GMT, Monday, 2 February 2009

The army offensive has pushed the rebels into a 300 sq km (110 sq mile) corner of jungle in the north-east of the island, which aid agencies say also holds 250,000 civilians.

The government says the number of civilians is closer to 120,000 and that the army has a policy of not firing at civilians.”  [12]

Al Jazeera:

“Sunday, February 08, 2009

Since January 1, around 17,900 have fled the fighting. Aid agencies said around 250,000 were inside the conflict zone before the exodus began, while the government disputed the figures claiming there were only 120,000.”  [13]

April 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“At the end of April the government claimed that there were just 10,000 civilians left trapped in the area. In fact there were over 200,000.”

The UN Advisory Panel report states:

At the end of April, United Nations estimates were that 127,177 civilians still remained trapped, whereas the Government said there were only 10,000 persons left at the time.  [14]

The New York Times published:

“April 24, 2009

More than 100,000 civilians fled from the combat zone earlier this week but the United Nations estimates that anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 civilians remain trapped on the sandy spit of land. Sri Lanka’s Defense Ministry said on Friday that 15,000 to 20,000 civilians were caught in the conflict zone.”  [15]

May 2009

Jon Snow claims:

“By now most of the No-Fire-Zone was overrun by the government and on the 8th of May they announced a new one, around 1 square mile in size. 130,000 people were trapped in this area”

The Age contradicts Channel 4:

“May 2, 2009

…

The UN estimates that up to 50,000 civilians are trapped in a narrow strip of coast where the Tamil Tigers are putting up a last stand. Government forces have said only about 20,000 people were still left in the area.” [16]

ABC (Australia):

“Posted May 09, 2009 13:41:00

…
The guerrillas have been confined to a five-square-kilometre area in the district of Mullaittivu and only three square kilometres of that would be the new “safe zone,” Brigadier Nanayakkara said.
…
The military estimates that up to 20,000 civilians are trapped in the small area where the Tigers are resisting a military advance.

The United Nations has said nearly 50,000 civilians could be trapped by the fighting.”  [17]

A foreign journalist in the war zone reported:

“May 21, 2009 10:42 IST

…
From April 20 to 23, over 125,000 civilians fled from the Tigers’s clutches and went over to the government side.
…
This was the defining moment when Sri Lankan Tamils emerged from the war zone. The LTTE and thousands of people were shrunk into a 12 square km area. The entrapment was real, but they didn’t surrender.
Outside the war zone the government declared 20,000 people were with the LTTE. UN agencies estimated the figure at 50,000, but there were actually 70,000 people with the Tigers.
…

The LTTE understood that the end had come, the game was over. Probably, Prabhakaran and a few of his men were in the last 500 square metre area. On May 15, 16 and 17, the last bunch of 70,000 people came out.” [18]

Why Inflate the Number of Displaced Civilians?

Gordon Weiss conveys the implications of inflating the number of displaced civilians:

“I think the only explanation is that it was deliberately misleading and I think that the reason for that is because they didn’t want to account for the number of people killed inside the siege zone.”

Channel 4, quite rightly, accuses the Sri Lankan government of underestimating the number of displaced civilians. Ironically, Channel 4 then deliberately inflates the number of displaced civilians, presumably to imply a larger civilian death toll. The Channel 4 documentary has lingered dangerously into the territory of propaganda.

Conclusion

Is it possible for an objective person to still think the Channel 4 documentary is a credible work of journalism? The producer/director believes that by criticising the LTTE he has provided balance. He completely misses the point that balance is achieved by conveying different points of view. It is clear that the Channel 4 documentary does not adhere to the principles of news and current affairs.

Maybe it was intended as a work of advocacy? Whatever the intention, the Channel 4 documentary is a combination of journalism, advocacy and propaganda. Those that are intent on burying their head in the sand and claiming it to be fake need to recognise that it does raise some valid questions that Sri Lanka needs to answer.

If you seek truth and justice, it is disingenuous not to acknowledge the factual errors littered throughout the Channel 4 documentary. Some media and advocacy groups have promoted the documentary quite passionately. It may be time for these groups to decide whether they believe that ’the ends justify the means’. These groups should also consider whether the short term gains by promoting this documentary will be negated in the long term. Have they not learnt anything from the controversial Nayirah testimony? [19]

Sri Lankans should watch the documentary, but beware of the factual inaccuracies in the narration. For those of us who are far removed from war, it unflinchingly conveys the horror of war. It should be a reminder to us all, particularly those barracking from a distance, why we should not walk down that path ever again. If you disagree, you should consider whether you are willing to take the first step, instead of asking others.

Endnotes

[1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5O1JAfRXew

[2] http://www.adaderana.lk/

[3] http://groundviews.org/2011/06/21/exclusive-interview-with-callum-mccrae-director-of-sri-lankas-killing-fields-produced-by-channel-4/

[4] http://jayasolutions.com/slreport/sl-channel-4-journalism-advocacy-propaganda.html

[5] http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/28/sri-lanka-urgent-action-needed-prevent-civilian-deaths

[6] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7850603.stm

[7] http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/28/sri-lanka-urgent-action-needed-prevent-civilian-deaths

[8] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/28/AR2009012802009.html

[9] http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf

[10] http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf

[11] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iOMzJjueDNhgLg-wyIlxUDU45juQ

[12] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7865190.stm

[13] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/02/200928111020168135.html

[14] http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report_Full.pdf

[15] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/world/asia/25lanka.html?ref=global-home

[16] http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-world/64-civilians-killed-in-sri-lanka-hospital-attack-20090502-aqwz.html

[17] http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-09/govt-troops-shrink-sri-lankan-safe-zone/1677642

[18] http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2009/may/20/slide-show-1-how-war-against-ltte-was-won.htm

[19] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nayirah_(testimony)

• Debating numbers, killing lives: UN and Government differences emerge
• Sri Lanka – Killing for Peace
• Exclusive interview with Callum McCrae, Director of ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ produced by Channel 4
• New leaks of UN war crimes report: Shelling civilians, horrifying medical conditions and failure of the UN system in Sri Lanka?
• When allegations become evidence

Sunday Times, Grease Devils Graphic. Until the 14th of August 2011.

Google Earth Area Photos of Concentrated Grease Devil Sightings
See Below: (1) Jaffna, (2) Mullaththivu, (3) Trincomalee, (4) Batticaloa & Ampara, (5) Puttalam, (6) Sabaragamuwa, Kurunegala & Up Country

Sources

• Statement by Women on the Attacks on Women, Impunity and the Lack of the Rule of Law, issued by the Women’s Action Network
• JAFFNA: BRUTAL ASSAULT OF CIVILIANS IN NAVANTHURAI, http://groundviews.org/2011/08/25/jaffna-brutal-assault-of-civilians-in-navanthurai/
• Grease Devils at Navanthurai: People with military-Confrontation, Author confidential

Internet News Sources

• http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14704906
• http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/08/21/grease-devils-busting-the-myth/
• http://sundaytimes.lk/110814/News/nws_15.html

Grease Devil Incidents via GIS (Google Earth)
Note that D Indicates Alleged Devil Sighting and V Indicates Violence or Vigilante related to Devil. Download these incidents as a KMZ file here.

Jaffna

Mulaththivvu

Trincomalee

Batticaloa & Ampara

Puttalam

Sabaragamuwa, Kurunegala & Up Country

• Post-war, is the Sri Lankan Army going on a rampage in the North?
• JAFFNA: BRUTAL ASSAULT OF CIVILIANS IN NAVANTHURAI
• De-greasing social speculation over “grease devils” in Sri Lanka: Part II
• Searching for Sri Lanka’s Anna Hazare
• De-greasing social speculation over “grease devils” in Sri Lanka

I just viewed a documentary produced recently by Al Jazeera titled ‘Civil war leaves Sri Lankan women vulnerable’. The film has left me deeply disturbed, shocked and ashamed particularly because as a woman, I am not doing my duty in protesting vociferously against such atrocities. Some sections of the documentary appear to have been deliberately blocked for apparent reasons.

We cannot continue to turn a blind eye against the neglect of vulnerable women who are struggling to rehabilitate themselves and their families, post war. Why is there a lack of concern by the state as well as society towards these war victims?

Many households in the north and east are headed by women as most males have died, been incapacitated or gone missing after the war. Several families have been located in areas that do not yet have the basic amenities and continue to live in flimsy shelters as they do not have the resources, income or capability to build secure houses for themselves. This poses the question of how many houses have been built utilising the grant provided by India expressly for this purpose soon after the end of the conflict.

In addition to destitution and neglect, many women and children suffer from post traumatic stress disorders due to the immense suffering experienced as a consequence of the ethnic conflict over the last thirty years and, particularly, during the final stages of the war.

The state has to be accountable for the safety and security of vulnerable women and children from stalkers of all types. However, the unnaturally extensive militarization strategy of the north and east maybe the cause for the breakdown in normal ethical and moral conduct. Also, the heavy concentration of power in the hands of those in authority in contrast to the financially, psychologically and emotionally affected majority of civilians leaves ample room for the abuse of power particularly towards the most vulnerable sections.

It is a disgrace to our nation that international media organizations should point out such atrocities to the entire world while we remain totally disinterested or in a state of denial.

The state and society need to act urgently to address the problem and restore our credibility to the world as a nation that cares and protects its citizens irrespective of their gender, social status or ethnic origin.

• Searching for Sri Lanka’s Anna Hazare
• Sri Lankan Women Human Rights Defenders: Linking Past and Present Challenges
• How hard is it to admit fault, Ambassador Wickramasuriya?
• No respite even after war: The rape, execution, torture and disappearances of IDPs in Sri Lanka
• Importance of psychosocial interventions in post conflict Sri Lanka

Whispering campaigns in Sri Lanka are the most speedy and penetrating campaigns that product promoting advertisers have not been able to make use of. Often in Sri Lanka these whispering campaigns have been political. They have also been on “negative impact” mode, socially. The latest is on the very sensational “Grease Devil” that is said to be after young women.

Opening for a “grease devil”

This has many stories making rounds and each round making it more bizarre than the previous round and the previous day’s. Worst is when media outlets use such stories for political interpretations of their own. The controversial “LankaeNews” (LeN) a not so professional web site carrying Sri Lankan news, reported on 12 August, 2011 a long story that gave life to gossip, captioned “Deadly flame of ‘Grease devils’ spreads: curfew in Samanthurai –King Dutugemunu’s sword vs people’s word”.

The report said, the so named elusive stalkers are on the prowl to abduct 14 breast feeding young mothers for a ritual to dig out the sword used by King Dutugemunu.  Justification of this fiction comes with the final paragraph that says, “no matter what…” the North Central Province reservoir dams are being dug by a powerful politico in search of King Dutugemunu’s sword and has pushed the archaeology department also into a quandary. Implied sub text of the whole story is that, it is for Mahinda Rajapaksa.

LeN’s “14 mothers” since August 12, have multiplied making rounds in Colombo and suburbs to 500, then to 1,000 and the last heard this morning (19 August) as 50,000 mothers. Most stories don’t talk of abductions now. Most now talk of night stalkers who come wearing well pointed “white iron” finger nails, that make scratching of  female breasts easy, to collect blood. Again the blood is said to be for a ritual that would release President Rajapaksa from a very bad astrological influence.

There are many deviated versions too that extend from saving Mahinda Rajapaksa from bad planetary effects to critical illness and to gain life long rule of the country that King Dutugemunu’s sword, (sometimes the crown as well) would guarantee.

Tracking the “grease devil” through media and gossip 

A very cursory glance at all the media stories, community stories told and retold over and over again with spicy alterations, the fear that has gripped society in very many areas and actual incidents that provoked people’s angry reactions in some parts of the country as acknowledged by the police and recorded in Courts of law, reveal a confusing pattern of social conflict that has evolved quite fast and has many unanswered questions. Its  the unanswered questions within this unexplainable social conflict, which makes the “Grease Devil” story worthy of dissection.

1. The whole “grease devil” phenomena had a pre event in Kahawatte, in  Ratnapura district, where an “elusive” serial killer was on the prowl for over an year. After his arrest, the man was identified as an army deserter. At the time of his arrest on 07 July, 2011 he was said to have killed 07, all elderly women, but in his interrogations he had accepted only 02 killings. The next day, 8 July, another army deserter was arrested from Kahawatte for the killing of another elderly woman. This murder spree of 03 women being killed within 03 months, and the killer(s) being elusive, came to be reported especially in the Sinhala media with spicy captions and the killer given an alias as “Bhoothaya” (Ghost or demon). Over months, the rural social psyche was being rooted in this mystic and elusive “Bhoothaya” with stories of villages around Opatha estate freezing in fear and some resorting to rituals seeking relief from Gods to rid their village(s) from ghosts. These rumours with more and more speculative media coverage, established the “Bhoothaya” story with fear, suspicion and frantic interpretations. During May – June period, “Bhoothaya” news got promoted to the front pages in Sinhala media. Meanwhile, the village Civil Defence Force (CDF) that was virtually disbanded almost 02 years ago, though some were still on the pay rolls, was reactivated to keep vigil in the night. While it is not known as to who initiated the CDF, villagers were not sure of the CDF that had many volunteers doing night rounds. Two days before the arrest of the first suspect, villagers came out on the streets in protest over police inactivity, with demands that the police be replaced by the army for their security. This brought the army and the STF to Kahawatte, reported in the media as a decision taken by the new IGP, on instructions from the defence ministry.
2. Thereafter, rumours were afloat in Colombo and suburbs, especially among the Sinhala middle class, about “Boothayas” in other remote areas, that gradually was given a twist, with the old fiction of “greased robbers”, turned into “grease devils” now hunting for young mothers. The Daily Mirror (DM) on 02 August reported that 07 youth alleged to have frightened women in the night and made homes in Ambagolla and Dodamgolla (Moneragala district) close doors and windows early evening, were produced in Courts. The news item was titled “Drunken grease devils scare women”.
3. Interestingly, the Police Spokesperson, SP Prishantha Jayakody was reported by the CDN on 05 August, 2011 as saying, “The grease yaka or the bhuthaya is a myth.” He was reported to have told the CDN, “The stories started when seven women were killed at Kahawatta. But all suspects are now in custody. All grease devils and other suspects arrested from various parts of the country(emphasis added) are in custody. No more grease yakas roam the country now.” His explanation on these new stories making rounds was that, “….some women had caught some `super natural forces’ and grease devils and found that they were from their own neighbourhood. Some women admitted that the persons who attacked them were not grease yakas but their own husbands who were under the influence of liquor. They had lied to the police to prevent their husbands from getting arrested,”
4. Just one week later, the IGP deploys the STF to track down “Grease devils” (emphasis added) not just in one village, but in more than half a dozen areas spread across 03 provinces. They included Hatton in CP, Badulla, Mahiyangana, Girandurukotte, Siyabalanduwa and Bibile in Uva Province and Rambewa in NCP according to DM (“STF on the lookout for grease devils”) of 12 August.
5. By then the “grease devil” scare had gripped more villages. In Haputale, 02 young men were hacked to death by estate workers who thought they were “grease devils”. Sunday Times (ST) of 11 August, had already passed judgement on the two who were killed by reporting they were caught “while intimidating women tea pluckers”. They had come from Moneragala on a motor bicycle wearing black said the ST report, but, was never proved so, in later investigations. There were also reports of villages in Galewela, Nuwara Eliya, Kandy and Ottamavedi getting into the grip of the “grease devil” syndrome. Quoting police sources, the media had counted 03 deaths by then.
6. On 11 August, the DM again reported that 06 youth from Halpe, who entered a tea estate in Uduwara, Badulla and tried to molest women were handed over to the Ella police, and that Ella police had taken into custody, a 3 wheeler they had used. Police were quoted as saying investigations are under way, but there were no reports of the youth being produced in Courts. The source of this whole story was also the police. In a second DM report the same day, the IGP is quoted as having deployed the STF in tracking down men who pose as “grease devils” to rob women (emphasis added). Yet police maintained there were no such issue as “grease devils”. Contradicting themselves, police were providing information about “grease devil” issues in different parts of the country, such as arrests in Alawathugoda, Bibile and Mahiyangane, where the police claimed persons posing as “grease devils” were arrested and investigations are continuing. But no reports of any being produced in Courts.
7. The second week of August ended with the “grease devil” issue gripping  Eastern Province more than in all other areas. The first was from Valachchenai where a woman was reported to have been attacked on Wednesday 10 August by a “grease devil” and warded in hospital, with deep scratches on her breasts (ST 14 August). Thereafter large uprisings were reported in Pottuvil where civilian population claimed they handed over 02 men suspected to be “grease devils” to the police, but the two had been released by the police. Large protests by the people who surrounded the police station, were first tear gased and then shot at, killing a protesting youth said to be a SLMC member. People claimed the two suspects handed over to police, were military intelligence men. Thereafter, Thirukkovil, Kinniya and Urani, were hot spots with very similar stories. Kinniya the difference was, instead of the police, the Navy camp became the target. People claimed again, 02 suspected “grease devils” were provided refuge in the navy camp.
8. Sinhala media also carried similar stories, with almost the same information, but the language and tone used, adding more speculation and a sense of desperation among villages. Yet the stories making rounds in Sinhala middle class circles were getting more political but on divergent lines.

• The more spicy and sensationalised of the two political versions, were getting more and more fixed on President Rajapaksa and when challenged for accuracy, were justified by saying even President Premadasa resorted to such awkward rituals, to avoid bad patches in his life and rule. “Leaders are that” was a stock answer.
• The second version argues that rumours were designed to bring disrepute on the government and disrupt public life. The unnamed but pointed reference is on the JVP. The CDN of 15 August in a news report titled “Political movement behind monster canard” said, “investigations conducted by the Police Intelligence Unit had revealed that the aim of spreading rumours about grease devils by this political group, is to disrupt peace in the country.”

First impressions on media reports

Of all news reports, the only confirmed cases of some tangible incident(s), comes from the East in Valachchenia, Pottuvil, Thirukkovil, Kinniya and Urani. In all cases except in Valachchenai, there is some involvement with the police and the security forces that the people had reason to get agitated for.

With little trust on the police, people in most areas had taken the responsibility of guarding their own village during nights, forming their own village “vigilante” groups.

Where people had taken the law unto their hands and deaths had occurred, was only in Haputale with 02 persons getting hacked to death. In Wellamboda Kandy, 01 had died from electrocution, trying to chase after a supposed “grease devil”.

All other deaths reported, were due to police firing at protesting crowds, that too in  Eastern protests.

All other news reports from very many areas that cited names of places – Ottamavedi, Galnewa, Rambewa, Wellamboda, Hatton, Nuwara Eliya, Alawathugoda, Mahiyangane, Girandurukotte, Siyabalanduwa, Bibile, Uduwara, Badulla, Ambagolla, Dodamgolla – mostly from Uva, have no clear proof of any incident, other than the police telling the media of incidents they claim, they are investigating.

What is most conspicuous was that, even the English media, generally accepted as more responsible than others, was not that responsible in their coverages. They too were taking the easy way out, carrying what the police had to say, using village gossip as dressings. For a very speculative issue that kept gripping more and more villages in fear and the rule of law and social order being compromised, there were no efforts to dig deep, with investigative reporting.

Speculations, realities and possibilities

1. Stories of “grease devils” stalking Tamil and Muslim areas spread quite fast with most Eastern Province villages getting agitated. Therefore minorities are feeling more insecure than the Sinhala people. Even in Kompannaveediya (Slave island) Muslim vigilante groups kept guard in the nights.
2. Rajapaksa regime is implicated in most instances. Many theories are gossiped around. (i) Blood in drops from breast feeding mothers collected for a ritual to bless President Rajapaksa (ii) Blood collected for a ritual to dig out King Dutugeminu’s sword/crown for President Rajapaksa
3. Political interpretation gossiped around, claim the whole “grease devil” story was used by the Rajapaksa regime to prove the military and the STF has to be deployed in all areas for security, even if the Emergency Regulations have to be lifted. This regime can not exist without the military, the argument goes, that also says the government is under pressure from international financial agencies to lift emergency regulations.

Summing up, it seems there is space to hypothesise that somewhere up the ladder, some brain(s ?) was trying to use the Kahawatte serial killing to justify the deployment of the STF at least, as most stories that were in the media, looks more like “plants” from the police. Perhaps the whole project blew beyond the expected size and went out of hand. Or was it ? This also coincides with the “hot news” that says, STF camps would  be established in every district. A news that was not contradicted nor denied by any in the regime, including the defence establishment.

Yet, what can not be clearly explained is, how such sensational stories wrapped with speculations, reach grass roots in remote areas so fast and with conviction. Also, how they provide or provoke social energy for spontaneous mobilisation of people. This perhaps needs a social psychiatrist to de construct the whole social narrative of the “grease devil”.

• The ‘Grease Devil’ Phenomena in Sri Lanka: A Brief Collation of Reports
• De-greasing social speculation over “grease devils” in Sri Lanka: Part II
• Post-war, is the Sri Lankan Army going on a rampage in the North?
• Reconciliation, a Political Settlement and the “Grease Devil”
• Women and Media Collective Press Conference on Violence Against Women

Image released by Police Headquaters which was saved allegedly in the phone of a 16 year-old who was arrested for a number of robberies in the Uva Province.

As we post this article, there is a tense situation in Kinniya, spilling over from yesterday on the issue of ‘grease devils’. A Daily Mirror SMS update notes that,

As this Reuters report notes,

“Historically, a “grease devil” was a thief who wore only underwear and covered his body in grease to make himself difficult to grab if chased. But lately, the “grease devil” has become a nighttime prowler who frightens and attacks women.”

The news reports are as bewildering as they are increasing in number, especially from the East. People are being killed, for no apparent reason. ‘Grease devils’ have been arrested, vigilante justice has been meted out (ironically leading to more deaths), curfews imposed, the STF is on the look out, but the mass panic persists. Well-known columnists have flagged these incidents as ‘an unbelievable collapse of confidence in law enforcement‘. Mainstream newspapers last Sunday covered this disturbing story (What the devil is going on?, The Grease Yaka Sightings: Fact Vs. Myth), but there’s generally confusion amongst the public that is fuelling anxiety and fear.

We received a report from a source in the East on this issue in Tamil and English, with the content in Tamil translated by him into English. We reproduce this content not as verified fact, but for open debate and discussion as dire markers of tension on the ground that we are very concerned can contribute to large-scale unrest and more deaths.

With verification of incidents extremely challenging given the context, law enforcement itself sans public legitimacy and many, rightly or wrongly, who believe that the ‘grease devils’ have links to the Sri Lankan military, it remains to be seen how the government will deal with this emergent threat to public order and security.

###

இன்று அதிகாலை செங்கலடி பொலிஸ்பிரிவிற்குற்பட்ட சந்திவெலிபிரதேச திகிலிவெட்டையில் வீடொன்றினுள் புகுந்த மர்ம மனிதர்கள் வீட்டிலிருந்த இரு பிள்ளைகளின் தந்தையான இளையதம்பி புலெந்திரன் – (35) என்பவரை வாளினால் தாக்கிவிட்டு தப்பிச்சென்றுள்ளனர். இச்சம்பவத்தினையடுத்து சந்தேகத்தின்பேரில் சந்திவெலி இராணுவ முகாமில் கடமைபுரியும் இராணுவ சார்ஜன்ட் ஒருவர் பொதுமக்களால் மடக்கி பிடிக்கப்பட்டு இராணுவத்தினரிடம் ஒப்படைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளார். நாடுபூராகவும் ஏற்பட்டுள்ள மர்ம மனிதன் தொடர்பில் பல உயிர்கள் காவு கொள்ளப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன், பலர் காயமடைந்துமுள்ளனர். இதன் பின்னனியில் உள்ளவர்கள் தொடர்பில் பல கருத்துக்களும் வெளிவந்தவண்ணமுள்ளது.

1. துட்டகைமுனுவின் தங்க கிரீடத்தினயும், வாளையும் பெறுவதற்காக இளம்பெண்களின் இரத்ததை தேடி சிலர் செயற்படுவதாகவும் இவர்களுக்கும் அரசுக்கும் சம்பந்தம் இருப்பதாகவும் பாராளுமன்ற உருப்பினர் விஜித ஹேரத் பாராளுமன்றில் தெரிவித்தமை குறிப்பிடத்தக்க ஒன்று.
2. இதேவேளை ஜனாதிபதியின் ஆட்சி நீடிக்க வேண்டுமாயின் 1000 இளம் பெண்களின் இரத்தபிசேகம் செய்யப்படவேண்டும் என ஒரு வதந்தியும் உலாவருகின்றது.
3. அரசியல் ரீதியாக கருத்து தெரிவிக்கும் சிலர் நாட்டில் அவசரகால நிலைமையினை நீக்கவேண்டிய நிலையில் அரசு சர்வதேச அழுத்தங்களை முகம்கொள்வதால் இவ்வாரான நடவடிக்கைகளினால் மக்களிடம் பீதியை எற்படுத்தி அவசராகால சட்டத்தை தொடர்ந்தும் தக்கவைப்பதற்கான நடவடிக்கையில் அரசு இராணுவத்தை பயன்படுத்துவதாக கருத்தும் தெரிவிக்கின்றனர்.
4. இன்னும் சில ஆய்வாளர்கள் அண்மையில் இலங்கை சர்வதேசத்தில் எழுந்துள்ள போர் குற்றச்சாட்டுகளை எதிர்கொள்ள பெரும்பான்மை சமூகத்தின் ஆதரவினை பெற்றுக்கொள்வதற்காக இவ்வாரான நடவடிக்கைகளின் மூலம் இனக்கலவரங்களை உருவாக்கி கொண்டு அதன் மூலம் அரசியல் பலத்தை பெற முனைவதாகவும் தெரிவிக்கின்றனர். இதன்காரணமாகத்தான் மர்ம மனிதன் தொடர்பான பிரச்சனைகள் கூடுதலாக தமிழ் முஸ்லிம் பிரதேசங்களில் இடம்பெருவதாக குறிப்பிடுகின்றனர்.
5. மத அடிப்படையில் சிந்திக்கும் சிலர் கடந்தகால வன்செயல்களின் போது வன்மையாக கொல்லப்பட்டவர்களது ஆவி உரிய முறையில் அஞ்சலி செய்யப்படாமையினால் அவை அலைந்து திரிந்து மக்களுக்கு தொல்லை கொடுப்பதாகவும் கருத்து தெரிவிக்கின்றனர்.

இது இவ்வாறிருக்க இதேபோன்ற நிகழ்வு சுமார் 3 வருடங்களுக்கு முன்னர் கலாவத்தை பிரதேசத்தில் இடம்பெற்றதாக தகவல்கள் தெரிவிக்கின்றன. இராணுவ சிறப்பு பயிட்சி பெறும் படைப்பிரிவினர் வன்முறைகளின் போது எவ்வாறு தப்பித்துக்கொள்வது என்ற பயிட்சி நடவடிக்கையின் ஒருகட்டமாக பொதுமக்களது வீடுகளை தட்டிவிட்டு தப்பிச்செல்லும் பயிட்சில் ஈடுபட்டிருந்தமை பின்னர் தெரியவந்தது. ஆனால் தற்போது மர்ம மனிதனால் சிலர் காயங்களுக்கு உள்ளாக்கபட்டுள்ளமை கேள்வியாகவே உள்ளது.

எது எவ்வாறுரிந்தபோதும் இவ்விடயத்தில் பொலிஸாரின் கடமை சரிவர மேற்கொள்ளப்படவில்லை என்ற குற்றச்சாட்டு எழுந்துள்ளமை குறிப்பிடத்தக்க அம்சமாகும்.

Whatever the motive behind is, the victims and mass strongly believe that there are strong links between government, security forces including police and grease men, they point to the following as evidence of this;

1. When these grease men have been caught they were carrying military/army identity cards
2. Irakkamam, Pottuvil, Otamavadi, Valaichanai and in a few other places where people did manage to catch some of these “grease men” and people believe that they were not brought to justice and the police or security forces released them.
3. When people tried to catch “grease men” in Samanturai and some other parts of Batticaloa they enter the police station or army camps of the respective village and the forces protect these “grease men” and blame public.
4. Last not the least, the government is blindly refusing to put in place any security measures in order to restore law and order in the affected areas and instead are blaming victims and demoralizing them.

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English translation of Tamil content provided by author (we have not checked for accuracy. Readers are kindly invited to cross-check)

This morning, “grease men” have entered a house in Thihilliverdhai in the Chanthivelli area which falls under the Chengaladi Police division and attacked Illaiyathambi Pulenthiran (35) a father of two with a sword. Soon after this incident, civilians in the area overpowered and apprehended a military sergeant from the Santhivelli camp on suspicion that he was one of the “grease men” and handed him over to the military.

Similar incidents took place three years ago in the Halwata (Chilaw) area. It was later learnt that escaping from civilians houses was a stage in the Special Forces training designed to help them escape when engaging in attacks.

Many lives have been lost and many people have been wounded in several parts of the country due to the presence of grease men. Many facts have also been revealed about the background to this incident.

1. MP Vijitha Herath stated in Parliament that some are attempting to get female blood in order to obtain the legendary gold crown and sword from Dutugemunu and that there is a connection between the Government and these incidents
2. At the same time there is another rumor spreading that a blood offering of 1000 young women is required for the reign of the president to continue
3. Some political commentators have stated that since the government is being pressurized by the international community to get rid of the emergency rule, the government is using the military to create a tense situation to justify the continuation of emergency regulations
4. Other researchers are of the opinion that this is an attempt to gain the support of the majority community and create ethnic disharmony among the communities in the light of the immense international pressure against the government on war crimes and gain political power. This could be the reason why the incidents relating to grease men are prevalent in Tamil and Muslim areas in the East.
5. Those who think on religious lines say that these are the spirits the dead coming to haunt us, particularly the spirits of those who faced violent deaths in the past.

Some of these “grease men” have also suffered injuries. Whatever the reasons may be the police have been accused of not carrying out their duties. 

• Chaos in Colombo: Mêlée over jobs indicates a serious economic problem in Sri Lanka?
• Photographic evidence of war crimes in Sri Lanka, or not? (Updated)
• Milinda Moragoda: The gap between promise and reality
• The ‘Grease Devil’ Phenomena in Sri Lanka: A Brief Collation of Reports
• De-greasing social speculation over “grease devils” in Sri Lanka: Part II

Sri Lanka’s thirty year war is now more of words than of guns, but it is no less bitter. RNW’s team in the country met with fierce resistance from the Sri Lankan government to the current calls for justice from the international community.

But the problem is that the international community’s presence in the country is dwindling, a fact witnessed when travelling across the east of the island – where once there were distinctive white NGO vehicles on every corner, the sight is now rare.

With the help of one remaining NGO which requested anonymity, RNW met nine freshly ‘reintegrated’ former Tamil Tiger guerillas who spoke of their desire for justice for all Sri Lankans. But people in the heavily militarized north and east live in fear of reprisal if they openly criticise the authorities – which is why a vociferous Tamil diaspora, the foreign media and a UN investigation have stepped in. The Sri Lankan government is now hitting back.

Video counter-punch

This week Colombo released a documentary video in response to British Channel 4’s Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields, in which it looks to discredit all claims that government troops killed and raped Tamil civilians and prisoners of war during the closing months of the conflict in 2009. The narrator of Lies Agreed Upon rubbishes Channel 4’s documentary: “Doctored footage and deliberate lies are presented as authentic. It begs for review.” The film proceeds to refute claims that the military deliberately bombed no-fire zones and seeks to bring into focus atrocities committed by the Tamil Tigers.

Reactions from the Tamil diaspora to the film are predictable – “The Tamil community is disappointed. The whole documentary is based on lies. The people speaking are all under pressure from the government. What would you do when you were a Tamil and you were under that pressure? You would probably go along with what the government wants,” said Mohan, a Dutch Tamil campaigner.

Tamils who feel free to speak openly say they want an independent, international investigation into the many claims of atrocities committed in 2009 and before. “We are requesting, pleading, begging the civilised world to stop the hypocrisy and double standards. And we’re calling for impartial investigations into missing persons,” said Donald Gnanakone head of the US-based ‘Tamils for Justice’.

Probing for the truth

Colombo says it is investigating the period in question and that all Sri Lankans watched over by President Rajapaksa, who smiles down from countless billboards around the capital.

Evidence of this, it claims, is his creation of the ‘Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission’ (LLRC) last year, the stated intention of which is to “focus on the causes of conflict, its effect on the people, and promote national unity and reconciliation.” This body claims to have interviewed five thousand people of all ethnicities around the country in the building of its report, expected later this year.

The international community though, led by the United Nations Secretary General’s office, is not impressed by the LLRC’s work so far, saying it is “deeply flawed, (and) does not meet international standards for an effective accountability mechanism.”

Lakshman Wickremasinghe is spokesman for the LLRC. Does he hear the ever louder calls from the outside world to make the Commission’s work more credible?

“I hope the international community doesn’t put pressure on the Commission because it’s the best mechanism the country has.”

Whether the Sri Lankan government likes it or not, greater pressure is being brought to bear on it. The US Foreign Affairs Committee, which advises Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, says it is pushing ahead with plans to stop American aid to Sri Lanka unless meaningful investigation takes place and the guilty are brought to book.

Wanted: justice for all Sri Lankans

During RNW’s conversations in Sri Lanka with former Tamil Tiger fighters it was clear justice was a high priority for the Tamil community, not only indicting Sri Lankan generals but Tamil leaders too. Critics point out this is easy to say since most of the Tamil Tiger leadership was killed during the closing months of the war.

The desire for justice is not confined to one side, according to the UN’s former spokesman in Sri Lanka, Gordon Weiss: “I think there are many Sri Lankans of all ethnicities who support accountability, who support the rule of law, who support a frank and full discussion of the past history.”

The problem is there is no history of accountability in Sri Lanka: “Almost nobody has done jail time for the crimes that were committed in 1971 when tens of thousands of Sinhalese were killed, or during the uprising from 1987 – 1990. So there is a long and very profound history of a lack of accountability,” said Gordon Weiss.

He remains hopeful about an independent investigation and justice in the future. The UN however only wants to launch an investigation with the approval of the government of Sri Lanka, which is unlikely to happen. The International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction, as Sri Lanka is not one of the 114 countries that have signed up to the court. Direct referral by the UN Security Council seems to be the only option left, but with China, India and Russia’s major investments in the country, they would be expected to veto any resolution on a referral.

Silenced guns or guns with silencers?

Sri Lanka has suffered from a cycle of oppression and violence for decades. And as the former Tamil rebels in the town of Batticaloa told RNW, if basic rights are not upheld, that cycle will simply continue into the future. The danger for Sri Lanka is that silent guns continue to be interpreted as lasting peace. As the NGO vehicles pull out, fear and impunity are left behind. Former Tamil Tiger Mutu told RNW: “I think there needs to be justice supervised by the international community. Because if the Sri Lankan government does it, it won’t be done properly.”

The other articles from RNW on Sri Lanka:
Sri Lanka’s white vans deliver fear and oppression
Sri Lanka: picking up the Tamil Tiger’s scent

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Content from Radio Netherlands Worldwide (RNW) is republished with permission on Groundviews for further debate and discussion, under a content sharing agreement between this site and RNW’s South Asia Wired programme.

• Burning of the Jaffna Public Library: 30 years on
• Silva’s Report, Role of International Community and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka
• An Era of Sri Lanka’s President: From Mullivaikal to Oxford Union
• In conversation with Nelum Gamage: Does anyone give a damn about corruption?
• A tragi-comedy? The UN Advisory Panel and war crimes in Sri Lanka

Groundviews caught up with TNA Member of Parliament Suresh Premachandran, who spoke to us about the nature of election violations that occurred in the Northern Province prior to the 23^rd of July and on Election Day, which included intimidation, assault, bribery, voter transportation, continuous campaigning and reports of the systematic and forced appropriation of ballot and identity cards by ‘armed actors’. Premachandran asserted that the result of the election delivered two messages to the Government; firstly, the Tamil people require development, but also ‘a political settlement’ and secondly, that there is a consensus on the need for an ‘investigation’ and ‘some sort of accountability’. Premachandran also spoke about the Government’s insistence on a Parliamentary Select Committee for drawing up a political solution, which he simply dismissed as a ‘delay tactic’.

On the issue of negotiations with the Government for a political solution, Premachandran stated that there was ‘no progress on devolution matters’. Furthermore, in what appeared to be a fit of idiosyncrasy Premachandran stated that the TNA did not provide ‘any comprehensive proposals as such’, but instead submitted ‘notes for discussions’. What ‘comprehensive proposals/report’ were Mathiaparanan Sumanthiran and Mavai Senadhirajah talking about a few months ago? It is hard to believe that when dealing with an intransigent and duplicitous government, Premachandran could deny the existence of ‘comprehensive proposals’ submitted by at least the TNA, particularly when the Long-term Reconciliation Committee – the unfortunate title given to the collective from the Government negotiating with the TNA – appears to have absolutely no concrete mandate or framework that delineates the basis for negotiations.

It is also interesting to note that Premachandran felt that the TNA might have to expand its mandate in order to address issues such as militarisation in the south and thereby fill the void created by the lack of effective opposition politics given the imbroglio of the UNP. While this does seem ambitious and perhaps even unrealistic, it does reinforce certain opinions expressed about the TNA being the only opposition alliance with the political backbone to challenge this government on critical post-war issues.

There is also growing concern about whether adequate funds will be provided to local government bodies in the Northern Province and with racist apparatchiks of the Government challenging the TNA to ‘develop the north’, it does seem as though the TNA will find it increasingly difficult to exercise effective administration, particularly if the Government adopts a retributive agenda in light of its significant defeat in the region. Premachandran ends ominously by stating that ‘if they [the Government] are not going to have a proper settlement through discussion[s] with TNA, then of course we have to take the struggle diplomatically…we will have to mobilise our people, we will have to start non-violent agitation…so that will continue’.

Download the interview as an MP3 here.

Also read TNA MP Suresh Premachandran on the result of the Local Government elections.

• TNA MP Suresh Premachandran on the result of the Local Government elections
• The SLFP Proposals: The Slap in the Face and the Shot in the Arm
• Human Rights and a Political Settlement: Regime Defences Wearing Thin
• Urgent questions to pose to the Leader of the Opposition
• Rohan Edrisinha on the APRC Proposals and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution