I watched the Frontline Club panel on Sri Lanka, belatedly and reluctantly. I am skeptical about such public enquiries and debates into complex matters, which threaten to reduce the dialogue and truth into performance.

In my view, the problem with these ‘events’, for that is what they are, is that the truth is reduced to a many-sided thing; the more one counts the sides the more fragmented the truth itself becomes. But of course you never get ‘all sides’ of the story. So, for example, someone keeping a count of the sides could say the Muslim question or the gender dimension figured not at all.

In fact, Stephen Sackur set the tone for an evening of performance with his opening line: “First thing to say is that it is fantastic to see such a great audience.” The panelists inevitably came with their own scripts—prepared remarks, notes, papers (Mr. Wijesinha had loads of them), computers etc. Then there were the self-appointed (or chosen?) cheerleaders—prompting, laughing, clapping and some even heckling on cue. If at all anyone listened it seemed like it was only to rebut. Thus did the evening proceed to rehearse well-trodden narratives and imaginaries of dominance, violence and marginality in Sri Lanka. And I have no doubt that the panelists and their supporters will have also enaged in post-event reviews; “how did it go?”

I am not suggesting that the issues raised and discussed were not important, on the contrary. It just seemed like a classic case of the very gravity of the issues dwarfing the forum itself. I am certainly not saying that everyone who participated lacked seriousness or genuine intent, which may nevertheless be true of some, but I fear that in forums such as this, in which, at the very least, no one wants his or her position to come out looking ‘lesser’, ‘weaker’, or a ‘loser’ the truth is often the casualty. It is a battle, not always subtle, between well-held positions. It is not a conversation.

The fact is, like in adversarial adjudication, theatricality is a norm in such forums. Or at least, a la Derrida, it is inevitable that the performative elements of dialogue and truth are the ones that tend to get most play. The most theatrical moments of the evening were inevitably around the most sinister—such as the number of people dead or missing in the final months of the war. Numbers and counter-numbers were tossed around until the moderator, inevitably, said it was time to move on, “we have done the numbers.”

If, however, there was one moment when the mask dropped, it was in Mr. Wijesinha’s response to Dr. Manoharan, the father of one of the five students executed on a beach in Trincomalee 6 years ago, widely believed to be the handiwork of Sri Lankan security/law enforcement agents. The first part of this exchange is, sadly, worth recalling. Dr. Manoharan asked why no progress had been made in the case, including despite Dr. Wijesinha’s personal assurances. Mr. Wijesinha, began sagely enough, acknowledging that there was a strong case. He then said that he was present when the President had asked the Attorney General to issue indictments, who had said (to Mr. Wijesinha) that he did not do so because he felt there was not enough evidence to secure a conviction. Mr. Wijesinha went to say, “I said [to the Attorney General], for God’s sake take a leaf out of the British. What they do is prosecute ten people, acquit nine, one person gets two months in jail and then they will say justice.” Stephen Sackur—a seasoned Hard Talk moderator—could scarcely restrain himself and remarked, “I can’t believe that you told that to the Doctor [Dr. Manoharan] thinking it would reassure him.”

Mr. Wijesinha no doubt realised, from Sackur’s spontaneous response and the murmur of disbelief in the room, that it was actually looking more like a case of hit-wicket and tried again, this time making sure to mouth the ‘right’ words, restoring theatre. However, that was perhaps the one time he was being utterly unpremeditated.

Actually, Mr. Wijesinha’s performance of the evening in general merits particular comment because it embodies the theatre that is the Rajapakse regime itself—wearing a devil-may-care cockiness and triumphal face one instant followed by an innocent, we-are-oh-so-victimised cry the next; seeming polite and reasonable one instant but menacing and name-calling the next; full of confidence and bluster one moment but petulant and childish the next. Yes, this too is a familiar sort of theatre, one induced by a deep sub-conscious fear, of knowing that you simply cannot fool everyone forever.

###

Editors note: As we were watching the live web stream of the Frontline event, a few moments after Rajiva Wijesinha’s incredible response to Dr. Manoharan, we tweeted:

tweeted:

• The Gaza Monologues: An interview with Ruhanie Perera and Jake Oorloff
• Interview with Mohamed Adamaly: A life in English theatre
• Floating Spaces: Theatre and censorship in Sri Lanka
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“There is no State of Emergency today.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Therefore, the attempt of the Sri Lankan government to replace emergency laws with another set of laws under a different name, yet meant to do the same task is not surprising. State of emergency is not only a particular set of laws. Removing emergency regulations while continuing with militarisation and a massive project of policing in socio-cultural arenas do not indicate a journey towards normalcy.” – Amali Wedagedara, Groundviews, 5 September 2011

“It is no secret that through 30 years there were armed groups and militias operating, especially in the North and East. All such groups have now been disarmed.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“March 3, 2012 marked a very dark ebb in our society as it saw the horrific rape and murder of little Jesudasan Lakshini (13), allegedly at the hands of former EPDP cadre, Kanthasami Jegatheswaran (alias Kiruba) (31), from the Delft Island, Jaffna. Currently being held in remand at the Jaffna Remand Prison, the accused was produced before the Kayts Magistrate this week (30). However, the hearing was further postponed to April 9, 2012, as the Delft Police had failed to conclude their compilation of eye witness statements, said attorney-at-law K.S. Ratnavel, who is appearing on behalf of the victim’s family. The pending statement is the last of four eye witness statements attesting to having witnessed Lakshini being intercepted and taken by the accused on her way to the market, he added. This raises the glaring question as to why the Police was unable to obtain a mere four eye witness statements in the course of almost a month following this incident, unless of course exterior political forces are in play.” – Marissa de Silva, Groundviews, 2 April 2012

“We have systematically removed from our vocabulary the references of refugee camps, land mines and villages under threat. ” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Back at the destroyed camp, we learned that earlier the same morning, the industries and commerce minister, Rishad Bathiudeen, had also paid a visit to the site. Upon his arrival, bombarded by residents’ desperate pleas to finally be allowed to return to their homes, he responded that he had only come to see what could be done to help them after the storm and ordered, “don’t try and turn this into a political issue”. Unfortunately, what Mr. Bathiudeen does not seem to know or acknowledge is that the reason for not allowing these people to return to their villages for almost three years is a political decision.” – Watchdog, Groundviews, 7 April 2012

“There were limits imposed on fishermen under which they could not go beyond a certain distance. These restrictions are also no more.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Many problems regarding the fishing industry in the North in many ways related to the militarization that was strengthened during the last phase of the war but not completely relaxed even after the end of the war. For instance, some coastal areas, which are very significant to fishing, still remains as High Security Zones (HSZ); and therefore fishermen are banned from engaging in their livelihood activities in those areas; in many areas, fishermen were allowed to go to sea only within a permitted corridor, and even for that they had to get passes from military forces.” – Sumith Chaaminda, Groundviews, 31 March 2012

“The check points and road blocks that we had through every two or three kilometers, and even on this Galle Road, are not there anymore… We are aware that the armed forces do not participate in the administration of the North or East. These regions are administered by the public service and the police. ” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“The reality that most, if not all the soldiers manning the Omanthai Checkpoint are not proficient in Tamil, is also quite telling in terms of the complete non-recognition of, and lack of respect for the Tamil community. More often than not, Tamil passengers unfamiliar with the routine have to rely on the Tamil translation of a more seasoned traveller. This indignity is further heightened when each of these passengers are made to have their personal belongings rifled through, until such time that the army personnel is adequately satisfied of the innocence of the specific passenger in question.” – Marisa de Silva, Groundviews, 16 April 2012

and

“The ubiquitous presence of armed security forces, weapons drawn, fingers on the trigger was fearsome. Every 100 metres on the Jaffna highway there was a security picket; every three kilometres, an army post; every 10 km, an army camp. The army was everywhere, running roadside shops, hotels and hospitality businesses. Even funerals or marriages or social functions in Tamil areas needed army permission in advance.” – The Hindu, 21 March 2012

“You will recall how terrorism compelled us all to live in the midst of much restrictions and obstructions, through 30 years. It is just three years since the war ended. Today, the country that faced such restrictions has returned to normal.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

“Especially for those living in the North, normalcy is far from reality. Only a part of these are the deciduous problems encountered, unfortunately but unavoidably, by people living in former conflict zones in the aftermath of war. It is now disconcertingly apparent that the militarisation of all spheres of life in the North is becoming increasingly institutionalised, and moreover, that this is the deliberate policy of the government. The regime is able to implement its policy with regard to the North, and more generally the continuation in force of disproportionate and repressive wartime national security measures, with virtually no meaningful democratic opposition.” – Asanga Welikala, Groundviews, 29 April 2011

“We are a country that is a member of the United Nations, working with friendship with all countries and sit with equality with all its members.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

On 30 June [2010], senior Government Minister Wimal Weerawansa urged the public to surround the UN office in Colombo and hold its staff hostage until moves by the UN to appoint a panel on Sri Lanka is dropped, putting the UN in Sri Lanka on high alert. On the same day, UN spokesman Farhan Haq said that when the UN contacted the Sri Lankan government over this statement, the government assured they were Minister Weerawansa’s “individual opinion”. On 2 July, it was reported that the government may tender an apology to the UN over the Minister’s comments. Any communication to this effect by the government to the UN is, to date, not in the public domain. On 4 July, Minister Weerawansa said he stood by his comment, and clarified that he made it as the National Freedom Front (NFF) leader and not in his capacity as a Government member. He also reiterated his call for the public to surround the building and protest against the UN panel. On the morning of 6 July, the NFF surrounded the UN compound in Colombo… Related to this, the Lanka Truth website runs a story on an alleged phone call with the President’s brother, the churlish Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in which he directly orders the Police to withdraw from the vicinity of the UN compound. – Groundviews, 8 July 2010

“We are already carrying out what we can agree to and can implement among the recommendations of the LLRC.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

The official media page of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) tells its own story. It’s blank. There’s literally nothing on the official website of the LLRC that provides information on public statements by the LLRC and coverage of its proceedings in the media. Furthermore, it’s impossible to find the interim recommendations or the final report of the LLRC on the official website… What remains of the LLRC’s proceedings and output – its interim report and recommendations, the accessibility and translations of its Final Report, most of the public submissions in Tamil, Sinhala and English, audio recordings and detailed records of media reports – are all, without exception, carefully curated and published online for public access by the very NGOs and platforms, including this site, that have been openly and repeatedly vilified by those in and partial to government. And all the government itself has managed to do was to establish a website for the LLRC – that too rather late into the LLRC’s activities and bereft of vital records. – Groundviews, 20 March 2012

“National political parties are today able to work and function freely in the North in absence of fear.” – President Rajapaksa’s Address to the Nation, 19 May 2012

vs.

The bizarre responses to what was a brutal attack, post-war, in broad daylight, against unarmed Parliamentarians engaging in nothing more subversive than the democratic process and it’s subsequent denial by the President himself – essentially shutting the door on any investigation or punitive measures – reflects a desire by government to, unilaterally and violently if necessary, define Tamil politics and moreover, throttle the growth of a more plural Tamil polity and society. These attacks are justified by senior government ministers, who believe that “the UPFA and other political parties represented more Tamils than the TNA”, which means that more can be expected in the future. The resulting humiliation of the TNA MPs is keenly felt and watched by a larger Tamil community, domestic as well as international. – Groundviews, The attack on TNA Parliamentarians in Jaffna: A timeline of outrageous denials (Updated), 5 July 2011

“Sri Lanka would soon pull out its remaining troops from areas still under military control in the Tamil-dominated northern province that was once an LTTE bastion, a prominent Tamil minister has said. ‘We have successfully taken the military presence off in most of the areas in the Northern Province. Only two in tenth of the areas are still under military control. We will soon make this area free of military presence. I need a month’s time from you to work on this,” Minister Douglas Devananda said while addressing people at Mathagal.” – Press Trust of India, 10 February 2012

vs.

“Sri Lanka’s president has rejected a call by Indian legislators to withdraw soldiers from the island’s former war zone in the north where minority Tamils are concentrated, his spokesman… President Mahinda Rajapakse told a delegation of visiting Indian lawmakers that troops could not be pulled out despite the end of the decades-long Tamil separatist war in 2009.” – AFP, 22 April 2012

and

“President Mahinda Rajapaksa speaking at the Victory Day celebrations today said that it was not advisable to remove or reduce military camps in the North as the Tamil diasporas had not given up its attempts to win Eelam.” – Ceylon Today, 19 May 2012

• What is the bigger lie? US resolution in Geneva or number of people in Vanni in 2009?
• Who really supports reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka?
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Reloading General Sarath Fonseka for a post-paid Sinhala package
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents

Photo courtesy Vikalpa

For the 3^rd successive year, the Sri Lankan government has made elaborate arrangements to celebrate the end of the war in Colombo. This year, May was declared as “war hero’s commemoration month”. For the last few days, roads were closed in Colombo causing great inconvenience, as preparations were being made for celebrating the end of the war.

However, in the North, among Tamils, where the last phase of the war was fought, the mood was far from celebratory, but outright mourning and grieving. In the morning of 18^th May, I joined a commemorative Mass in a church that was yet to be rebuilt after the war. More than the church building, two monuments stood out. One for Fr. Sarathjeevan (popularly known as Fr. Sara, who died on 18^th May 2009) and another for all people who had been killed in the war. Villagers including school children and Hindus flocked to this church. Amongst those present were families of those killed and disappeared. About 20 priests participated. After the Mass,  flowers and garlands were laid for those killed. A Tamil priest from Jaffna welcomed the small group of Sinhalese from Negombo, Colombo, Anuradhapura etc., who had joined the mourning and the simple commemoration, while most other Sinhalese were seen celebrating.

In the afternoon of 18^th May, I witnessed the passion of women whose family members had disappeared and been killed, as they gathered at a Hindu Kovil in Killinochchi town and participated in a service there, which included the smashing of coconuts. Some of the women were crying and some were clearly angry with those that had killed or made their family members disappear. I would not want to be at the receiving end of such anger.

In the evening, I joined other friends in a solemn event in Jaffna to commemorate the 3^rd year after the end of the war after by remembering those killed and disappeared. All of us lit candles and some shared their tragic stories of those killed and disappeared. Several mourned also for the lack of space to even cry and remember without fear, with one boy thanking the organizers of the event, as several others he had spoken to organize such an event had refused in fear.   Another woman, whose brother had died on 18^thMay 2009, spoke of the tension with which they participate in these events, as they are fearful to hold them in public.

One of the organizers of the Jaffna event spoke of the challenge he faces every year in May to organize a commemoration. His fears were clearly grounded and real.

On 17^th May evening, some unknown persons had inquired about him and his activities. The priest in whose church the commemorative event was held on the morning of 18^th May in Vanni was also questioned by the Army the previous day about what services and activities were planned. On 18^th May morning, the Secretary of the Jaffna University Students Union was attacked and was seriously injured. A friend told us that he was in the accident ward of the Jaffna hospital while we were there.

In another interior rural village close to Jaffna, Army personnel had twice visited a Catholic Priest and threatened him not to have any special masses between 18^th – 20^th May. In their 2^nd visit, they had told the Priest he can have mass, but that he shouldn’t pray for those killed in the last phase of the war, as all those killed had been LTTE cadres. There had been no answer when the Priest asked whether the 1-2 year old children killed and elders over 60 years who had been killed were also LTTE cadres.  Some months ago, threats by the Army had compelled the same priest to scrap the plan to build a tomb to remember all those killed in the war and didn’t have a tomb or a burial place. On 27^th November 2011, the Army had insisted that lamps  not be lit  and bells should not be rung in Churches and Kovils in the North and in some places, and had even threatened Catholic Priests not to celebrate the Sunday Mass! (Perhaps ignorant that Sunday Mass is celebrated in churches all over Sri Lanka and over the world for hundreds of years). Outside the Killinochchi Hindu Kovil that the families of disappeared and killed had gathered, there was a significant Police and Army presence and one of my friends recognized an intelligence officer who was photographing us and watched us as we got into our van after joining the Kovil event. By coincidence or not, in the next few minutes, our vehicle was stopped at a check point and subjected to registration and questioning which was not at all usual in my previous travels in the North this year.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry (LLRC) had recommended that a special event on National Day (4^th February) be set apart to express solidarity and empathy with all victims of the tragic conflict, but this was ignored by the Government.

And the military appeared to be doing its best to discourage and stop any religious or non religious events related to remembering the dead and disappeared, to grieve and mourn. The intimidation and threatening of organizers of such initiatives are alarming.

I’m happy the war had ended. But I’m not at all happy about the way it was fought, especially the last phase. And celebrating while many others are mourning and grieving – and actively trying to prevent mourning and grieving – doesn’t seem to be the way towards a genuine reconciliation.

But I did have something to celebrate also – the courage, creativity and perseverance of those who dared to build small monuments, organize and participate in memorials events to grieve and mourn for those killed, disappeared and who have suffered. It is this courage  and creativity i believe that will lead us to reconciliation.

• Celebrating war victory and banning commemoration of dead civilians: this is “home grown & indigenous” reconciliation and freedom in Sri Lanka?
• Christmas 2008 in Sri Lanka
• Destroying monuments for those killed & disappeared: The Catholic Church and the Sri Lankan Government
• Fr. Jim Brown and Mr. Vimalathas: Five years after disappearance, where are they and what has happened to the investigation?
• Sharing a common god: The Sivasubramaniam Kovil in Slave Island

is the appointment
of a presidential committee
to decide upon which

recommendations to adopt
regarding the erstwhile
ethnic question, which

has been subsumed
into the unitary enterprise
of the war-fighting, now

North and East-occupying,
government dedicated
to paying appropriate attention

to the international human
rights lobby and European
and American states.

Nothing like a committee
to push the football away,
like the many formed

and dissolved
in the past without
achieving laws,

but which gained time
for the family
to work and play.

• Beam Me Up to Planet Football!
• Official transcript of LLRC oral submission by Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala (Updated)
• World Cup Cricket and Football: Nationalism in France and Sri Lanka
• Counter-productive propaganda and human rights in Sri Lanka
• Writing against the RSF/JDS appeal to boycott the Galle Literary Festival

The Associated Press obtained a copy Thursday of an email written by a U.N. land mine expert that said unexploded cluster bomblets were discovered in the Puthukudiyiruppu area of northern Sri Lanka, where a boy was killed last month and his sister injured as they tried to pry apart an explosive device they had found to sell for scrap metal.

The email was written by Allan Poston, the technical adviser for the U.N. Development Program’s mine action group in Sri Lanka.

“After reviewing additional photographs from the investigation teams, I have determined that there are cluster sub-munitions in the area where the children were collecting scrap metal and in the house where the accident occurred. This is the first time that there has been confirmed unexploded sub-munitions found in Sri Lanka” the email said.

Emphasis ours. The incident noted in Ravi’s copy was actually reported in the Tamil media on 6th March 2012.

The story on Sudar Oli, published on Page 7 notes,

An explosion in Killinochchi kills a boy: His sister sustains serious injuries

From Vishamadhu, Killinochchi, comes the report of a death of a boy, who had tried to examine a metallic object. The details of this incident are as follows.

Yesterday (5. March 2012) at around 11.30am, V. Villuwan (14) a small boy and his sister, V. Kovila (22) were collecting metal when they tried to remove the copper off a metallic object. At this moment, there was an explosion with a huge sound.

Seriously injured from the explosion, both children were admitted to the Dharmapuram Hospital. Afterwards, they were transferred to the Jaffna Hospital’s emergency ward, at which time the boy succumbed to his injuries.

It’s very important to track the Sri Lankan government’s denials over the use of cluster munitions. Last updated on 19 August 2011, the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor notes,

Sri Lanka has said that it does not possess cluster munitions. The Sri Lankan government’s Media Center for National Security issued the following statement on its website in February 2009: “The Government wishes to clarify that the Sri Lanka army do not use these cluster bombs nor do they have facilities to use them.” The Ministry of Defence website posted a statement saying Sri Lanka never fired cluster munitions and never brought them into the country. In February 2009, a military spokesperson was quoted stating, “We don’t have the facility to fire cluster munitions. We don’t have these weapons.”

Emphasis ours. On Page 47 of the UN Panel of Experts report, allegations of cluster munitions use are noted along with denials from the Sri Lankan government,

1. Allegations of the use of cluster munitions or white phosphorus
169. There are allegations that the SLA used cluster bomb munitions or white phosphorus or other chemical substances against civilians, particularly around PTK and in the second NFZ. Accounts refer to large explosions, followed by numerous smaller explosions consistent with the sound of a cluster bomb. Some wounds in the various hospitals are alleged to have been caused by cluster munitions or white phosphorus. The Government of Sri Lanka denies the use of these weapons and, instead, accuses the LTTE of using white phosphorus.

One of the most categorical denials came from Palitha Kohona, an Australian national who at the time was Secretary of Foreign Affairs and is currently Sri Lanka’s top ranking diplomat to the UN in New York.

In the interview with CNN, Kohona explicitly notes to a question by the anchor, Monita Rajpal, whether the Sri Lankan Army is using cluster bombs,

“I can say categorically that the Army does not use cluster bombs, it does not posses cluster bombs and it does not procure cluster bombs. I say this with authority, because I have… since… hearing the story, I have verified the facts with the procurement committee.”

There have been a number of reports in web media in particular on the use of cluster bombs. Coincidentally, in a report published on 21 March 2012 on Tamilnet.com, which is blocked in Sri Lanka, it is reported that “a container allegedly deployed by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) to carry cluster bomblets has been recovered recently by the de-miners of the humanitarian de-mining agency Halo Trust near a house at Thiruvaiuyaa’ru, 3 km east of Ki’linochchi town”. A PDF copy of the story, which also contains an image of the cluster bomb container, can be seen here. In January 2009, the same website carried images of cluster bombs allegedly dropped by the Sri Lankan Airforce in Mullaitivu. A PDF copy of the story, along with images, can be seen here.

There have also been other media reporting alleging the use of cluster bombs in Sri Lanka. Though is hard to verify the accuracy of a report that appears on Sri Lanka Truth conceding the use of cluster bombs in Sri Lanka sourced from Russia, the UN’s most recent confirmation over the use of cluster bombs also means that the report cannot be dismissed easily.

On 22 April 2009, the Guardian ran a story on the use of cluster bombs in Sri Lanka, which noted that,

Cluster bombs and artillery shelling have killed many civilians at a makeshift hospital within the last strip of Sri Lanka’s coastline still controlled by the Tamil Tigers, a doctor said today. Thangamutha Sathiyamorthy is a doctor working at the hospital in Puttumatalan.

Sathiyamorthy claimed that there had been a number of cluster bomb attacks, one of which killed a doctor, Dr Sivamanokaran, in the temporary hospital at Valayadmadam.

“The hospital yesterday was functioning and the doctor visited that area and there was a blast that is a cluster bomb and so he died in the hospital area,” he said.

In another news report published on IBM Live much earlier, on 4 February 2009, it was reported that,

Cluster bombs have been used in the war in Sri lanka for the first time since the collapse of a Norway-brokered ceasefire in 2007. The bombs were used near a civil hospital in Puthukudiyiruppu. It is not clear if they were used by the Lankan military or the tigers.

The organisation’s spokesperson, Sarasi Wijeratne couldn’t say who fired the shells. But Dr Thurairajah Varatharajah, the top Government health official in the area, said the attacks appeared to have come from the army.

Earlier we spoke to Gorden Weiss, the UN Spokesperson in Colombo who said that cluster bombs have been thrown in the vicinity of the hospital.

Revealingly, the three government doctors who claimed high civilian casualties and the use of cluster bombs by the Sri Lankan Army were rounded up and under duress, forced to retract their submissions. Though widely suspected, it was only after the Wikileaks cables were published that exactly why they contradicted their earlier submissions was confirmed.

Other prominent government spokesmen were more outright in their dismissal of concerns by the international community over the use of cluster bombs. Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha, in February 2009, called those in Amnesty International “lunatics” and their concern over the use of cluster bombs by the Sri Lankan army “rank idiocy”.

Did the Sri Lankan Army use cluster bombs and phosphorus bombs against civilians?, published in September 2010 on Groundviews, translated a lead story published in the Sudar Oli newspaper based on the testimony of one N. Sundermurthi to the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). As we noted at the time, not a single English or Sinhala mainstream print or broadcast media carried this story. Sundermurthi’s testimony notes,

In the final stages of the war, thinking they were attacking the LTTE around Puthumathalan, the Army used cluster bombs and phosphorus bombs against innocent civilians. There were many casualties on account of this. Around 400 to 600 died daily, and around 1,000 were injured.

The LTTE even attacked airplanes that were sent to attack the safe zones. When they counter-attacked, the Army used banned phosphorus and cluster bombs against the LTTE. There were many casualties on account of this. Around 400 – 600 died daily, and around 1,000 were injured. It was a grim situation. After this, amidst incredible hardship, we arrived in areas controlled by the Army.

There are, at the time of writing, 112 comments to this story, and most of the commentators vehemently deny the use of cluster bombs, noting that there is no way Sundermurthi could have known what kind of munitions were used and fired. At the time, Sri Lanka’s top ranking diplomat at permanent mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations at Geneva, and currently Ambassador to France, with accreditation to Spain and Portugal, and Sri Lanka’s Permanent Delegate to UNESCO, Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka first roundly dismissed the report, and then said that the story was Sri Lanka’s equivalent of WMD’s (in Iraq). Another commentator, David Blacker, noted,

The witness’ testimony is quite useless on the point of whether or not cluster bombs and phosphorous was used by the SLAF. The witness merely states as fact that these weapons were used. There is no description of the weapons in action, the detonations or impact, nor of any residue, damage or injury caused. None whatsoever. The witness could just as easily have said that the SLAF used tactical nuclear weapons.

As an aside, artillery units use white phosphorous (WP) shells as marker rounds for forward observers, and often the explosions and residue from these rounds are mistaken for offensive weapons.

Overall… the witness’ statement seems a bit contrived, as if he has been fed a few keywords (DPU, cluster bombs, phosphorous, etc) and is trying to work them into his story. The skeletons he describe probably were from a cemetery having been shelled or bombed. In general, civilian statements on artillery exchanges are often sketchy, with witnesses unable to accurately discern direction, especially at close range.

Given all of this, is it really surprising that no other newspapers bothered with this?

This analysis was backed up by Dr. Jayatilleka. Blacker went on to accuse Groundviews of being a “tabloid” and “sensationalist publication” for republishing in English Sundermurthi’s testimony to the LLRC.

It remains to be seen how the Government will answer the UN’s confirmation, based on its significant technical expertise of dealing with UXOs, that there are in fact unexploded cluster munitions still in and around the Puthukudiyiruppu area. Perhaps because it trusted government reports, that the UN itself was wholly unprepared to deal with unexploded cluster munitions is evident in the leaked UN email. As AP’s Nessman notes,

Poston’s email, dated Tuesday, said mine clearers in Sri Lanka had not been prepared to deal with the bomblets, and are now relying on the experience of deminers who had worked in Lebanon, where Israel used cluster munitions in its 2006 war.

One deminer with experience in Lebanon was asked to clear the area and train other teams in how to handle the bomblets, according to the email. The local mine clearing office is adopting the Lebanon standards, and UNICEF was informed of the need to educate the local population about the dangers of the unexploded munitions, it said.

What new levels of spin, deception, counter-claims, propaganda and hate speech through spokesmen, Ambassadors, advisors and other assorted apologists will the government employ to counter this damning new evidence of what can constitute war crimes by the armed forces? If vehement denials of cluster bomb use by the government turn out to be false, what command chain responsibility implications will it have?

• Did the Sri Lankan Army use cluster bombs and phosphorus bombs against civilians?
• Cluster munitions, inhumane IDP camp conditions and the White Flag incident: More disturbing leaks from UN report
• Government MP Rajiva Wijesinha clarifies allegation against Groundviews
• The desecration of graves in Jaffna: Path to reconciliation?
• Post-war, is the Sri Lankan Army going on a rampage in the North?

Conducting a census is an important activity for any country as the data gathered from it would serve as the foundation for policies, development related activities and future planning of not only government institutions but also non state actors such as academics, development and aid agencies. The idea behind collecting feedback on the 2012 Census in Sri Lanka is to identify the positive and negative aspects of the census, and to encourage discussion on how it can be improved without merely identifying the faults. This year’s census was held after 30 years and covered the entire island. The importance of this census and the data it gathered is obvious to us all. Feedback on Census 2012 was launched in late March. Some initial feedback from people who shared their comments via the site and also via email follow.

Enumeration stage – Enumerators for the Census 2012 underwent a training whereby they were briefed on the questions in the data collection tool and the methodology. Each enumerator was also given a handbook which they could refer to should they have any doubt during the enumeration stage. While there was some positive feedback with regard to the professional manner in which data collectors gathered information from each household, most of the feedback received indicates several flaws in the enumeration stage.

One key issue that was evident from the comments was that it appears that many enumerators have taken the liberty of filling out some of the answers themselves. The census questionnaire is a lengthy one and in a household where there are a lot of people, it would take a fair amount of time. However that is not a valid reason to assume the answers and select an answer on behalf of the people in the household. Not only does it create a bias based on the enumerators own opinion but they could also be filling out the wrong answers.

An example for bias was flagged by an individual whose parents were of two different ethnicities and religions. The enumerator had not asked her what her religion and ethnic group was and instead filled in the same answers as her father’s, when in fact the religion she follows is that of her mother’s. The enumerator assumed that the children’s religion and ethnic group is the same as the father’s and it was only because she was observant that she noticed the enumerator had filled out these two questions on his own that she was able to point out the error.

Another question posed on the Feedback on Census 2012 website was on what questions should have been asked by the census, but were not. One person commented saying that they should have asked about Internet usage. When asked to clarify her point as internet usage was a question that was asked in the census, the answer given by the individual – “I’m sorry, it’s just that our enumerator didn’t ask us where we access the internet from, so I was under the impression that there wasn’t a single question with regard to internet usage. He did ask us about our computer literacy though. He might’ve made an assumption based on that.” – was an interesting one as it highlighted the same issue of the enumerator assuming the answer and not asking the question at all.

There were several people who said that their households were not enumerated at all. This included people who lived in apartment complexes as well. Some households had not been visited at all whereas some had been visited when no one except the domestic worker had been home and afterwards never revisited at a time when everyone was home. While there were articles that ran in the print media that stated that those who have not been visited by a census enumerator should contact their relevant Grama Niladhari officer, it is not a practical option as a) not everyone reads newspapers b) some people do not even know who their GN officer is and therefore would not take the time to personally go meet him or her to provide information. A more realistic approach to ensure that every household is counted would have been to provide enumerators with official printed notes which they could put in a household’s post box or leave with whoever that was at home stating that that household had been visited by a census enumerator and to contact the enumerator using the provided contact details so that a revisit can be made at a time when everyone in the household was at home.

Enumerators did not have to visit the households of people who had opted to fill out the census form online. However a comment made by an individual on the 6^th of April 2012 – “Information was submitted on-line. Hope they received it since no acknowledgement. When I phone them on 24 hr line, the officer answered said it should have been OK. But up to now, no response from the Dept.” – indicates that better monitoring of online submissions should have been in place to ensure that every single household was counted in the census.

Questions that should have been asked – The 2012 census asked a wide range of questions that have not been asked before in Sri Lanka’s census history. From educational qualifications to detailed questions about occupation, disabilities, literacy and household information, the data gathered would give valuable information about Sri Lankans. We asked the public whether they thought there were any questions or sections that should have been included in the 2012 census in order to identify missed opportunities which can hopefully be included in the next census.

One question that several people felt should have been included was a question about number of vehicles and type of vehicles owned by each household. The number of vehicles on the roads increases significantly every year and this has an impact on the traffic, road infrastructure, parking facilities of each city and therefore it would have been useful at a district level or even a DS level to know the number of vehicles to identify what infrastructural gaps would need to be filled in the years to come.

The census 2012 did not include any questions with regard to documentation – whether each individual had a birth certificate and where relevant, a National Identity Card, deeds for land owned by them, marriage certificates and so on. Birth certificates and NICs are the most important documents that an individual should possess and including a section on documentation would have proved to be invaluable to ascertain whether there are particular districts or regions that the state should focus on with regard to setting up or improving existing institutions to ensure a better documentation system of the country’s citizens.

In addition to any comments you may want to leave on Groundviews, please leave your feedback on the Feedback on 2012 census site as well.

• The persuasive power of numbers and the mystery “8.5%” figure
• The Wild Elephant Census in Sri Lanka
• The Prime Minister’s call will exacerbate Horizontal Inequality in Sri Lanka
• Interview with Prof. Kumar David
• Milinda Moragoda’s ‘Right to Information’: A sordid record of its real nature and limits

Photo courtesy  Sampath Wijenayake

It is no secret that many members of the Tamil diaspora are actively involved in helping the victims of the war in Sri Lanka in some way or the other.  There are those who send assistance direct to known or identified victims. There are others who respond to calls from various organisations for funds to help them.  Such organisations are now available in abundance both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

However, only a few of such organisations would be able to render accounts to benefactors on how much they have collected and what amounts have been spent to provide relief and even on what kind of relief or assistance  have provided using their funds.   Occasionally we hear about  organisations that collected monies and  duped gullible sympathisers.   In any case in  most instances the victims are mere receivers of assistance and have no say whatsoever in  deciding the nature, the extent and the kind of assistance they need.  It is in the light of such situations that this suggestion is being made that co-operatives are a better option  to provide relief to uplift war victims in Sri Lanka and make them self reliant.

No talk or write-up on co-operatives will be complete without referring to the famous Rochdale Pioneers of England.  Though they commenced their co-operative activities in the middle of the 19^th century, the principles they enunciated were officially adopted by the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) in 1937 as the Rochdale Principles of Co-operation. These principles were adopted by the ICA in 1966 as  Co-operative Principles.  It is a known fact that after the  devastation of the second world war co-operative societies formed on the basis of these principles played a key role in Sri Lanka and other countries in easing the problems caused to the people following the devastation during the war and the economic  depression that followed the war.   It is in the light of the experience gained during that period that  one has to consider the benefits of co-operatives to help the victims  of the recent war in Sri Lanka.

It would be relevant at this point to mention that there are different  kinds of co-operatives in various parts of the world.  Sri Lanka has a three tier system of apex co-operatives, secondary co-operatives and primary co-operatives.    Primary co-operatives are grass root level societies which can band themselves together and form District Unions or District level societies which in term join and form apex co-operatives at a national level, often referred to as federations of co-operative societies. While the apex societies can link themselves with co-operatives in other countries,  the primary level societies link up persons at the village level who have a common interest.  There are agricultural co-ops, fishermans’ co-ops,  employee’s co-ops, dairy co-ops,  welfare co-ops, thrift and credit co-ops, etc.  These co-operatives are formed in Sri Lanka on the lines set down by the Co-operative Societies Law. The Department of Co-operative Development has the function, among other things, of ensuring that co-operative societies are registered and function according to the law  and their accounts are audited annually.  The Department has Assistant Commissioners in every district and they have a team of the Co-operative Inspectors through whom the Departments functions are carried out.

According to a report issued by the Office of the Governor Northern Province  there are 1359  thrift and credit co-operative societies are functioning in the North.[1]  They happen to be  the largest number of  primary co-operatives functioning in  the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.   Many more such societies which had been functioning before the war may  now be defunct.  Yet these thrift and credit co-operative societies (TCCS) are the best means available now at the grass root level, to channel assistance  to the victims of the war  in those areas. Many of them are already members of these societies.  There is nothing to prevent war victims becoming members of  the TCCS in their areas if they are already not members.  If none exist in their locality,  they could get together and form one.   A few words about the TCCSs, how to form one if there isn’t one nearby,  and,  on how they function,   would enable one to understand why they are considered a better option to channel assistance  to uplift  the victims of the war.

About ten persons  living in a particular area could get together for  the common objective of promoting thrift and savings among its members. They can  pool their meagre  savings into a fund to provide  micro-credit to its members  at  a nominal rate of interest, as decided by the members themselves,  when the need arises. This would make one ask the question, how could  a person who has hardly any income, save. The oft repeated example is that of saving a spoon of sugar or a fistful of rice per day which could be a substantial quantity at the end of a month.   They have to meet at regular intervals, pool what little they have saved,   discuss matters of common interest relating to the objective of the organisation, maintain minutes of the meeting and render accounts at every meeting on the monies collected and loans granted, if any.  Applications for  assistance or loans are considered by the members at their meetings and depending on the availability of resources or funds,  Such applications  are  considered by the members themselves and approved depending on availability of funds and the urgency of the request. Since at least two members should stand surety for any loan granted, it becomes the responsibility of the sureties to ensure that the loan is re-paid  without default as agreed.  For  such a society  to become  a legal body, it has to be registered with the Department of Co-operative Development where the Commissioner is also the Registrar of Co-operative Societies.  The society becomes eligible for registration only if  it  can be  proved that they  have been meeting regularly and have been carrying on the functions of the society informally, at least for a few months,   systematically.   The Department would verify these matters through its officials known as co-operative inspectors.   The request for registration should be based on a motion approved by the members who have also to agree to abide by the by-laws, models of which are available at  the Department.  Additions could be made to the by-laws  if  two thirds of the members so desire.  They could also add to the objectives of the society matters like for what purpose loans could be given and  how they should be recovered in the event of default.  Since only loans are given for specific purposes and no out right grants are given, the capital of the society does not melt away but keeps multiplying as days go by from the savings of its members and any donations they receive.   Once an application for registration is accepted by the department, the society becomes a legal body entitled to own properties, including land, open a bank account with a state bank and take such other measures as may be necessary to secure the funds of its members.  Usually State Banks are obliged to provide loans to such societies at the rate of approximately 20 times the amount  of savings of its members, lying with the bank.   The important point to be noted is that  these societies being legal bodies, they are entitled to receive bigger amounts as deposits by its members or  other amounts that could be donated to the society by well wishers for the uplift of its members.  They function as  mini banks at the grass root level just like the famous Grameen Banks of Bangaladesh.

It should be noted that since 1359 thrift and credit societies are already available  anyone desirous of helping  its members could deal with them straight away.  The necessity to create new societies  may not be an immediate need.

This  provides an opening for  members of the Diaspora to make donations to these societies  with a condition that such funds be used exclusively to grant loans to  members who may have been victims of the war and  who may be in need of assistance to start life afresh by indulging in some income generation  activity or the other.  Since the applications for loans are going to be considered by the members of the society who are living amongst them, they would know better about the feasibility of the venture concerned and the capability of the applicant to indulge in such a venture.  Thus the responsibility for the proper disbursement of the funds rests with their own brethren and not with any higher authority.    As stated earlier, it  is a widely known fact that  many in the diaspora are now involved in providing funds to help war victims.  But often these monies  get expended in projects identified by the  donor or implementing agencies. When  such funds reach a TCCS,  the membership would be held responsible for  the proper management of the funds as they themselves would be  deciding  who should be granted loans (not donations)  for  which income generation activity and whether the applicant’s venture would be feasible.    Once the recovery  commences, fresh loans could be given to others in the waiting list from the amounts that get collected every month.   In other words, a donation provided to the TCCS rotates and assists several  persons instead of getting expended on one person.  While the  management  of the funds are supervised by the membership as a whole and the Co-operative Inspector is obliged to supervise its activities and regularly check the books of these societies to ensure that funds are used only for the approved purposes  and whether  the figures tally with the bank statements.  That way misuse of the funds is minimised and the monitoring of the funds disbursed is done systematically. It should be noted when donations of bigger amounts are made to societies, it is customary for such money to be granted to  a Union of these societies at the District level with a condition that  the donations should be  made available for specified purposes only.  A  memorandum of understanding could be  signed between the organisation that is donating such funds and the District Union concerned .  This would perhaps suffice for the time being to understand how secure the funds  provided to a TCCS to help war victims, could be.   Every district in the North and the East have District Unions of TCCS which are equipped to handle and disburse large amounts of monies to its member societies. Non-governmental organisations are using them for similar purposes.   The Department of Co-operative Development is closely involved in supervising and providing technical assistance to  the District Unions by way of auditing  their accounts regularly and conducting training programmes to members on related topics such as leadership, accounting,  and the management of  societies according to co-operative principles.

A few words on what these co-operative principles are, would be appropriate at this stage. They  are guidelines by which co-operatives should operate and put their values into practice.[2]

1. Voluntary and Open Membership –  Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious discrimination
2. Democratic Control -  Co-operatives are democratic organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their policies and making decisions. Men and women serving as elected representatives are accountable to the membership. In primary co-operatives members have equal voting rights (one member, one vote) and co-operatives at other levels are also organised in a democratic manner.
3. Members economic participation – Members contribute equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-operative. At least part of that capital is usually the common property of the co-operative.
4. Autonomy and independence – Co-operatives are autonomous, self-help organisations controlled by their members. If they enter to agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their co-operative autonomy.
5. Education and Training -  Co-operatives provide education and training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives.
6. Co-operation among co-operatives  -  Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through local, national, regional and international structures.
7. Concern for the community  -  Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of their communities through policies approved by their members.

A few more  questions relating to this matter need to be answered.

a)  One may ask why  it is better to provide assistance to war victims  through TCCSs and not through other co-operatives.  You would have seen that this is one kind of society  which functions at the grassroot level where the members have full control of its activities.  When it is a industrial cooperative, as for instance a fishermen’s society or a  farmer’s society there is always a possibility of larger numbers of members  being involved  and political interference creeping in. With political comes in possibilities of state funds being channelled in.  Along with it comes the taking away of the rights of its members especially on  who should be its beneficiaries and who should have control over the funds. The government has formed an organisation called the   CLCMS Centre for Livelihood Credit Management Services (CLCMS)    which  acts as  viable institution to implement the Government and Provincial Council Policies through accomplishing its mission. [3]    Any society that has received financial assistance from the state  comes within the purview of the CLCMS  which ensures that the policies of the Government are accomplished – and not that of the members of the co-operatives which could be different.  Since the TCCSs have not solicited or opted to receive such funds, they are still free to act independently.

b)  The other question that could arise is how does one reach the war victims through  TCCS.  While there is nothing to prevent a benefactor identifying a TCCS which has a number of war victims in its membership and donating directly to such society,  it would be desirable  for such benefactors in the diaspora  to  find out which of the organisations in their own country are working with  TCCSs in Sri Lanka and provide the fund to that organisation with a specific request to  make the monies available to war victims through TCCSs.   At least two such organisations are known to be working in the North and East by linking up with the District Unions in these regions and channelling funds to their member societies.

c)  The other question that may be asked is,  how safe are the funds so provided. TCCS are expected to conduct all their financial transactions through their bank. So funds should be provided  directly to the bank account of the TCCS concerned after  signing a memorandum of understanding with the society concerned with a condition that copies of the  financial statement of the society  certified by the co-operative department should be provided to the benefactor regularly.  It is a requirement that at every meeting of a TCCS  its financial statement should  presented to the members.  At the end of the year the Auditors of the  Department  of Co-operative Department are obliged to prepare an audit report of the organisation.  So this does not involve extra work and the benefactor could demand a copy ot these statements be sent to them regularly to enable them to  keep track of what is happening to the funds they provide.

d)  The other option benefactors have is to form co-operatives of their own in the respective countries where they reside with the objective of providing help to their brethren back home in Sri Lanka.   Once such a body is formed and is registered under the co-operative laws of their respective countries,  they could avail of the internationally accepted principle of  co-operation between cooperatives and directly link up and work with the co-operatives in Sri Lanka. Besides such a co-operative could be a non-controversial means by which the already divided factions among the Tamils in the diaspora  could be brought together for the common and undisputed objective of helping the victims of the war back home in Sri Lanka.  That would eventually become the best and the most viable means of helping the war victims without any political bias as they would be recognised as a legal,  non-political co-operative institution  in their respective countries.   They would also be able to interact with the other co-operative institutions of different countries too and help to share information on the plight of the people for whose benefit they have formed the co-operative.

Thus it could be seen that helping war victims in Sri Lanka through their TCCSs  is the best option available to ensure that funds provided by interested persons or organisations in the diaspora  could be efficiently and effectively channelled to such victims.  The best thing that could happen to make the diaspora  play a key role in the uplift of the war victims is for them to form co-operatives of their own in their own countries and liaise with the cooperatives in Sri Lanka.

###

The author was formerly an Assistant Commissioner in the Department of Co-operative Development in Sri Lanka.

• Reasons I love Mihin Lanka Airlines…
• Politicizing Aid
• Photos from demonstration against 18th Amendment
• A Wave of Relief
• School admissions

[Editors note: Also read New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka]

Twenty nine disappearances (including an attempted abduction) have been reported in Sri Lankan media between February and March 2012. There have been fifteen in March and fourteen in February. This brings the total number of disappearances reported in the last six months to fifty six.

Nineteen cases were reported while the sessions of the UN Human Rights Council were in progress in Geneva from the 27^th of February to the 23^rd of March 2012.

Out of the twenty nine disappearances in February-March 2012, sixteen of the twenty nine (16/29) appear to have occurred in the Colombo district while eight have been reported from the Northern Province (8/29). Five of those reported from the North are said to be ex-LTTE cadres who had been detained, released from detainment and then abducted. There are also three from the indigenous Wannilaye Aetto (Veddah) community.

Amongst the twenty nine 29 are also two school girls (one of whom escaped) and one university student, businessmen, a Government politician and relatives of politicians and  individuals reportedly to be members  of underworld gangs. Twenty four have been reported as abductions and five are reported as “missing”. Out of the persons who are reported as “missing” are three people from the Veddah community and two people from Jaffna. It was reported that one of the people missing in Jaffna was found dead.

Media reports had presented startling facts about involvement of the government in some of the abductions in March 2012. On 10^th March, Mr. Ravindra Udayashantha, a government politician who is the Chairman of Kolonnawa Pradeshiya Sabawa (local government body in the Colombo district), was saved from being abducted when his political supporters intervened.  The abductors were apprehended by the supporters, were positively identified as being from the Army and handed over to the Police. The number of the vehicle involved in the abduction, the names of the alleged abductors, their photos and even a video clip have been published. However, the abductors were released from police custody afterwards.

On the 26^th of March 2012, former Western provincial councilor Mr. Sagara Senaratne,  brother-in-law of Minister Jeevan Kumaratunga was released within hours of being abducted after the abductors had got “a call” while he was still in the van that he had been abducted in. The driver of Mr. Sagara was a eyewitness to the abduction and it appears that “the call” given to abductors to release Mr. Sagara had come after Mr. Sagara’s driver informed Minister Kumaratunga, who in turn had informed President Mahinda Rajapakse and Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse. Mr. Sagara had claimed that he would not be alive if not for the intervention of the Minister, the President and the Defense Secretary. It is not clear how the Rajapakse brothers and Minister Kumaratunga were able to ensure the release of Mr. Sagara even as he was being taken away by the abductors, without even the involvement of the Police.

In February 2012, Mr. Nethiyas Chandrapala was abducted outside the main court complex in Colombo. Also, in February 2012 Mr. Ramasamy Prabhakaran, a former detainee who had been severely tortured before being released as innocent was abducted two days before the case he had filed against senior police officers was to be taken up in the Supreme Court.

When will we see an end to disappearances in Sri Lanka?

Disappearances in Sri Lanka from Oct. 2011 – March 2012 (based on media reports)

• New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka
• The abduction, assault, arrest and defamation of the Sudar Oli Editor: Questions for the Sri Lankan Government
• Human Rights and Reconciliation Challenged in Dambulla and by Disappearances
• Another abduction in Colombo
• Journalist Pakkiyanathan Vijayashanthan who went missing reported to Badulla Police station

March 3, 2012 marked a very dark ebb in our society as it saw the horrific rape and murder of little Jesudasan Lakshini (13), allegedly at the hands of former EPDP cadre, Kanthasami Jegatheswaran (alias Kiruba) (31), from the Delft Island, Jaffna. Currently being held in remand at the Jaffna Remand Prison, the accused was produced before the Kayts Magistrate this week (30). However, the hearing was further postponed to April 9, 2012, as the Delft Police had failed to conclude their compilation of eye witness statements, said attorney-at-law K.S. Ratnavel, who is appearing on behalf of the victim’s family. The pending statement is the last of four eye witness statements attesting to having witnessed Lakshini being intercepted and taken by the accused on her way to the market, he added. This raises the glaring question as to why the Police was unable to obtain a mere four eye witness statements in the course of almost a month following this incident, unless of course exterior political forces are in play.

The Acting OIC of the Delft Police, SI W.P. Mendis said that the accused was first produced before the Kayts Magistrate Court on March 16, 2012, following which he was ordered to be remanded at the Jaffna Prison till his next court date on March 30, 2012, where both this case, and a previous allegation against him, would be taken up. “Just three months ago, the accused had held a young girl at gun (“plastic” pistol) point in Delft, in an attempt to intimidate and rape her. Following this incident, he was ordered by the Kayts Magistrate to sign in at the Delft Police Station on a daily basis until further notice. He was doing this until the day before the rape and murder of Lakshini.” Why an alleged attempted rapist is allowed back into the community with as little as a “wrap on the knuckles” is quite telling of the political influence the accused seems to be wielding. If instead, he had been subject to due process, Lakshini might still have been alive today.

Furthermore, villagers claim that the pistol had been in fact real and not plastic as mentioned above. If this were true, it raises two grave issues; 1.why is it that the State is yet to carry out a nation-wide disarmament programme of all former paramilitary cadres, e.g. EPDP, TMVP, PLOT etc., and 2. How is it that an armed ex-cadre can walk about freely, brandishing arms at will, within an island fully controlled by the Sri Lanka Navy? Villagers said, that it was only after they made complained about this incident to the Navy, that the Police had arrested him and produced him before the Kayts Magistrate.

The Police have also made a request to the Magistrate, for a blood sample from the accused, to be sent to Colombo for DNA testing. Having collected the sample, the Police have sent it through one of their officers to Genetech, Colombo, for testing this week (March 19).

Having visited Lakshini, a student of Neduntheevu Maha Vidyalayam’s bereaved family last week, a Jaffna –based local organization shared the following details with me.

Delft, being home to approximately 1500-2000 people now, is quite obviously a close-knit community, much like any other small town. However, the Kachchatheevu Feast (St. Anthony’s Church Feast), which is of great religious significance to Christians having drawn over 5000 devotees this year, resulted in Delft being almost deserted at the time Lakshini met with her brutal end.  Lakshini had left home for the fish market at about 8am on that fateful day, with the 100 rupee note her mother had given her to buy fish, clasped in her hand. Later that day, when she hadn’t yet returned home, her family and relations had started to search for her in their neighbourhood. “My relatives saw my child (Lakshini) being picked up by Jegatheswaran (the alleged perpetrator) whilst she was on her way to the fish market. He had told her to come with him that he would get her some fish, as fish was unavailable at the market that day. He was the one who killed my daughter,” said Lakshini’s distraught mother.

The Police was notified about this incident by woman from the village who had discovered Lakshini’s body on her way to chop firewood. “We found Lakshini’s half naked body, lying face down at a bare land approximately 30Ms down a little lane nearby the Pillaiyar Temple, at the 10^th Region of Delft. She was only wearing her Shalwar top, as her trousers had been removed, and she had received multiple injuries to her head. A bicycle, an empty bottle of Arrack (quarter pint), a 100 rupee note and a few coins, and a large stone were found alongside the body of the victim,” elaborated the Delft Police.  As the Kayts Magistrate was due to arrive from Kayts the next day, to initiate an enquiry into her death, villagers had stood guard over her body until the judge arrived to the scene. The Post Mortem Report stated that the child had been raped and later killed as a result of having her head smashed by a rock.

 “I lost my dearest daughter Lakshini. I can’t believe he did this to my daughter. I heard that there was a bottle of alcohol near her body, and that her dress was all disheveled. The money she had been given to buy the fish too was still there on the ground next to her, and her head had been severely injured. I was also told that he had attempted to strangle her. I simply cannot bear the loss of my daughter,” lamented Lakshini’s father tearfully.

As this was not the first incident of assault/abuse of girls in the area that Jegatheswaran has been accused of, on discovering Lakshini’s body, the villagers had stormed into his house, dragged him out onto the street, and started beating him up. Eventually, the Navy had intervened and handed him over to the Delft Police.

Villagers said that Jegatheswaran had  been former EPDP Commander, Napoleon’s right hand man, and also a suspect in the murder of Jaffna based Journalist Mylvaganam Nimalrajan. In addition to the two above mentioned cases, villagers claimed that he had also attempted to abuse two other young girls, a mere two days prior to this incident. The villagers are enraged at the inaction of the Police, even after having lodged multiple complaints against the perpetrator, and are therefore convinced that it is as a result of some political influence that he was released by the Police, thus enabling him to carry out this heinous crime.

“The Accused has only studied till Grade 5, and is from Manipay. He used to sell newspapers for the EPDP in Jaffna during the war. As he had not returned the proceeds from newspaper sales to the EPDP, they had punished him by making him work for their office in Delft. He eventually married a young girl from Delft. We have come under fire by certain parties claiming that we’re not taking any action against him, because of his political affiliation, but this is completely untrue. Not only is he no longer a member of the EPDP, but we also don’t care what party/faction he belongs to, we will do our job regardless of his affiliations,” emphasized SI Mendis.       

It is very rarely that you get to witness the people of Delft go up in arms against any authorities, as they have been under the complete control of the Navy and the EPDP. However, this time they decided to take matters into their own hands, as so they took to the streets demanding that Jegatheswaran must not be permitted to escape and must be incriminated according to the law. “Let us punish him! We want justice! The murderer needs to be severely punished,” is what the people are said to have chanted outside the Police station that day. Angry villagers had also had confrontations with the Police and EPDP members, demanding justice.

Villagers had entered the premises of the EPDP Office in Delft, and demonstrated outside the entrance, at which point many party members had fled the scene. The people had pointed to the fact that Jegatheswaran was a member of the EPDP, and that as a result should not escape from being punished for his crimes. People are demanding that justice be served and the perpetrator receive the maximum punishment.

The Jaffna-based Tamil Daily, Uthayan Newspaper reported the following comments from TNA MP S. Sritharan. “The punishment meted out to this murderer should act as an example and put fear into the hearts of all other such perpetrators. Incidence of sexual abuse seem to be on the rise in the North, with 140 children having been abused in the Northern Province to date. The accused having committed such a crime whilst being a member of a Tamil political party in Delft which is also under the control of the Navy and the Army, is a complete violation of the people’s rights; the very rights he has a duty to protect and uphold.  So, stringent action must be taken by both the Court and the Police this time, so as to ensure that he doesn’t get away. The islands have been under the control of the Navy for more than 20 years, making it that much more unacceptable that an armed man is permitted to freely walk their streets abusing children,” he added.

(Authors note: A much shorter version of this article appeared in The Sunday Times, 1 April 2012)

• Robberies Increase In Jaffna
• 3 years after the end of war: Official statements vs. reality
• Analysis of how Jaffna voted and why the EPDP feels defeated in Sri Lanka’s first post-war elections
• 42 People Surrender at Jaffna Human Rights Commission
• Disappearance

Introduction

Newly initiated development projects in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in post-war Sri Lanka are expected to open new avenues towards ethnic reconciliation, as proclaimed not only by government media but also by the mainstream development scholarship. However, this popular perception about opening up new avenues for reconciliation through development seems to foreclose certain barriers and obstructions existing within the so called development highway itself, especially with regard to ethnic minorities. To understand the possible political and other forms of repercussion of the currently existing development-community encounter, one should turn one’s ears not only to the subject-agents of the development discourse but also to those who are subjected to the development industry, considering the fact that the subalterns also are involved in creating meanings (or counter-articulate the dominant discourse, as Laclauian discourse analysts would suggest) in their own way. This piece explores the ways in which the local communities in the Northern fishing villages receive the messages enunciated by the dominant or official discourse of development and counter-articulate meanings in a different, competing manner and the ways in which this community-development encounter would affect the wider problem of post-war ethnic and social reconciliation.

Jaffna’s fishing industry

The Fishing industry, being one of the main sources of livelihood of a large number of people in the Jaffna Peninsula, happens to be a sector that was severely affected by the thirty years ethnic civil war. Before the war, Jaffna was the largest fishing production district and contributed about 48,000 metric tons per year comprising almost one fourth of the total production of the country.  However, this significantly developed fishing industry was  severely affected by the war. “While the Jaffna District alone provided 20-25% of the total fish production in Sri Lanka before 1983, its contribution was reduced to 3-5% by the end of the third Eelam war.” The annual fish production in the District numbered around 2000 metric tons during the war. Although this got recovered to some extent in two years after the war, it is far from pre-war levels.

Current Problems and Challenges

Many problems regarding the fishing industry in the North in many ways related to the militarization that was strengthened during the last phase of the war but not completely relaxed even after the end of the war. For instance, some coastal areas, which are very significant to fishing, still remains as High Security Zones (HSZ); and therefore fishermen are banned from engaging in their livelihood activities in those areas; in many areas, fishermen were allowed to go to sea only within a permitted corridor, and even for that they had to get passes from military forces. Currently, although some of those restrictions have been removed or relaxed in some coastal areas, the Northern fishing community, CBO leaders and civil society representatives remain concerned about the continuing stringent security arrangements even after two years after the end of war, in the areas where Northern fishermen used to do their livelihood activities.

Although the authorities are claiming that the situation in the Northern Province has largely been normalized in terms of de-militarization, this claim was highly contested by the special situation report on the Northern and Eastern Provinces presented to parliament by M.A Sumanthiran, a TNA parliamentarian on October, 21, 2011. The report explains the situation of the fishing industry in Jaffna within a militarized context, as follows,

Severe restrictions are placed on members of Tamil fishing communities, resulting in a drastic impact on their means of livelihood. The report tabled by me in July of this year detailed the restrictions placed on members of the fishing community in Mullaitivu, especially in the areas of Kokkilaai to Chundikkulam in Kilaakaththai, Maathirikkiraama, Uppumaaveli, Thoondai, Alambil, Semmalai, Naayaaru, Kokkuththoduvaai, and Karunaattukkernee. These restrictions are still in place and of serious concern is the fact that several Sinhala fishermen in the area have received direct permission to fish in this area from the Ministry of Defence.

Apart from the militarization, Jaffna based researchers and civil society members highlight a series of other issues related to the development of fishing industry in the region. These  issues include illegal fishing in the Sri Lankan waters by Indian fishermen, which is popularly known as ‘Indian Trawler’ issue. Other contentious issues include an increasing number of seasonal fishing in Northern and Eastern regions by Southern fishermen; illegal fishing methods used by Indian and Southern fishermen that has negative impacts on resources; lack of sophisticated boats that are essential for deep sea fishing; lack of stock assessment; specific problems in the island areas like transport problems and dependency on big mudalalies who have political patronage; lack of infrastructure facilities; institutional support and insurance facilities etc.

Potholes, Checkpoints and Cattle in the Development Highway

Although recently initiated development projects in the Northern Province have addressed some of the issues discussed in the preceding part of this article, they have not contributed to make a significant breakthrough. Structural problems that barricade the development of the fishing industry such as regional disparity, dependency relations, political patronage structures and related socio-economic issues remain to date. On the contrary, sometimes, these development initiatives seem to contribute towards furthering of some of these issues. For instance, the merchants from the Southern Provinces who have coolers, sophisticated techniques and market networks are now being facilitated to come along the ‘development highway’ into the Northern fish market, to strengthen their dominance over the Northern competitors, whilst the perceptions of the Northern fishing community over this new development is not yet publicly heard. Some sectors of the Jaffna civil society members expressed their feelings on this aspect of regional disparity in the highly propagated post-war development, by comparing and contrasting the current situation with the ‘good old days’ of the Jaffna fishing industry. Signs of uneven development between North and South become apparent by the way Southern fishermen get all the advantages in the competition for limited resources in the sea because of their technological and economic advancement.

Fishing and Development

The fishing industry which is a large source of livelihood in the Peninsula, seems not to get its due prominence in the government’s development agenda, although there is wide expectation that the fishing communities stand to reap benefits from the ending of the war and the post-war development activities. Government representatives especially highlight the significance of these general infrastructure developments such as transport facilities. They emphasize the fact that newly constructed Mannar Bridge and Kallady Bridge and road developments in the coastal areas have benefited the fishing communities and encouraged merchants in other areas to expand their market relationships to Jaffna.

Special initiatives with regard to fishing sector are also in the pipeline. They include opening up of a new office for fisheries-related issues named District Fisheries Exchange Office; distribution of some equipments; establishment of new fishing villages under the post-war resettlement programme; introduction of new laws regarding illegal fishing methods etc.

However, a different form of articulation of a ‘development discourse’ can be observed when one listens to the fishermen in the Northern Province. Many of them interviewed for this study said that although the government has performed erratic development activities those activities don’t address concerns of fishing communities.  The Northern fishermen do not go to the South for seasonal fishing, basically owing to their lack of resources and technological capacity required. It can also be observed that they sometimes tend to perceive this in ethnic terms. There were some allegations that especially in Manner area Southern fishers are supported by military forces. Some fishermen in Karainagar explained the negative impact of the Southern fishers’ arrival to the North. The low income categories were mostly affected by some environmentally harmful methods used by them such as blasting of shells; using cylinders to catch conches and using ‘small eye nets’ to capture prawns by the fishermen coming from Negombo, Beruwala and Matara areas. A community leader claimed that “if this happens in their areas, the government’s response would have been different. But here they are able to destroy our resources, without facing to any charge.”

Periphery within periphery: patronage strengthened

In the case of the current development initiative in the Northern Province, it can clearly be observed that some dependency structures supported by relations of political patronage are being reinforced and strengthened. The situation in the island area in the Jaffna peninsula, which can be considered as a periphery within a periphery, both in geographical and in socio-economic terms, provides a fine example for this. Many islands do not have roads to link with the mainland and therefore the fishing communities are depended on businessmen who own transport facilities and linkages with the market in the mainland. For a long time, a large number of poor fishing families have been exploited by this economic dependency structures, against the background that they all are become debtors to a few businessmen who could control the market and transport facilities.

These dependency structures facilitated by political patronage have significantly developed in the island region during the period of the war because of certain strategic reasons in the area.

To make development really affective on a community, there needs to be a broader approach for addressing not merely the minor technical issues, but more structural issues as explained above.

Concluding Remark

The case of the fishing industry in the Jaffna Peninsula suggests that the current development strategy can reinforce and reproduce some existing social hierarchies, power relations and suppressions among people in the war affected areas. The manner in which post-war development is being framed by mainstream nationalism strengthens uneven development among different ethnic communities that would lead to more tension amongst inhabitants in the war affected areas. In other words, against the popular belief that development is the solution to the ethnic problem, a politically articulated discourse of development can also fuel the conflict, by unevenly distributing the benefits of economic growth among different ethnic communities.

###

This essay is part of a series on the theme of post war reconciliation, justice and development initiated by the International Center for Ethnic Studies, (ICES). Colombo. The views expressed are the author’s own and does not necessarily represent the views of the ICES.

• LLRC submission: The Citizens’ Commission on the Expulsion of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in October 1990
• Life in Udappu, a traditional Tamil fishing hamlet – Photo story
• Marketing a troubled land: War, peace and tourism in Sri Lanka
• Ground realities in Jaffna and its environs: Two key perspectives
• Prices Improve In Jaffna

Photo courtesy Vikalpa, from protest against US resolution in Colombo, 27 February 2012

The US-sponsored resolution at the UNHRC had to be defeated. It was not. 24 in favour, 15 against, 8 abstained. Hearts are broken, glasses are shattered, the ‘gods’ have ignored our prayers, there is madness surrounding us; 2012, we are now sure, is when the world comes to an end.

But that was yesterday. Today, the morning after, is once again cold; we need to pick up the pieces, mend our hearts, move on. And there are questions too: what is this resolution? How did we perform? Is it all India’s fault? Where did we go wrong? Are we to be blamed? What now?

Resolution L.2: From US, with love

The resolution titled ‘Promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka’ has, during the process of the UNHRC session, undergone considerable change. From being an intrusive and arrogant one sponsored by the US, it now appears rather soft, innocent and caring. The US troops will not be in Sri Lanka tomorrow, no travel or trade embargoes are imposed. The object and purpose is to get the recommendations of the LLRC implemented.

But resolutions, like many other documents, can be interpreted differently. The manner in which it is interpreted depends on the interpreter’s own political predilections. There are numerous objects and purposes; some which are mentioned, some which are not. Interpretations change over time. And that is why all or most interpretations offered today have the potential of appearing to be accurate, or will prove to be accurate, in the future.

For instance, to make the resolution appear soft, the US and other promoters of the resolution can highlight the point that it is only about the implementation of the LLRC recommendations. They can stress in this regard, that they welcome the constructive recommendations of the LLRC, that technical assistance is to be provided “in consultation with, and with the concurrence of” the Sri Lankan Government; that its all about requests and encouragement, etc; that there is nothing intrusive, sovereignty is therefore not violated. There is love.

But others would dispute this. There’s another interpretation which states; that there is no mention of the LTTE which is astounding; that some recommendations are being termed ‘constructive’ because the sponsors have also included their own ‘constructive’ recommendations in place of the not-so-constructive recommendations of the LLRC; that it further internationalizes internal affairs of the State by reference to, for example, provincial-level devolution; that the phrase “requests the Office of the High Commissioner to present a report on the provision of such assistance to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-second session” implies in practice, assistance will need to be obtained; that it is not only about implementing the recommendations but also about taking “additional steps to address alleged violations of international law.”  This kind of interpretation, certain elements within the liberal camp would say, is pure nonsense.

But why is it not? Why do both interpretations seem accurate? Why and how can the former interpretation slide towards the latter, and the latter, in turn, appear to be the accurate one?

It is simply because the latter is, firstly, what the promoters of the resolution do not stress in their interpretations. It is the other half of the ‘truth’. Secondly, it is because the latter interpretation is that which will be adopted if the Government does not implement the LLRC recommendations. Promoters of the resolution will find it difficult to stick to the former interpretation if no action is taken; and with that the entire appearance of the resolution, its object and purpose, will begin to change. And with that change will come the following reminder: that the resolution did note “with concern that the [LLRC] report does not adequately address serious allegations of violations of international law.” The gentle touch and caress now feels like a punch; love turns into agony.

All this is not difficult to understand, of course. It is just that admitting the above makes the promotion of the resolution difficult. But also, this is where the politics of human rights, and the politics of the US, come into play. My point here is not an endorsement of the entirety of the observation made by the SL Representative in Geneva, that: the resolution “reflects a blatant case of politicization that takes the Council hostage to the hidden agendas of the mighty.” The UNHRC, being an inter-State body, is obviously political, and as Professor Makau Mutua once questioned at the American Society of International Law: “How can you politicize that which is political?” It is obvious.

Rather, my argument is that it is necessary to understand that there are “hidden agendas” (and of course, all actors have hidden agendas) of the “mighty” the US. States such as the US have better things to do, than to run around the UNHRC to obtain votes from this or that country to get a resolution passed. And when a super-power such as the US and its allies introduce such a resolution and canvass support, they sure know what they are up to (and up against), diplomatically, politically and even legally.

So there needs to be a more holistic appreciation of the politics underlying the adoption of the resolution. It is said to be a first step towards reconciliation; it is also a first step towards other things unmentioned and unmentionable. In other words: there is love, but it’s not unconditional love.

And yet, to conclude: the challenge is to move on, and that second type of interpretation mentioned above need not worry a Government too much if there is a genuine willingness to implement the LLRC-recommendations.

Performing at the UNHRC

We all know that the UNHRC is about human rights (also, human rights formalism), about international law, about bureaucracy, rules, regulations, procedures and technicalities. But it is far more interesting too. The UNHRC is also about politics, about feelings, about anger and frustration, about the ‘West’, the ‘Third World’, about drama and performance. Like all UN bodies, the UNHRC is a grand stage. It is where the language of international law and human rights is craftily used by actors to articulate their myriad grievances; where the beautiful hypocrisy of actors is played out; where we imagine that human rights problems get resolved; where performance does matter. But unlike in 2009 (Geneva-I), ‘performance’ was not Sri Lanka’s strong point in 2012.

At times, grand theoretical expositions are unnecessary to detect and understand the underlying problems of a country, its diplomatic approach or its foreign policy. What Sri Lanka’s diplomatic approach is, what its image is, where Sri Lanka wants to go and where it is going – are questions for which answers were provided in those few minutes during which Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe spoke. Where, for instance, was the Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in Geneva? Instead, why so many local politicians and Parliamentarians? A Minister leading the way, a not-so-comfortable looking Foreign Minister behind him, an accused Minister close by, a former Attorney General to the left, and a couple of more politicians in front: a sight which does absolutely nothing in terms of changing the attitude and foreign policies of other countries (at least in a positive or pro-Sri Lankan way, and that too, just minutes before the vote was taken); a sight which doesn’t inspire confidence.

And of course, this told us what we had known already: about the lack of autonomy, and perhaps influence, wielded by those who are meant to conduct matters of foreign policy in the diplomatic arena; the utter waste of resources given the futile presence of so many politicians in Geneva, not to forget the sheer waste of their time; also, the irresponsibility and the disregard shown for accountability in including certain individuals accused of crimes and with that, the inability and unwillingness to understand how strategically and diplomatically counter-productive it is to include them in delegations to the UNHRC, especially when matters of human rights and the implementation of the LLRC-recommendations are being discussed.

What of the message? Of course, given that the UNHRC is a stage, ‘mega-phone’ diplomacy is not essentially bad if the big and powerful have difficulty in listening to and respecting the concerns of the small and the weak. But much depends not on ‘sound’ alone, but substance too. And in this regard, what Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe had to say did sound unfortunate at times: it almost implied that there will be no reconciliation in Sri Lanka if the resolution is adopted. As he said: “This resolution if adopted will not add value to the implementation process in Sri Lanka; on the contrary, it may well be counter-productive and, as such, those who have been using extreme pressure tactics in garnering support for this ill-timed and unwarranted initiative should be mindful of the responsibility that accompanies it.”

It was also said: “If this proposed intrusion is accepted by this Council, no domestic process would be free to deliver on its mandate unimpeded. Instead, a superimposition of an external mechanism would become the order of the day.” While external mechanisms should not become the order of the day, the problem here is that Sri Lanka has institutions which have not freely delivered for quite sometime. More importantly, that ability to deliver freely has been retarded by certain legal and constitutional developments that took place after May 2009.

Tackling ‘Incredible India’: SL foreign/domestic policy

Geneva-II was also about votes, numbers and mathematical calculations. The way the members voted, their reasons for voting for, against or abstaining, are known. In all this, India did have a major role to play. And in ‘post-Geneva II’, Sri Lanka confronts some significant questions which reaffirm the importance of understanding that inextricable relationship between domestic and foreign policy.

One such question is the ‘Indian factor’; strengthening ties with India. Much depends on how we perceive India now, its role in the region and the wider world, its past and present, and our willingness to understand that not all actors are either black or white.

To begin with, the capitulation was significant. Pressured by Tamil Nadu, India went from being a country which was against country-specific resolutions to supporting a country-specific resolution. The structure of political argument, between India and Sri Lanka, now becomes fascinating. Sri Lanka thinks that India voted against her; India states that it was in fact a vote in support of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka, before the vote, stated that India is a responsible member and will vote accordingly given their understanding of the ancient and historical ties; India has now voted (the way responsible members do!) and having done so informs in turn, that Sri Lanka understands why India did so given their long and traditional relationship. Coalition partners of the Sri Lankan Government state that India’s support for the resolution contradicts its (India’s) own foreign policy; but India can reply that it is India’s business to decide what her foreign policy is after all.

How then do we proceed?

There is a lot of anti-Indian sentiment generated everywhere. That cannot be prevented easily. Already, demands have been made by local politicians to re-think the nature of Sri Lanka’s economic ties with India. India, people will not forget, is well capable of making life ‘difficult’ for Sri Lanka, as history will teach you. There is of course the language of diplomacy: Sri Lanka and India are the best of friends; we are like brothers; ours is a historic relationship; it is a special understanding, a very unique relationship, etc, etc. And yet, India is no innocent bystander.

But playing the ‘China-card’ will not always ensure success. India is a geopolitical reality. A balance needs to be struck. As the late Lakshman Kadirgamar once stated: “… ideally the Tamil question within our polity should be so managed as to preclude the need for Indian concern, far less involvement. However, it would be wholly unrealistic for anyone to claim that under no circumstances could India have a legitimate concern with the management of certain aspects of our internal affairs” (Speech delivered at the Hindustan Leadership Seminar, Dec., 2003).

If then, there is a need to understand not only the complexity of SL-India ties, but the very complexity that is ‘India’; its own secessionist problems; the ‘Tamil Nadu factor’; India’s own strategic objectives, such as gaining membership in a restructured and reformed UN Security Council; about how such geopolitical goals bring India and US closer; and how that partnership, in turn, affects SL-India, and SL-US ties, etc.

Along with that, what also needs to be appreciated is the fact that India is not only capable of making life ‘difficult’ for the Sri Lankan Government, but also, making it ‘comfortable’; as it did in numerous ways during the last stages of the war, and especially diplomatically, especially in Geneva, 2009. That relationship which was strengthened during the last stages of the war, well harnessed and further developed in Geneva-2009 (we remember the support of the Indian Representative in Geneva even after the Special Session concluded) should not have been undermined.

And this latter kind of external relationship can only be maintained if internal policies within Sri Lanka are geared towards addressing the questions of power-sharing and the protection of the rights of Tamil people, especially in the North and the East, in a more sincere and serious manner. Sri Lanka either has to ensure that the political promises made to India are kept [especially regarding the implementation of the 13th Amendment – see, for instance, the ANI report, ‘India feels Lanka has done very little on devolution of power’, 24 March, 2012], or that it is able to move forward peacefully, with sincerity and determination, especially with the Tamil political parties and the TNA, in terms of devising a mechanism of power-sharing which is autochthonous. There are decisions here which Sri Lanka is unwilling to make.

India, then, is neither our best friend nor our worst enemy. Thinking of India in such extreme ways obfuscates the complexities surrounding inter-State relationships, and unnecessarily simplifies the challenge of foreign policy making too. Today, ‘nonalignment’ does not mean that India will always be with Sri Lanka (and against the West) on every conceivable diplomatic and political problem Sri Lanka confronts. That was the old way of thinking. Even the very term ‘nonalignment’, as the former Indian diplomat and politician Mani Shankar Aiyar (MSA) has stated, “was appropriate to a world characterized chiefly by the wooing of the rival superpowers to align with one or the other of their blocs” (MSA, A Time of Transition, p. 257). But after the Cold-War, relationships became much more fluid, much more complex; with such changes, ‘nonalignment’ ceases to become a simple question of voting for or against a State.

Political maturity

In addition, the current situation also demands more maturity in terms of assessing Sri Lanka’s diplomatic debacles.

It is, today, a popular argument (made by the SL Foreign Minister, for example) that Sri Lanka had the support of 23 members (i.e. including the 8 abstentions) of the UNHRC. Spin is fine, and is to be expected from all Governments. But where does this kind of spin take us?

Minister GL Peiris argues, for instance, that an abstention amounts to a vote against the resolution. But of course, the same argument can be raised by the opposing party. The US too has the right to claim that an abstention amounts to a vote for the resolution.

But this argument gets more dangerous, and ignores history. If Sri Lanka is pleased with the current performance, how much more pleased should we be with the result in 2009? To put it differently, how much more worrying should the current performance be, when compared with the solid and overwhelming majority Sri Lanka gained in 2009?

And, in proclaiming that Sri Lanka fought with the US (but didn’t it do the same in 2009?) and got the support of 23 members, the SL Foreign Minister ignores (or forgets) that there has been a serious nosedive from 35 (29 + 6 in 2009, following the logic of Minister Peiris) to 23; forgetfulness or ignorance which is quite dangerous, as it fails to appreciate the kind of degeneration that Sri Lanka’s vote-base at the UNHRC has undergone over the relatively short span of three years. And if this degeneration is not taken seriously, not much effort will be made to mend our own policies and re-build relations with other States.

Security 

Closer to home, there are more problems. There is the continuous labeling of the critic, journalist or human rights activist as ‘LTTE-agent’, ‘Tiger’, ‘terrorist’, ‘separatist’ or ‘traitor’. It is not a novel development, but it takes a far more dangerous twist now with the adoption of the resolution. Also, the time has come when we are exposed to the sight of mad politicians who make public utterances which amount to direct and indirect threats to the lives of journalists and human rights activists. It is highly questionable whether the Government is concerned about such developments. Given the dangerous nature of these threats and the manner in which they seem to be receiving the approval of the public (did we not hear people applauding Minister Mervyn Silva?), the mere condemnation of these utterances and open threats is wholly inadequate.

Debate, argument, and political rivalry are essential and are to be celebrated. But in this case, all this turns dangerous and deadly when critics of a Government who call for accountability, human rights protection and devolution are conveniently labeled and transformed into ‘traitors’ and ‘separatists’. Every criticism becomes a criticism of the State, every critic an enemy of the State; no amount of statements made by such a critic in favour of the need to build a plural, democratic and united Sri Lanka seems convincing to the regime if such an advocate also demands accountability and/or devolution. In such a context, even the rejection of all forms of violence (as Parliamentarian MA Sumanthiran has commendably done, in critiquing the armed forces and the LTTE: ‘TNA faults both govt. and LTTE’, Daily Mirror, 21 March, 2012) might not be enough to satisfy the regime. Geneva or no Geneva, the challenge of securing a more tolerant democracy seems to be a gargantuan task.

Moving on

The UNHRC in Geneva may be a place for the great matters of law, human rights, and justice. But it is also a place that makes us feel human; a place for politics, passions, love and joy, agony and tears. It is a place which gives those of us far away (and would you not agree?) that moment to switch on our computers, to watch the live webcast, to have that drink, to shout whatever we liked at those we saw on our screens. And we do this, not because we are less concerned about peace and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Rather, it is because we know that peace will not come with the beginning or the end of some UNHRC-session, far away in Geneva.

If then, reality should set in. The morning after is as cold as the day before. And after yet another UNHRC-session, we are back to where we were. But then, perhaps before leaving, we might need to answer one more question: we talk about victories and defeat, but who really won or lost in Geneva? It is here then that all those who are less-forgiving would need to engage in the politics of re-imagination. The task is to re-imagine, or better still, to recognize that Geneva is where we all win and lose, and that in every victory there is something to be lost, and that in every defeat, there is something to be won, too. Because after all, we need to be there for each other if progress is to be made. At the moment, we are against ourselves. And that has to be changed.

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• Sri Lanka and its ‘Geneva-problem’
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• GENEVA-II & FOUR-LEGGED FURNITURE
• Restoring Government in Sri Lanka

their names and photographs,
inciting fears of death
squads preparing to drive
white vans to their residences.

The warning by the UN Human
Rights Commissioner to protect
witnesses is welcome, quixotic.
How will her office stop disappearances

when government has rejected
the resolution, said it will push back
reconciliation, which I presume to mean
more islanders vanished, bloodshed,

people living in fear and loathing,
keeping quiet or moving out,
accompanied to the airport
by diplomats from a friendly mission,

leaving their homes to caretakers,
a new life abroad for champions
of human rights at home? And
for those who stay, negotiating

protections, waiting for
a post- midnight call
by an elite team of assassins,
like the ones who shot

prisoners at Nandikadal,
stopping motorbikes
in the intersection
to beat Lasantha to death,

dressed in black with black
glasses, or as drivers
of white vans, in assorted
civilian garb, ordinary

people working
a second job at night,
disappearing themselves
into the morning rush.

• At Your Service
• The day after tomorrow
• Dial a White Van for a pest-free life!
• Students Missing In Jaffna
• A question Sri Lanka’s leaders keep dodging: Where are the disappeared?

Photo courtesy JDS/Guy Calaf, Agence France-Presse​

By the time this article is published, the votes on the hotly-contested UN Human Rights Council resolution on Sri Lanka will have been cast and counted.  I am writing this as the debate over the resolutions is taking place in Geneva, and I find myself wondering if the outcome will be meaningful for the lives of hundreds of thousands of victims of our 30 year war.  Don’t get me wrong – I recognise the significance of the UNHRC resolution in terms of its moral and political symbolism, and that it may have profound implications for the Sri Lankan state’s position within the field of geopolitics and international relations.  I know that it will very likely impact the course of Sri Lanka’s national politics – even if I can’t anticipate the precise consequences.  Whilst I’d like to hope that the outcome of the UNHRC vote could lead to the harm and hurts of decades of violence being addressed in a meaningful and effective way, something inside me tells me not to kid myself.  Not wanting to to be heretical, I simply cannot bring myself to have much faith that the UNHRC resolution vote, regardless of the outcome, will make much difference to the lives of people who have been deeply marked by the conflict.

Much of the debate around the current showdown in Geneva has claimed that what is at stake is Truth, Justice and Reconciliation.  Over the past months, I have become increasingly sceptical that a process of international reckoning anchored in Geneva or a process of national reckoning such as the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission process are capable of delivering – even under the best conditions and with sincere efforts – what is desired from them in terms of this holy trinity.  I feel that these are blunt, bureaucratic instruments that are unlikely to produce the sort of truth, justice or reconciliation that is needed by those who are most entitled to it – the thousands upon thousands of us who have suffered direct losses and harm from the war. And they probably cannot really deliver it for the rest of us either.  Instead, I have come to believe that the path to a better kind of peace requires a different sort of approach – one that is deeply personal even as it must engage with the experiences of others.  It is probably something that requires honest and difficult processes for each of us.

Truth
In the past year, public debate about the facts of what happened during the final months of the war has been dominated by commentary on the details of (and even more often on the ‘vested interests’ ascribed to) the  Report of the Expert Panel to the UN Secretary General, the subsequent report of the GoSL Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission’s report, and two high-profile documentaries from Channel 4 in the UK.

I chose not to watch Channel 4′s first ‘Killing Fields’ documentary when it came out in 2011.   I had been inside Menik Farm at the end of the war, and talked with people who survived the ordeal of the final months of warfare.  I had been with the relatives of those who did not escape the violence. What I saw and heard was enough for a lifetime. But what I learned was also messy, complex and inchoate.  The stories were fragmented; they occasionally contradicted each other and were sometime silent on the most difficult events; and of course they changed in small but important ways as time passed. These stories defied compilation, summarising, reduction, and in some cases even communication.  Still, by coming to know the people who told them, I came to hold inside me a mosaic of undeniable visceral truths about what took place in the hell into which over over 300,000 people had been cast.  I doubted that Channel 4 could reveal to me new horrors that I had not already felt.  The subsequent detailed debates in the media and in my social circles about the content and authenticity of the ‘Killing Fields’ documentary rendered my refusal to watch somewhat irrelevant – but seemed to confirm my judgement.

I was, however, struck by two things.  The first obvious issue was how the public discourse shifted so quickly from consideration of what had happened in the Vanni to a debate on the provenance of the footage – the images were shocking, but were they real?  The second was a more serious observation – that the controversy about the legitimacy of the documentary produced in the UK had completely eclipsed the reality that within several hours journey from anywhere in Sri Lanka you could actually meet thousands of people who had been through the events depicted, who had witnessed atrocities, who could vouch for losses they had experienced personally and were still suffering the effects of.

The two subsequent reports by the panel of UN experts and the commissioners of the LLRC suffered from a similar displacement of the voices of the people at the heart of the matter. The latter did see rare instances where some recognisable human experience broke through the procedural and political strictures imposed on the Commission.  Many of the people who took the risk of testifying before the LLRC did so out of a need for their truths to be told, heard and recorded.  The approach to testimony, in this case was quite inadequate for this purpose, as survivors were rarely able to speak on their own terms and were subsequently usually rendered in the report as mere ciphers, rather than as sentient beings.

In Sri Lanka today, our access to the truths of the final stages of the war need not depend so much on the verdicts of forensic experts examining photographs and video or on the credibility of well-referenced reports, as on our will to travel up the A9 to make contact with those who lived through that period.  On this small island, it wouldn’t be too hard to find a friend of a friend to make an introduction.   In social terms, Sri Lanka is still a village where we are never separated by more than a step or two from people with a first-hand perspective on how the war was really waged.  Truly hearing what people have to say (or don’t say) may be more the challenge – but overcoming this barrier is also a matter of will, patience and heart.

A retired friend of mine in Colombo, having viewed the government’s alternative version of the Channel 4 ‘Killing Fields’ documentary asked me if I really thought that the army could have treated people ‘like that’.  It was hard to imagine, he said, that they could have behaved like such beasts.  I had gently to remind him that from where we were standing talking on his balcony we could see the spots where the tortured bodies of suspected JVP members had been burned and hung from a lamppost during the terror of 1989.  He nodded slowly.  The truth of what the armed forces (and armed insurgents) were capable of was already available to him as a Sri Lankan who had lived through an insurrection in his own town.  It was just not very easy or pleasant to admit it to himself.

We ought to know better than to uncritically accept the half-truths and justifications purveyed by propagandists. Thirty years of war should have made us attuned to detecting disinformation, and an even longer history of violence by state forces and insurgents should have made us acutely aware of the systematic cruelty and criminal acts of which both are capable. Whilst those of us who have lived in or near the theatre of war have countless recent examples to caution us, those who are more detached need only to remember the extra-judicial tactics widely abused by the Sri Lankan state during the last JVP insurrection, the LTTE’s forced evacuation of the population of Jaffna to cover its retreat in the mid 1990s, the routine concealment of government atrocities whether in Suriyakanda or Sathurukondan, and the LTTE’s massacres of Muslims or its brutal methods for dealing with competitors and dissenters within the Tamil community. Even those of us too young to remember should be able to recognise the opportunistic and rather transparent methods used by both sides to discredit the few independent accounts of the conflict – allege bias, suggest conspiracy, label as imperialism, claim financial impropriety, question competence, undermine credibility and attack personally when under criticism – and should refuse to be distracted from the moral issues that really matter.

The unpleasant truths of what transpired during the final stages of the war – and indeed in the thirty years that preceded that – are not outside our grasp.  In fact, you might say that we already have some of that knowledge within us, and need only allow ourselves to recognise it.

Justice and Reconciliation
The question of what to do with the truth is more complex and difficult.  On the one hand, those of us who have suffered (and those of us who support survivors) have a desire to see perpetrators of violence punished or held accountable.  Yet, our thirty year war was more than a series of individual acts of murder, damage and destruction.  The violence was not just cyclical, but also structural.  Even as we abhor and condemn the cruelty of individuals who tortured, maimed, oppressed and killed – we have to acknowledge that they often did so within the context of terrible personal histories, forced enlistment, draconian chains of command, powerful ideologies of persecution, realities of repression and militarisation, and actual existential threats.  This is not to absolve individuals of responsibility, but rather to place their actions in perspective.

Perhaps most important to note is that the perpetrators of violence also carried out their terrible acts with the tacit or explicit support of millions of ‘civilians’.  It’s not a stretch to say that there is blood on all of our hands – from at least some point in the history of our long conflict.  We all bear some degree of responsibility for the commission of atrocities, even in our failure to oppose them in deed or thought.  All of us have probably paid taxes that bought bombs and bullets that killed people.  Most of us have voted for, endorsed or simply accepted leaders who bear direct responsibility for violence and loss.  Many of us have turned a blind eye to ethnic prejudice and even harboured it within ourselves. Others of us have justified unlawful killings as a ‘necessary evil’, rationalised collateral damage as ‘unavoidable’ or rejoiced (perhaps secretly) at the deaths of hate figures.  Still more of us have denied, minimised or ignored the suffering of tens of thousands who have been displaced, dispossessed or discriminated against.  Each of us has sustained the war machine in some way – I know that I have.  Whether or not we chose to acknowledge this at the time, it is not a defence now simply to say that we did not know.  All these acts are not equivalent under the law, but they have all contributed to enabling the harm inflicted on others. In moral terms, do they not belong to the same plane of violence? If so, who amongst us is then to cast the first stone? Is it enough to charge only those of us who pulled the triggers or those of us who ordered the bombers?  What do we about the rest of us?

Perhaps our approach to justice should not only be about holding others to account, but also judging ourselves.  If we wish for others to atone for their sins and omissions, then so must we.  Answering the question of how we can each do this is not easy, and is likely to be very personal.

In my own journey, I am trying to do this by seeking ways of responding to the circumstances of those whom the conflict has left in pain or in serious hardship.  I’m learning that this is far easier said than done.  People do not want sympathy or pity, nor I am equipped to help them get them what they really need – information about missing family members, replacement of lost livestock and decades worth of accumulated capital, decent work that will remove the necessity for parents to work in the Middle East, better health services for disabled children, help adapting to life after military service, the freedom to return to their own land and a hundred other difficult and important things.  Many people also want to be heard and have their losses acknowledged publicly.  This last part is something that I am able to help with, facilitated by friends and acquaintances – to be present, too listen to stories, to witness respectfully, to share with friends and occasionally to write about issues that matter to them. This is only a start and itself does not mean much, but I hope that it might form a basis for real relationships that may allow me to play some useful role in the future.

It feels far too early and presumptuous to talk about reconciliation.  It seems to me that the desire and means for overcoming anger, animosity and mistrust must come from within each of us as individuals, rather than be transacted at the level of community leaders or national figures (who of course, could set a good example).  The experience of being with people who have suffered enormous losses has made me realise that reconciliation is not a destination, but rather a deeply personal ongoing process of transcending and managing painful histories.  When I look at those women and men whom I admire deeply for their attempts to put aside their own hurts to relate to those of others – none of them talk explicitly about reconciliation.  They just get on with the work of recognising and connecting with the humanity in others, even those whom they have many reasons to dislike or even hate.

I feel that that we cannot afford to hold our collective breath and hope that the wrongs of the past will be resolved by war crimes tribunals, independent panels or government commissions – any more than we can wish the consequences of our violent history to simply fade from memory.    Regardless of the outcome and consequences of the vote on the resolution at the UNHRC in Geneva, acknowledging truth and enabling justice are processes that we ourselves must take responsibility for individually.  It may only be through this that we might be personally or collectively graced by reconciliation or real peace.

• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• Sri Lanka and the UNHRC: Implications for India and for Human Rights
• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• Sri Lanka and its ‘Geneva-problem’
• Bridging comedy and conscience

As the three Sri Lankan human rights defenders who have come most under attack by the state media in Sri Lanka in the past week, because of our active involvement with the on-going session of the UN Human rights Council in Geneva, we feel compelled to issue this statement of clarification.

We do not deny that we are critical of the conduct of the government of Sri Lanka, and the institutions and agencies under its control, whenever disregard for the human rights obligations imposed on the government by virtue of its being signatory to almost all international human rights conventions comes to our attention. As the President of Sri Lanka, and his Special Envoy on Human Rights well know, the three of us have offered our services to this government to ensure human rights accountability in the past. For example, all of us served on the National Advisory Council appointed by Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe, when he held the portfolio for Human Rights.

Nor do we deny that we work with a range of human rights organizations, nationally, regionally and internationally, to draw attention to human rights violations in Sri Lanka as well as to the culture of impunity and the lack of accountability for violations of the past and of the present. This is our right, as human rights defenders, and we have exercised that right for many years, under various governments, in spite of a barrage of attacks and intimidation from various quarters, including state and non-state entities.

It is indeed regrettable that at a time in the history of our country when we have the opportunity to transform our society, to move from a post-war to a post-conflict phase, and to enjoy the support of the international community to rebuild a just, humane and prosperous Sri Lanka in which all its citizens can live together with peace and dignity, the government and its media have seen it necessary to launch into an unprecedented and utterly personalized attack against the three of us. There is no attempt to challenge us substantively on any point. None of the comments attributed to us, were actually ever made by any one of us; there are many who were present at the side events where we have spoken who can testify to that.

This attack is totally counter-productive in terms of the government’s campaign to resist the Resolution on Sri Lanka, which has been tabled at the Council. In fact, in Geneva today, there is more focus on the attacks and acts of intimidation of Sri Lankan human rights defenders than there is on the negotiations around the Resolution. Those who accuse us of bringing the country into disrepute would do well to examine both their own motives and the consequences of their actions. Instead of carrying on with advocacy for defeating the Resolution, Sri Lanka’s ambassador to the Council, Ms. Tamara Kunanayagam has had to spend hours of her valuable time talking to delegations, to the President of the Council and to officials of the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights about the campaign of intimidation and attack against Sri Lankan human rights defenders at the Council and in Sri Lanka.

As human rights defenders working to defeat impunity in Sri Lanka and to build a strong system of justice and accountability for human rights violations, whether committed in the past or in the present, we remain committed to our ideals and to our goals. For us, whether there is a Resolution on Sri Lanka at the UN Human rights Council or not, our work to defend human rights in Sri Lanka must, and will, go on.

• In conversation with Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: The resolution in Geneva and its discontents
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• THE BIG LIE ABOUT THE US RESOLUTION
• Focus on Human Rights
• HAS MAHINDA RAJAPAKSA BEEN A TRAITOR TO SRI LANKA?

when chasing the ball on Duplication Road, or the girl back
in the village, shyly accept the glance of her neighbor’s son,
by the well, over a garden wall, the victims, the left behind

after the tsunami or the shelling without end, abroad,
processed, rebuilding their lives in the company of
Australians or Canadians, new people, while the distant war

on its nightly visit to parents, single or a pair, does not curse
the kid born away, who loves the latest fad on satellite radio
and the girl in his class who sports an infectious laugh.

• TASTY CHOCOLATE AIDING TERRORISTS
• Voices of Reconciliation Radio – New Content
• Heshma Wignaraja: Thoughts on dance and choreography
• Bridging comedy and conscience
• In conversation with Tracy Holsinger

I’d been in Sri Lanka just three weeks when I first heard of someone disappearing. It was May 2009 and I got an anonymous email telling me that Stephen Sunthararaj, a human rights worker from northern Sri Lanka, had been abducted at gunpoint and taken away in a white van in the heart of Colombo. He had previously been detained by the police – on suspicion of what, it is not clear – then released for lack of incriminating evidence just before his abduction. I tried to contact one or two ministers, I think, but didn’t get through and my work once more turned to the war then still raging in the north. I bitterly regretted not following up the case. Months later I met a Westerner who had known Stephen Sunthararaj. At the mention of him at dinner, he wept.

Fast forward to this year. Five weeks ago Ramasamy Prabagaran, a businessman and, like Stephen, a Tamil, was snatched in front of his wife and three-year-old daughter just as they were getting home. He too was spirited away in a white van; he too has not been seen since. When we visited his home, his wife, Shiromani, with holy ash from the Hindu temple on her forehead, was able to welcome us with a smile. But her voice was anguished as she told of how the men wrestled with him as he screamed and tried to hang onto the gate, of how cars and people passed and did nothing to help. How would the enchanting young daughter, Nikita, be affected now and if her father doesn’t come back?

I haven’t met the abducted man, who’s known as Praba. It seems he’s reasonably well-off. A muscular man whose exercise treadmill we saw in the front room. A man photographed on holiday in Switzerland and meeting top Indian cricketers. He belongs to a small ethnic group – Tamils of Indian origin, who had nothing to do with the separatist war. But he had nevertheless been held by the security forces for over two years, accused of Tiger involvement, bitterly denying it, and – according to a government medical officer’s report – showing signs of severe torture – “inflicted intentionally”, as it put it. “They are trying to make me a Tiger but I am not a Tiger,” he cried during a fleeting meeting with his wife during that time. But in September he was at last freed for lack of evidence. Two days before his complaint of torture came up in court, he was abducted. Where is he now?

There is a feeling of helplessness surrounding such events. This is the second time in nine months that I have covered the issue as a journalist.

Unfortunately “white vans” are the subject of a sort of grim humour in this small, intimate city. You talk with friends about someone doing something risky. Then you say: I hope a white van doesn’t come for him. The history of these sinister vehicles with false number plates goes back at least 20 years. But the war has now been over for three – yet the vans continue their cruel operations.

Human rights campaigners documented 32 unexplained abductions and disappearances between October and February. There was another this week, plus an apparent attempted abduction. The victims have been of all ethnic groups: Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim. Only five victims escaped, while seven bodies were found and the rest have vanished.

Arumugan Weeraraja is a labourer who struggled to educate his son, Lalith. He asked him not to get involved in politics. But Lalith, and a friend, Kugan, did. They organised demonstrations by families of disappeared people from the former war zone. In December they themselves were disappeared in Jaffna in the north, as if being taught a grim lesson for daring to speak up. No locals dared testify about what they witnessed. “I’ve asked at all the police stations, but none can help me,” said the father, tearfully, at a news conference.

A shocking thing has been the brazenness of several incidents. Both Stephen, a few years ago, and Praba were taken after being cleared in court cases. Another man was whisked away from the very arms of prison guards outside the Colombo Law Courts.

It isn’t just government critics who have vanished, or those it was seeking to implicate in terrorism. Some victims are those whom the authorities and the highly partial media denounce as being part of the criminal underworld. Even some figures until recently associated with the government are disappearing, especially since October when there was a fatal shooting incident involving two rival government strongmen.

When I met the genial police spokesman, Superintendent Ajith Rohana, he said time and again that the police were trying to solve these cases and the government wasn’t involved. I asked him whether we aren’t now talking about death squads in Sri Lanka. “Not at all. We totally deny that allegation,” he insisted.

But if unaccountable gangs roam around in vans, removing people who are usually never seen again – regardless of who sent these men, what are they other than death squads?

In its report in December, the internal war commission set up by President Rajapaksa said, quoting one witness: “Disappearance is far worse than death… When a person has disappeared, it is an eternal suffering.”

So I would ask the Sri Lankan leadership: Where is Ramasamy Prabagaran? Where are Lalith and Kugan? Where is Stephen? Where are Prageeth, Upali and others whose cases I reported earlier – and so many others beyond that?

I wonder if I will get answers – and whether their distraught families will.

[Editors note: This is article expands on the BBC Radio podcast first broadcast on 13 March 2012. Watch video of this story on the BBC here.]

• New wave of abductions and dead bodies in Sri Lanka
• Defending the Country
• Doesn’t she have the right to live with her daughter?
• A brief note on the attack on J.C. Weliamuna
• Media and Violence

The official media page of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) tells its own story. It’s blank. There’s literally nothing on the official website of the LLRC that provides information on public statements by the LLRC and coverage of its proceedings in the media. Furthermore, it’s impossible to find the interim recommendations or the final report of the LLRC on the official website.

The interim recommendations of the LLRC were first published in full on Groundviews. The most comprehensive record of media coverage on the LLRC, from domestic and international media, is also on Groundviews. Long before the LLRC’s official website was launched, Groundviews collated and published official submissions to the LLRC. With 214 submissions, it’s far more comprehensive than the records currently on the official LLRC site (the LLRC site does have a record of field visits – more on this partial set of records later). Groundviews served as a platform to correct mainstream media misreporting and misrepresentations of key submissions, and translated into English disturbing official testimony and Tamil media coverage of the proceedings, which were, at best, under-reported in the English and Sinhala mainstream press.

When the LLRC’s Final Report was made publicly available, it was placed on a decrepit government server that promptly crashed due to the high volume of traffic. We managed to download a copy, mirror it, and publish it. Today, the report and annexes can be downloaded, in theory, from the website of the Policy Research & Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat of Sri Lanka. However, given that the site is so unreliable and slow, we again spent some time downloading all the annexes and mirroring them for easier access, linking and embedding on other sites. This isn’t rocket science, and as noted before, they are impossible to find on the LLRC’s official website.

Even though most, if not all of the LLRC’s public sittings and submissions were recorded, not a single recording is available on the LLRC’s official website. Again, this content is available on a website created and curated by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), along with other content around the LLRC.

The LLRC’s Final Report was released to the public in December 2011. Today, the tweeted:

At around the time the LLRC was constituted and began its work, Chandra Jayaratna (former President of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and LMD Sri Lankan of the year 2001) wrote to the commission and to Groundviews on how Information and Communications Technologies could help the LLRC’s proceedings, and reconciliation writ large in Sri Lanka. His submission fell on deaf ears.

Warts and all, the LLRC was a process that generated a lot of public debate, both within and outside the country. It elicited revealing submissions, including from women and men in the Vanni and Jaffna. From the get-go, it was voices from civil society, not government, who called upon the LLRC to leverage modern technology to ensure that the information it received wasn’t lost. Sadly, much of it is already lost. There’s no record of what happened to the official audio recordings. Hundreds of written submissions by those in the Vanni and Jaffna in particular, in Tamil, aren’t available online or on the official website of the LLRC. What’s featured on the LLRC’s website under field visits is really a sub-set of a much larger corpus of submissions. Whether or not they fed into the LLRC’s Final Report, they are an invaluable record of Sri Lanka’s history, expressed through the public. There is no record of these submissions in the National Archives. These are vital records for posterity, but quite possibly already irrevocably lost.

What remains of the LLRC’s proceedings and output – its interim report and recommendations, the accessibility and translations of its Final Report, most of the public submissions in Tamil, Sinhala and English, audio recordings and detailed records of media reports – are all, without exception, carefully curated and published online for public access by the very NGOs and platforms, including this site, that have been openly and repeatedly vilified by those in and partial to government. And all the government itself has managed to do was to establish a website for the LLRC – that too rather late into the LLRC’s activities and bereft of vital records.

Since the LLRC was constituted and ended its mandate, there’s been more public debate and discussion around reconciliation Groundviews and Vikalpa alone than on any official mechanism or online platform established around the Panel’s proceedings or to examine its findings. Search for the LLRC’s final report on its official website. The search result (0 results found) is a prescient indicator of the government’s ability and willingness to pursue and implement the panel’s recommendations. And all the while, they will continue to employ a language of vicious hate and harm against civil society actors, who have in fact done more to support the LLRC’s proceedings and output.

Post-war Sri Lanka in a nutshell.

• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• A letter to the President on his re-election campaign spending
• LLRC: Interim report to Government
• Recommendations for ICT and Research Supported Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the LLRC
• Women’s Day 2012: Concerns, challenges and opportunities from Sri Lanka

Image from Wikimedia Commons

“One of the rankest untruths in the public domain today is that the US resolution is innocuous and unobjectionable…” said Amb. Dayan Jayatilleka in his article THE BIG LIE ABOUT THE US RESOLUTION on 16^th March 2012. It would be pertinent to question whether a bigger untruth in the public domain since 2009 is about the population in Vanni in 2009. Correct me if I’m wrong – but from my memory, Amb. Jayatilleke was a party to this lie, helped cover it up – and never offered an explanation even afterwards.

Population in LTTE controlled Vanni

• On 30th Jan. 2009, according to official government website: 75,000 – 100,000 people (high side!) (See here)
• On 26th Feb. 2009 according to government website, quoting the Defense Secretary – 70,000 people (See here)

Now let us compare above with what is stated in Government’s version of events in last few months of the war – “Humanitarian Operation Factual Analysis” available here - see the numbers of people who had crossed over from LTTE controlled Vanni to Govt controlled areas:

• By 1^st week of Feb: Over 20,000 (para 175)
• 20^th April: Over 42,000 (para 197)
• 21^st / 22^nd April: Over 60,000 (para 198)

And after this, it seems the estimated civilian population was 70,000 (para 201)

• After 17^th May: about 80,000 (para 207 and 208)

So if we are to believe the population was indeed 70,000 in February, how come around 182,000 people (the government report indicates more have come, but no clear figures available) crossed over from LTTE controlled Vanni to government controlled areas in April and May alone? Then let us look at some other figures about the Vanni population – available now publicly thanks to the LLRC (pending the official statistics from the census)

• Total population in LTTE controlled Vanni in end of September 2008 and early October 2008 : 429,059 (Based on two signed and stamped documents from Mullativu and Killinochi Kacheris presented to the LLRC on 8^th Jan. 2010 by the Catholic Bishop of Mannar – transcript available at official LLRC website)
• Total population in LTTE controlled Vanni on 22^nd January 2009: 350,000 – 360,000 (Testimony to the LLRC on 24^th November 2011 by the then Government Agent of Mullativu and present Government Agent of Jaffna, Mrs. Imelda Sukumar) See transcript available at LLRC’s official website.
• Arrivals to Government controlled areas from LTTE controlled Vanni after 27^th Oct. 2108 – 282,380 persons (Figures compiled by UN based on figures reported by Government Agents) available here.

So what about the differences?

So what are lies and what are truths?

What are the implications of the lie(s)?

Why hasn’t any government official clarified?

Why LLRC didn’t pursue this when it had clear documentary evidence and oral testimony?

When there is doubt – or confusion about fate of 80,000 or even 146,000 Sri Lankan citizens – our brothers and sisters – is it not so important to clarify?

Or is there some explanation that has eluded me which makes all these add up as truths and no lies and hence no need to pursue or clarify?

• Who really supports reconciliation in post-war Sri Lanka?
• Debating numbers, killing lives: UN and Government differences emerge
• A Realistic Look at the Draft Resolution by the US on Sri Lanka at the UN HRC
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Civilian displacements in the Vanni

Like so many diasporic Sri Lankans I watched it, even staying up late (by my currently low standards that is).

Did I think that the first programme was a good thing? Yes. There’s a line, a quandary, a grey area after any conflictual situation. And it’s about what we should just put behind us and forget or accept and what we need to analyse and dissect in order to learn from to move forward.

There’s probably no one who would suggest that it’s wise to forget and / or accept absolutely everything, on all sides, and there’s probably no one who would think that’s it’s sensible to analyse and dissect every single thing. But the line has to be drawn somewhere and, for me, much of the positioning of the line has to do with the issue of civilian casualties (which sounds so much more PC than “civilians deaths”).

Up until after the showing of the first Killing Fields documentary there were of course no civilian deaths in the final days of the conflict at the hands of the GoSL.I’m not sure that there was a strict and binary tipping point but I’m convinced that the doco was the closest thing to it in getting the GoSL to change its approach. Frankly that was a good thing, only a start but a good thing nonetheless.

I asked a good friend about things and he told me that many people on the GoSL’s side feel that they’re being attacked and that they didn’t do anything wrong in the first place. I asked him how those people could explain then the GoSL’s change in stance from “no civilian casualties” to what it is now.

His response, which actually did astound me, was that “if there had been no accusations in the first place they wouldn’t have said zero casualties”.  Of course there’s no way of testing his theory but I just don’t accept it. Chap A commits a crime, gets accused of it and, faced with a large amount of evidence, fesses up to it (a bit). And the theory goes that, had chap A not been accused then he would have admitted to it anyhow. Hmmm….spurious.

Over here the publicity leading up to the showing of KF2 was big in an underground sort of way. From the things I see and have seen on the ‘net I get the impression that people in Sri Lanka think that the whole of the UK observes things in Lanka and spends a lot more time and energy discussing them than is actually the case. It’s weird; the people who have an interest are interested and the rest just don’t give a damn.  The Sri Lankans and the Sri Lankan diaspora were all aware of the programme, I’m sure a few who had that interest, maybe people who have holidayed in SL or who do business were interested too.

But, most people aren’t that bothered. It’s the morning after the night before and, as I sit here in my office dwelling on it, not one person here so far has mentioned the programme, asked my opinion or anything similar.

Before KF2 I had hoped that Channel 4, or the programme’s makers at least, wouldn’t make the “mistakes” ( a term I use very loosely) that had been made in the KF1, as those elements were used by some to attack the credibility of the makers and therefore the documentary. It’s the most basic of schoolboy tactics; shooting the messenger, but can be highly effective. And it was. After seeing it I reckon they did a better job in that respect, but time will tell.

*As it happens, about five minutes after I wrote the sentence in which I told you that no one in my office had asked about the programme, someone did. She was horrified.*

For the record though Jon Snow is a highly respected journalist and presenter here and most find it hard to believe that he’s full to the brim with the lack of integrity and hidden agenda many have suggested.

KF2 actually mentioned the GoSL’s counter “documentary” – Lies agreed upon – showing some footage from it and tackling the issue of why the Doctors who had been quoted and filmed in KF1 regarding the shelling of civilian targets and hospitals appeared to totally change their stories. Seriously I ask you, does anyone find it that hard to believe that these people were threatened with imprisonment and told what to say in Lies Agreed Upon?

I suppose, for people who have some knowledge of Sri Lanka anyway, things like KF2 don’t really change anything. They just reinforce opinions, whatever those might be. I didn’t really watch and learn anything I didn’t already think or know and I’d bet that was the case for you too.

The most salient points about the whole thing for me are simple, but often get lost or forgotten in all the rhetoric. As David Miliband said, the expectations of a democratically elected government are higher than that of a terrorist organisation. That doesn’t excuse or justify the actions of the LTTE, but it does say that there should be a higher power, a better standard of behaviour.

And, if the GoSL really has nothing to hide, then why the lack of a proper investigation and inquiry?

Of course the standard answers to the above are pretty much as follows:

1. David Miliband, well he’s just evil, everyone knows that.
2. Who would do the investigation? The UN is about as corrupt, inefficient and fundamentally flawed as can be and all white people are evil anyhow. Look at how they colonised us.
3. The UK invaded Iraq illegally a few years ago, who are they to talk?

Well all these are points, but not very good ones. Shoot the messenger, attack the credibility of anyone who criticises and punish dissent will only last for so long, for a finite amount of levels. Then, somehow things come out. They always do in the end.

But, for those who are still learning, these things are a source of knowledge.

I had my girls with me last night but dropped them back at their mother’s before the programmes started. They’re almost sixteen and almost eighteen now, so I mentioned to them that it was going to be on TV later, without trying to push them to watch it.

I’m not sure about K, but I know A (the eldest) did watch it. They love Sri Lanka and have been going there regularly since they were each about eighteen months old, but don’t know much about its politics.

A texted me late at night and said:

“Is this what the Tamils did?”

I replied and said:

“Well its what both sides did A, really sad.” I missed out the apostrophe in “it’s” but it was a text and I sometimes live dangerously and go a little crazy like that.

She responded:

“That was horrible. What’s sad is that it kind of makes me sort of not proud to say I’m from there after seeing that programme.”

“I know and I understand”. I said.

And I do know. And I do understand.

• How The East Was Won – Watch the Al-Jazeera documentary
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• I think it’s stupid, do you?

A discussion.

I thought of him as the speaker of the flag

He said

We Sinhalese are the people of the lion.  Our flag represents us. Every point every line has a meaning.  Look at the color of the flag it is red and yellow. Yellow is symbolic of wisdom and derives from the color of the Buddha’s robe.  The Buddha, when he attained enlightenment wrapped himself in a cloth that covered the bodies of the dead.  The bodies in those days may have been bathed in saffron, which was used as a disinfectant. The saffron dye stained the cloth that the Buddha wore and it became yellow.  The color yellow became indentified with the Buddha and his wisdom, which encompasses both life and death… And so yellow became the color of wisdom. While red became the color of life. Red for our lifeblood, our energy, our anger, our hate, our passion, our love, our revolutions, our desires,

He said

The red ground within the yellow border represents man’s instincts contained within a framework of wisdom. The four yellow Bo leaves for the tree under which the Buddha sat as he obtained enlightenment represent the four symbols of enlightenment. Respect for life, compassionate action, altruistic joy and the gravity of that sublime state of mind as you contain within you the discipline of wisdom.

He said

The lion represents society and the sword is the instrument of protection of society.

He said

The sword has three sections the first, the hilt or handle stands for the basis of society, the second, the hand guard stands for the guidance of society, the third the blade, stands for the protection of society

He said

Look at the hilt, the basis of society.  The three points at the bottom are there for the law of dependent origination, birth, life and death. The four petals extending from the hilt represent the fact that every   thing has a form and a name.  , The four petals for land, water, birth and death represents man’s birthright Just as he, as a living being has a form and name, a right to land, to water, to birth and to death and no one can deprive man of these…

He said

This is the basis of the ten royal codes of conduct, the instrument by which society is ruled and is the code for the rulers to live by.

Sharing,
Morality,
Recognition of talent,
Integrity,
Courtesy,
Restraint,
Non-violence,
Non-hate,
Patience,
Non-revenge.

And through non-revenge we protect the right of all to exist.  In non-hate, in non-violence, in restraint, in courtesy, in patience, in integrity, in the recognition of talents, in morality, in sharing. This is the basis of the existence of sovereignty for any society of human beings

And I said

In my world we manipulate both birth and death and do not hold anyone’s right to land and water as sacred.  Instead we value life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Nor do we value non-revenge but rather the right to extract it through the instrumentality of the law!

From : Harrison and Harrison  (1986) The Lagoon Cycle

So, as we fight to protect our symbol and to hold our heads high, it will behoove us to appreciate what this symbol signifies. It challenges all of us who claim to be represented by this flag to be measured by the ideals symbolized by the flag in order to establish our identity.

Reference

Helen Mayer Harrison and Newton Harrison 1986 The lagoon cycle: March 23 through June 2, 1985, Herbert F. Johnson Museum of Art, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

• Yellow Banana
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