“Our duty is to fight until the last minute for our country, for our planet and for humanity.”

- Fidel Castro, Feb 4, 2012, launching his memoir, ‘Guerrilla of Time’

As world class singers of Sri Lankan Tamil parentage go, MIA isn’t half as good as a new voice, Bhi Bhiman, an American singer of blues–tinged folk music with a voice as clear and mournful as the whistle of a lonesome train coming ’round the bend. MIA’s flair for the theatrical far outstrips her singing talent. Giving the finger at the Super Bowl this month seems however to be politically symptomatic, because Mr. MA Sumanthiran, a sophisticated lawyer-politician, has just done that to the 13th amendment and prospects of a moderate yet substantive degree of power sharing. In an interview given to Namini Wijedasa, ‘MAS’ (as the newspaper bills him) says:

“…The 13th is not a proper scheme. We have rejected it…The 13th Amendment was passed in 1987. If it was sufficient, we would not have had all this bloodletting…We have engaged with Global Tamil Forum… You have to ask the Tamil people whether they want to stay in the country or be separate. Everywhere it’s like that…A distinct people in international law have certain rights called self-determination. The right to self determination international law now says must be exercised internally in the first instance. But if that is consistently denied, then according to the Canadian Supreme Court judgment on Quebec, they might even become entitled to a unilateral secession. So, if Sri Lanka should remain as one country, and we think it should remain as one country, then to preserve it as one country you must grant that right to self-determination and have it exercised in an arrangement within one country. That must be given, that must be recognized. It’s not at the wish of the majority that it’s given. That is as a matter of right in international law…” (‘Sunday Lakbimanews’ & DBSJeyaraj.com, Feb 5th 2012)

If I didn’t know that this was Mr. Sumanthiran of the TNA speaking last week, I swear I would have identified it as Anton Balasingham speaking at Prabhakaran’s press conference in the Wanni in 2002 or during the rounds of negotiations in Oslo and Sattahip, during the wretched CFA years of appeasement. I am not exaggerating for effect, and any Internet search would confirm that this was indeed Mr. Balasingham’s argument. So we are currently in a strange place, a time-warp, in which the TNA’s most sophisticated spokesperson is echoing the argumentation of the LTTE’s most sophisticated spokesperson. What makes the TNA or anyone else think that the Sri Lankan state and citizenry, which resisted and rejected this nonsense and went on to fight and decisively win a war, will treat it with anything other than a combination of acute suspicion and scant disregard?

Mr. Sumanthiran must enlighten us as to how a judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court becomes ‘international law’. He must then tell us how ‘soft’ international law – even if one were to concede for the sake of argument  that this postulate has entered the realm of ‘ soft international law — takes precedence over national Constitutions and state sovereignty. He should also be so kind as to tell us how Canada – or Scotland, for that matter– becomes ‘everywhere’. Can he tell us where precisely it is — outside of a militarily defeated, failed, fractured state (Mengistu’s Ethiopia, ex-Yugoslavia, Southern Sudan) — that ethnic groups preponderating in identifiable geographic areas are entitled to referenda as to whether they shall or shall not remain within existing state boundaries, and where it is recognized that if ‘internal self determination’ is not exercised, ‘external self determination’ i.e. secession is recognized as an option?

What would the planet look like if every ethnic group which numbered a few percentage of the total population of a state were able to exit that state at will, sundering the country and wrenching away part of its territory? This would not only mean the outright violation of a principle of democracy by privileging the wishes of a majority within a minority over the overwhelming majority of the citizenry as a whole, but also bloody disintegration, civil war, and the diminution of the size and strength of independent states thereby making them vulnerable to predatory neo-imperialist overlords.

The principle of sovereignty of the overall state and the right of self determination of the nation as a whole, the citizenry as a totality, i.e. national and popular sovereignty, cannot be subordinated to the right of self determination of an ethnic minority, national minority or minority nationality.

Mr. Sumanthiran does so much travelling that he is clearly unaware of which continent of the planet Sri Lanka is located. No state in Asia, including quasi-federal, democratic, secular India and liberal democratic Philippines, regards the judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court as having the slightest bearing on its domestic affairs or even gives it a second thought as constituting some norm in international law. One wonders if the Hon Member of Parliament has heard of Kashmir or Mindanao.

The TNA MP has flipped the bird in the direction of the 13th amendment, which was the best that India was able to obtain for the Tamil people at a time when the Tamil insurgency had not been crushed by the Sri Lankan state. Mr. Sumanthiran does not explain by which logic he expects it to be qualitatively superseded in the aftermath of a stunning military victory by the State. When the provincial devolution enshrined by the 13th amendment is being called into question as excessive, Mr. Sumanthiran’s rejection of it – as distinct from urging its upgrading and/or speedy implementation—is hardly helpful.

Mr. Sumanthiran’s argumentative assertion that “if it [the 13th amendment] was sufficient, we would not have had all this bloodletting…” is demonstrably nonsensical. If it was the insufficiency of the 13th amendment was responsible for continued bloodletting, how did that bloodletting stop in May 2009 without an improvement upon the 13th amendment in place or even the 13th amendment being implemented? It was not the insufficiency of the 13th amendment that led to the continuation of the bloodletting in 1987, it was the bloodthirstiness of the LTTE, which rejected that reform and spurned the space it opened up.

The TNA has yet to express regret or proffer an explanation over its rejection at the time, of those very proposals it is now bringing back to the table, namely the Mangala Moonesinghe formula, the CBK proposals of 1995, 1997 and 2000, and the APRC (which it boycotted). If its behavior was attributable to the LTTE’s threats it should come clean and say so now. Then again, the TNA has yet to criticize the LTTE for murdering Rajiv Gandhi– and its own leaders such as Appapillai Amirthalingam and Neelan Tiruchelvam. The failure to do so can no longer be attributed to understandable physical fear but to moral and ethical failure.

There seems to be an inability to grasp what it means to give the finger to all reform proposals, wage a war for three decades including against a peacekeeping force, and lose that war utterly. When you wager all and lose that kind of bloody wager, there is a political price to be paid for a considerable period. Your capacity to make demands is impaired. You cannot simply dust off proposals you rejected when you thought the going was good, brandish them and expect to be taken seriously.

Least logical and reasonable is the call for a referendum among only the Tamil people as to whether or not they wish to live within Sri Lanka. Contrary to Mr. Sumanthiran’s assertion, ‘internal self determination’ is not ascertained by a referendum which raises the issue of whether or not a people wish to live within a given state. If that question is on the agenda there is nothing ‘internal’ about such self-determination. What if the answer at the referendum is ‘no, we do not wish to be part of the existing state’? What, pray, is ‘internal’ about that?

Let’s think this issue through to its conclusion. Why should any administration take the risk of sharing power at a sensitive periphery of a state, a mere two and half years after a 30 year war, with a party that rejects the constitutional basis of that power sharing, i.e. the 13th amendment, and stands for a referendum on self-determination? Is it unreasonable to assume that such a party would use the territorially based council as a platform to call immediately for more powers and move on to hold or agitate for the holding of a referendum on whether to remain within or exit the state and its boundaries? Is this the TNA’s game-plan, or rather, is it the game-plan of the TNA-GTF? Isn’t this strangely similar to the playbook of Prof Steven Ratner (of the infamous Darusman panel), whose scholarly specialization is the study of the break-up of existing states along lines of pre-existing internal administrative boundaries? Is this not an alternative pathway to achieving that which the Tigers attempted through terrorism?  Does the project of exit remain the same, except that it is now going to be in a two step sequence?

Every progressive or liberal minded party, political personality and commentator in the South welcomed the LLRC report and urged its expeditious implementation, while the TNA rejected it at quite considerable length.  The gap between the reform-minded moderate centrists and progressives in the South, on the one hand, and the demands of the TNA on the other, do not seem to faze the latter, any more than this same chasm was of concern to its precursor, the Federal party, in previous decades.

Mr. Sumanthiran must now ask himself which Sri Lankan political party of any note, in or outside of government, be it the SLFP, UNP (‘Ranilist Royalists’ or Reformists), JVP or the radical breakaway Movement for Peoples Struggle, would consent to devolution that went qualitatively beyond the 13th amendment to the next level, countenance ‘self determination’ ascertained by a plebiscite purely of the Tamil people, and accept dismemberment of the country by ballot where bomb and bullet have failed. Where is the proposal that can act as a bridge? Is the TNA not interested in a bridge to the Southern majority? Is it uninterested in Southern partnership within the mainstream and unwilling to do what it takes to secure such partnerships? Where will you find takers outside of the Tamil polity, Mr. Sumanthiran, and if you do not have takers among the Sinhala majority, where do you expect to find them? Certainly not in the region or on our continent—so where might they be? Surely this is the wrong era and continent to await a Balfour Declaration?  Mr. Sumanthiran must not make the standard error of ‘cosmopolitan’ Tamil nationalists, of taking the Sinhalese for fools.

Sherlock Holmes used to say that once the impossible has been ruled out, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the answer. If elements within the TNA are making it strategically imprudent to risk the transfer a provincial council and its powers to them, then the answer must surely lie in hoping for an evolutionary re-composition of Tamil politics, through which may emerge responsible, pragmatic partners in power-sharing at the periphery. The speedy implementation of the LLRC Report’s recommendations may create the conditions for such evolution.

• Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka on history of power-sharing in Sri Lanka and the 13th Amendment
• Final text of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in Parliament opposing the 18th Amendment
• “Sound is no substitute for argument”: Exclusive video of TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran’s speech in parliament against 18th Amendment
• Hansard on 18th Amendment debate, 8 September 2010
• Exclusive video interview with Somawansa Amarasinghe, the Leader of JVP, in English

From 19 – 27 May 2010, Groundviews ran a special edition on the end of war in Sri Lanka. Over this week alone, the site received over forty-thousand readers and exclusively featured over eighty-thousand words of original content, one video premiere, over a dozen photos, generating over one hundred and fifty-thousand words of commentary.

By popular request, The End of War in Sri Lanka: Reflections and Challenges, a compilation of content that appeared online in PDF form, was first released in May 2010. In mid-2010, it was published in print form. Today, we are relaunching the book as a free iBook on Apple iTunes. It is available as a direct download in 32 countries and regions, and readable on both the iPad 1 and 2 using iBooks. Ironically, Apple’s Sri Lankan iTunes store does not list the book, but you can easily download it to your Mac or PC using this link (138Mb iBook). Once downloaded, importing it to iTunes and synchronising it with your iPad is a cinch, and takes just a few seconds.

In his review of the book, Prof. Sasanka Perera, Professor of Anthropology and Head, Department of Sociology, University of Colombo, noted:

Therefore the pieces contained traverse a wide terrain that includes the rational, clinical, accommodating, hopeful, hope-less, post war scenarios of the future, politics of diasporas and so on… To me, that variation is the reality of our post war existence. Our experience is not linear; our perceptions not black and white across the board; our take on the past and the future not a monolithic reality. What is unfortunate is that the reality of this variation has not emerged in the popular and the dominant discourse on war, conflict and peace in the country.

Another review by Channa Wickremesekera, a military historian and novelist based in Melbourne Australia noted,

The most cursory glance at some of the websites that showcases opinions from those whose first language is truly Sinhalese will show that it is still the Wimal Weerawansa’s rather than Kalana Senaratne’s who make opinions of Sri Lankans, even in cyberspace. They are still dancing the victory dance, expecting the Tamil in the room to join in singing Sinhala bailas or to leave the room altogether… Groundviews, I am sure, has no pretensions to having the power to shift heaven and earth which is what, it appears at times, is required to change the direction the country is heading in. Yet, despite that seeming impotence, the collection of articles also presents a pleasing prospect. It shows that there are still at least a few of us who recognise that the end of the war has not ended the conflict as long as we do not deal with the Tamil in the room, fairly and justly. It may make a few other decent people stop and think, even feel. That would be a modest victory but a victory nevertheless.

The new iBooks edition of the book takes over 40 contributions, including high definition video and high resolution photography, and beautifully presents them on the iPad. Content automatically resizes for orientation, presenting text in a clear, crisp format. Photos by Aufidius, Deshan Tennekoon, Sharni Jayawardene and others can be viewed as thumbnails, and pop out in high resolution. Alongside the article by its producers who were the first to visit the Vanni after the end of the war, the trailer of the award winning documentary The Truth That Wasn’t There plays in high definition. iBooks on the iPad also offers the ability to annotate the text and easily email these notes (which Apple calls study cards). When connected to the Internet, each article has a link to access the online version, with all the comments generated still archived.

It is quite simply a new way to engage with content, and Groundviews is pleased to offer, for free, a book that is of enduring value to scholars, historians, political scientists and the average reader. Using poetry, prose, photography and video, The End of War in Sri Lanka: Reflections and Challenges for the iPad demonstrates the potential not just of the device and Apple’s iBook Author to bring content alive, but also the power of new media to present inconvenient truths in a compelling manner.

• Groundviews now formatted for iPad
• Sri Lanka’s and South Asia’s first citizen journalism iPhone app
• Long Form journalism: An invitation to contribute
• Launch of Groundviews 2.0: New features, enhanced readability, comprehensive search
• Send us content for publication

Photo credit Ada Derana

This is the question of the day. This is raised nationally and internationally and answers contrast for different reasons. In this article, I endeavor to briefly answer this question from a governance perspective, keeping in mind the present socio-political realities  in Sri Lanka.

The President appointed the Commission of Inquiry on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliations (LLRC) on 15^th May 2010 with a broad mandate to inquire into and report on specific matters, in terms of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. The title of the Commission and the mandate in general suggests that the objective of the appointment of the LLRC is to find ways for reconciliation among all communities, after a bloody ethnic conflict.  It is also possible to argue that the LLRC was appointed to advise the Head of the State on how to avoid a national tragedy in the future. The Warrant has, among others the following term of reference:

“[inquire and report on] Institutional, administrative and legislative measures which  need to be taken in order to prevent any recurrence  of such concerns  in the future, and to promote further national unity and reconciliation among all communities, and  to make any such other recommendation  which reference to any of the matters that have been inquired into under the terms of this Warrant.”

In that context, the LLRC had a mandate to examine the governance structures and its functioning to ascertain why Sri Lanka was in a “mess” in relation to ethnic harmony. The LLRC submitted its report on 15^th November 2011 to the President and unlike many other Presidential Commission reports, this report is in the public domain.

Governance Related Recommendations

The Report deals with a variety of issues including the Ceasefire Agreement, Overview of Security Operations, Land Issues, Resettlement, and Reconciliation. Judging from its recommendations, we can conclude that the LLRC has also addressed its mind to the relevance of governance for overall reconciliation efforts.  Perhaps there may be disagreements on other findings and recommendation, but, I believe, there is implicit consensus on the findings and recommendations on governance aspects.  Being a governance and human rights activist, I was delighted to read these specific findings/recommendations. The civil society has been urging the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) for many years, to respect the existing constitutional guarantees and establish Rule of Law; and raised almost identical  issues.  The government continues to pronounce that Sri Lanka has good laws, which are respected. The GOSL never accepted that there was any paucity or deficiency in rule of law or human rights protections. Centuries ago, Aristotle taught us “Good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government”.

For the purpose of this article let me reproduce few governance related recommendations of the LLRC, selected and clustered by me for easy reference:

1. Media freedom, attacks on journalists etc.

(a)   The LLRC  was deeply disturbed by persistent reports concerning attacks on journalists and media institutions and killing of journalists  and the fact that these incidents remains to be conclusively investigated and perpetrators brought  to justice…. Any failure to investigate and prosecute offenders would undermine the process of reconciliation and the Rule of Law.  (paragraph 9.114)

(b)   It is essential that media freedom be enhanced in keeping with democratic principles and relevant obligations. Steps should be taken to prevent harassment and attacks on journalists and media institutions and deterrent punishment should be imposed on those who were responsible for attacks. Priority should also be given to the “investigation, prosecution and disposal of such cases to build up public confidence in the criminal justice system”. (paragraph 9.115)

(c)   Government should ensure that the freedom of movement of media personnel in the North and East, as it would help in the exchange of information contributing to the process of reconciliation.

(d)   Legislation should be enacted to ensure the right to information (paragraph 9.115)

2. Freedom of Association

People, community leaders and religious leaders should be free to organize peaceful events and meetings without restrictions. (paragraph 9.118)

3. Law Enforcement, Police and Impunity

(a)   The Commission notes the failure on the part of the law enforcement officers to investigate offences and bring offenders to book, where the offences are committed by persons with political connections. The  Commission emphasizes that all allegations should be investigated and wrongdoers  prosecuted and punished  irrespective of their political links, so as to inspire confidence among the people in the administration of justice (paragraph 9.203 & 212)

(b)   The Police Department is a civilian institution which is entrusted with the maintenance of Law and Order. Therefore, it is desirable that the Police Department be de-linked from the institutions dealing with the armed forces which are responsible for the security of the State.  (paragraph 9.214)

(c)    An independent permanent Police Commission is a pre-requisite to guarantee the effective function of the Police and to generate public confidence. (paragraph 9.215)

(d)   Activities of illegal armed groups are of serious concern to the Commission.  It appeared that the dominating presence and activities of such groups have created fear among the general public, contributing to an environment of impunity. Some of their illegal activities affected the basic rights of people such as the right to life. …. Action should be taken to disarm and put an end to illegal activities of these groups (paragraph 9.72-74)

The above recommendations are self-explanatory and need no elaboration. It speaks volumes of the present governance status. The LLRC was able to find the nexus between Rule of Law and Reconciliation. It has found that the collapse of Rule of Law and restrictions on civil liberties is   detrimental to reconciliation efforts.

Priority  to Tighten the Political Grip;

Probably one can argue that the whole issue of accountability (in the final stage of the war) has been ignored by the LLRC. Nevertheless, the local and international community is awaiting the response of the President, not mere GOSL, on the key findings and recommendations of LLRC. In my view, whether the government has the political will to fully implement the LLRC recommendations depends mostly, if not mainly, on whether the President and his government are prepared to respect Rule of Law.  Are they genuinely prepared?

This question cannot be answered in a vacuum without understanding the basic norms of how the country is run today.  Some of the most significant features of the present GOSL under the leadership of President Rajapaksha is as follows:

1. The concentration of power within his close circle (family and few others)
2. Tightening  the  political grip through control of free expression, media and free assembly, while  taking all possible steps to monopolize  information.
3. Politicization and weakening of public institutions including the law enforcement agencies
4. Militarization of civil life and civilian institutions.
5. The manipulation of elections, through unprecedented abuse of state resources and emasculation of opposition.

Aspects (a) to (d) above have been dealt with by the LLRC but not the (e) above. Probably there were no sufficient representations made to the LLRC on that aspect. It seems clear that the LLRC thinks these features of the regime are obstacles to engage in reconciliation among the communities. In my view, these features pose a threat to the continuity of democracy in the country, not just reconciliation.

Whether the regime is serious in implementing these vital governance related recommendations must be judged from the past conduct of the Rajapaksa regime.  The regime has failed to improve governance structures and, in fact, it has shown complete indifference to governance. If we have a quick look at its governance record, almost all the public institutions including regulatory institutions and law enforcement agencies were politicized.  The constitutional guarantees available for protection against politicization were removed with the 18^th Amendment to the Constitution.  None of the assassinations of journalists and attacks on media institutions were seriously investigated.  All the cronies of the government and their families are above the law. It has never taken steps to eliminate impunity. In my view, these are well planned strategies of the regime – for a clear purpose of tightening the political hold.  If the governance related recommendations are implemented, then the Rajapaksa regime will lose its political grip and a fair political equilibrium will emerge. In my view, that is not a rick the regime will take.

Probing into bona fides of GOSL

If the police are independent, being placed under an independent Police Commission as suggested by the LLRC, and de-linked from the military, and then we are bound to see a different police. Investigations will be conducted by professional policemen and evidence will be elicited, against any suspect, irrespective of the nature of the crime. They will not be subject to the dictation of the political masters. In such an event, there is a likelihood of successfully solving political or high profile crimes. Such independent investigations can expose the involvement of main players of the regime, who otherwise, comfortably sweep such investigations under the carpet and manipulated investigations.  History has seen that when the law enforcement agencies become independent, corrupt leaders, including heads of the police department go to jail and new countries and new cultures emerge. That is exactly what happened in Hong Kong in late 1970s. Is the GOSL ready to accept it?

Take the case of killings of journalists, which have not been truthfully investigated by this government.  There are at least two people who know those responsible for the deaths; the one who gave orders and the other who carried out the orders. If the police is given a free hand to investigate and prosecute the offenders, there is a likelihood of even judicial findings against the higher officials and politicians within the government. An investigation can expose those who were responsible for those crimes. World political experience show that such exposures have even brought down governments! Is the GOSL ready to accept it?

Freedom of expression, mostly political dissent, is something not new to President Rajapaksa because he was one who frequently used those rights at the highest level, while being in the opposition. Now, President Rajapaksha (and the regime as a whole) does not welcome any powerful dissenting grouping that can challenge his political future.  However, the Government is at a natural advantage, because the people in the south honestly admire it for defeating the LTTE.  The war victory (and popularity) is often used as the most powerful tool to suppress any dissenting voices. This reminds us of the famous quotation of Polybius: “Those who know how to win are much more numerous than those who know how to make proper use of their victories.”   If free expression and lawful assemblies are permitted on sensitive political matters without impediment, alternative voices will certainly expose the government’s sham political devices and much more. Authoritarian tendencies will then be challenged openly.  Is the GOSL ready?

The GOSL  has mastered the control of media, through lawful and unlawful means.  Apart from extra judicial tactics used by the GOSL with impunity, the entire state mechanism is now used for the protection and survival of the Regime. Besides, consider how the government reacts to anything that can “embarrass the government”.  With that mind set, I do not see how there can be a political will to ensure full scale free expression and media freedom.

There may be other sensitive international and legal issues why the GOSL has some reservations on implementing the LLRC recommendations.  On political expediency, GOSL will definitely answer affirmatively  to the question,  whether  Sri Lanka has an independent and credible mechanism to investigate allegations of human rights violations  and,  in particular,  the  incidents  during the last stage of the war.  In my view, the GOSL cannot implement the governance related recommendations, simply because it believes that it is a political suicide to respect Rule of Law and protect human rights. Should the public be quiet then?  As Martin Luther King Jr. said “Freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed”. Unless there is sufficient and intensive demand by the people of this country, on the streets,  in Sri Lanka, the GOSL will not even consider implementing these recommendations. Then, the LLRC would be a show piece for international consumption, without any relevance to Sri Lanka.

• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• LLRC Recommendations: Can the Rajapaksa Regime Digest?
• Recommendations for ICT and Research Supported Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the LLRC
• A slumbering LLRC: The image of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
• LLRC: Submission by Manik de Silva, President of the Editors Guild

The throng of devotees and tourists visiting the Nallur festival had receded and life slowly returned to normal in Jaffna. I stayed behind to see if I could persuade others visiting from abroad to be a part of my Longing and Belonging series. I was especially interested in those that were engaging in a sustained manner, in contrast to the charming young family that I had met at the height of the festival. This however proved to be a challenge. I met many who were engaging with projects in the north, but who were uncomfortable with being open about their views, preferring instead to keep a low profile.

One man who was willing to be involved was Dr Narendran, an associate professor who had worked for many years in Saudi Arabia, and who was now back in Sri Lanka, spending most of his time here.

We talked over coffee at the famous Malayan cafe in the heart of Jaffna town about his ideas for an agriculture and animal husbandry project on the islands off the Jaffna peninsula. His plans were still in their infancy. The government had offered him large tracts of state owned land to use for his project. It occurred to me that Dr Narendran had no qualms about working closely with the government, something I knew would be unpalatable for many of the diaspora that I had met during my visits to London.

Later, we took a taxi to the arid environment of the islands, which Dr Narendran compared to the deserts of Saudi Arabia. As we talked about his plans I thought that while I didn’t agree with everything that Dr Narendran had said to me during the time we spent together, he wasn’t expecting me to either. I sensed he knew I likely held different views, but that didn’t deter him from speaking to me with respect. He just wanted me to listen. I have to be honest here – some of the things he said to me, for example, about the Tamil diaspora taking responsibility for their part in dealing with the devastation in the north made sense.

Meeting Dr Narendran and other individuals on this assignment underscored what he had told me – that the diaspora is not a homogenous entity. It is a diverse group, with myriad perspectives, motivations and experiences. Dr Narendran was positioned somewhere along that spectrum of views.

Also see From London to Jaffna for the first time, Returning lives, rebuilding limbs, and Diaspora shorts

• Longing and belonging series: Diaspora shorts
• Longing and Belonging series: From London to Jaffna for the first time
• Longing and Belonging series: Returning lives, rebuilding limbs
• In the midst of the Adi Vel festival
• The campaign to save Rizana Nafeek: Ways to help

The Nallur festival was in full flow. Kavadi drummers played for the crowds of devotees that swelled around Jaffna’s famous temple. Dotted around me were visitors from abroad. It was wonderful to see they were back, tracing lost roots and reconnecting with family and friends. I wanted to meet them and to understand what it was like being back.

One of these was a young Tamil family from London. For the two daughters, it was their first time in Sri Lanka, visiting what they called their mother’s “home country”. The family had been helping a local charity, the Hindu Board of Education, from afar and were in Jaffna to visit the orphanage and to take in the Nallur festival. The two girls had struggled all week with the heat, the mosquitoes and the crowds, but they didn’t complain. They took time to talk to the children in bits of Tamil that they had learned and handed out chocolates to them after lunch. It was their way of “giving back” they told me. Listening to the girls compare the Nallur experience to the carnivals that they had grown up with in Britain brought a smile to my face. It was reassuring to see them there, to hear their London accents in Jaffna, and to explore the possibilities of how they could “give back”.

Editors note: For an overview of the Longing and Belonging series and trailer, please click Longing and belonging series: Diaspora shorts. Also see The science of planning in Jaffna.

• Longing and Belonging series: The science of planning in Jaffna
• Longing and belonging series: Diaspora shorts
• Longing and Belonging series: Returning lives, rebuilding limbs
• Liberation
• Ramblings of an outsider in Jaffna – 1

Sunday: A day of perfect rest. My cousin and nephew visit. She had brought string hoppers and fish curry, cooked in perfect Sri Lankan style. No, it was perfect Jaffna style. No, no, it was perfect Karainagar style. I could remember the taste from over 40 years ago when she would insist that I eat up the fish curry and string hoppers before running off to play hide and seek behind coconut palms. It was the very same taste, I am certain. That is nostalgia you see, in driving up neural resonances, it is far more powerful than fine wine and loving sex.

I call my friend and ask her to book my Jaffna bus ticket.

Monday: Spent the day at the University of Colombo, School of Computing (UCSC). We discuss difficulties in automatic translation between natural languages.

Tuesday: Morning, again at UCSC. We discuss the four undergraduate projects that I support remotely – how to predict if two proteins interact, how to calculate if a small molecule might bind to a protein, on interactions of genes in the rice genome and on building a Sinhala-English translation system. It is great to work with these bright kids!

At lunchtime, my friend brings me the bus tickets. She explains the intricacies of how buses with bubble shock absorbers offset the effect of bumpy rides. “Beyond Vavuniya, roads are still very bad, no?”

Fine night bus ride to Jaffna; I was sitting close enough to eavesdrop on the conversation between the driver and his gOlaya [apprentice], from which I learn much. Half way between Puththalam and Vavuniya he calls the driver of the bus behind him “paaththu vaa machchaan yaanai oNdu nikkuthu [watch out there is an elephant]” ; a bus coming from the other direction makes a Morse code signal which warns him of a traffic police patrol ahead; a random policeman stops the bus near Mankulam and the driver says “maathayaa anthuran naedhdha, ethaa apE bus ekE aavE [Sir, don’t you recognize us, you travelled by our bus the other day?],” and we are waved through — a corrupt cop whose bribe has been pre-paid.

Omanthai still has a border. Locals (holders of national identity cards) stay in the bus, foreigners like me have to get down and obtain clearance. The soldier photocopies my passport. “What is the reason for going to Jaffna?” he asks. “I am a don, doing what dons do.”  “Contact number please?” I tell him. “That is a Colombo number, no? Give me mobile number.” Embarrassing – I do not know it. He gives me a funny look. “What kind of a don are you?” is written all over his smile. He asks me to call his phone, and gets my number from the missed call. Military intelligence is no longer an oxymoron to me.

Something else is interesting. I spoke in Sinhala, and the soldier spoke in English. Contrast this to an experience from HillTop many years ago where I had a disagreement with a member of clerical staff. After a brief argument, I complained to the clerk’s boss. In the three-way conversation that followed, the boss and I spoke to each other in English, but we both spoke to the clerk in Sinhala. The direction of power flow thus established, even though the clerk was technically right, I won.

Wednesday: Going into Jaffna University, I s­ee the name of a building: “Kurushestra.” My friend Aachcharya works here I remember. I go in and speak to a helpful young lady. “Where is Aachcharya?” “He has gone to teach.” No surprise there. We find him and go to their common room for a cup of tea and general gossip.

Something about that lady bugs me. She seemed to be everything that Tamil poets had declared how pretty women ought to look like (hair – clouds, forehead – crescent, eyebrows – concave, eyes – fish and so on). I could not bluntly ask her for her email or facebook account. That could hurt cultural sentiments of the place. But I still need to track her down later. Coming out of Kurushestra, I make a quick sketch of the lady in my diary.

Thursday: An enjoyable workshop, with several good talks and an effective poster session. The hosts have done a brilliant job – great lunch, too. I learn a lot from the Dean about the challenges they face. Readers can see some pictures from the workshop here.

Friday: The new Vice Chancellor is gracious enough to spare some time and talk to me about the University’s plans to set up engineering education at Kilinochchi. Conversation with her tempts me to think of investing in a retirement hut next to the Iranaimadu tank.

Late afternoon I go to the Rio ice cream shop near the Nallur temple, now a prominent tourist attraction, and bump into my friend, Accuratus Numeratus, greedily eating a very large ice cream. He is sweating a lot and is eating the ice cream very fast, as though he purposefully wants to cool down. “What’s up, mate?” I enquire.

He was at the Parameswara junction, taking a photograph, when a soldier had threateningly challenged him: “You, you… photo taking?” A young soldier was expressing suspicion at Numeratus over the use of a camera. Numeratus bursts out in anger: “I am a don doing my don job, returning to my country after 22 years, what is the harm in me taking a photograph? It is not written anywhere this is not allowed, is it?” He shows his Dolphin identity card, making sure his thumb partially covers his name, but ­clearly exposing his job title. That outburst, Numeratus managed to do in fluent Sinhala, with perfect intonation superposed on his phonetics. The soldier backs off, and says “sorry, sir”. Numeratus puts his hand on the young man’s shoulder and says “Oh kaman nae, malli [It’s OK, brother]”.

When the soldier walks away, Numeratus quickly gets into the nearest tuk-tuk and gets himself driven to the ice cream parlour.

“So what is the problem, eh?” I tease him. “There is peace in the country. There is nothing called minority. Everyone is equal. The soldier was curious, you told him off, you called him malli – in fact, my friend, given your age, you should have called him putha [son] — so what exactly is your problem?”

“I will be gone tomorrow,” he explains, “I had the skill to talk my way out of that situation. Just think about people having to go through with such intimidation day in, day out. No wonder these people feel like living in an open prison, don’t you see? Every visitor to Jaffna reports unfilled pot-holes on the roads, but they don’t notice that just beneath the surface, you find much unhealed wounds. Wounds kept open so that salt may be rubbed into them.”

“You are reading too much into this,” I try to calm him down.

“But it also brings memories, man,” he went on, and told me a true incident that happened nearly three decades ago. “Do you know the place Punchi Borella?” In my young days, I used to take the 103 bus from Maradana to Borella a lot — to the YMBA, where chess tournaments were held.  “Yes, I know,” I replied.

“One day, long ago, a young man, twenty years of age, was sitting in this 103 bus and a thug got in, drunk and smelling of arrack. The thug is of blood type S, and the young fellow is of type T. The thug holds the young man by his collar and shouts, `You are type T aren’t you? I am going to kill you, and teach your people a lesson.’”

“The young fellow had the presence of mind and amazing courage to shout back at the thug: `beepuhaama aes penen naedhdha?’ [can’t you see properly when you are drunk?] Do I look like a T, what an idiot you are?’ The young fellow’s outburst came out with perfect intonation, superposed on fluent Sinhala phonetics, just as Numeratus had done half an hour ago in Jaffna. The thug seems convinced and leaves the bus. `hary yung [OK, let’s go],’ shouts the conductor and the bus moves. The young man sweats profusely and trembles, thanking for his survival the Gods he never believed in.”

“And then, this is the punch line,” Numeratus continues after a brief pause, “the conductor walks up to the young man.”  “With his hand on the young fellow’s shoulder, the conductor quietly says into his ears: `bErunaa nE, hondhai? [escaped, no? good]’”

Postscript: In my return journey to Colombo one of the bubble shock absorbers broke and I had to hitch a ride in a far less comfortable bus. At Pettah, getting into a local bus, sleep deprived and with a severe back ache, my Sinhala fails me.

I ask to go to Biththaramalla (instead of Baththaramulla).

This 103 conductor and I share a hearty laugh.

[Author’s note: Part I of this diary, of a visit mainly to Peradeniya just over a year ago, can be read by clicking here]

• Jaffna People Back To Barter Business
• The Story of Learning Lessons by Counting Costs
• Like Slaves In Jaffna
• Questionnaire And Licenses In Jaffna
• For the love of books: A story from Sri Lanka

Photo courtesy asianews.it

“I was on my motorcycle going through this area behind a couple on a motorcycle. The woman was pregnant and they were out probably to do some shopping. The couple was coming fast. They signalled to me and I moved aside to let them overtake. I suddenly saw the couple fall down for no discernible reason and the man writhing in agony. He had been hit by a bullet from the army’s side. I stopped and the pregnant woman pleaded with me to take her husband to the hospital. Most people passed us by engrossed in their own problems and such things had become a daily occurrence. The man whose lower jaw had been blown off was vomiting blood and the situation looked hopeless. What had happened was that when we passed that area on motorbikes, it was our custom to dip our heads as low as possible to minimise our chances of being hit by an army sniper. Because the man had ridden fast and taken a curve in overtaking me, he lacked the balance to dip his head as a precaution.

The stricken man’s wife was helpless. To carry the man to the medical post at Valaignarmadam required a third person on the bike so that the injured man could be sandwiched between us. My bike being too small for that, I asked the wife to help the man onto the bike so that he could sit behind leaning his head on my back. In this manner I took the man to the hospital. By the time I reached there he was dead. It was then that I noticed my own state. A good part of my person was drenched in blood and covered in flies. The flies formed also a thick layer upon the dead man. This brought home to me the absolute squalor of the place.

I was once travelling on the main road when unexpectedly I saw an RPG shell fired by a soldier across the lagoon landing in front of me. I considered and decided that there was no point in stopping and rode on and another RPG shell fell behind me. I warned people travelling in the opposite direction not to proceed as there was an ambush waiting. But no one seemed to take notice. How does one explain such behaviour? On the one hand there is constant danger from shelling and from small weapons fire and ideally children should be inside bunkers. But on the other, you see children playing on the beach and even flying kites, indifferent to sudden death that strikes unawares.”

UTHR(J), Special Report No: 34, Let Them Speak: Truth about Sri Lanka’s Victims of War, December 2009

Moderating the session with Dr. Abuelaish Izzeldin, the author of I Shall Not Hate: A Gaza Doctor’s Journey on the Road to Peace and Human Dignity at the Galle Literary Festival this year was memorable not so much for what Dr. Izzeldin said, but for the audience reaction. It may have been the only session where the speaker was applauded after every response and received a standing ovation at the end of the session.  From the vantage point of the elevated stage, I could see dozens – women as well as men – in tears, or fighting hard against them. The questions had a predictable preface – Dr. Izzeldin’s book made people cry.

With a redesign of The Nation in the offing, columnists were asked to limit their submissions to around 800 words. Around 580 of this column reiterate an inconvenient truth about the human cost of victory. There are hundreds of families, not unlike Dr. Izzeldin’s, not far from where you read this. Dr. Izzeldin survived. Many in Nandikadal did not. Dr. Izzeldin went on to write a book. The horrific stories of those caught between the advancing Sri Lankan Army and the frothing madness of the LTTE aren’t as well-known, even though they are in the public domain. Perhaps grief is easier when its focus is farther away in geography, time or identity? Perhaps the optics and politics of grief, recognition and memorialising – the monuments, statues, renaming of roads, commemorations, garlanding – that take place in the South for war heroes are accepted as more authentic and necessary than the grief of a family in the Vanni whose children were killed or conscripted?

Dr. Izzeldin was visibly moved when he spoke. I remain unconvinced he has come to terms with his own catastrophic loss, and hope he finds peace. For us in this country, we are told we are at peace. Moved by the violence of distant lands, we care not to read our own stories. There are many. Grief is not the exclusive domain of anyone, or any one community. But grief today is unequally recognised, and the space to grieve is unequally framed. If a family in Gaza is able to move us to tears, can 580 words depicting a larger horror move us to tears too?

And if we don’t care enough to read, to ask, to know and to grieve, we must acknowledge that we too are authors of violence.

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This article was first published in The Nation newspaper on 29 January 2011.

• Like Slaves In Jaffna
• Inquiry into a Sri Lankan Man’s Stolen Bicycle
• A recent trip to Vavuniya: For the future looks dark and gloomy
• Let this be the moment that defines us
• War IDPs

Editors note: Groundviews is very pleased to host the web premiere of Longing and belonging series: Diaspora shorts by Kannan Arunasalam. We’ve featured Kannan’s visually stunning and compelling work before in Koothu, kerosene and paper: portraits of resilience, part of the Moving Images series commissioned by Groundviews. Over the coming week we’ll progressively upload Kannan’s short videos, so check back often. Finally, if you have a good broadband connection, we highly recommend that in the trailer below, you turn on HD and view it full screen.

Please see From London to Jaffna for the first time, The science of planning in Jaffna and Returning lives, rebuilding limbs.

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August in Sri Lanka is a month of religious festivals in the north and also a chance for the diaspora to return and reconnect with their homeland. What better time I thought than to try and meet members of the diaspora returning to visit Sri Lanka.

My own journey started six years ago, and since then I’ve made Sri Lanka my home, putting down new roots in the country of my birth. It’s fascinating for me to observe others go through what I went through years ago.

I’m was now looking at ways in which the diaspora are engaging with development work in Sri Lanka, to find out what challenges they face and how their experiences might help others who are also thinking of returning.

I began my assignment for International Alert in Jaffna at the annual Nallur festival. Last August it drew thousands of devotees. This is my hometown and the sights, smells and tastes took me back to my own childhood, growing up here. Jaffna is also home to some Tamil Diaspora and I could understand why they return to experience these things that are still very much a part of their culture. It was nice to see they were back, tracing lost roots and reconnecting with family and friends.  I wanted to meet them, to understand what it was like being back.

One of these visitors was a young Tamil family from London. For the two daughters, it was their very first time in Sri Lanka, visiting what they called their mother’s “home country”.  The family had been helping a local charity from afar and were in Jaffna to visit the charity, as well as to take in the “carnival” atmosphere of the Nallur festival.

I also met Dr Narendran, an associate professor who had worked for many years in Saudi Arabia, but who was back in Sri Lanka with ambitious plans for agriculture and animal husbandry on the islands off the Jaffna peninsula. We talked over coffee at the famous Malayan Café about his plans and later he took me along to the arid environment of the islands, which he compared fondly to the deserts of Saudi Arabia.

From Jaffna I travelled to Mannar where I met Dr Panagamuwa, a Sinhala doctor from Birmingham and a specialist in rehabilitation medicine. He had set up a limb-fitting workshop at the Mannar Hospital, coming under his British based charity, the Metha Foundation. Together with his team of technicians, he attended to the needs of amputees and the disabled. The vast majority were victims of war, but there were also polio sufferers and injuries caused by everyday accidents.

The three individuals have very different stories to tell as were their connections to Sri Lanka. Meeting them underscored what Dr Naredran had told me, that the diaspora is not a homogenous entity – it is a diverse group, with myriad perspectives, motivations and experiences. There were others too, with very different views, and who were not willing to return.  Even the ones who are returning to visit seemed to have reservations. I met many who were engaging with projects here, but who were uncomfortable being open about their views, preferring instead to keep a low profile.

They ones that were prepared to be filmed, inspired me to capture their reflections on being back and engaging with the needs of the north of the country. The three short films under my Longing and Belonging series on the Sri Lankan diaspora aim to encourage constructive discussion on what is no doubt a complex and sensitive aspect of Sri Lankan politics. Tapping into the large resources of the diaspora would greatly benefit the people of Sri Lanka. Not all will be willing to come, but those that can be won over, need to feel more welcome.

• Longing and Belonging series: From London to Jaffna for the first time
• Longing and Belonging series: The science of planning in Jaffna
• Longing and Belonging series: Returning lives, rebuilding limbs
• Paper: The incredible story of Uthayan in Jaffna
• Koothu: Theatre and leprosy in Jaffna

Editors note: The author informs us that this Long Reads article is the result of many months of research, and aimed at promoting reconciliation. It is a dispassionate take on a vexed issue, and the author has in recent weeks shared it on a personal basis with selected political figures in the Government and Opposition. It is published on Groundviews with just a few edits. The author predicts that sooner than later negotiators in Government will come to terms with power sharing in land administration.

The article is especially timely given the statement to media yesterday by Hon. S.M Krishna, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, that President Mahinda Rajapaksa has promised the full implementation of the 13th Amendment plus, and that the Sri Lankan Government would deliver on its promise. The hope of the author is that his article lays the foundation for a progressive dialogue on this vital issue.

Austin Fernando is the author of My Belly is White, and a former Secretary of Defence in Sri Lanka.

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Having observed recent changes of approach regarding other differed stances of the government, (e.g. Terms of Reference of the Parliamentary Select Committee) I initially decided to share thoughts on land power sharing, welcoming a decent dialogue on land power sharing.

I am not a politician or a lawyer, but a believer and supporter of power sharing. As a development administrator I was the Secretary of the Ministry of Provincial Councils and Local Government for three continuous years from 1993-1996, under two different political administrations. I believe these qualify me to look at sharing land powers with all provinces- not only to the North and East.

The already known stance of some in the incumbent government on land power sharing differs from mine. But, governmental or political stances need not be permanent. How can one predict whether the governmental / political stances on devolution or land power sharing would not change? As a Buddhist I believe in “Sabbe Sankara Anichcha” (Everything is impermanent) and apply it even to this conceptual difference, especially in the light of the latest recommendation made by the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission Report stating that devolution should promote greater harmony and unity among the people of this country.[1] Sharing land administration powers is a part of the devolution process enshrined in the Constitution and hence a dialogue on land power sharing can be considered useful, though stances on devolution oscillates in the same personalities, depending on the environment.

For example, today, if one asks Minister Maithripala Sirisena who once declared[2] as the General Secretary of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party that “the Government would devolve all powers including police powers to the East in accordance with the 13^th Amendment to the Constitution” what his stance on sharing land and police powers with provinces is, he will respond differently, because of impermanence of political thinking.

The President being reported in Daily News online December 21^st 2011 as saying “He also noted that an outstanding demand of the TNA for police powers to the North and East is not a practicable proposition” shows some change of attitude on land power sharing, which he included in the same package of non-events earlier. If this is not misreporting, in other words it could mean that he considers land power sharing as practical. The title of this paper therefore indirectly addresses an issue related to a presidential statement and hence a decent debate and tolerance of dissent may not be a waste of effort.

Governmental stances on ‘land power sharing’

I must say the behavior and responses of the incumbent government on power sharing on land is similar to almost all former Sri Lankan governments, though there were differed but extremely rare positive stances for power sharing  taken by the like of Minister Gamini Dissanayake, immediately after the Provincial Councils Act No: 42 of 1987 was passed. For that matter he deserves honor because he was the only Minister who could be credited for such convinced brave steps for land power sharing. Therefore, only blaming the incumbent government for the disinterest, current disagreements and hiatus, as done by Tamil politicians and internationals some time, is unreasonable.

Earlier President Mahinda Rajapaksa categorically declared that he was not for sharing Land and Police Powers with Provinces. Not much explanation was given by him or others for such stance. However, it is not difficult to understand why. I think that it is indirectly explained by Appendix II of the 13^th Amendment to the Constitution (hereinafter Appendix II). I may point out in summary the negative concerns that might have influenced negative perceptions creation for land power sharing.

1. Even though State land continues to be constitutionally vested in the Republic, if the provisions in Appendix II of the 13^th Amendment are adhered in land administration, it may lead to “controls” by the provincial administrations- especially if the provincial administration is politically uncooperative with the government in power and thus should not be permitted.
2. Under 1:3 of Appendix II, alienation or disposition of State land shall be by the President, on the advice of the relevant Provincial Council (PC). One may argue that the government may seek advice, but refuse to accept when offered. Such dissent may be due to non-cooperation by PCs. However, if it happens, it will then dilute the concept of devolution of power by withdrawing from a “give and take policy.”
3. Even though the inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects (e.g. Mahaveli) will be the responsibility of the Government, the actual application of the principles and criteria under 2:3 of Appendix II for “selection of allottees and other incidental matters connected thereto” will be within the powers of the PCs. (Appendix II Clause 2:4). This may excite the ‘center’ as loss of power by devolving, as reflected by the responses of the pro government politicians now.
4. Having got the better of selection of the allottees by the Provinces, which is the space offered for political yields, what will be the gain for the center only by administration of inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects?

Since I am not a lawyer the above concerns may be considered as layman’s interpretations. But the Supreme Court has declared as follows, which may be creating serious concerns for the politicians at the center. In one judgment, it is stated:

“The position that was taken by the learned State Counsel came up in Agrarian Services (Amendment) Bill. Agrarian Services as has been enumerated by the Court, is a subject which is given in the Provincial Councils List as well as in the concurrent list in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. When a subject is listed in the concurrent list, it would be necessary to consider the subject matter in depth to ascertain how much authority the Provincial Councils would have over such a subject. However, this difficulty does not arise with regard to the question under review as there is no reference to the subject matter of land in the concurrent list.

“In fact in the Reserved List, reference is made to State lands and provides that, 

      “State land and Foreshore, except to the extent specified in Item 18 of List I”

Such extents, as referred to earlier are clearly set out in Appendix II of the 9^th Schedule, which specifically states that, “land shall be a Provincial Council Subject.” In considering the aforementioned contents it is abundantly clear that the matter in question is a Provincial Council subject that has been devolved to the Provincial Councils in terms of the Thirteenth Amendment.”[3]

If one goes by this ruling he/ she may reasonably and legally contest the statements made against land power sharing, and the unconstitutionality of such rejection. Another may interpret this judgment as proposing placing Land as a Concurrent List subject, so that it may create the need “to consider the subject matter in depth to ascertain how much authority the Provincial Councils would have over such a subject,” meaning allowing the government at the centre to finger on land issues.

The fear at the center at all times must be the stances that would be taken by an elected PC in the North and East, which will not abide and stand with southern political thinking, stances and implement directives from the center on land power sharing. It cannot be a pipe dream, knowing the political thinking of many Tamil politicians who are not from the two mainstream political parties. One should not forget that the ‘Tamil aspirations’ of Tigers included this demand, expressed as “Homeland Concept” and expanded to a wide area demarcated in their Eelam maps. I suspect that some Tamil politicians must be waiting for the day to constitutionally respond through an elected political entity of theirs (e.g. a PC). This is the suspicion in the minds of southern politicians at the center too, converting them to be negative for the demand. As a last resort, they may one day extend the suspicion to a status of demand for the erasure of PCs from the Constitution. The issue is how far that day is.

The Tamil politicians who are with the government show a different face. It is evident from recent statements in the media made by pro-devolutionist Minister Douglas Devananda. He has suspected “political unrest among people in the south over any attempt to devolve land and police powers.”[4]  He did not mind shedding devolution of Land and Police powers for the time being and demanded implementing the 13^th Amendment. A sigh of relief would have appeared on Minister Devananda’s face having seen the above quote in the Daily News. There is also the hard view that agrees with the President’s, held by some of his supportive political groups in the incumbent government, which might have instilled more of such fear in Minister Devananda, for him to succumb in this manner. When he is the Chief Minister of the North, as he aspires to be, and pressured by the elected body, will he be able to reject a very popular constitutionally accepted political demand to administer land in his Province? Will the Buddhist teaching of impermanence prevail on his current statement to implement the 13^th Amendment, sans land and police powers?

For the southern pro-government incumbent provincial politicians land power sharing does not seem to be a concern. From court cases related to land power sharing (e.g. Please see foot note 12 for one recent case in Appeal Courts) it is apparent the Provincial Land Commissioners already use authority over land. So much so, the first respondent in the case mentioned in foot note 12 was the “Land Commissioner (Southern Province)”. If the government at the center too is politically theirs, it is not difficult to deal with land administration arrangements to suit their convenience and satisfaction. Since it is so currently (2011), provincial politicians would not mind the status quo to operate under ‘camouflage.’ In a way, not permitting such enjoyment of constitutional rights overtly or covertly to the northern and eastern PC authorities may be interpreted by them as discriminatory.

But the Tamil politicians reaping the benefits irk the politicians at the center for political and popularity reasons, which has been aggravated after the war victory in May 2009. The central political feeling may be “Why should the government give in to a Tiger demand after wiping them out?” which appears correct. The Tamil political feeling may be “Why should not we enjoy the political right we have earned through the Constitution?” A pro-devolutionist cannot disagree with it.

Purpose of this exercise

The attempt here is to explore a via media to share power on lands, with least annoyance created to opponents of power sharing with all Provinces, while staying within the operative constitutional provisions. In other words, the purpose is to answer the titled query aiming to focus on solutions to one itching issue before the Government and the electorate, sometimes extending across the oceans.

It is neither a challenge to the thinking of the supporters of extensive and comprehensive centralization, nor a backup to the political parties vociferously demanding total sharing of land powers in the North and East Provinces. This is only an exploration of justifiable compromises, to enable withdrawing from hawkish demands for power sharing, while agreeing with the need for power sharing, as well as, to disable mooting selfish non-sharing of land administration. This effort aims through dialogue carving a sensible practical operational medium which may be acceptable to both ‘devolutionists’ and ‘centralists’.

What is attempted here is legal, as there had been confirmations received on this issue by decisions taken by the Supreme Courts[5]. As quoted earlier such decision has firmed up that land is a devolved subject. Hence, what is wrong in attempting a via media to respect such decision from the highest court?

Approach of this presentation

In finding the compromising paths for land power sharing, I consider it important to revisit the past, which is forgotten by political hierarchies, policy makers, professionals, lawyers and media who oppose devolution as a process.

I do not think it is required to visit the present State land management issues in the South because (as stated above) the PCs and the government currently belong to the same political group. It has been alleged that in the North and East governmental pressure on land administration had been made on the PC through the Governors. I believe that though there is no openly and expressly stated land power sharing with PCs, at present through operational arrangements land administration is done by the PCs, (other than in the North and East), as wished by the Chief Ministers, who are generally the Ministers in the PCs in charge of the Land subject. Hence, the non-insistence of this power by current Provinces and even publicly refusing devolved land powers by some southern provincial politicians is only camouflage.

This presentation will briefly discuss the background for power sharing, fears expressed on land power sharing, counter such fears, explain actions already carried out by successive governments towards this end and summarily propose a power sharing process considered by me as feasible within the current constitutional provisions, which can be reviewed and amended as required. However, being a layman development administrator, my focus will be on tacit application of the laws. In the process some legal implications will be discussed hoping that the required political and legal inputs would be explored, reviewed, revised and applied by appropriate legal experts and politicians.

Indo- Lanka Accord 

In 1987 the government devolved power to the PCs after the Indo – Lanka Accord. Some argue that devolution was a process gulped by Sri Lanka under Indian compulsions and that it is a project “Made in India” for all intents and purposes. I am aware of the opinion expressed –rightly or wrongly- that India has deliberately used the Appendix II in the 13^th Amendment to favor the demands of Tamils. Some political authorities and anti-Indian spokespersons oppose land power-sharing quoting these anti-Indian sentiments. But, they little realize that the former have signed the declaration or swore the Fourth Schedule in the  Constitution to uphold and defend the Constitution of Sri Lanka, which also carries sharing of land powers  with the PCs.

Expressed fears of devolving land powers and Appendix II

The current constitutional provisions on land power sharing are comprehensively expressed under Appendix II and Item 18 of List I under the 13^th Amendment to the Constitution.

The main theme of arguments enunciated against land power sharing is based on the following.

1. Such power sharing will lead to a duplication of a Federal State arrangement where total land administration will fall in to the hands of ‘federated Provinces’, thus superseding the Cabinet at the centre. With politicians least respecting the Principle of Subsidiarity[6] and holding to centralization, based on political hegemony at all institutional levels (e.g. National, Provincial, Local Authority or even at community – i.e. Cooperative or Rural Development Society), this issue has become acute.
2. The President’s constitutional authority [Article 33 (d) of the Constitution] on State land will be challenged by the Provinces.
3.  The State land needs of the Security Forces could be ‘blocked’ by minority controlled North and East PCs creating security threats and consequently threatening peace, thus favoring Tiger regrouping.[7]
4. The extent of land in the North and East is so large; such vast resource will be monopolized by the North and East PCs- thus paving way to a meager national ethnic minority to discriminately control one third or more of land of the country.[8]
5. Land administration by Provinces will reject or scuttle alleviating land hunger of the majority community, which had been practiced from first Sri Lankan Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake’s era.
6. The larger areas of land mostly eligible for virgin development are in the North and East and the land related power sharing will discriminate and jeopardize the majority social welfare in other provinces due to possible legal inaccessibility to lands in the North and East, if land administration power is devolved to PCs and snobbishly used by them.
7. Though not publicly stated, a hidden feeling exists that the Sinhalese supremacy as an ethnic group will be weakened by land power sharing due to constraints placed on the majority community.
8. In a situation where the government is formed by one political group and the PC administration from another opposing political group, whichever the PC is, there will be difficulty in cooperating on land administration. In other words, government authority could be rejected by the PC, thus converting the central state authority to be secondary to provincial, if proper controls are not in place.
9. The hold of the government on environment considerations will be jeopardized by sharing land powers because resources such as watersheds, rivers etc are dual or multi-provincial assets.

The fear in (1) above is negated by the fact that Sri Lanka is a Unitary State, and not Federal or Quasi Federal. Hence there are many legal restrictions on that alone to counter such status, unless a Federal Constitution is accepted by the country, which seems to me millions of light years away from reality, unless a political miracle happens. Of course, if miraculously a Federal Constitution is accepted, the country has to abide by its stipulations because it is the country’s preference.

Concern (2) is negated by Article 33 (d) of the Constitution and it already made known by the interpretations by the Attorney General, which will be discussed later.

Concern (3) above can be managed under Appendix II 1- 1:1 where only a consultation is required with the PCs, when State land is required for a Reserved Subject. For me ‘consultation’ does not mean ‘concurrence’ or ‘permission’. It means procedures for assessing public opinion about a plan or major development proposal. Devolution can succeed only with such dialogue and compromises made.

Arguments (4) to (8) are not necessarily centered on land issues but on political and ethnic or communal considerations, as the North and East are predominantly populated by minorities who will elect majority of their provincial “rulers” from minority communities. It will make the national majority of Sinhalese a regional minority which will not be a consideration for other provinces. This discriminatory approach is in itself anti-constitutional because a person who has declared upholding and defending the Constitution (i.e. Fourth Schedule to the Constitution) will be violating the Constitution provisions by negating Clause 3:3 of Appendix II  by debasing land policy on “political and communal” aspects.

Any PC or parliamentary or other constitutionally established authority within the Government / Opposition hierarchies, thus inclusive of the Tamil politicians,  too will be violating the Constitution in similar manner by acting with such discriminatory bias, whichever the communal  / political group that is favored by them.

The concern (9) is looked after by Clauses 3.2 and 3.3 of Appendix II and Article 27 (14) of Directive Principles in the Constitution.

Being a non-lawyer layman I do not intend dealing with intricate legal issues, but my stance (subject to correction by legal luminaries) is that the concerns in (9) and other legal issues are surmountable under existing constitutional provisions.

Countering fears on devolving land administration powers

Let me briefly counter these fears that suggest that existing constitutional provisions assist federating, provincially monopolizing, leaving space to block national land hunger solutions, discriminating the majority and degrading environment.  Nevertheless, unexpected repercussions may arise but it is a case of management to overcome them.

(1)    The preamble of scheduled List II under 13^th Amendment to the Constitution gives the National Policy making power on all subjects (thus ‘land’ included) to the government by being “Reserved” and not to the PCs. Reaffirmation of this power is in Appendix II- 3:1 through the National Land Commission” (NLC) of the government, and not by the PCs. Under Clause 3.4 of Appendix II, the PCs have to exercise powers devolved on them “having due regard to the national policy on land formulated by the NLC, which will be an arm of the State. Therefore, the threat of monopolizing and ad hoc manipulations by the PCs will not be possible. Note: The National Policy on any subject / function under the 13^th Amendment which lies in the hands of the government cannot be cajoled or crippled to suit narrow minority political gains of political parties that demand power sharing. They cannot be rhetoric and debunk the constitutionality. Those from the government ranks who oppose devolution of land powers should clearly understand the power lying in the hands of the government. Instead they have throughout exhibited jittery weak-kneed responses to devolve. However, the accepted work steps to declare a National Policy is not clear. Is there any law, constitutional arrangement, institutional arrangement or a commonly accepted process for this exercise, except for land national policy making? If available, has any government made use of any such system for national policy making?

(2)    According to Appendix II preamble “State land shall continue to vest in the Republic” and not with the PCs and subjected to Article 33 (d) of the Constitution and written law. This is further subjected to special provisions stated in Clause 1 of Appendix II. Of course, the challenge will be how to manage the special provisions to bring the conflicting groups together when there are given court rulings.

(3)    Disposition of State land will be in accordance with Article 33 (d) of the Constitution which states that the Public Seal of the Republic for grants and disposition of lands and immovable property will be a power and function of the President. It is noted the attempts through PC Statutes to thwart this power and authority has been successfully countered by the government.[9]

(4)    Land as a subject and function will be controlled by the government as per (1), (2) and (3) above, excepting in some constitutionally identified areas, as mentioned under (5) below.

(5)    Appendix II Clauses 1- 1:1 to 1:3 empowers the government to:

(a)    Utilize land for a Reserved or Concurrent subject by the government in accordance of laws governing. The government shall ‘consult’ the provinces but not be dictated by the PCs, or for that matter need not always agree with the PCs’ opinion. If the interpretation of ‘consultation’ is to seek permission it will complicate the issue and hence care should be taken in drafting working arrangements of the national policy on lands. However, ‘consultation’ will be one way to condition stiffened stances.

(b)    Make available land for provincial subjects for the administration, control and utilization in accordance with the laws and statutes governing land, for which the national policy of the NLC will be the main guideline (Clause 3:4 of Appendix II). It will be seen later that there had been some accepted ways in the past and review and imposition of the appropriate may be considered by authorities.

(c)    Permit the President to alienate and dispose any State land on the advice of the PCs, which makes the government powerful to manage lands under power sharing. Here too it must be remembered that PC advice need not be mandatorily accepted[10], but reasonable and due consideration will enhance required relationships between the centre and periphery.

Note-1: The Attorney General has interpreted this matter further by opining that Clause 1:3 of Appendix II is only confined to alienation[11] and disposition of state land which had been released to a PC for PC subjects in terms of Clause 1:2 of Appendix II for which the advice of the relevant PC will be required. This means that the right of the State to dispose State land in accordance with Article 33 (d) of the Constitution and other written law (which will include the Crown Lands Ordinance) is unfettered.[12]

Note-2: Whether the ‘advice’ is binding on alienation or disposition of State land may be a concerned matter. On perusal as a layman, it is observed that there are instances where ‘advice’ comes in to limelight in PC administration. For example Article 154B (8) (d) relates to the Governor acting “in accordance with the advice of the Chief Minister” who possesses the majority in the PC[13]. Under 154F (1) the need to act in “accordance with such advice” is stated. But under 1:3 of Appendix II such forcible use is not demanded. The President is subjected to act “in accordance with the laws governing the matter” and not on the advice of the PC. It meant working in accordance with the Land Laws already in place and even the future legal instruments that could be passed.

(d)    The constitutional provisions for inter-provincial irrigation and land development projects (e.g. Mahaveli Scheme) straightforwardly lie in the hands of the government, as per Clause 2 of Appendix II. However, compromises to be made towards the role of PCs as per Appendix II should be explored, as stiffened status will not support power sharing. The NLC and the National Policy could assist in building the required rapport. [14]

(e)    Under Clause 2:3 of Appendix II the principles and criteria regarding the size of the holdings will be determined by the government in consultation with the PCs, but not unilaterally by PCs or under the dictation of the latter.

(f)     The criteria for allottee selection will be on the degree of landlessness, family size, income levels, agricultural background etc (Clause 2:4), which had been similar during Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake days and later, until politicization of selection increased under all successive political regimes. One may argue that the application of these criteria is within PCs powers. But, PCs shall exercise such powers having due regard to the National Policy formulated by the NLC. (Appendix II- Clause 3:4). The NLC can within the constitutional provisions incorporate to the National Land Policy other appropriate criteria on selection of allottees or processes, tagged to constitutionally approved ones.

(g)    Further, ethnic ratios and expansion of the allottees to the Province from districts is assured by Clause 2:5 of Appendix II, which will look after all communities on a proportional basis.

(h)    Clause 2:6 of Appendix II assures the equity principle of land management.

(i)     The politically vulnerable maintenance of demographic ratios is assured by Clause 2:7 of Appendix II.

The focused demands of land powers and the expressions used at such instances made by Tamil politicians, media and Diaspora spokespersons have made this issue acute and suspicious, with an ethnic bias. It is unfortunate. Their interests project expressions endorsing the “Homeland Concept” of the Tigers. This concept and counter concepts have been in circulation for long. The merged North and East concept of the Tigers and Tamil politicians was one such, which was countered during President JR Jayewardene’s tenure by opening up Dollar and Kent Farms and attempts made to redraw the provincial boundaries by colonization the banks of Yan Oya. Probably the Tamil spokespersons are convinced now (end 2011) that it is currently happening.

The brewing demand for Tamil homeland was orchestrated recently by TNA Leader R Sampanthan MP and MA Sumanthiran MP where they focused on the land owned by Tamil people’.[15] Some called these lands “Tamil lands”[16] tagging ethnicity to lands. Countering this is observed right now with carving of Weli Oya Divisional Secretary’s Division by the government replicating status anticipated by the Yan Oya Project of the UNP regime quoted above. These Tamil politicians demanding land administration powers, having created suspected ulterior motives of political and communal bias also commit the same judgmental error, equivalent to those committed by some pro-government political authorities in the South who resent sharing land powers with the Provinces.

Land administration power sharing past interventions

May I start with the political beliefs behind land power sharing?

The politicians rely on conventional thinking of power sharing. So much so deliberately or inadvertently they place devolution and decentralization as an ethnic issue. This status is due to a false premise, also patronized by many Tamil and some Sinhalese politicians. Many Tamil politicians think that North and East belong to the Tamil speaking people, and none other. Many Sinhalese politicians and sometimes bureaucrats think that North and East should be left alone as the potential area for alienation of their choice and should not be lost to minority administrations. Further, they argue on historical, ethnological and archeological evidence to demand total control of land, and some going to the extent of Sinhalese- Buddhist domination of areas. How unfortunate to observe a devastated nation cracked to splinters, population and leaders think in divisive and non-integrative terms after a nearly thirty year conflict, when unity and integration should be the theme for nation building? This is the psychological paranoia created by trust deficiency, which takes various shapes, one being future security considerations, another being State aided colonization. And, there may be many others.

Let us glimpse on the past practices that had been guided by this mythological beliefs. I say so because how governments acted had been decided by politicians’ whim and fancy, and, unfortunately and not necessarily by sanity, judiciousness or constitutional reasoning.

The points quoted here are proof of how successive governments performed in power sharing exercises on land. The importance of reference to such actions is that the governments cannot be ad hoc, nor need to waste time to reinvent the wheels. And further, this proof provides the understanding that a government could be challenged on legality, processes, past, continuity, predictability that should be maintained by a government. Such challenge will not motivate reconciliation, which seems to me as a serious pressure exerted on the incumbent government, especially by the Indian South Block, though sometimes subtly handled by them with a velvet glove. Or, are we not privy to what really happens to conjecture so?

I flag some of the actions that related to the land power sharing exercise undertaken by successive governments, which cannot be erased by rhetoric, as I see from statements made by politicians, some professionals, opinion makers and journalists etc. Summarily some salient aspects are stated below.

(1)    The 13^th Amendment has proposed several institutional arrangements and legal provisions that could make land power sharing a possibility. All land related activities are expected to be done in accordance with Appendix II. This status could be used to have controls through the NLC, which can safeguard governmental interests, as it derives power from the basic law- i.e. the Constitution.

(2)    It is reminded that the then Minister of Land and Land Development (Minister Gamini Dissanayake) met the Chief Ministers, Provincial Ministers, Chief Secretaries and senior officials on August 4^th 1988 and made clear the State policy on devolution of land powers under the 13^th Amendment. His Secretary by circulars informed the extent and coverage of land powers that have to be devolved by ministries and departments and went to the extent of informing that the officers in the Provinces who were carrying out the functions of Lands and Irrigation under List I would thereafter function under the administrative fiat of the Provincial Secretary of Lands and Irrigation.[17]

(3)    The above circular was issued after wide dialogue between the government and provincial administrators and extended to even submitting a draft Statute for land power sharing, from which the Ministry expected fulfilling provincial statute making.[18]

(4)    The Ministry intended to share resources with the provinces for land management as stated in this circular.[19]

(5)    A conflict in law on delegation of power based on Clause 1:3 of Appendix II, which queried on the alienation or disposition of State land within a Province to any citizen or to any organization by the President was pointed out by the Ministry of Lands and Land Development[20] to the Presidential Secretariat.[21]

(6)    To this conflict the Attorney General responded[22] that “it would be competent for the President to delegate any power in terms of Section 105 of the Crown Lands Ordinance”.[23] But the Attorney General additionally advised that “before making the proposed delegation, it would be necessary to amend the Third Schedule in Regulation 24 made under Sections 95 and 96 read with Section 105 of the said Ordinance”. I do not think this amendment was done.

(7)    Since there was a time lag for Statute making the PCs (Consequential Provisions) Act No: 12 of 1989 was passed by the Parliament and certified by the Speaker on May 30^th 1989. Its preamble says that it is an “AN ACT TO MAKE INTERIM PROVISION FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF WRITTEN LAW ON MATTERS SET OUT IN LIST I OF THE NINTH SCHEDULE TO THE CONSTITUTION” which showed the interest and intent of the government for continuity of implementing the constitutional provisions of the 13^th Amendment (not only State land matters).

(8)    Though there is fear among the opponents of power sharing on land that PCs will have total power on alienation and disposition of any State land in a Province, based on the Attorney General’s opinion the Secretary of Lands advised that “the advice of the relevant PC will be required only for the alienation and disposition of State land which have been made available to PCs for PCs subjects (List I).”[24] Hence, the above mentioned fear may be redundant as the PCs’ authority is restrained / limited by release of lands by the government to the PCs [summarily explained below under (9)] and due to the requirement for the PCs to adhere to the National Policy that is formulated by the NLC. (See Appendix II- Clause 3:4.)

(9)    Release of State lands thus becomes very crucial for which there were arrangements made by the then (1989) Ministry of Lands.[25]  Accordingly, when an application is made to the Minister of Lands and Land Development, it will be processed by the Ministry and approved by the Minister; and, when the request is for more than 500 acres it will be submitted to the Cabinet for approval. When the approval from the two sources is received, a certificate of release will be issued by the Minister of Lands. The Land Commissioner will release land to the PC through the GAs. The fear that the provinces will grab State land as they wished is rejected or at least satisfactorily diluted when this process of release of State land is considered. The authorities involved in the operation are all centrally government managed and hence will be center friendly.  As it is, land administration can be reinforced by the NLC by delegating more powers to the GAs, as decided by the Cabinet recently (October 2011)[26], if accepted by the NLC. These past processes can be learning experiences.

(10)  Since the PCs were managing land affairs in different ways, the Ministry of Lands and Land Development clarified the operational status on transfer of land work to the PCs under several important legal instruments , i.e. the Land Development Ordinance,  as amended by Act No: 16 of 1969 and Act No: 67 of 1989, Crown Lands Ordinance No: 8 of 1947, Land Grants (Special Provisions) Act No: 43 of 1979 and State Lands (Recovery Possession) Act No: 7 amended by Act No: 58 of 1981.[27] These have looked after the needs of the government up to now (with revisions as required) and improved by the government under the Bimsaviya Programme.[28]

(11)  There is grave fear in the minds of southern politicians that the Tamil politicians will encourage encroachment of State lands as there had been similar experiences with the Gandhian Movement and others in the quest for state power by the Tigers. Hence this fear may be even justified. Even this issue is covered under Act No: 29 of 1983, Regularization of Encroachments wherein it was expected that PCs receive the concurrence of such regularization through the Land Commissioner and Ministry of Lands, again central authorities.[29] The inputs of guidelines by the NLC could be used to tighten screws as required by endorsement, if such fear is intact even now, or until clear understanding is reached.

(12)  Keeping to the constitutional requirements, the Ministry of Lands directed that all lands other than the Inter Provincial Irrigation and Land Development Projects should be administered by the PCs and kept the decision making power on the latter lands in the centralized unit of GAs at the District level, again a central authority. If this is the way how it ought to be, the NLC mechanism could be utilized as an alternative authority to the Ministry of Lands even in the future.

(13)  According to the instructions given by the Ministry of Lands, PCs could initiate the alienation of State lands for which the lands had to be released by the Government and this will be done according to the process mentioned in (9) above, which gives the handle to the government and not to Provinces. It was categorically mentioned that alienation of lands under small tanks rehabilitated under Village Irrigation Rehabilitation Project which did not come under the Inter Provincial Irrigation and Land Development should be done by the PCs[30]. If 13^th Amendment is for power sharing, and at least this power is not given to Provinces, what is farcically shared or devolved?

(14)  The Ministry was cautious with regard to possession of documents which was to be done through the GAs or Provincial Land Commissioners due to the ongoing conflict situation in the country, which may be reviewed at present after war victory.

(15)  The Appendix II made a very important provision regarding the establishment of the NLC, under Clause 3. This proposition has created many knee-jerks among southern politicians. The NLC was not appointed by any government after 1987, though required by the Constitution.  It was perhaps due to several reasons, though Appendix II was very clear that its appointment was by the government, and PCs should exercise the devolved powers having due regard to the National Policy as formulated by the NLC[31]. Reasoning for non appointment of the NLC is thought of as follows:

(a)  The prevalent understanding that national policy making should not be in the hands of a Commission but in the ‘supreme’ Cabinet, as such policy making will negate the powers and authority of the ‘central’ politicians in the Cabinet.[32] However, national policy making is completely controlled by the government under the preamble to List II under the 13^th Amendment, Article 33 (d) of the Constitution and Appendix II- Clause 3.

(b)  The fear was that the NLC membership in numbers will be more biased to the eight PCs and hence the PCs may dictate to the government on land issues- the tail wagging the dog! When the NLC Bill was presented in the Parliament on July 21 1992, this fear was erased by making provision for 19 members under Section 3 of the draft Bill. The overriding power was kept in the hands of the government by proposing a larger number having allegiance to the center and thus the NLC’s National Land Policy would have been obviously centre oriented.[33]

(c)  The monopolistic power that was wielded by the Parliamentarians on land issues since Independence cannot be retained if land powers are shared because the lands released for alienation and disposition will be managed by the PCs according to the Constitution. This is one selfish jealousy that prevents the centre to hold on to land powers. But, if needed to counter misdoings, the National Policy approved by the NLC can provide for reasonable measures such as reviews.

(d)  In addition, if the government and PCs are in different political controlling hands it may thus provide opportunities for the PCs to come in to conflicts with the opposing political groups during alienation and disposition of land. If the ongoing dialogues are an indicator it is certain that such conflicts would occur, especially between the center and North and East Provinces. Even now this happens in southern PC areas when political power rests with the same political group. And, some times after an election selected allottees are chased away from the legally alienated lands due to political reasons! However, the NLC should strictly create the selection criteria with national binding that could prevent such happening. Additionally, the Technical Secretariat in Clause 3:2 in Appendix II should introduce methods to settle conflicts of interest between and among PCs / Government.

(e)  The unpreparedness of Land Ministers to think that the NLC is the body to make the National Policy for State Lands was openly expressed by the Ministry of Lands advising Provinces and District Administration to inquire on National Policy from them,[34] while concurrently and conveniently evading appointment of the NLC, thus validating reason for such direction by the Ministry of Lands.

(16)  The Bill presented in the Parliament to establish the NLC gave the powers and functions of the Commission that included the preparation of the national policy with regard to the use of State lands and to lay down norms in regard to the use of State lands having regard to the soil, climate, rainfall, soil erosion, forest cover, environmental factors and economic viability, which are the interests of the Technical Secretariat under Section 14 of the draft Bill. But this Bill never saw the light of the day and lapsed after nearly two years on June 24^th 1994 with the dissolution of the Parliament. This showed how the then UNP government that showed extreme keenness to devolve land powers in 1989 lagged behind in five years.  It coincided with another important political scenario- i.e. change of hands of the presidential administration, as well as allocation of the subject of Land in the Cabinet.

(17)    Administrative control of Provincial Land Commissioners by governmental fiat was done in several ways. Firstly, the government took steps to appoint all Provincial Land Commissioners from among Assistant or Deputy Land Commissioners of the Land Commissioners Department[35] Secondly, the Provincial Land Commissioners were concurrently appointed as Additional Land Commissioners.[36] Thirdly, the Land Commissioner commenced Provincial Land Commissioners Meetings where land management issues were discussed and directions were given. Fourthly, with the Transfer of Powers Act the Divisional Secretaries were made Heads of Departments of the centre and land work in the Divisions was left in their hands using centralized authority. These arrangements kept the provincial land administrators under the thumb of the centre and not really under the PCs. Is it the latter been tried now (end 2011) by strengthening the hands of the District Secretaries?

(18)    Two Provinces, namely North Central and Western, passed the Land Statutes.[37] However, the government did not want these statutes to be implemented. The government received the Attorney General’s Department blessings to intervene on recommendations made by the Land Commissioner to stop implementation[38]. Some provisions in these Statutes were conflicting with or suggesting encroachment of Reserved constitutional provisions, which incidentally found to be wanting by the government on reasonable grounds. I may quote one such provision to prove the point. In the Land Statute 5 of 1994 passed by the North Central Province, Section 3 while stating that the implementation of the Statute was subject to the powers vested to the President under the Constitution, included provision to issue grants under Section 4.1- a presidential power under Article 33 (d) of the Constitution. In another case the Statute empowered the PC under 3.6 to deal with mining, disposition of minerals etc, which is a power granted to the government under the Reserved List ‘Minerals and Mines (b)’. Hence, it was not surprising to observe the ‘central’ government [39] and Attorney General opposing such provisions, and making use of such opportunity to steamroll the PC by using Executive direction. This is the way how the Government which was so accommodative in 1989 to pass the Statutes (by even sharing a draft Statute) changed its course in 1995 due to political decisions and afterwards blocked the implementation of the Statutes which were passed by the PCs.

(19)    When I was the Secretary of PCs, end 1993 a similar issue was raised and on the instructions of Lands Minister Paul Perera, circular instructions were issued by the Secretary Lands reiterating the already explained constitutional provisions.[40] I guess this was due to my refusal to permit alienation of land on a request of a UNP parliamentarian and my acting in defense of the Southern PC under (Opposition) Chief Minister Amarasiri Dodangoda. Later even Governors were cautioned by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Provincial Councils and Local Government to ensure that Land Statutes were delayed or not passed.[41] These experiences taught how governments could pressure not to share land powers.

Need for a National Land Policy as per 13^th Amendment

The National Policy on Land is specifically mentioned in Appendix II Clause 3:1 and the implementation by PCs is mentioned in Clause 3:4 of the same.

The Land Commissioner or the Secretary of Land or President’s Secretary[42] has been declaring what should be the purported Land Policy or guidelines for adherence by the center, PCs and even other government institutions. Though the NLC was the institution to do this job by constitutional empowerment and when there was no attempt even to frame a law to establish the NLC, how could it perform? How could extraneous authorities be restrained from acting in this manner in such lacuna? If one argues that this was deliberate usurpation of constitutional power and thus a violation of the Constitution, it shall hold water.

Ad hocism was observed through out. As mentioned earlier there were political and positive bureaucratic interventions just after the PCs Act was passed. Immediately after the change of presidency in 1989 this commitment lapsed and all institutional arrangements were directed towards centralizing, affecting good performance of devolution and land was one area thus affected heavily. I may list a few of these actions for reference sake to prove that there were negative attitudes against devolution exhibited by all successive governments.

1. Withdrawing Assistant GAs from PCs to the center, creating Divisional Secretariats responsible to the center and allowing them to handle land issues, appointment of Provincial Land Commissioners faithful to the center (during President R. Premadasa’s term)
2. Withdrawal of Grama Niladharis from the PCs (during President D. B. Wijetunga’s term)
3. Appointing Committees to decide on land policy issues comprising only of central government representatives and without a representative from the Ministry of Provincial Councils at the center (PM Ranil Wickremasinghe’s term)
4. Issuing of orders, guidelines and adherence notes to PCs and central agencies etc by the Presidential Secretariats (during Presidents D.B. Wijetunga’s, Chandrika Kumaratunga’s and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s terms)
5. Gazetting of Land Use Policy Planning Department by executive fiat by the Ministry of Lands[43] encroaching in to a portion of NLC powers endowed by the Constitution under item 3.2 of Annex II. (President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s term)

These show the extent of centralized encroachments and interference on the constitutionally provided devolution of powers. Similarly it affected the National Land Policy formulation mechanism authorized by the Constitution.

Proposition for consideration

The basics of State land are unknown to the general public. Similarly, they are in the dark on devolution and centralization. They will face the same amount or more of less of similar injustices, favoritisms, political interventions, corruption etc, as they had been for ages whether the land powers are shared with the PCs or not. As a former land administrator I have seen these happening under all political regimes.

The current lack of dialogue on land power sharing in all quarters other than among politicians proves the narrow understanding and disinterest the public have on this issue. It is mostly the politicians in the government and Tamil groups who are interested in the cause for land power sharing. They are the affected groups from sharing or non-sharing of powers on land. For political expediency parliamentarians and even those in the PCs who would gain more power by devolution reject and refuse land power sharing, as observed from the statements made by parliamentarian Deputy Minister Karuna Amman who had vociferously demanded power sharing earlier when he was a Tiger and PC Chief Minister of the East and PC Chief Ministers even in the South. Are they speaking their hearts out? I doubt the integrity of their intentions. How politicized the issue is proved by such behavior. Hence, the propositions are to sort out a crucial political issue on the table.

I may summarily state on a step by step basis the way out of this embroiled status, leaving space for improvements by the Executive and other political, legal and administrative hierarchies.

1. On parliamentary approval of the NLC law the government can establish the NLC according to the requirements of Clause 3:1 of Appendix II to formulate the National Land Policy and create the Technical Secretariat as per Clause 3.2 of Appendix II with persons possessing expertise to handle land issues.
2. Let the NLC initially review the current national land policies and their implementation status to identify the strengths and weaknesses. It should find the threats for devolution and opportunities for further improvements.
3. Find out from the above exercises the areas where the government should make revisions to State land use, land release, alienation and disposition processes. The National Land Policy should be an outcome of these deliberations and perhaps by serious studies undertaken by the NLC Technical Secretariat, and not on ad hoc decisions and stipulations.
4. A White Paper on National Land Policy should be prepared by the NLC which could be discussed with the PCs and at the Parliamentary Consultative Committee before it is presented to the Cabinet for approval. Large amount of information mentioned above on past interventions could be made use of as appropriate in the preparation of this White Paper. This process will fulfill the constitutional requirement of List II Preamble for policy making and erase the suspected negative inhibition that the Cabinet will be secondary to the Provinces.
5. The Attorney General will have to observe and unambiguously advise the NLC on the application of the National Land Policy from its formulation to implementation, monitoring and reviewing stages to ensure conflicts are minimized to the maximum in implementation and to support drafting a common Land Administration Statute that should balance and erase the suspicions in the minds of the government and PCs. A senior representative from Attorney General’s Department should be seconded to this Secretariat on full time basis or at least nominated to assist the NLC.
6. The NLC should carry on as an ongoing and continuing exercise by way of monitoring and evaluating the progress or digressions or deviations that occur in the implementation of the National Land Policy and propose revisions and amendments as required making it an efficient and effective work process. NLC will advise the government (i.e. Cabinet) on areas which will need future policy and implementation revisions, for the Cabinet to decide on legal and operational amendments, as required.

This issue is not as simple as one could present in a paper. It is a much more serious legal, political, socio-economic and ethical issue. However, if the government is interested in sharing power with the PCs on land administration, these may be initial steps that could be considered. These could be the foundation for change of attitudes and actions. One may note that compromises have to be reached if the ends in the 13^th Amendment are to be achieved. It cannot be achieved by demanding the pound of flesh as done mostly by devolutionists and Tamil politicians, especially in the Tamil National Alliance or by denials alone as done by some pro-centralists opinion makers and southern politicians. “Give and take” mentality has to be adored.

I believe that the government currently thinks in the same pose as seen from the stance of President Mahinda Rajapaksa who had requested Democratic People’s Front leader Mano Ganesan to convince the TNA to drop its hard line stance, be flexible and cooperate with the government to find a solution to the national issue.[44] Cannot one consider the earlier quoted Daily News statement by the President a show of flexibility and cooperation? Any way clapping with one palm is impossible!

Conclusion

If the government is determined not to share power in anything and carry on with centralization whatever the opposing political demands are, and give a backroom position to devolution and reconciliation, the propositions given here can be instantly ignored. Perhaps, erasure of the 13^th Amendment may solve the issue of devolution for good! The day it happens the validity of this paper will exist no more. The manner in which the government is acting even gives the indication that it could be on the way, if too much pressured. One should not push the President to the wall and expect him to succumb when he is in total control of the Parliament and the country. Until then the hope is that the case for land power sharing could and should be revisited under the nagging circumstances mentioned above.

It will be very embarrassing and difficult for the government to run away from giving a fair deal for sharing land powers. This demand has constitutional validity, backed by recorded judicial decisions from the most superior courts, some decided by the very same luminaries who will sit on judgment on the issue. It is pursued relentlessly by Tamil political authorities and the internationals, in an environment where a government appointed Commission recommends devolution and when the government is exploring avenues of proving its genuineness of the commitment for change to Sri Lankans –especially to Tamils- and internationals.

Since the demand is made by political negotiators like parliamentarians R. Sampanthan and M.A. Sumanthiran (at government initiated negotiations) who do not carry suicide bombs like Velupillai Prabhakaran, it will be difficult for the government to throw down the gauntlet calling them terrorists, as the government did with the Tigers. I believe that one day –sooner than later- the government and Tamil negotiators will come to terms on an agreed basis of power sharing in land administration.

It has to invariably happen irrespective of fears in the mind of Minister Douglas Devananda as quoted earlier and the negative stances taken by Ministers like Wimal Weerawansa and Champika Ranawaka on land power sharing. It has to happen even though professionals like Attorney Gomin Dayasiri or Dr. Gunadasa Amarasekara reason out for the rejection of this demand. The important million dollar question will be to what extent can the government and Tamil politicians agree on devolving land powers to the PCs and how. In that context the above proposal may be basic, but could be considered as an initial approach to answer this query.

Concurrently, it is the war victory that gives the strength to reconcile and take convinced extremely bold decisions. Such decisions can be marketed to the nation only by the victor. In the current context it is President Mahinda Rajapaksa who can take this challenging uphill task and none other. It appears that the time has come for him to volunteer for such stance even to go beyond the 13^th Amendment.[45]

I am aware that one may find loop holes in this proposition and arguments. If so, let them discuss and improve the proposition. It is required because it is a constitutional obligation and all these politicians have declared to uphold the Constitution by signing the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.

I wrote the paper with the conviction that this is one way to rationally think of reconciling and bring justice after the Great War victory. This paper may be a miniscule contribution for reconciliation, but, it is drops of rain that form streams, water falls, reservoirs, rivers, estuaries, seas and oceans.

To conclude, I am reminded of what Mark Twain said once- i.e. ‎”A man cannot be comfortable without his own approval.” This saying applies to those who cannot approve what is in their own Constitution. As long as they do so they will be uncomfortable and will be carking, because they are violating the basic law of the country. A broader consultation and dialogue for approval may make things comfortable for everyone.

Long Reads brings to Groundviews long-form journalism found in publications such as Foreign Policy, The New Yorker and the New York Times. This section, inspired by Longreads, offers more in-depth deliberation on key issues covered on Groundviews

• All Party Representative Committee (APRC) Final Report: Executive Summary
• The 13th Amendment as a political solution
• Radical Reforms in Sri Lanka: Realities we are afraid of?
• Aftermath of the Victory: whither Sri Lanka?
• Land in the North and East of Sri Lanka: Concern and confusion over Government circular

• Going beyond the 13th Amendment: Newspaper coverage of the Sri Lankan’s President’s assurance to India
• Interview with Prof. Tissa Vitharana on the 13th Amendment, Constitutional Reform, IT and English language
• Minister of what?????
• An exclusive interview with Eastern Province Chief Minister Pillayan after the TMVP’s arms decommissioning
• Has journalist J.S. Tissanaiyagam really received a Presidential pardon?

GV caption: Three terrorists, two terrorists, former terrorists, patriots or a hero? How one sees this image is  measure of how much Sri Lanka remains divided post-war. Image shows Secretary of Defense Gotabaya Rajapaksa speaking during the inaugural National Conference on Reconciliation in Colombo November 24 ,2011. REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawatte, courtesy MSNBC.

One of the most fundamental challenges of peacemaking and peacebuilding is confronting the past while building a just foundation for the future. Fighting impunity and pursuing peace are not incompatible objectives – they can work in tandem, even in an ongoing conflict situation.  – Ban Ki -moon, The Secretary General, UN [1]

Background of Silva’s report

Since the brutal war in Sri Lanka came to an end in May 2009 with the violation of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law, the International community called for an International Independent Investigation [III] into war crimes and crimes against humanity. Due in part to this pressure, the UN Secretary General appointed a Panel of Experts (PoE) to advise him on accountability issues in Sri Lanka. The PoE findings also recommended an International Independent Investigation.

However, the Government of Sri Lanka (GosL) rejected this call and refused to accept the PoE as a UN report and called the UN Panel of Expert report as the “Darusuman” report. Mr.Darusuman, who was the head of the UN Panel of experts.

In response to war crimes allegations and the calls for an III, Sri Lanka came out with its own home grown report, which is a domestic “investigation”. The “Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation commission – LLRC” is an outcome of this process. I call this report “Silva’s report” as Chitta Ranjan De Silva is the Chairmen of the so called Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation commission and he was a former Attorney General and Solicitor General of Sri Lanka. Silva’s report is flawed and has completely failed to reveal the comprehensive facts and break the veil of silence that covers what occurred in the past. The key intention of the report is to hide the deliberate attacks on Tamil civilians and constant attacks on hospitals, committed by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces [SLAF]. In addition, it has gone to extremes to protect the Chain of Command [CoC], including the Defence Minister/President Mahinda Rajapakse, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse, and Senior level commanding officers, especially those who are loyal to Rajapakse regime. This is one of the main reasons behind the appointments of alleged war criminals to Sri Lankan diplomatic missions. Furthermore, to ensure the impunity of the perpetrators, the regime has had a precise agenda to divert, obstruct, and, if possible, to curb international pressure to establish an III into war crimes and crimes against humanity which took place during the final stages of the Eelam War – IV. This becomes clear even through an interview[2] of Sri Lankan cabinet minister Wimal Weerawansa.

In addition, the Silva report is attempting to intentionally generate ‘new’ facts and to blackout important testimonies. A remarkable outcome of the report, finally, is that it mentioned that the SLAF was responsible for at least some civilian causalities, which is a major transformation from the Government’s previous version of so call “zero-sum-causalities”.

International human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group rejected the LLRC report and are still insisting for an III.  Sri Lanka’s past is a good lesson learnt that none of the Sri Lanka’s commissions delivered justice for victims. Considering the fact and the reality, genuine reconciliation is possible, after producing justice for the war victims. It is feasible only through III and committed and collective efforts by the international community.

Flaws of Silva’s report

The Silva report has failed in several ways. Firstly, there is no credible information about war crimes and human rights abuses committed by the SLAF. It also built based on denials and fabricated information.

Foremost, Silva’s report failed to counter impunity, and did not attend to individual and collective accountability. Also, the report failed to address the real needs of the victims. In addition, the way the report was written leads to the conclusion that some important heartbreaking testimonies or serious incidents were purposely avoided from appearing in the report itself. For example:

• What is the fate of Rev. Fa. Francis Joseph, who initiated the surrender of most LTTE political officers during the final days of war?
• What about Rev.Fa. Jim Brown, who was providing humanitarian assistance to the Tamil civilians in August 2006 mid of intense fighting. According to a witness, the Sri Lankan Navy threatened him prior to his disappearance.
• The murder of Rev. Fr. M X Karunaratnam, who was a human rights defender and the Chairperson of the NorthEast Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR)[3] was also ignored.
• Particularly, two shocking attacks on school children were ignored in the report, as well. The first one, a massacre of fifty-three students (all school girls) along with their three teachers on the 14^th of August, 2006 while the other attack was on the 29^th of January, 2008, where a bus carrying mainly school children and teachers came under a claymore attack near the Madhu church complex in the Mannar district (Northern part of Sri Lanka). Twenty people in the bus were killed and a further twenty-one were injured, seventeen of them seriously injured. Among those killed were thirteen school children and a school principal. All of the thirteen students who died were between the ages of 10 and 16.[4]
• The report included the information that the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) was unilaterally declared by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE] on Christmas Eve, 2001; however, nothing mentioned about the murder of the Tamil National Alliance [TNA] parliamentarian Joseph Pararajasingham, who was assassinated inside a Church during on Christmas Eve 2005.
• Besides, in his submission to the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, the Bishop of the Mannar Catholic Diocese, Rt. Rev. Dr. Rayappu Joseph, pointed out that over 146,679 people in the Vanni are not accounted for in post-war Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, the report mentions a considerable number of his remarks while completely wiping out the numbers relating to the  unaccounted.
• More importantly, an official from the Pooneryn Agriculture Development Authority went on to note in front of Silva’s commission in Kilinochchi and said, “the Army used cluster bombs and phosphorus bombs against innocent civilians. There were many casualties on account of this. Around 400-600 died daily, and around 1,000 were injured[5], but this testimony was also not mentioned in the report.

Above are some of the crucial events since the CFA was signed that cannot be avoided or ignored under any circumstances.

If the aim of the commission is to genuinely deal with lessons learnt and promote reconciliation, it has to be independent, transparent and accountable.  However, what the Rajapakse regime wants is to place blame, in every instance, on the LTTE, which they have done through Silva’s report as well. But, “if Sri Lanka wants true reconciliation, simply blaming the Tigers is not enough. The government, and the country, must take responsibility for the dead, mend the lives of the survivors — whatever their ethnicity — and stop the vicious cycle of ethnic strife by arriving at a political solution that meets, if not all aspirations, most of them. Until then, the end of the war will not bring true peace.”[6]

Basically, in Sri Lanka’s cabinet minister’s word, a main intention of the report is: “really we do not want the LLRC report. The LLRC report was a requirement of local and international forces who are disenchanted over the military victory achieved by the Government against terrorism and to successfully defeat international pressure exerted on Sri Lanka over alleged war crimes.”[7] Considering the “war lord’s” intention, how can any dignified human being believe that the Silva report or any other so-called “home-grown” mechanism can deliver justice to the war victims?

Role of International Community and the Future of the “Tear Drop”

Indian Faction

India and the island nation of Sri Lanka have a longstanding and unique relationship, particularly with Tamils. There is no need to repeat the ties between India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Still, a considerable section of Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Diaspora believe in and want India’s positive intervention for Tamils in Sri Lanka. However, disappointment continues among most Tamils, as India welcomed  the so-called Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission [LLRC] report, which was published only in the middle of December. At the same time, India has yet to openly acknowledge the report of the United Nations Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka. “New Delhi hesitates to push the Rajapaksa administration on governance issues and has resisted endorsing an international investigation into the atrocities committed during the last months of Sri Lanka’s civil war, in which as many as 40,000 civilians were killed. India’s longstanding interest in a peaceful and politically stable Sri Lanka is best served by strong messages to Colombo to end impunity and reverse the democratic decay that undermines the rights of all Sri Lankans”[8]. India’s constructive action vis-à-vis Sri Lanka will not only help to seek justice and sustainable political solution to the Tamils in Sri Lanka, but is safe for its national interest, particularly from the national security point of view. Also, it can be a precedent for India taking an adequate role as a global player. In contrast, there are more possibilities in the long-term that suggest that a lack of India’s appropriate action affect its own national interest and India may lose its remaining influence over Sri Lanka and gain more frustrations from the Tamils not only in Sri Lanka, but remarkably from Tamil Nadu, within India itself.

Chinese Faction

China as a leading player in geopolitics should support those international actors concerned with protecting and promoting human rights and justice in Sri Lanka. China should not be an obstacle to seeking justice for war victims. While extending its economic interventions in Sri Lanka, China should not oppose a human rights-based intervention in Sri Lanka, which China itself calls as an intervention on one countries internal matters. Ethno-political conflict in Sri Lanka is not any more an internal matter. It became an international issue long ago. China should support or, at the very least, not oppose bringing any resolution to the UN Human Rights Council or UN Security Council, which is connected to accountability in Sri Lanka.

Role of the West

It was both tragic and unfortunate that Western countries could not stop the slaughter of Tamil civilians at-least during the final stage of the bloody war. Western countries were waiting for the publication of Silva’s report. Now, the report is published, but it is clear that the report has not met international standards. Also, the outcomes of the report raises serious questions about its credibility. According to Human Rights Watch, the report “disregards the worst abuses by government forces, rehashes longstanding recommendations, and fails to advance accountability for victims of Sri Lanka’s civil armed conflict.”[9] Western countries have to take all needed and helpful measures to establish an independent, international investigation into the violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law. Also, they have to send independent fact-finding missions to get the full picture regarding the past abuses and ongoing land grabbing, systematic demographic change and militarization in the Tamil homeland, which is the worst part of “post-war” Sri Lanka.  Therefore, as responsible global players who promote liberty and democracy, the West has to act constructively and swiftly in order to create a lasting peace in the island nation rather than waiting further. Especially, as the US concerns itself to strengthening its presence in the Asia-Pacific region, they have to take bold and genuine efforts to ensure that justice will be delivered to the war’s victims without any delay.

• Sri Lanka’s Diplomatic Offensive Won’t Make Killing Fields Disappear
• The official report of the LLRC
• An Era of Sri Lanka’s President: From Mullivaikal to Oxford Union
• Reconciliation without Truth in Sri Lanka?
• Sri Lanka’s Tamil question: Justice, Lies and Videotape

Photo courtesy JDS

The concluding report of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) was finally made public in mid-December, after multiple delays and an interim report that went mostly unnoticed.

The Commission’s report has sparked considerable debate within an increasingly stifled public sphere, rejuvenating conversations in Sri Lanka about governance, human rights, and a permanent political settlement. Unfortunately, because the Report was only released publicly in English, a substantial number of Sri Lankans are excluded from these conversations. We also note that in a true democracy, a free press holds government to account: Sri Lanka needs—and clearly does not have—a strong fourth estate to track the Government’s implementation of LLRC recommendations.

We welcome the Report’s contributions to political discourse, but even its most critical conclusions reveal its irredeemable limitations: like the many commissions of inquiry before it, it is neither a truly investigative body, nor empowered to hold political elites to account. Nevertheless, the Report, which contains the testimony of thousands of citizens and surveys the political challenges confronting Sri Lanka, invites further discussion and debate.

1. The Report contains useful recommendations for the country’s ongoing political, social, and economic development, as well as honest assessments of historic failures by Sinhalese and Tamil political leaders. We welcome especially the clear statement that to move forward, Sri Lanka’s citizens must acknowledge and mourn all losses from all communities. This is an important rebuke to unspoken post-war policy: the Government honors the military while refusing to acknowledge the thousands of Tamil civilians killed at the end of the war, and the traumatic impact of those final months on those who survived.

2. The Report effectively marks its own limitations throughout. The Commission was never equipped to meet the post-war needs of the public, and indeed, was formed largely without its input. However, in several instances, the Commission sought to go beyond the weak mandate granted it by the Government. Thus, certain sections of the Report exceed the Commission’s original scope. We note particularly the decision to quote at length numerous citizen testimonies, especially those related to disappearances, as well as a certain flexibility with regard to permitted timelines and histories. The resulting document presents a more expansive and critical view of Sri Lanka’s human rights situation than the Government might have initially contemplated.

3. The Report also addresses the ongoing hardships Sri Lankans face two and a half years after the war’s conclusion. These include militarization of the North and East, the challenges of post-war return and resettlement, and diminishing prospects for national reconciliation. The Commission advocates for a political solution so that the conflict may not continue by other means, and foregrounds the need for the devolution of power as an issue “of national importance, affecting the people of the entire country.” We welcome the urgency with which the Commission seeks to promote democracy—specifically, power-sharing between all communities and accountability from their political leaders.

ACCOUNTABILITY

4. The Government has repeatedly promoted the LLRC as an adequate response to the demands of post-war justice and accountability, resisting calls for international war crimes investigations. Of critical importance, therefore, is the Report’s treatment of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international law allegedly committed in the final phases of the war. The U.N. Panel of Experts, noting civilian casualties in the tens of thousands, deemed these allegations substantial enough to warrant an international investigation of war crimes committed by both LTTE and Government security forces. International reporting, notably Channel 4’s documentary, “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields,” alleged the same.

5. However, the Commission’s response to these allegations is stunningly inadequate. The Report arbitrarily invokes the principle of proportionality to justify some deaths and attributes others to “bad apples,” peremptorily concluding that there was no systematic or large-scale targeting of civilians, and that civilian deaths were neither intended nor recklessly disregarded. We acknowledge the many reports that individual members of Sri Lankan security forces acted compassionately and bravely in aiding civilians escaping the No-Fire Zones. However, this does not preclude the possibility of larger-scale war crimes sanctioned, implicitly or otherwise, by the military hierarchy. These allegations call for more than the Commission’s cursory treatment; they require the scrutiny of an independent body.

DIASPORA

6. Considering our own positions abroad, we also note especially the Report’s comments on the Sri Lankan diaspora.

7. The Commission wisely advises the Government to liberalize its policies with regard to its diaspora communities, and to make space even for those it counts as adversaries. We appreciate particularly its comments about easing travel, obtaining dual nationality status, and effecting remittances, particularly as these measures disproportionately affect minority communities.

8. Lanka Solidarity also notes the Report’s references to “hostile diaspora groups.” These are identified solely as being Tamil nationalist and separatist groups, some of which have been described as supporting the LTTE. Through their uncritical support of the LTTE, a number of these groups have overshadowed genuine reconciliation efforts and substantially harmed the welfare of many Tamils living in Sri Lanka.

9. However, criticism of diaspora actors should doubtless include Sinhala nationalist groups, which have also polarized discussions of Sri Lanka’s future by acting as the Rajapakse regime’s rump abroad, labeling any criticism of the government as pro-LTTE, and advancing Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism and political fantasies.

WOMEN

10. Despite the conflict’s disproportionate impact on women and children, the Commission included only one woman.

11. There were consistent and serious allegations of sexual abuse and violence during the end of the war and in its aftermath; however, the Report only mentions sexual violence briefly in relation to the Channel 4 documentary, and then focuses mostly on the need to authenticate the footage. Elsewhere, the Commission only makes oblique references to gender violence, and fails to address with sufficient urgency and specificity the particular vulnerability of women in a heavily militarized post-war environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ENGAGEMENT

12. The Report should be offered in Sinhala and Tamil so that it is accessible to the citizens whose response to its content is paramount. This is in keeping with the Commission’s own emphasis on national language policy as key to political reconciliation.

13. An independent investigative process with international participation must immediately be initiated. The inclusion of international actors in an investigative process regarding state actions provides a measure of accountability, especially in light of the centralization of state power in Sri Lanka. Thousands of civilians were killed in the final months of the war, and allegations of war crimes have been made consistently and credibly ever since. The failure to investigate these allegations denies these victims justice; reflects more pervasive crises of accountability, rule of law, and governance in post-war Sri Lanka; and sets a dangerous precedent for other arenas of armed conflict.

14. Witnesses for any further commissions of inquiry or investigation should receive adequate protection, as the witnesses for the LLRC did not.

15. The Government must demilitarize the North and East so that civil society in those areas can rebuild. A sizable military presence currently encroaches on key aspects of civilian life, such as education and trade. The Government must directly address a climate of fear and political culture of violence. Its actions on the ground must match public commitments.

16. In particular, we note that violence against women is growing in the North and East. Such incidents must be investigated and prosecuted swiftly. Law enforcement must be sensitized to violence against women. Tamil-speaking police and other civil authorities must be available for women to seek redress. Demilitarization is vital to women’s security.

17. Reconstruction efforts in the North and East should be consultative and provide affected civilian populations with emotional and financial security in their resident lands. This requires, at a minimum, the enforcement of land rights and the equitable resolution of land disputes and issues surrounding the return and resettlement of displaced persons. However, instead of confronting the complex of economic, psycho-social, and reconstruction needs of those living in the North and East, the Government is relentlessly pushing forward with its economic vision of turning Sri Lanka into a cabana republic.

18. We note the commission’s post-report recommendation to remove ethnic classifications on Sri Lankan identity cards. To the extent that this limits discrimination, this would be a welcome move. However, where such discrimination is widespread, identifying differentiating factors provides an important tool by which to track the treatment of minorities. Advancing the concept of a Sri Lankan identity is a commendable goal—as long as it is not merely a guise for Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The rhetoric to rebuild Sri Lanka’s pluralistic identity must include rather than obliterate minority difference.

19. Leaders from all communities and across the political spectrum in Sri Lanka should prioritize a fairly negotiated political settlement. In doing so, they should recognise and engage with the broad range of perspectives within the diaspora. Indeed, as the Commission itself acknowledges, the Government has much to gain by recognizing “the untapped potential of the expatriate community . . . and [engaging] them constructively with the Government and other stakeholders involved in the reconciliation process.”

20. In turn, the most vocal factions of the Tamil diaspora, which have long been uncritical of the LTTE, must reconsider and reject exclusivist nationalism and political intolerance. Calls for war crimes investigations originating in the diaspora will resonate more strongly in Sri Lanka and the international community if they acknowledge human rights abuses committed by the LTTE. Sri Lankan diaspora communities must consider their own responsibility for the present situation, participate in processes of honest reflection, and better appreciate the myriad challenges confronting minorities—not just Tamils—in Sri Lanka.

21. A sizable portion of the Tamil diaspora was silenced by the LTTE’s overseas proxies during this long conflict. It is time for this silent majority to voice its views, to engage with conversations like those begun by the LLRC, and to participate, critically and constructively, in Sri Lanka’s future.

• A slumbering LLRC: The image of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• ‘Learning Lessons’ from those affected by war: Does the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission really listen?
• Reconciliation without Truth in Sri Lanka?
• LLRC: Testimony by Ferial Ashraff

It was less than 200 years ago that the title of “orator” or “navalar” was bestowed on Kandar Arumukam Pillai, by the grateful inhabitants of South India. Leaving his native Jaffna for a time, he had spearheaded a renaissance of the Tamil language and culture in South India preaching, printing and endowing educational institutions. Thus began a long history of Jaffna Tamil involvement in the renaissance of Tamil. Thamotharampillai, Winslow and Kanagasabai Pillai are but a few whose contribution to the Tamil renaissance that rushed through South India and Jaffna.[1]

Jaffna’s isolation from Sanskritic influence and its commitment to education has meant that it considers itself culturally superior to the natives of Tamil Nadu, it considers it language and culture purer and closer that of that Sangam ideal. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the blast of the trumpet against the now infamous “Kolaveri” song should be so strong in Jaffna. The day before yesterday SJ Stalin released a fascinating response to the song, entitled “Yarlpanathilirunthu Kolaverida”, a rough translation would be “Dude, Bloodlust from Jaffna”.  Its essence is a celebration of Tamil language and culture, a deploration of the bastardisation of Tamil and chastisation of those who are ashamed of their Tamilness.

At first glance, the music video appears to be primarily targeted at Dhanush. His mix of English and Tamil in the Kolaveri song has proved immensely popular with over 30 million hits on Youtube. Stalin considers his song a war on the Tamil language and describes his attitude toward it as bloodlust. He wonders why Dhanush chooses to use English – he asks why Tamil is scarce in its heartland, Tamil Nadu. He seems to imply that if Tamil gave sufficient creative freedom for Kamban, Valluvar and Bharathi it should be enough for Dhanush. Stalin thinks that Dhanush doesn’t give Tamil the respect that it deserves. As an ancient language, one which Stalin describes as predating the creation of stones and sand, Tamil has a rich literature and culture and Dhanush appears to ignore this and consider Tamil lacking. This is brought out by the poignant contrast between the focus on the keyboard in Dhanush’s work as opposed to the harmonium, perceived to be a more indigenous instrument, in Stalin’s video.

From a political point of view, the vehemence with which Dhanush is attacked is notable. In India, Tamil feels more secure now that the policy of replacing English with Hindi, popular in the 1960s, is dead. In contrast, the Tamils of Ceylon, whose numbers have dwindled considerably as a result of the war and migration, now feel that their language and culture are under attack –  just as when the first missionaries arrived in Jaffna in the 1800s. The reaction, as then, is one of Tamil pride and yearning for the glory days of Dravidian power and culture – the Sangam period.

The politics does not end there. The opening scene highlights an official government signboard, at the entrance of Jaffna, which has Singhalese at the top and an indigenous signboard where Tamil is above Singhalese. This juxtaposition highlights the vulnerability of Tamil and the divergence of official and popular sentiments toward language policy in the North. The continuous flow of buses from the South into Jaffna must demonstrate a concern with the increasing settlement of people from the South (read Singhalese). The police board in the corner (again Singhalese top, Tamil bottom) takes the mind down an associative track that ends in colonisation and cantonments. Another associative track is set in motion by the constant reference to bloodlust, intermingled with references to Ahimsa (non-violence) and revolutionary zeal – we all know where it leads.

It also highlights the threat to Tamil from within. After years of persecution some Tamils have chosen to hide or disassociate from their Tamil identities – especially in the metropolis of Colombo. The victory of the Sri Lankan Army, and the present occupation of sorts constantly reminds Tamils that they are second-class citizens. Stalin’s video is an exhortation for Tamil’s to embrace their culture; hence his parting cry to the Tamil is, “keep your head high”.

• A-Z of Sri Lankan English: L is for link language
• Current situation in Jaffna, Sri Lanka: A resident speaks out
• Language Barriers
• On Anthems and the State of the Union
• English language is the need of the hour

[Editors note: The author was married to Dr. Rajini Thiranagama (née Rajasingham), a Tamil human rights activist and feminist murdered in 1989 by the LTTE. She was one of the founding members of the University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna, which during the war, published some of the most hard hitting critiques and exposes of Government as well as LTTE atrocities and human rights violations. Since 2009, Dayapala Thiranagama's insightful articles to Groundviews have been amongst the site's most read and shared.]

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“Politics can be relatively fair in the breathing spaces of history; at its critical turning points there is no other rule possible than the old one, that the end justifies the means” (Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, London, 1940, Page 81).

On 27  December 1989 I arrived in Heathrow along with my two young daughters, aged 9 and 11 years. At  the Immigration Desk the  Officer asked me how long we intended  to stay.I replied ‘a couple of weeks’. My youngest daughter still hanging on to my hand and whispered  to me ‘Thaththa, don’t tell lies we are not going back to Sri Lanka’.  She  of course  was telling the truth. Now after more than two decades I had to return to  Sri Lanka alone, leaving them behind.

There were two main  reasons that made ending my  exile possible: the achievement of my personal  commitment to  my  children which was  to ensure that they were independent,  and the change in Sri Lanka’s political climate, which is the focus of this account.

By the end of 1989  when we fled Sri Lanka we left behind a country gripped by  seemingly insoluble political contradictions. They seemed to require a comprehensive military defeat  of one party over  the other for  the  resolution  of the crisis. The JVP was fighting   the Sri Lankan state which had sought India’s help and the LTTE  had taken on the mighty IPKF(Indian Peace Keeping Force). The JVP had  begun a ‘patriotic war’ accusing  that the Sri Lankan State of  capitulating   to Indian imperialism.They demanded that the people patriotically oppose the  devolution of any power to Tamils  just  as the UPFA at present defines its patriotism in order   to deny the possibility of granting of democratic rights to the    Tamil speaking people.  At the time the JVP had  begun  assassinating all those who supported the devolution of power to Tamils. Their targets  included  the activists and the leaders of the Left parties and groups,  as they were in the forefront of  the campaign in support of the 13^th Amendment, which allowed  for the devolution of power. The JVP  had become  cruel  and ruthless killers of  other political activists in the name of ‘patriotism’ and appeared  to be   knocking on the door of the state power.

I had joined the Vikalpa Kandayama (Alternative Group) and later organised the Movement for Socialism and Democracy uniting all the left groups ,democrats and some  prominent individuals in trade unions.The state also responded with equal cruelty and ruthlessness to the JVP rebellion. There were death squads acting with impunity  and  the roadsides in certain areas became open graves.  The LTTE was not any different from the JVP and they  also assassinated all those who were critical of them. With these murders there were personal sufferings within families  who experienced irreplaceable losses.

Rajani Thiranagama, my wife who was  brutally  gunned down by the Tamil Tigers  merely  because she was a vocal critic of their human rights violations. This was despite the fact that she had  given medical treatment to  leading LTTE cadres at the  very inception of their organisation. Her  assassination  was symbolic of  both the Tamil Tigers’ fascist nature as well as the  bleak future  that    the so called ‘Tamil liberation’ would have brought about in the North and East, if they were not  comprehensively defeated.

Rajani was brutally killed on 21 September 1989. My children lost their most stable primary carer who was their  great  source of love , stability and hope. Despite the fact that I took the full responsibility for their upbringing after her death, I feel that I could not replace fully the love and support  they should have had from their mother. Like them, thousands of children in Sri Lanka  have suffered the loss of their parents leaving them experiencing  a legacy of pain and vulnerability that  has continued long after the war   has finished.

When Rajani was assassinated I had to assure my children that I would be there for them.But unfortunately I could not carry out this  responsibility whilst being in Sri Lanka and having  an  underground  or semi -underground life . Sri Lanka had become very unsafe, as there was not  even  the  slightest regard for human life. All the parties who  fought their armed opponents threw away almost all  internationally accepted  norms  of warfare and when they had  audacity to kill their  unarmed critics or civilians they  also threw away unhesitatingly  all the civilised norms of  resolving  human  and political conflicts. The victims of the armed violence never had a chance to comprehend  or to know the specific charges against them  at the time when the gunman or the suicide  bomber appeared before them. Like many others, Rajani never knew the specific charges against her.  She only knew that the Tigers did not tolerate dissenting  views  and that  these  would be punishable by  death.

By 1989  the Sri Lankan state was in  grave danger of being defeated by the armed  groups  led by the Sinhala extremist JVP. It survived. In all three armed struggles , two of them led by the JVP in 1971 and 1987-89 and the Eelam war  led by the LTTE, the challengers to the state and parliamentary democracy has been  comprehensively defeated by the Sri Lankan state. It is ironic that that the defeat of the reactionary,violent and fascist forces of the JVP and the LTTE has been won at an unbearable cost for Sri Lankan society and its parliamentary democracy. The survival of the state in this fashion has posed difficult questions as well as presenting an opportunity to reform  the Sri Lankan  state political structures.

The  absence of   a commitment  from the current government to meet the democratic aspirations of all our communities and  the  lack of political will  for democratic reforms  appears to be the  main challenge facing Sri Lanka  at present. The massive loss of human life,legacy of the war,its effect on ordinary civilians and the imprint it has left on political activity has reshaped our future.Understanding and addressing what is felt on an individual level as a deep personal loss and what is felt by us collectively as a tragedy is fundamental to the creation of a different   country  and a different  politics,where such events cannot happen again.

President Rajapaksa enjoys a solid political support among the  Sinhalese rural masses, which hither to  no other political leader has been able to  command . His popularity is unassailable and the  recent  local election results show that it is not going to be any easier now  for  his political opponents. This    popularity is undoubtedly  due  to  the political leadership  he was able to provide  in defeating the LTTE separatism. This  will  continue to have  huge political significance in the country for generations to come.  Without the Rajapaksha brothers  at helm of the state power it would not have been  possible to defeat the Tamil Tigers. Whether we would like it or not as long as the West  pursues   the war crime allegations  against the state, Rajapaksa’s popularity is bound to increase,    solidifying  the  support that President Rajapaksa already enjoys. This popularity  is also the main  obstacle for the possibility of ethnic inclusiveness. As long as the TNA continues to apply pressure  through India and West to gain a political solution to the issue of the democratic rights of the Tamils ,it will be seen as political interference in the internal affairs of  Sri Lanka and  thus a largely a  counter productive effort.

There is also an element of this when foreign funded NGO’s campaign for the rights of Tamil people. However, the NGO’s are making a valuable contribution in defending democratic rights, a role which political parties in the opposition are unable to play with credibility as their political lines have been similar to that of the parties in the UPFA.The JVP’s anti-devolutionary violent  political history against the Tamil democratic rights is a case in point.

It is unlikely that the government will be able to dismantle  Sri Lanka’s  parliamentary democracy as some critics would like to suggest but there should not be any complacency in this regard. When the tentacles of family interests spread through state institutions giving up power will not be an easy option.The most difficult situation is that the opposition is meek and feeble and the government would like to have  a free ride at the expense of the political rights of the people. If the government is planning to   dismantle parliamentary  democracy,  it will be the greatest political blunder and the folly of the capitalist class in this country .

A divided opposition  hugely disadvantages ordinary  people.They are in disarray precisely at the time when there is an urgent need for a common political programme to protect basic democratic  and  political rights. Each opposition party is also deeply  divided  within themselves on the issue of political leadership  and/or  political ideology and strategy. The UNP and the JVP are undergoing the most serious and catastrophic  splits  within  their own parties  by weakening their capacity to oppose the government and to change the balance of forces in their favour. The  UPFA political hegemony  appears unbreakable despite  their  shortcomings.    The  government is also  using every possible corrupt incentives  to lure the opposition figures to their side. As long as the opposition is unable to mount a credible and mass base democratic   political challenge to the government, the possibility of  launching a successful  battle  to win for greater  democratic rights  is  still long way off. This has meant that the government have felt able to get away with any anti-democratic act or legislation.In Gramscian  terms this is the ‘effective reality’  at present in the country . Gramsci further sees the need for any political   opposition to ‘transcend beyond’ this ‘effective reality’ and alter the balance of forces in their favour.

The  Mulleriawa incident  exposes  the  continuing thuggish and criminal  behaviour of  some of the government politicians . It is also  a warning that what they are capable of doing to their own  they will feel able to do double fold to those who aim to challenge  them democratically. These are legitimate and genuine issues that need  to be  addressed  by both the opposition and the government. If they fail at this juncture, they will not be forgiven  nor  forgotten by the people. In the deep fault-line of our politics the effect of the breakdown of civil society and political culture can be still felt.The forces of violence ,the climate of fear  and the suffocation of democratic voices that took centre stage in our politics have not yet been defeated despite the end of the war.

I returned to my village, Happawana-Harumalgoda West in Habaraduwa to reside . I had last left as a young man  in 1967 to attend the university. All my memories in growing up here  were of   the poverty and destitution of this village, matched only by   the generosity of its people  when I had difficulties  with the security forces. Growing up in this village made me conscious of  the path of the personal sacrifices  that have to be made   to achieve social justice,political rights  and fairness  for all ethnic communities in our country. The legacy of this village lies deep within my political history and identity. In 1971  the villagers  protected me from the CID and police   as they encamped this village to apprehend me.When I was acquitted  in my trail in1975  they took me home in a huge procession  that filled a two-mile long stretch from the Pilana junction  of  Deniyaya-Akuressa Road to my house.

In Sri Lanka, the journeys we make , both politically and physically are often defined by great  losses.This two mile long route runs through the village that  connects it to  the George Ratnayake Mawatha, which was named after  my comrade and friend George Ratnayake  who was brutally assassinated by  the  JVP in  August 1989. He was the finest human being this village has ever produced. His loss is  felt deeply not least by me.Without him my village is a lonelier place. George was a trade unionist and a Central committee member of the Communist Party . He  stood for the provincial council election  and won in 1989. He was killed by the JVP because he openly supported the devolution of  power to the Tamils. His assassination  stands  a testimony to the brutality of the JVP and their  racist politics of  Sinhalese supremacy. This village  will never forget this heinous crime. The JVP  had  sent  a group of   faceless assassins from outside that day. The day the village buried their finest human being they also defied all the funeral restrictions imposed by the JVP.

This village has changed  since I left it  and will  continue to change at  increasing  speed. It no longer bears the hallmark of destitution and abject  poverty I witnessed as a child. It no longer exists in the same intensity. Both male and female  wage labour has increased here. This I hope  will influence its future political direction and enable it to continue making a political contribution to win and preserve democracy.

In Sri Lanka in  general the politics in the  countryside where  the electoral bulwark of Sinhala Buddhist supremacy reigns supreme  will be pivotal in the coming years of  re-drawing electoral battle grounds. This is partly  due the UPFA regime shifting the political emphasis to its village  based  support  structures and has undertaken infrastructural development hither to unseen in rural areas.Sri Lanka will not be able to resolve its thorny issue of   nationhood unless rural communities support an electoral victory that would resolve the issue of the devolution of power to to the Tamil community.

During these turbulent years of violent politics, the personal losses including having to leave my own country have made a lasting impact on my life.Those  comrades and friends who knew me closely  including my wife Rajani who fell victims to the LTTE, the JVP and  the security forces would have expected  in their last moments that I would continue their  struggle for social justice and democracy. But  I could not evade my personal responsibility towards my children at the time.  Rajani , my  comrades and friends knew  very well the mortal danger that would pose  to any individual in Sri Lankan politics. But they never hesitated. These  murderous  non -state actors eager to justify these crimes  in the name of ‘revolution’ or ‘national liberation’. They have made no  apology for these murders.The  security forces have  not shown any accountability.They have acted with impunity in the name  of ‘democracy’ and ‘national sovereignty’.

It is great to return home.

However, Sri Lanka as a nation has not ended its own political exile even after  wining the separatist war. Unless Sri Lanka  resolves its critical issue of ethnic inclusiveness, she will be in political exile. There will be a day, the masses of this country will drag her out of  this and make us a proud nation where all ethnic communities will enjoy democracy and freedom.

• Rajani commemoration: An absence of actuality
• Blinkered vision of Tamil nationalists and socialists is self-defeating
• The Politics of Diaspora Dissidence: A response to Dayapala Thiranagama
• Reflections on the Underlying Issues that Determine the Outcome of the Election: Who has got the Edge?
• The 18th Amendment: Constitutional Reform as the Consolidation of Power

The man I saw is a friend. His name is Accuratus Numeratus, with origins in Jaffna, Sri Lanka. He earns a living by extracting useful information from large and complex datasets. Naturally, the contentious issue of how many Sri Lankans actually perished during the last phases of the war intrigued him. We know all sorts of numbers are quoted by those with their individual agendas, estimates ranging from zero to 40,000 – a massive range indeed. So, this man Numeratus set about carrying out a computational way of figuring this out. The steps of such an approach are known to all of us, even the non-experts like you and I. Formulate a model, collect some data from a small sample and extrapolate to see if the model fits the data.

The Model: Man is a social animal, it is said. Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of the UK, is perhaps the best known evil person who didn’t believe in this. She said there is no such thing as society, just a collection of individuals. Naturally, if you claim something does not exist, you have to destroy it to prove your point, don’t you? Thatcher is known to have done that in style. But unlike her, we know we are a well linked society. We are linked so well that the average distance between two of us taken at random is six hops. I can start from myself and go “I know X”, “X knows Y”, “Y knows Z” etc… and in six hops I can reach President Obama. Note this is average results, estimated across all pairs of individuals, not the distance between every pair of individuals. So, Numeratus theorized that the Tamil community could be modelled as a network, linked in the same way as a network in which the average distance between two random nodes is six. (There are other properties of the statistics of connectivity which I avoid detailing in this forum.)

The Data: Whenever he got a chance, Numeratus collected data. From his relatives and arbitrary people he met at weddings, funerals and conferences, he would gently ask: “Did anyone directly known to you get killed in the Vanni?” “Do you know anyone who knows anyone who got killed in the Vanni?” The answers he meticulously recorded in his little notebook, giving each person an imaginative nickname to hide their identities, yet avoiding duplication. (If only his relative knew these nicknames, my friend’s days will be numbered, for sure.)

Numeratus then set about doing the following calculation. Start from a big network of 300,000 nodes, connected as explained before, and see how many nodes you ought to take out at random before the results explained the data you have collected. You have to do this again and again (known in jargonese as Monte Carlo simulations) to make the results meaningful, so Numeratus wrote some software and ran it on a big computer, over several weeks.

The answer surprised him, a totally counter-intuitive small number, with huge margin of error, is what he found. “No way,” he said to himself, “if you have such a large number of people packed in a small area and blast them with a few rounds of shells from a distance, the loss should be much bigger than what my calculations reveal.”  He re-visits his computer code several times looking for bugs, turns the computer off and on several times – as any computer expert would do on such occasions — and re-runs the programme. Nothing changes. A counter-intuitive result is all he has.

After months of frustration with this problem, Numeratus remembered something very basic that Lakshman Jayatillake had taught him during thermodynamics lessons at HillTop University. “Your challenge is to build simple (parsimonious) models, making sensible assumptions about the problem domain,” Jayatillake had drilled into his students, “but you must always perform sanity checks — if the answer doesn’t make sense, never be afraid to question the assumptions upon which your model was based. Learning begins when you question your assumptions.”

When Numeratus questioned his assumptions, it suddenly dawned on him. “Of course,” he shouted, “it is not a uniformly connected network – the stuff comes in clusters.” His is a profound error. You will see this from the illustration I provide below, that in such clustered networks, you cannot learn much lessons about one part by querying another.

Returning from the run in his sarong on that cold winter morning, Numeratus made an entry in his log book about the lesson he learnt — using a hybrid of mathematical and amateur poetic forms. Such is the power of mathematics that once you find an accurate formulation, including proper notation, the solution will stare at you and pop out of the page. There remains no need to spell it out.

The Alphabet Song of Lessons Learnt
by Accuratus Numeratus

Oh my glorious land, my Island:
The letter L,
Thy short sighted politics, the hegemony:
Of letter S,
Rebellion in response, or plain selfish arrogance:
Of letter J,
Warlord’s ammunition, sacrificial little lambs the poor:
Of letter E,
On that long march to massacre, in the backyards:
Of letter V.

• A letter from Batticaloa against the 18th Amendment
• ‘I can’: The power of simple random acts
• The Lessons We Never Learn
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Don’s Diary II: A Flying Visit to Jaffna

Writing from a Tamil nationalist position which occasionally earned the LTTE monster’s ire, David Jeyaraj has provided the world with invaluable service over the years. He had considerable information on both the Tiger operations and behind the scene events in the Tamil north. I have utilized his articles on numerous occasions.[i] However,  in jumping to the defence of a family friend who has presented a “true story” of her engagement in the Tamil liberation struggle, Jeyaraj has recently provided one with a meandering exercise in obfuscation and deception: see his  “From Shenuka to Niromi: True Tale of a Tamil Tigress.”

Jeyaraj dazzles his readership by revealing that he knows her real identity in the course of presenting Tamil Tigress as a tale of Niromi-Shenuka’s disillusionment with the LTTE and her recovery of everyday life till she crafted her book as a “story of redemption” and a “classic immigrant success story.”[ii]

He then challenges those who have read the book as a literary forgery by depicting them as “conspiracy theorists.” Rather daintily he avoids naming these critics, namely, Ambalavanar, Roberts, and Sarvananthan, and proceeds to lump all three together in his review with casual disdain for the differences in argument. He dismisses the various charges as “unsubstantiated” and “unfair.”

Jeyaraj affirms that Niromi’s tale is entirely credible because it is a “memoir,” not an “auto-biography” (his words, his casting). In this assertion Tamil Tigress is a “mixed genre” – a book in “memoir format with the characteristics of a realist novel.”

The affirmation is a gigantic bluff. Any glance at the English Thesaurus[iii] or the Oxford English Dictionary would indicate that an “autobiography” and “memoir” are synonyms, though a “memoir” has a wider compass in that it embraces biography. In its autobiographical form it may, however, focus on just one episode or event in one’s life (and thus, like autobiographies, on persons and events around one’s activities). Let me cite the OED (p. 905) in full:

Memoir 1 A historical account or biography written from personal knowledge or special sources; 2 an autobiography or written account of one’s memory of certain events or people. 3a an essay on a learned subject specially studied by the writer treatise. 3b the proceedings or transactions of a learned society.

Jeyaraj’s assertion that Niromi’s blunders are matters “of minor detail” and a sign of some “sloppiness” is built on this foundation, a colossal misreading of the category “memoir.” Thus, in claiming that my previous reviews do not amount to a credible challenge,[iv] Jeyaraj builds his critique on a conceptualization that is not merely erroneous, but also amounts to an act of deception (one that, significantly, seems to have taken the Tamil world by storm).

Besides, he sidesteps the critical bone of contention, a contextual statement of major significance in Tamil Tigress, which had aroused my doubts in the first instance and which has directed all my articles on the subject: namely, the claim by both Niromi and Allen & Unwin that the ambush which Niromi’s platoon faced in December 1987 was a skirmish involving “government troops,” that is, soldiers of the Sri Lankan Army rather than soldiers of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

Let me provide a basic timeline for Niromi de Soyza’s pertinent biography:

1. In mid-1987 she joined the LTTE (aged 17)

2. The IPKF was in Jaffna from 29 July1987 to 1990.

3. Early October 1987 LTTE commences battle vs IPKF  and India.

4. Niromi resigns from the LTTE in 1988 (aged 18)

5. She arrives in Australia in 1990.

6. She presented her first version of her memoir in newspaper outlet in May 2009.

7. She collaborates with Allen & Unwin to present a book-length autobiography in 2011 (aged 42).

All accounts of Eelam War One agree that during the phase October 1987 to late 1989 the LTTE was pitted against the enormous contingents, sometimes amounting to over 100,000 personnel, of the IPKF. This error of central background fact, no “minor error” in any credible reading, informed my two overlapping articles:

A] “Another Demidenko? Niromi de Soyza as a Tiger Fighter” in my own web site http://thuppahi.wordpress.com on 21 August 2011;

B] “Forbidden Fruits: Niromi de Soyza’s Tamil Tigress, Noumi Kouri and Helen Demidenko?” which appeared initially in Groundviews on 31 August 2011.

The question marks in the titles indicate that my arguments were not full-proof in my own mind and that I was raising a probability for people to consider.

Subsequently, however, I discovered that Niromi de Soyza had presented her biographical journey in the 1980s as a short story of some nine pages in the Daily Telegraph in May 2009 as the LTTE army was on the verge of defeat. This tale was entitled: “Life as a female Tamil Tiger guerilla relived by one of first female soldiers.”[v]

This tale too is launched in melodramatic fashion by an account of de Soyza’s first battlefield skirmish: “At dawn that day, Indian soldiers had surrounded our hideout” she says in 2009 (emphasis mine). Later in this same account she notes that “fighting the Indian soldiers made no sense to me.” This realisation is presented as one factor inducing the decision to extricate herself from the commitment to fight for Tamil independence under the LTTE.

So, when she spelt out her biography in 2009 Niromi knew who her adversaries were in December 1987. In contrast, in the opening account in Tamil Tigress in 2011, the enemy are just “soldiers;” while the back cover explicitly proclaims that “two days before Christmas 1987, at the age of 17, Niromi de Soyza found herself in an ambush as part of a small platoon of militant Tamil Tigers fighting government forces in a bloody civil war that was to engulf Sri Lanka for decades (emphasis mine).” Again, when she was interviewed by Nikki Barrowclugh for the Good Weekend in July 2011, Niromi indicated once again that her unit spent “most of the time … running and hiding from government soldiers.”[vi]

In brief, the Indian presence has been obliterated in the critical opening lines and cover page in her book version of 2011 and interviews around it — even though their presence is noted on occasions at other points deeper in the book (pp. 162, 164, 168, 227, 264). We face a stark contrast which no amount of obfuscation can smother.

We thus have strong circumstantial proof of deception in 2011 as distinct from 2009. This leads to my suggestion that the fabrications in 2011 were directed by (a) the propaganda war that was peaking in late 2010/early 2011 and (b) the Western world’s sustained criticism of the Sri Lankan state in 2011 within a backdrop created by the disclosures in Killing Fields  and an UN panel report by so-called “experts.” Whether this deliberate shift in background emphasis was informed by the advice of the Tamil Tiger lobby in Sydney and the several Australians who are affiliated in various ways with them (Gordon Weiss[vii] Jake Lynch, Antony Lowenstein, Bruce Haigh, James Dowd in the Sydney-Canberra circuit for instance) is a further possibility that one has to keep in mind – for Allen & Unwin would have deployed reviewers and this process could have informed the adjustments that I have identified.

This new information and its implications were incorporated in my third article, entitled “Niromi de Soysa’s Path of Redemption with Deception? Or Both?” which I sent to several news outlets in Lanka and eventually inserted in my web site on 27 October 2011. Since the Lankan agencies did not print it, few readers have consulted this article; so this present essay is a re-iteration of its claims in the new context created by the articles on Tamil Tigress penned by Cooke and Jeyaraj.

I do not have problems with some of the motifs in Tamil Tigress that are praised by Cooke (2011) and Jeyaraj. It is the degree to which it is a true historical account in its central details that is at issue here. The critical issue remains the question who, in Niromi’s mind, the Tigers were fighting? The remarkable fact is that while the first skirmish of December 1987 was an encounter with Indian troops in her 2009 recollection, in both 2009 and 2011 she keeps insisting that the LTTE was fighting both Indian and government troops at ground level. “The war resumed, just as Prabhakaran had predicted, though now we were fighting not only the government troops but the peacekeepers, too” she says in the Daily Telegraph account in 2009. This is a consistent aspect of her stories at both points, an aspect reiterated during interviews for radio and magazine.

Niromi de Soyza seems to have the theatrical ability to support her claims with vales of tears during some of her public presentations. At the “Missing Peace Exhibition” on 16th October 2011 organised by the Eltham Bookshop in Melbourne, her talk was interrupted by emotional tears of grief. I was not present, but Jeremy Liyanage, previously amenable to her moderate position, was quite disconcerted because he interpreted it as an act. I may not have accepted his reading; but when I made inquiries from my Scottish wife she reminded me of a Sri Lankan friend in the old days who could turn on the tears at will to persuade recalcitrant bureaucrats at the customs office.

So, we face a major puzzle. Virtually every Tamil resident in the northern and eastern reaches of the island would have known that the LTTE faced Indian troops in the period 1987 to 1989. The LTTE successfully resisted the might of over 100,000 Indian troops for over two years in a sturdy guerrilla campaign. Indian accounts leave one in no doubt that this resistance was based on popular support and a remarkable grassroots intelligence system which enabled the LTTE to track troop movements out of their camps and even heli-gunships on sorties.[viii] Note too that the camouflage uniforms of the IPKF and the turbans worn by the Sikh regiments who were part of the IPKF were distinct from those of the SL Army outfits. In such circumstances how could a Tiger fighter be unaware that those shooting at her platoon did not include SL army soldiers?

It is this huge error that led me to question the authenticity of Niromi’s alleged battlefield experience and her opening gambit of “Ambush.” In a scathing comment in GV, Vijayaraghavan Sakthivel, writing as a Tamil nationalist, has endorsed my reasoning in his own vocabulary by marking the red-hot political context of 2011 and sensationalist commercial imperatives as the stimulus for the twist inserted into the “major political detail” surrounding the late 1980s battlefield context. We can conjecture, therefore, that this fabrication was the work of author, advisors and/or publisher acting in concert.

Niromi de Soyza’s other accounts of warfare compound one’s astonishment. In 2009 she tells us that “during battles we had been trained to fire in the general direction of the enemy, not at individual targets, and I am not sure whether any of my bullets hit anyone.”[ix] Again, in 2011 she told Barrowclough that during her skirmishes as a guerrilla she may have shot at someone running, but “didn’t ever see a face… I would have frozen if I’d seen a face.”[x] It is no wonder that after he met her, the journalist Windsor concluded that the LTTE was an amateurish outfit. A few months later, in October 2011, she led Mark Furier to quote the Allen & Unwin book-blurb identifying “government soldiers” as the adversaries responsible for the “ambush” in the course of his interview-article for Serendib News (page 23).

Nowhere do Jeyaraj and Cooke address this shortcoming. Jeyaraj deploys his longwinded virtuosity to trail several red herrings and a range of smokescreens around this issue. Reports elsewhere indicate that he has shut out Ratnawalli’s direct questioning of his essay.[xi] In a personal communication Ambalavanar now informs me that his review article, published initially in Thesamnet.co.uk, was sent to Tamilweek (one of Jeyaraj’s websites), but rejected; while all Ambalavanar’s efforts to contact Jeyaraj were spurned. That, of course, is an editor’s prerogative; but it does suggest that Jeyaraj will not face up to such challenges in an open manner. Indeed, I now wonder if Jeyaraj has actually read the whole book (no page references are provided anywhere) and has been induced to spin his article after working the phone (this has always been his forte) and viewing Niromi’s interviews etc.

Jeyaraj also plays word-games with Niromi, Shenuka and Sharmila as part of his box of magic tricks. Can we not conclude that his essay is as much an act of deception as the Tamil Tigress book? We have now seen Jeyaraj the Illusionist.

Lapping it up

His magic worked. The overwhelming majority of cybernet comments within his own website, and several within GV, have bought his performance hook, line and sinker – though there were some notable exceptions (e. g. “PK,” “sambar” and “Offthecuff”). This line of reaction has now continued in juvenile manner in the new discussion around my Groundviews article. This type of outcome is itself cause for comment.

On both a priori grounds and the names/nom de plumes adopted by the bloggers we can conclude that most of the comments have been presented by Sri Lankan Tamils in various corners of the world,[xii] though there may be the odd Sinhalese among those inserting approval of the claims of Jeyaraj (and Cooke). Thus, we can move to the conclusion that the anguish these Tamils have suffered over the last forty years and the heightened emotions arising from the defeat of the LTTE in 2009 directed their reading of the Jeyaraj article. From cyber-world commentary at that time in 2009 and images of demonstrations in the West it seemed to me then that even Tamils who had reservations about the LTTE programme were agitated by the humiliating defeat of a renowned Tamil leader. The subsequent propaganda campaign on war crimes has probably stoked their nationalist sentiments yet further. In brief, then, “Tamilness” is the condition of being[xiii] that has sponsored such a favourable reading of the Jeyaraj article.

This could be a charitable reading of the widespread favour and fervour generated by Jeyaraj’s acts of obfuscation. Others might suggest that all those who lapped it up have displayed a lack of intelligence and discernment. Indeed, some of the comments seem incredibly juvenile and determined to kick that man Roberts, not the ‘football’ of data and argument. Since I am embedded in the debate it would be best if a person who is not Sri Lankan, that is, someone clinically dispassionate, dissects the commentary and tells us whether this reading of the comments is valid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Niromi 2009 versus Niromi Tigress 2011
• Reply to the Rebuttal of my article by the SJC87 Initiative
• Outing a Counterfeit Guerrilla: A tale of lies by Tamil Tigress Niromi de Soyza
• Separating Fact from Fantasy on the ‘Research Note’ by ‘the Principal Researcher’ Mr. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan
• The singer might change but the song remains the same: A critical look at Roberts and Sarvananthan ‘outing’ Niromi de Soyza

Niromi de Soyza’s so-called autobiography, Tamil Tigress, has received extensive coverage in Australia and has traversed the world now because of critical reviews by several personnel and devoted defence from others. It has been described as “part memoir, part compelling reportage, part mea culpa” by Nikki Barrowclough in the Sydney Morning Herald’s weekend magazine.[i] Gordon Weiss, the moral crusader, proclaimed it to be “incredibly moving” and considers it “a story of redemption” (as quoted by Nikki Barrowclough). This may well be one of the motifs that Robert Perinpanayagam, a perceptive commentator, sees as the potential crux of the book in his unelaborated blog comments.

Without denying that dimension of the book if one stretches a point and treats it as a “faction,” that is, a “fictional narrative based on real events,” rather than a historical account, its self-presentation as a memoir[ii] and “true story” renders Tamil Tigress liable at the same time to the charge of deception (a combination stressed in my little-noticed third article on the topic[iii]). Indeed, it is arguable that it could be subject to a legal charge for a misleading advertisement that deceives consumers.[iv]

My initial doubts arose from the back cover advertisement that stated that young Niromi’s platoon found itself under attack from “government forces” during the Christmas season of 1987, a central emphasis because the book was structured to begin with this dramatic account of an “Ambush” in Chapter One. Anyone familiar with Sri Lankan politics over time would be aware that the Sri Lankan army was confined to barracks in August 1987-89 and that the LTTE had been engaged in ground warfare of a guerrilla character against the Indian troops of the IPKF from October 1987.[v] However, most Western readers and new generations of Sri Lankans and/or Lankan migrants may not have been cognizant of this fact. Hence the whiff of deception together with my early doubts as to whether Niromi de Soyza had fought at all.

My reading of the book led me to the conjecture that she may possibly have had a limited spell[vi] in the LTTE ranks and the wild thought that her parents may have purchased her demobilization from the LTTE ranks[vii] – speculative ideas that I did not present in public. In quick time, however, a friend brought my attention to a capsule version of the same tale under the same nom de plume in the Daily Telegraph on 3 May 2009, while one can find a highly abbreviated report in The Australian on 23 May 2009 under the revealing title “Cause remains for Tamil Tiger in Our Midst.”[viii]

It is this juxtaposition that I bring to the debate now. I ask readers to compare the short stories in different newspapers in mid-2009 with the longer book version of 2011. They will discover two Niromis, with both differences and overlaps.

In both the Daily Telegraph essay and book the tale is launched in melodramatic fashion by an account of de Soyza’s first alleged battlefield skirmish, one that is central to the unfolding composition in the autobiographical book because several of her bosom mates and one mentor died in that fiery encounter.[ix] [4] “At dawn that day, Indian soldiers had surrounded our hideout” she says in 2009. Later in this same account she notes that “fighting the Indian soldiers made no sense to me.” This realisation was one factor in her decision to extricate herself from the commitment to fight for Tamil independence under the LTTE.

In contrast, in the opening account in 2011, the enemy are just “soldiers;” while the back cover explicitly proclaims that “two days before Christmas 1987, at the age of 17, Niromi de Soyza found herself in an ambush as part of a small platoon of militant Tamil Tigers fighting the government forces in the bloody civil war that was to engulf Sri Lanka for decades (emphasis mine).”

In short, in 2011 the Indian presence has been obliterated at this critical juncture, though they figure occasionally at other points deeper in the book (pp. 162, 164, 168, 227, 264). The contrast with her initial foray in 2009 is an indication of deception catering to the Western world’s sustained criticism of the Sri Lankan state in 2011 within a backdrop created by the disclosures in Killing Fields and an UN panel report by so-called “experts.”

It is not difficult to conjecture why such a misrepresentation was injected into the new and expanded book-length version of her tale: foregrounding the Indians in the opening chapter would undermine the propaganda pitch as a Tamil patriot which is one dimension of Tamil Tigress. Readers in the West would assume that the soldiers were Sri Lankans because they were not versed in the complexities and temporal shifts attending Sri Lanka’s ethnic wars.

Our detective work is not that simple however. In both her public presentations, in 2009 and 2011, Niromi de Soyza tells the world that the Tigers were engaged in fighting the Indian troops of the IPKF as well as the troops of the Sri Lankan army during her alleged battlefield stint from October 1987 to June 1988. “The war resumed, just as Prabhakaran had predicted, though now we were fighting not only the government troops but the peacekeepers, too” she says in the Daily Telegraph account in 2009. She is consistent on this point. In 2011 she told Margaret Throsby in an ABC interview that “when I joined, the Indian forces had arrived and the Tigers had chosen to fight the Indian forces as well as the Sri Lankan forces.”[x] [5] During her leisurely chat with Nikki Barrowclough in Sydney in July 2011 she said that her unit spent “most of the time … running and hiding from government soldiers.”[xi] [6]

This aspect of her thinking has also been underlined recently by Darshanie Ratnawalli in Lankan newspaper accounts.[xii] Ratnawalli then asks a weighty question: how could any Tiger fighter not be aware of the identity of his/her adversary during the IPKF period of occupation?” This is precisely the issue that initially led me to suggest that Niromi was emulating Helen Demidenko and Norma Kouri.

Such sweeping suspicions are compounded when Niromi tells the world that (a) “during battles we had been trained to fire in the general direction of the enemy, not at individual targets, and I am not sure whether any of my bullets hit anyone;”[xiii] [8] and (b) that during her skirmishes as a guerrilla she may have shot at someone running, but “didn’t ever see a face… I would have frozen if I’d seen a face.”[xiv][9] In the result, Gerard Windsor concluded that “the Tigers were “amateurish” after his read of the book.[xv] As an admirer of the LTTE’s battlefield and organisational capacities over the years,[xvi] I find such a verdict quite mind-boggling. It is not Windsor’s error: it is induced by Niromi de Soyza.[10] Here, then, de Soyza does a disservice to the Tigers as a fighting force, while marking her profound ignorance about warfare.

These failures therefore lead me back towards the strong suspicion that she did not fight for the LTTE at all (though perhaps receiving some training before she extricated herself or was extricated). In these prevarications on my part I underline the several PUZZLES within Tamil Tigress that all readers should address. Together with several fallacious statements in the book which other commentators have noted, they cannot simply be dismissed as errors of memory or acceptable embellishments. In this respect it seems a far cry from the realties expressed by Shobashakti on the one hand and Umeswaran Arunagirinathan’s Allein auf der Flucht on the other – to judge from evaluations sent by Arun Ambalavanar and Maithri Samaradivakara respectively.

If Tamil Tigress had been cast as a novel or even a fact-based fiction its impact as a vehicle for reflection on the human condition and a softening of the perception of the Tigers as “terrorists” of a satanic kind would have remained forceful. When a whiff of deception intrudes, such reflective potential is diluted. Participants in the debate and future readers must ask themselves – in measured manner with analytical rigour of mind rather than emotional force of heart – whether they are being taken for a ride.

• Clouds of Deception: Jeyaraj anoints and cloaks Niromi Tigress
• Reply to the Rebuttal of my article by the SJC87 Initiative
• Outing a Counterfeit Guerrilla: A tale of lies by Tamil Tigress Niromi de Soyza
• The singer might change but the song remains the same: A critical look at Roberts and Sarvananthan ‘outing’ Niromi de Soyza
• Separating Fact from Fantasy on the ‘Research Note’ by ‘the Principal Researcher’ Mr. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan

Photo, courtesy JDS, is of Sri Lanka’s President reading the LLRC report on a ‘haansi putuwa‘ at his official residence.

Though not without flaws and lacuna, the long awaited LLRC report does not disappoint, and reaches high standards, ranking with the best reports emanating over the decades from official and semi-official/autonomous Sri Lankan commissions, reviews and probes. It is a serious, thoughtful, carefully written and constructed text, striking in its fair-mindedness and balance. It deserves constructive engagement with, by all concerned Sri Lankan citizens and those in the world community who are concerned about and with Sri Lanka.

Let us first dispense with the flaws and gaps, of which there are chiefly two. Firstly, the Report echoes the conventional wisdom, as does the Norwegian (NORAD) post-mortem, that the CFA was the result and in the context of the military weakness of the Sri Lankan state. This is factually incorrect since it ignores the chronology of events, in which the deadly LRP missions which were taking down the Tiger command structure, followed and not preceded the disastrous Agni Kheela operation and the devastating raid on Katunayake airport. Thus the lopsided character of the CFA which heavily favoured the LTTE did not reflect the real balance of forces and was not inevitable. Secondly, the LLRC Report draws a veil of silence over the even more lopsided post-tsunami relief mechanism, the PTOMS, which was negotiated at the tail end of the Chandrika presidency and was frozen in its dangerous middle tier, by the Supreme Court, responding to a petition by the JVP. These errors and omissions should not, however, detract from the essentials merit of the Report.

The Report is Janus-faced in the best, original sense of the term. It looks back at the war and the context of the conflict and provides a perspective of the kind of society we need. It constitutes the only road map so far, to a durable peace and a better future. It does not stop at a vision, sometimes more implicit than explicit, but pinpoints wrongs and shortcomings that require rectification while listing reforms that cry out for urgent implementation.

Responses to the LLRC report have been of two sorts.  One is that it is basically laudable and balanced, containing recommendations which should be promptly acted upon.  This response then subdivides between those who are hopeful of action and others who are pessimistic or cynical.  The second response is that the LLRC report is far from satisfactory, and is a whitewash or to change the metaphor, a sweeping under the carpet of war crimes and accountability issues.

To my mind the first response –with its optimistic and pessimistic subsets– constitutes a reasonable reaction, while the second does not.  I say this because those who dismiss the report as His Master’s Voice make the fundamental mistake of being teleological in their approach. Having concluded a priori, that the Sri Lankan state and armed forces were guilty of war crimes and/or crimes against humanity, they fault the LLRC Report for not having arrived at the same conclusion, and dismiss it out of hand, echoing calls for an international inquiry.

These critics overlook or fail to undertake at least five basic tasks. They fail to grapple or even make reference to the rigorous reconstruction and argumentation that leads the Report to conclude that despite episodic crimes, civilian casualties were not, for the most part, intentional. They ignore the fact that this finding is the same as that which was arrived at by at least two impeccably non-state, independent sources, the oldest civil society think tank in Sri Lanka, the Marga Institute and its respected founder and outstanding liberal thinker Godfrey Gunatilleke, as well as a joint commission of three private sector business confederations. They fail to examine and disprove the extensive and solid argument on international humanitarian law in the LLRC report.  They disregard the listing of specific cases, based on testimony, which require independent investigation. They ignore the chapter on Human rights, which, unlike that on international humanitarian law, is quite critical of the status quo.

The Report also cuts like a surgeon’s knife through the old questions as to what the grievances of the Tamil community are, which of them are genuine and legitimate and how they differ from the grievances of the Sinhala community. This is done in excellent segments entitled ‘Grievances of the Tamil Community’ ‘The Historical Background relating to Majority-Minority relationships in Sri Lanka’ and ‘The Different Phases in the Narrative of Tamil Grievances’ (pp291-294, 369-370).

Perhaps the single most important contribution of the LLRC Report is its clear and unambiguous identification of the causes of the Sri Lankan conflict and crisis, the resolution of which remains the central challenge before the country. The LLRC has, in short, undertaken a diagnosis and provided a prescription.

“The Commission takes the view that the root cause of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka lies in the failure of successive Governments to address the genuine grievances of the Tamil people. The country may not have been confronted with a violent separatist agenda, if the political consensus at the time of independence had been sustained and if policies had been implemented to build up and strengthen the confidence of the minorities around the system which had gained a reasonable measure of acceptance. A political solution is imperative to address the causes of the conflict…” (p 291, articles 8.150, 8.151)

The LLRC Report justifies its most ambitious claim, which is to provide a post-war programme and pathway.

“… To this end, the success of ending armed conflict must be invested in an all-inclusive political process of dialogue and accommodation so that the conflict by other means will not continue… However, if these expectations were to become a reality in the form of a multi-ethnic nation at peace with itself in a democratic Sri Lanka, the Government and all political leaders must manifest political will and sincerity of purpose to take the necessary decisions to ensure the good-faith implementation of the Commission’s recommendations... While not being an exhaustive agenda to address, let alone cure, all ills of post conflict Sri Lanka, the recommendations of the Commission could nevertheless constitute a framework for action by all stakeholders, in particular the Government, political parties and community leaders. This framework would go a long way in constructing a platform for consolidating post-conflict peace and security as well as amity and cooperation within and between the diverse communities in Sri Lanka.” (Preamble, pp.1-2)

Overall, perhaps the most vital contribution of the Report is its potential to re-balance the Sri Lankan policy (and political) discourse, re-constituting a tragically vacated middle ground or centre space. Indeed, the LLRC report is that rarity: a welcome example of an enlightened Middle Path, at a time of strident affirmations of dogmatic fundamental positions.

• A slumbering LLRC: The image of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
• The official report of the LLRC
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• The LLRC report and ‘accountability’ in Sri Lanka
• The Final Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission: A Response

Readers will find no big surprises after reading the final report of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC).

It is very much what most people were expecting. A document that looks to the future, exonerates the military, does not touch on the question of accountability and includes some touchy-feely language about the country’s need to move forward, celebrate its diversity and be grateful for the defeat of terrorism.

Essentially, all civilian casualties were the result of people caught in the crossfire or were the LTTE’s fault. “The protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority” by the Sri Lankan armed forces, the Commission has determined. The report also claims that military operations moved at a “deliberately slow” pace because Sri Lanka’s military personnel were so careful and cognizant of the dangers to civilian life during the final phases of the conflict.

While the LTTE deliberately targeted civilians, it appears that Sri Lanka’s military did not, according to the LLRC report. That assertion goes against what most people seem to think, including the report produced by the United Nation’s Panel of Experts. In order to determine “questions of State responsibility,” the LLRC report goes on to note that an “international tribunal” would be unhelpful because there just is not enough evidence about what actually happened during the final phase of the conflict. Essentially, it would be nearly impossible to “re-create” what actually occurred in a court of law. The Commission found that it was just too challenging to give even an estimate of civilian casualties during the end of the war.

The Commission also found it difficult to determine what happened regarding the shelling of hospitals. Although, it is clear to the Commission that Sri Lankan military personnel never intentionally went after civilians in the No Fire Zones(NFZs) either.

The report talks about remuneration for victims/survivors, especially civilians. Again, this is not a big surprise either. Most people thought that the LLRC Report would recommend that the government “throw some money” at a few people.

Although, the responsible entity for doing so, the Rehabilitation of Persons, Properties and Industries Authority (REPPIA) is currently suffering from a lack of funds so it is uncertain how that will play out in the years to come.

The Commission’s analysis of the current challenges facing Sri Lanka appears to be slightly more realistic than the rest of the report. Land issues, minority rights and the possibility that militarization in the North might be a bit too much are all mentioned. And yet “The Commission however recognizes the fact that considering the protracted nature of the conflict spanning a period of thirty years, resolving all such issues would naturally take time and require significant resources and financing.”

So, Sri Lankans and the international community must be patient, of course. Wait, wait, wait—there is always something to wait for in the pursuit of accountability in Sri Lanka. And of course the Commission has found that the most responsible way to approach accountability and the pursuit of national reconciliation would be to establish some additional “independent” bodies to help achieve this. The Commission has even suggested that the Sri Lankan government conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of the Channel 4 documentary “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields.” Evidently, authentication by United Nations specialists is insufficient. While the video does contain certain inaccuracies, it still provides credible evidence that widespread violations of human rights and international law were committed by Sri Lankan military personnel.

There is some fluffy prose about promoting a trilingual Sri Lanka and finding a political solution to address the long-term grievances of the Tamil people. Sri Lanka is still loaded with ethnic tension. Does anyone really believe that a “trilingual Sri Lanka” in the next ten years is a feasible goal?

So, the question is not whether or not the LLRC is insufficient. (It is obviously a weak report, and, in some ways, undoubtedly weaker than what even the most pessimistic people were expecting). The question is whether people sitting in Western capitals (like the US, UK and Canada) who were demanding “accountability” are going say that this report is good enough.

Was the statement made by US Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, a genuine articulation of US policy that the Obama administration will pursue aggressively? How hard will the US and other countries push Sri Lanka on the question of accountability over the next twelve months? Does Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper really care about accountability in Sri Lanka? (Or does he just care that Tamil Canadians think it is important to him).

Many people were waiting for the publication of this report. Sri Lanka, the UN’s Panel of Experts report and the LLRC should be topics of enormous interest at the Human Rights Council’s 19th session in Geneva this March.

It is unclear how events will unfold early next year in Washington, New York, Geneva, London, Ottawa and elsewhere. It would be nice to see a country from the Global South speak out strongly against the LLRC report as well.

What is clear is that if President Rajapaksa is able to get through the next two cycles of the Human Rights Council unscathed, accountability and the idea of an international mechanism will become afterthoughts.

Sri Lanka is currently struggling with numerous problems related to human rights, media freedom, governance and national reconciliation, which the current regime shows no interest in resolving. Yet a balanced, accurate recounting of what actually transpired at the end of the war is vital. Human Rights Watch has already come out with a strong statement condemning the report and others from international organizations will inevitably follow.

It is hard to imagine that a reasonable person (who has been following events in Sri Lanka closely) could buy “the story” that is the LLRC. But if other countries are placated by this biased, inaccurate and disappointing report loaded with lacunae, it will be incumbent upon Sri Lankan citizens and civil society leaders to demand more transparency and better governance from their politicians.

International mechanisms and should never be the first option when it comes to accountability, in Sri Lanka or anywhere else. Yet, it has become increasingly clear that Sri Lanka’s domestic institutions are inadequate—particularly as it relates to the rule of law, the judiciary, media freedom and the protection of individual liberties. There is some skepticism about how much consensus could be garnered at the Human Rights Council, as is the case with any multilateral body.

Irrespective of how the Commission was formed, or how biased the Commission might be, President Rajapaksa was given a chance (and rightfully so) to prove that Sri Lanka was capable of looking into credible allegations of war crimes in 2009. People waited patiently for the LLRC to produce its final report.

The production of a mediocre report would have at least given the Sri Lankan government a chance to make a “decent” argument in with foreign governments, in Geneva and other in other international forums. Yet the LLRC is painfully inadequate, especially when it comes to the veneration of the armed forces and the Commission’s inordinately generic and general comments about the behavior of Sri Lankan military personnel at the conclusion of the war.

The publication of the LLRC report is one more sign that Rajapaksa’s regime thinks it can do whatever it wants and face no consequences for its actions.

There is a good chance that the regime is right.

It will take significant political will, leadership and courage if Rajapaksa’s regime is going to be held accountable at the UN’s Human Rights Council, or anywhere else. The US government has just come out and said that they have some serious concerns about the report.[1] “Concern” is one thing, real action is another.

US State Department Spokesman Nuland’s recent statement not only decries the fact that the report is insufficient. She goes on to say that, in addition to fulfilling all of the recommendations in the LLRC report, the Sri Lankan government should deal with the issues (and there are many) that the report did not include.

It is hard imagine that the Rajapaksa regime will comply with this request with alacrity, if it does at all. If other influential governments come out with similar or far more critical responses to the LLRC, it will be interesting to see how the Sri Lanka government will respond. Of course, sovereignty will lie at the heart of their defense, but they will need a more nuanced riposte than that. Rajapaksa’s regime has proven itself to be extremely effective when it comes to consistent, coherent messaging and the manipulation of high-level diplomatic visits in Sri Lanka.

Yet, one would hope that the efficacy of the tactics and strategy that they have used quite well in the past would wane with the publication of this underwhelming report.

Nuland’s comments are an encouraging sign. Hopefully, they will be followed by concrete action by Washington and many others, including those Sri Lankans who have already suffered so much and deserve a better, impartial, more detailed account of what actually happened in April and May of 2009.

[Editors note: A version of this article first appears in the Journal of Foreign Relations.]

• Examining Sri Lanka’s Diplomacy Machine
• A tragi-comedy? The UN Advisory Panel and war crimes in Sri Lanka
• Waiting for the end of the LLRC
• Archive of Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) submissions and media reports
• Can GOSL Implement LLRC Recommendations?

Shortly before their disappearance Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan had been organizing a press conference to be held in Jaffna on 10^th December, international human rights day.  On 10^th December, a group of HRDs from the South who were travelling to Jaffna to attend a peaceful protest to mark human rights day were stopped for several hours by the police and prevented from attending the protest. (Detailed report available at http://groundviews.org/2011/12/14/42-political-activists-and-hrds-detained-and-prevented-from-participating-in-peaceful-protest-in-jaffna-town-on-human-rights-day/)

Background of the Two HRDs

Mr. Lalith Kumar Weeraraj is a political activist and human rights defender who has worked extensively in the North and East of Sri Lanka. He is the Jaffna Coordinator of the Movement for People’s Struggle (MPS) (Jana Aragala Wiyapaaraya) launched by a dissident faction of the Peoples Liberation Front (JVP), a mainstream opposition party in Sri Lanka represented in Parliament. The movement aims at mobilizing people against state repression, human rights violations against the Tamil minority and the problems faced by IDPs in the North. MPS launched their campaign at a meeting at the Hyde Park grounds in Colombo on 13^th December 2011, where they also held a protest calling for the immediate release of the missing activists.

Mr. Weeraraj is also an Executive Committee member of ‘We Are Sri Lankans’ (WESL), a university student based organization aimed promoting and protecting the rights of the Tamil people in order to build national harmony and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Mr. Weeraraj has campaigned for the release of Tamil political prisoners and detainees and against human rights violations and repression of HRDs and civilians in the North.  He also worked closely with IDPs calling for better infrastructure and livelihood opportunities for resettled or relocated IDPs in the North.

Mr. Weeraraj has worked extensively on the issue of disappearences in the North and East.  He helped set up committees of Families of the Disappeared in the Trincomalee, Mannar, Vavuniya, Killinochchi and Jaffna Districts. He was the main organizer of the protest campaigns with families of the disappeared in Trincomalee, Vavuniya, Killinochchi, Colombo and Jaffna between May and November 2011. The last protest in Jaffna was held on 29^th November 2011. Mr. Weeraraja has recently visited several places of detention including the Bossa Detention Center in the South and the Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) Head Quarters in Colombo, the Welikada Prison in the Colombo district and military camps in search of disappeared persons. Through his efforts he was able to locate two persons who were being held at the Boossa Detention Center and the TID Head Quarters.

Mr. Muruganandan is a close associate of Mr. Weeraraj and has been involved in organizing several protests and campaigns against human rights violations including events with the families of the disappeared.  Mr. Muruganandan assisted Mr. Weeraraj in his work for the Movement for People’s Struggle and the WESL.  He assisted in their work on disappearances and against unlawful detentions and contributed through his own resources and local contacts towards the movements activities in Jaffna. Both men were organizing a press conference on 10^th December 2011 to publicize the protest by the Movement for People’s Struggle in Colombo on 13^th December 2011, when they disappeared.

Previous Threats and Attacks

Mr. Weeraraj has faced repeated threats, intimidation and attacks by the military and police in the North due to his human rights work and campaigns. He has been warned on several occasions to stop doing human rights work in the North, particularly work on enforced disappearences and arbitrary detention, which the military considered to be anti-government or political activities.

On 25^th March 2011, Mr. Weeraraj was putting up posters in Mannar town, calling on the Government to provide information on disappeared persons, when he was abducted by a group of men who claimed to be army officers.  Mr. Weeraraj was blindfolded and held overnight, believed to be in an army barrack. The men threatened Mr. Weeraraj and questioned him about his work. The following morning, Mr. Weeraraj was blindfolded and brought back to Pesalai Junction in Mannar and released. Although he tried to lodge a complaint with the Mannar police regarding the abduction, the police refused to record his complaint on the ground he was unable to identify the persons responsible.

On around 10^th April 2011, Mr. Weeraraj and a friend were arrested by the Vavuniya Police while they were putting up posters in Vavuniya about disappearences in the North. The police tore the posters and threatened to shoot Mr. Weeraraj if he tried to put up posters in Vavuniya again.

On 23^rd June 2011, Mr. Weeraraj had travelled to Killinochchi to organize a protest for WESL when he and a friend were abducted by officers from the Killinochchi (Depo Junction) Army Camp and held in an abandoned ice-cream factory, behind the army camp, and interrogated for around 6 hours before being released. The military forcibly took a photograph of Mr. Weeraraj before releasing him.

On 14^th November 2011, Mr. Weeraraj, along with other activists, was severely beaten by a group of unidentified thugs at a protest with families of the disappeared in Jaffna, opposite the Jaffna town bus stand at around 11.00 am. The attack took place in full view of the police and the army who failed to intervene and stop the violence. Mr. Weeraj and several others ran into the house of former parliamentarian Ms. Padmini Sithambaranadan for their safety.  The gang followed them into the house and locked Mr. Weeraraj in a room and beat him severely. Mr. Weeraja was badly injured in the attack. A complaint regarding the incident was filed with the Jaffna Police Station the same day. However no action has been taken to date.

Disappearance on 9^th December 2011

Mr. Weeraraj travelled to Jaffna on 9^th December to organize a press conference for the MPS in Jaffna the following day (international human rights day).  Mr. Weeraraja and Mr. Muruganandan were last seen by relatives, leaving Mr. Muruganandan’s house at Avarangal Jaffna on Mr. Muruganandan’ motorbike (license no NP GT 7852) at around 5.00pm (Sri Lankan time) on 9^th December. Both men have been missing since then and there is no information regarding their fate or whereabouts to date.

At around 11.00 pm on 9^th December, Mr. Weeraraj’s father received a number of threatening phone calls on his mobile phone (no.+94711879124).  The callers threatened to kill Mr. Weeraraja and warned that “either you remove your son from Jaffna or we will do it for you”. Mr. Weeraraj’s father filed a complaint regarding the threatening calls with the Kosgama Police Station (Colombo District) on 11^th December 2011 (CIB 94/133).

Complaints/Action by Family and Civil Society Groups

Mr. Kugan Muruganadan’s family filed a complaint with the Achchuweli Police Station (Jaffna District) on 10^th December 2011. They were not given a complaint number by the police. Mr. Weeraraj’s father filed a complaint with the Kosgama police station (Colombo District) regarding the disappearance on 11^th December 2011 which was recorded under Complaint no: CIB 94/133.  Mr. Weeraraj’s father also filed a complaint with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regarding the disappearance on 13^th December 2011, recorded under Complaint no: LKC/432333.

Parliamentarian Mr Ajith Kumara submitted a written complaint regarding the disappearance to the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa on 10^th December 2011.  Mr. Ajith Kumara also filed a complaint about the disappearance with the Jaffna police station on 10^th December, recorded under Complaint no: CIB 232/79.

A complaint was filed with the National Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (NHRC) regarding the missing activists, by Mr. Ajith Kumara on 13^th December (Complaint no: HRC/ 33852/ 2011). A further complaint was filed by Mr. Weeraraj’s father to the NHRC on 16^th December 2011 (Complaint no: H.R.C.3934/11)

Local and international organizations including Amnesty International (http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA37/018/2011/en/523cd9d9-a12b-4013-a31a-5e368272d22e/asa370182011en.pdf), the Asian Human Rights Commission , http://www.humanrights.asia/news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-200-2011, the Sri Lanka Human Rights Centre and the Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), and the International network of Sri Lankan Diaspora http://www.srilankandiaspora.com/blog/?p=2138, have expressed shock and concern regarding the disappearences and concern over the safety of the two missing activists.

State Response

The Jaffna police told Mr. Ajith Kumara MP, on 10^th December 2011, that that the two individuals were not in their custody.  However no action appears to have been taken to date to investigate their disappearance.  On 14^th December, Mr. Ajith Kumara made a statement in parliament about the disappearance of the two activists.

On 15th December, Cabinet Spokesperson, Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told the media at a Cabinet briefing that ‘Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan have not been disappeared, they are there’. He also said that the two activists had not been detained unlawfully and if they were being held by the police or military they would be produced before a Magistrate and dealt with according to the law. This news item was carried on Sirasa TV News on 15^th December at 7pm; http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/12/18/parent-seeks-hrc-intervention-to-find-whereabouts/; http://soundcloud.com/lanka-views/keheliya).

On 14^th December, Mr. Muruganandans wife found the motorbike license no NP GT7852, in which Mr. Muruganandan and Mr. Weeraraj were last seen, parked inside the Atchchuveli Police Station. Mr. Muruganadan’s wife had visited the police station to collect a copy of her complaint regarding the disappearance.  When she inquired about the motorbike, the police told her that the bike had been found by the Kopai Police on 13^th December, parked near a Hindu temple in Kopai.

Appeal

The families of both Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan and WESL and PSM, believe that the Sri Lanka Army is responsible for the disappearance. The Government has so far failed to provide them with any clear information regarding the two missing men and their whereabouts. The family has heard through unofficial sources that Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Muruganandan are being held at an unidentified detention center in the Jaffna district but there has been no official confirmation of this fact.

Following the statement by Minister Keheliya Rambukwella to the media, that the two activists ‘have not been disappeared, they are there’, their family and colleagues believe that the two activists are currently in Government custody and home that they will be produced before a Magistrate. They call on the Government to provide credible information regarding the whereabouts of Mr. Weeraraj and Mr. Murugan and to treat them according to the law.

• 42 Political Activists and HRDs Detained and Prevented from Participating in Peaceful Protest in Jaffna Town on Human Rights Day
• Disappearance
• Youth activists on human rights in Sri Lanka
• Still waiting for justice in Sri Lanka
• 119, Buddhism and being Sinhalese