A CC is basically a French idea. The French Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) was established by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in 1958. The idea of a CC is alien to common law countries headed by the United Kingdom. Our own CC is limited to the narrow task of creating and supervising the Independent Commissions and advising the President on top level appointments. Essentially it is a clearing house. In fact many common law countries entrust such establishment decisions to the chief executives at different levels or to bodies created by the Head of State or relevant Ministers.
Status and Impact
The PSC in Canada and Australia is a ministerial creation. The Indian Election Commission is appointed by the President. The absence of a CC in these countries has not been a felt vacuum. Creation of a CC in this country appears to have arisen essentially from suspicion and distrust of the integrity of the chief executive. But the appointments made after the creation of a CC do not appear to show a conspicuous improvement on those made before. Nevertheless the clamour for a CC persists despite its limitations noted below, perhaps because of the halo initially created around it as a ‘progressive’ measure or is it reluctance to identify the King’s new clothing?
The French CC is not burdened with house-keeping roles. In France the CC is the highest constitutional authority entrusted with the duty to ensure that the principles and rules of the constitution are upheld. The French CC has the power to decide on the constitutionality of legislation. It supervises elections, presidential and parliamentary and ensures the legitimacy of referendums. It also issues the official results of elections and ensures proper conduct and fairness at elections. The second area of Council power is the interpretation of the fundamental meanings of the constitution, procedure, legislation, and treaties.
These powers are elaborated in some detail in order to show comparatively how insignificant the role of our CC is. In Cambodia, the President of the CC has rank and prerogatives equal to those of the President of the National Assembly. Members have rank and prerogatives equal to those of its Vice-President. This indicates how seriously other countries take their CC and treat its membership, thus highlighting its significance which is principally based on the important role it plays in the body politic. The similarity between the French CC and ours appears to be only in name.
Independence
The main purpose behind the creation of the Sri Lankan CC is said to be to install an entity that can function with independence. But the manner in which the members of the CC are to be selected belies that claim. Three of its 10 members are leading politicians. One is a nominee of the top politician of the land, the President. Five others are nominated by the two politicians leading the two sides of the House. The tenth member has to be a nominee of the minor parties in Parliament, a provision that has opened a can of worms and virtually held up the appointment of the second CC for more than two years.
Not satisfied with the involvement of politicians on a party basis, Article 41A (3) of the Constitution introduces a communal element to the nomination by requiring three of the members to be from the minority communities thus introducing a sectarian bias to the CC ab initio, perpetrating a parochial division and nurturing a mindset that calls for elimination in the task of nation building. Besides what practical impact can three members of the minorities have against seven of the majority? The distinction only serves to dampen objectivity on both sides by having to play their implied role of safeguarding sectarian interests.
Method of Nomination
The above method of nominating members to the CC may be usefully contrasted with similar provisions elsewhere. In France the President of the Council is selected by the President of the Republic. Three members each are appointed by the Presidents of the Republic, the National Assembly, and the Senate. In Cambodia, three members are appointed by the King while the National Assembly and the Supreme Council of Magistracy elect three members each.
In the Republic of Kazakhstan the Chairman of the Constitutional Council is appointed by the President of the Republic and two members are also appointed by him, two by the Chairman of the Senate and two by the Chairman of the lower house of Parliament. What is noteworthy is that in these countries the relevant bodies make the nominations as an entity and not on a party or communal basis and no politician is personally involved by office with the nomination. The same measure of a-political and impersonal nomination can be achieved here too if the selection is made by Parliament as a whole, through a secret ballot.
Note also the bar on functioning politicians in the above Councils. In France as well as in Cambodia, former Presidents of the republic are ex officio members of the CC but even they are shut out if they remain politically active. Three of the highest ranking politicians are members of our CC. The impact of their presence at a council meeting on their ordinary co-members needs no underscoring. Can independent, balanced and fearless decisions be taken in such an inhibited environment?
Mandate ignored
Article 41A (5) of the Seventeenth Amendment states that the President ‘shall upon the receipt of a written communication of the nomination…….forthwith make the respective appointments’. This imperative direction has not been invariably acted upon. The former President ignored with impunity, the nomination of the CC for the posts of the chairman and members of the Election Commission and the impact of that defiance is still keeping a reluctant Elections Commissioner in office long after his retiring age, at grave risk to his health. The ongoing clamour against the delay in appointing members of the second CC recommended to the President, is another instance that casts doubts on the effectiveness of the mandate in the above article.
There is no provision in the Seventeenth Amendment to ensure that recommendations made to the President by the Speaker for appointments are compulsorily acted upon. Thus a President can immobilize by mere inaction an institution boastfully created to be a restraint on him. This deadlock has no remedy. It cannot be solved legally through a writ of mandamus as the President is immune to litigation under the Constitution.
It is but fair to look at this breakdown from the angle of the President. The Amendment gives the President a Hobson’s choice. It makes no provision for alternate nominees. To say the least, it would appear to be discourteous to demand the Head of the State to make an appointment without leaving any discretion in his hands. The mandate makes a rubber stamp of the President. Suppose recommendations made to him for appointment contain an optional list equal to the number to be appointed, the President will be given a decent chance to imprint his personality on the appointment.
Such courtesy would naturally justify more effective constitutional measures to cure a possible deadlock. The President may be given a definite period, say two weeks, within which to make the relevant appointments. He may appoint all the persons in the original list or substitute any or all of them with those in the optional list. In such a background, it would be fair to make provision for a presumption that the President is deemed to have approved the persons in the original list, unless he makes a different appointment before the end of the given period.
Confidentiality
Another malaise besetting the CC stems from the lack of confidentiality in the appointment process. It is manifest at present with the hue and cry over certain pending appointments. Institution of the new CC is held up on account of certain protests made to the President by some individuals against the appointment of two persons recommended by the Speaker. Now these recommendations are made through a process prescribed by the Constitution after a long and contentious sifting by all parties in Parliament. The Prime Minister himself is associated with the process of selection. It is logical to presume that he would have informally sounded the President before he agreed to the nominees.
It is proper and prudent that a document prepared with such thoroughness and with the approval of some of the highest dignitaries in the land be kept confidential until the appointments are made. Announcing the names in the recommend list in advance exposes the due process of selection to undue influence. The list is exposed to bargaining by every passer-by, like an article placed in the Mariyakade market. This is tantamount to opening the list to an unofficial referendum. The ensuing objections and protests could keep the CC in abeyance ad infinitum. Although such an impasse could serve the interests of a government prone to corruption and abuse of power, it would defeat the intended purpose of the Seventeenth Amendment.
If we must have a CC, let us see to it that it is properly constituted, adequately burdened and unfailingly effective.
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I would suggest that the existing structures be used as transit camps for future arrivals white moving out those who are already in them to more congenial habitats. The new cottages should be built with material like cadjan, palmirah and straw. They should be put up among big trees removing only the underbrush for construction work. There is no need to farm out construction to contractors. Those selected to inhabit a particular settlement can build the cottages themselves. That would give them a chance to earn a little pocket money. More importantly, engagement in building their habitat will break the hopelessness of displacement by creating a positive interest.
Selection of settlers for a new camp calls for insight. Lumping together refugees from different localities can lead to disorientation and distress. People who have come from the same village/locality should be housed in the same camp, preferably naming the settlement after the place from which the inhabitants hail. That would give them a sense of identity and security. Work on classification by village should begin immediately as it would automatically link up family members who got dispersed on their way from home.
The recent appointment of refugees to supervise the camps is a step in the right direction. This trend must be further developed by getting the selectees for a new camp to nominate their own committee of management. Officials should work in consultation with the committee in all matters pertaining to the settlement, including clearing, construction, infrastructure, discipline, and maintenance. Worries about security can be minimized by the trust placed in the settlers’ committee. The exercise would also be a first lesson in self-government the government is promising to create in the North.
Another complaint against the camps is their exclusivity. Anxiety about security is understood, having regard to the crisis and past experience. But excluding all visitors creates suspicion by the very announcement, thereby giving credence to negative impressions locally and internationally. For imaginable reasons, admission to camps cannot be given as in the case of a public exhibition. On the other hand accessibility naturally creates credibility. Therefore government must give thought to the appointment of committees of camp visitors as in the case of hospitals. This committee must be representative of all interests, local and foreign.
The original announcement that refugees would be confined to the camps for three years was a stunner. Fortunately that limit has been since contradicted; however there is still no indication of how long the refugees would be kept in the camps and no one appears to have any clue about it. This is a matter that should engage the immediate attention of government planners, if any.
Naturally the period of stay cannot be calculated en bloc as resettlement has to proceed progressively area by area. But a time frame has to be worked out methodically for each settlement and notified to the refugees. That would give them a target of hope and the officials a coordinated programme of work.
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Be magnanimous
The motive power behind the war against the LTTE was the ‘Dutugemunu’ frame of mind. I believe that the most productive response to the emerging situation is that the State that played Dutugemunu in war should remain Dutugemunu in peace. The Mahavansa records the magnanimity of King Dutugemunu to Elara whom he vanquished in battle. The honour accorded to Elara at his funeral and the royal decree forbidding mounted riding past his mausoleum, built inside a proclaimed silence zone, reflect values that have been infused into the Sinhala bloodstream over the centuries. The State can do no better than living up to such values eschewing triumphalism. That should set the stage for a peaceful resolution of the ethnic conflict.
It is unpleasant to hear some of our leading politicians referring to Prabhakaran in disparaging terms as he is supposedly nearing his end. Lighting of crackers at the end of a successful battle is in the same un-Sinhala tenor. Whatever his faults, limitations and mistakes may have been, Prabhakaran has stood up for his people as much as Keppetipola, Gongalegoda Banda and Veera Puran Appu stood up for the Sinhalese in their hour of need. All these heroes deserve equal admiration for their self sacrifice in rising to the occasion when they believed that their people were imperiled. Their orientation or their ultimate defeat is beside the point.
Be courageous and determined
In short what the State can do for the Tamils, for that matter, for all the minorities, after the war, is to ensure that they are given their due place in society so that they may live with dignity and self respect with the same rights, liberties and privileges enjoyed by the majority. That can happen only if the President is large-hearted enough to remain Dutugemunu after the war. Judging from the lukewarm manner in which the APRC has been staggering over the last several years, some are doubtful whether the State has the guts to steer clear of the obstacles that are likely to be placed in the way of achieving that goal.
But if the Head of State can marshal the same courage and determination with which he fought the war in the face of all odds and tremendous international pressure, he may be trusted to lay the foundation stone for a free and equal post-war Sri Lanka, provided he has the will to do so. This trust is redoubled by the views on the aftermath of the war expressed by the duo that spearheaded the military campaign for the President, the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary. They have always insisted that victory in the battlefield should be followed by national reconciliation, if there is to be a lasting peace.
Optimism is further enhanced by Victor Ivan’s observation (Island, 02.04.08) that the main ingredients of the package of reparations for the Tamils has already been written into JR’s otherwise Bahubootha Constitution.
“While the Sinhala Language continues to be the Official language (Section 18) both Sinhala and Tamil languages were accepted as National languages (Section 19). This is a deviation from the ‘Sinhala Only’ policy which was part of government policy since 1956. The right to be educated in any of the national languages was ensured (Section 21 – 1). In the event a certain course in the university is conducted only in one language, the right is ensured for a person who entered the University from the other language stream to continue education in the University in his own national language (Section 21 -2). The right is also ensured for the people of North and East to communicate with officials in the national language used for administrative purposes. (Section 21 -3).
Constitutional validity was given to the regulations approved under the Tamil languages (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958 by including them in the Constitution. The right to use a language of one’s choice was ensured in Section 14 (1) (f). By section 27 (b), it was accepted as a state policy that no citizens should face any difficulty due to language. By Section 25, it was declared a government responsibility to provide adequate facilities for the use of a language as stipulated in the constitution. The provisions stipulated in the Constitution regarding fundamental rights was even more important to minorities. Seeking relief from the judiciary in the event of a breach of a right was assured by this provision.”
Pick up the lost thread
Victor Ivan also points out that at the end of the All Party Conference summoned by JR after the Riots, in 1984, the then Tamil leaders had agreed to a reconciliation package including amalgamation of districts and land administration. When this package was about to be written into the law, the Tamil leaders unexpectedly backed out of the agreement, presumably under duress. Tamil youths had by then resorted to violence. Now that the possibility of intimidation is no longer a serious factor to reckon with, the State may resume the dialogue from where it was interrupted.
However it has to be appreciated that the theater in which the dialogue has to be resumed is not identical to what JR had to deal with. On the Sinhala side protagonists are more assertive than under JR’s dictatorial rule. What disturbs those concerned with the ongoing moves to resolve the national crisis is that Sinhala ‘chauvinists’ would upset the apple cart. Already there are rumblings from the ultra-nationalist sector that the Government is giving in too much to the Tamils. Surmounting this roadblock calls for tremendous tact and courage. In the ultimate analysis national reconciliation will depend on the capacity of the President to overcome this challenge.
This does not mean that the Government should rush forward blindfolded, reckless about possible consequences. Some dissenting voices come from learned lawyers and other professionals whose views have to be given due consideration. They cannot be brushed aside as mere ‘Sinhalese Chauvinists’. They may in their wisdom envisage certain dangers in the path to reconciliation. Even if their anti-thesis is not accepted, it has to be examined and suitable safeguards found to counteract the feared pitfalls, subject to the imperative condition that safeguards do not violate the legitimate rights of the minorities.
Present Tamil leadership is not the same that JR had to face. It has been decimated and neutralized through decades of violence. The leaders that remain do not command universal acceptance. Some have been overshadowed by their opposition to terrorism which has been the order of the day for most Tamils so far. Others have ruined their reputation through their own acts of omission and commission. Those who posed themselves as the leaders of the Tamils by proxy would naturally fade away with the civil war. The greatest need of the hour for the Tamils is to find their leadership. The Tamil Diaspora has a duty to help fill this gap. In that context the present dialogue their representatives are engaged in with the Government is a most welcome development
Act promptly
Time is of the greatest essence at this moment. Understandably the Tamils are shocked and disappointed with the collapse of the LTTE regime which was intuitively a tower of strength and a ray of hope to most of them. Quick action is needed to win them over to an alternative that would satisfy them as a genuine and positive course of action leading to their amelioration. Dilly dallying on committees and conferences will not work at this hour. In this sense, implementing the Thirteenth Amendment appears to be a first step in the right direction as it is already in place. May be no party agrees unreservedly with this move. Only it happens to be a move that no one would seriously oppose.
However it is important that the Amendment is implemented in full and in real earnest. It has been already diluted by power greedy politicians in order to expand their ‘empires’ and the misguided priorities of the national budget. To think that implementing the Thirteenth Amendment is the end of the race would be deceiving oneself. The sincerity with which the Amendment is implemented should generate greater trust among the communities which in turn would doubtlessly make the stake-holders more amenable to greater consensus on further progress.
Allow time to heal
Future developments will depend largely on the mood of the people. Judging from the results of surveys conducted by the CPA there already appears to be a growing tendency on the part of the majority to accommodate the political rights of minorities. It is a long term responsibility of the State to nurture this trend, mainly through conducive policies of education.
Multi-stream schools aught to be the order of the future. They should be encouraged to create opportunities for children of all communities to come together socially. Formation of interactive structures in schools would go a long way to achieve this objective. Where schools are limited to a single stream by necessity, the merging has to be realized through visits, educational tours, competitions and exchanges of students etc. Segregationist education policies followed in the past are mainly responsible for the present alienation among communities.
Perhaps it is too early in the day to visualize the way ahead of the Thirteenth Amendment. Besides conjecturing on further moves at this stage may be counter-productive. Let us get ourselves going now and cross bridges when we come to them. It may well be that none of us living today would come to the last bridge. It would be crossed by our progeny who by then would have developed an inclusive mind-set capable of crossing the bridge with ease. They will make decisions on the dictates of their own social and intellectual environment. It is dogmatic and futile to dictate terms to future generations on the strength of existing power bases.
This submission is in response to a question posed by Groundviews posed here that asked readers to opine on a war ‘over in 3 weeks’ and a ‘post-LTTE’ Sri Lanka. Please visit this original post to read a rich spectrum of opinion and commentary on the nature of post-war Sri Lanka.
Saliya opines,
“It it is not convincingly justified why the pro-devolution cause cannot be productively served from anti-military standpoint. In fact it is contradictory to promote devolution of power while endorsing pro-war military mentality which can easily be misinterpreted as a military solution.”
Much as I agree with Saliya’s viewpoint, it has to be pointed out that it loses its relevance at this stage when the military initiative is supposed to be nearing its end. His view was certainly in point before the military moved in and it may have produced more sustainable and less destructive results if it was acted upon with vision on both sides at that stage. But now that the horse has fled, why think of closing the stable? At this stage the reflection is only of academic interest.
This consideration focuses attention on the adequacy of the grid itself. Both grids are centered on the present moment in time. If they are analyzed as a continuum, conclusions reached by both writers may not be valid for all times. Validity of a conclusion depends on the environment at the time of analysis as the following examination of Jayatilale’s grid would indicate:
(A) Pro-Tiger, anti-war, anti-MR/Govt, pro-devolution/federalism
(UNP leadership, ‘peace’ NGOs, INGOs)
Judging from their public statements the UNP leadership does not appear to be Pro-Tiger or anti-war now. That position was tenable only in the scenario of their peace initiative. Are the anti-war responses of the ‘peace’ NGOs, INGOs based on partiality for any party to the conflict? Could their supposed pro-Tiger attitude be a product of emotion or a response to the changing balance of power? Could not their anti-war response be universal and a part of their value system? Besides is it safe to surmise that they are all anti-war after the LTTE’s consistent resistance to their peace initiatives?
(B) Anti-Tiger, anti-war, anti-Govt/MR, pro devolution/federalism
(UTHR-type, CBK sympathizers)
Would they be anti-Tiger, if the latter responded favouably to their overtures? Are these groups still anti-war or could they have changed with time like the UNP? Would they be anti-Govt/MR if the Government was more democratic and less corrupt?
(C) Anti-Tiger, pro-war, anti-Govt/MR, pro-devolution/federalism
(UNP base, TULF)
Is not the anti-Tiger, pro-war stance a development of the failure to come to terms with the LTTE? Would not the Tigers have been more accommodating if they visualized a possible military defeat? Is the TULF anti-Govt. at the moment?
(D) Anti-Tiger, pro-war, anti-Govt/MR, anti-devolution (JVP)
JVP’s anti-Tiger response is a development over the years. They became anti-Govt after their recent break up with the powers that be They were very much with the Government during the last Presidential Election.
(E) Anti-Tiger, pro-war, pro-Govt/MR, pro-devolution
(SLFP, CPSL, EPDP, Karuna)
These again are responses that developed over time due to the failure to settle internal disputes or the break up of the traditional left values.
(F) Anti-Tiger, pro-war, pro-Govt/MR, anti-devolution
(JHU, NFF)
This is perhaps the most consistent stance in the grid. Even here the pro-Govt. attitude may break up if the Government resorts to a pro-devolution stand.
I have made these observations to show that the attitude of the parties concerned is time and situation bound and inter-dependent. We have come to the present predicament because the solutions available at different stages of time were not taken advantage of for personal reasons or due to a lack of vision.
Of course present action must necessarily be based on present demands. Sophistication of the Grid as a continuum may help each concerned party to see where they missed the bus and learn a lesson for the future. The contradiction in trying “to promote devolution of power while endorsing pro-war military mentality” is an inevitable result of failing to devolve power at an earlier stage in the continuum.
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The Incrementally Progressive Approach
Liyanage sums up his preferred option for the Tamils as follows;Â
‘My submission here is if the advocates of pluralist democratic constitutional order adopt a strategy of gradual and incremental reforms, it may produce better results. Thirteenth and Seventeenth Amendments notwithstanding their limits provide with options that would facilitate the journey towards a new constitutional order”.
In his article on “Tamil politics tomorrow: Options, challenges and pitfalls“ published in the Groundviews on February 5, 2009, Dayan Jayatilleka makes the following observation:Â
“The tragedy of Tamil politics is that both the Tigers and the EPRLF failed to recognize that the 13th amendment represented the limits of the possible. The Tigers stand was rejectionist and violent, but even the EPRLF declared the 13th amendment as inadequate before they entered the Provincial council to work it. Therefore they never really settled in to work within those parametric constraints.”
Jayatilleka makes this submission more specifically when he saysÂ
“This is why the only man with a roadmap, Douglas Devananda, has embraced President Rajapakse’s ‘comprehensive implementation of the 13th amendment’ as the only feasible start, while placing the 13th amendment Plus, and even consideration of the Indian model, as subsequent stages of political evolution. Between the various stages of his gradualist formula lie periods of the broadening of consensus and the building up of trust between the communities over time and through practical experience” ["Tamil Nadu, the Indian model and devolution", August 13, 2008.]
In my Hurry up and go slowly posted on the Groundviews on August 18, 2008, I wrote,Â
“It is foolish to idle because the ideal is not possible. We can only achieve the optimum practicable at any point in time depending on the balance of forces currently operative. In this sense, the President’s declared move to implement the Thirteenth Amendment appears to be a first step in the right direction. May be no party agrees unreservedly to this move. Only it happens to be a move that no one would seriously oppose”.
My conception of the way ahead was optimistic:Â
“To think that implementing the Thirteenth Amendment is the end of the race would be deceiving oneself for want of a sense of history. The sincerity with which the Amendment is implemented should generate greater trust among the communities which in turn would doubtlessly make the stake-holders more amenable to greater consensus on further progress.”
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Strategy and Tactics
It is perhaps an irony of fate that a people have to resort to strategic manipulations to realize their birth rights. Even such are the vagaries of politics based on the numbers game. But it is imprudent to refuse to resort to strategy after direct options have ended in failure. The most favourable scenario to Tamil interests would be the two major parties coming together on a pluralist liberal democratic platform. Going by past form however, such an opportunity appears to be remote in the extreme.
In the event of the major parties refusing to come together, Jayatilleka recommends the following strategy to the Tamils for the progressive realization of their aspirations:
“If they opt wisely to form a coalition with Mahinda Rajapakse, they can neutralize and outweigh the influence of the Sinhala hard-line parties and dark fantasies of settler-colonized permanently Occupied Territories, ensure the full implementation of the 13th amendment, prevent any unjust legislation, push for the elimination of all forms of discrimination, and accelerate the economic development of their areas. If they ally with the Rightwing Opposition which is tarred (perhaps for generations to come) with the brush of appeasement, they will continue to find themselves at a political dead-end.” [Tamil politics tomorrow: Options, challenges and pitfalls", Supra]    Â
Sri Lankan politics being so unpredictable, opportunistic and temperamental, I personally think it would be unwise for the Tamils to hitch their wagon to a single star. The wiser strategy would be for them to choose their partner according to the exigencies of the developing situation.
In a climate where ruling parties have had to palaver minorities for their survival, optimum advantage is gained by helping the ruling party to maintain its slender majority in the precarious situation into which the Bahubootha Constitution has cast them. This was the strategy of Thondaman and Ashroff and it cannot be denied that they obtained the best possible bargains for their people, bargains that were not forthcoming through confrontation.
Allegiance in a ‘political marriage of convenience’ is not permanently owed to any specific party, but to the party in power. On the face of it, this strategy may appear to be dishonest but all is fair in love and politics. “There are no permanent friends or permanent enemies in politics”. What matters are the gains a leader makes for his people through skillful manipulation of the balance of power.
The paramount consideration for a leader is the welfare of his people. Most of the concessions the upcountry Tamils have won are undoubtedly the outcome of Thondaman’s manipulative tactics. That he zigzagged from government to government to achieve his mission may raise many a cynical smile but what matters is that Thondaman has had the last laugh. Ashroff adopted similar strategy and in the process, delivered much more for his people than conventional politics has been able to achieve for decades.
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Responsibility of the Diaspora
The problem however is to find a Thondaman or an Ashroff for the Tamils. Tamil leadership has been decimated and neutralized through decades of violence. The leaders that remain do not command universal acceptance. Some have been overshadowed by their opposition to terrorism which has been the order of the day for most Tamils so far. Others have ruined their reputation through their own acts of omission and commission. Those who posed themselves as the leaders of the Tamils by proxy would naturally fade away with the civil war. The greatest need of the hour for the Tamils is to find their leadership.
In any case, the old leadership brigade of the Tamils is outdated and what would have been the new, lie at eternal rest in the vast graveyards of the North and East. Even to those who have survived, decades of armed conflict have denied the basic facilities that would have groomed them for leadership of their people. In the circumstances, the Tamils have to look to the Diaspora for guidance and direction and it is the sacred duty of the Diaspora to help fill the leadership gap in the present helpless situation of their people.
The Diaspora comprises the best brains available to the community but it is doubtful whether they would sacrifice their ample blessings in disguise, to answer the call of their siblings at home. Even if they are not prepared to sacrifice their new found fortunes for the sake of their people, the least they can do is to guide them through the critical post-conflict years. This calls for the preparation of a road map for amelioration of Tamil interests, a task for a Think Tank.
Impliedly the Diaspora has ample resources for a Think Tank par excellence but the problem is the absence of infrastructure to put together such a guiding light. Those who liaised internationally with the apparently losing cause have a new role to play here. They should take the initiative to put together a plan of action for the post-conflict Tamil cause and guide, harness, sustain and encourage their less fortunate siblings at home.
To begin with, leading lights of the Diaspora should follow up the lead given by the President in his Independence Day address calling for the return of expatriate Tamils. They should seek a dialogue with him with a view to laying down a foundation that would lead to the final emancipation of their people. Their lethargy at this crucial stage will only strengthen the countervailing elements to force the hands of government towards parochialism. A prompt hands-on, pragmatic approach by the Diaspora should be more meaningful and fruitful to the Tamils than all the efforts to get Clinton, Brown, Obama and Moon to help by remote control.
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Perhaps the initial mis-concept is the impulsive assumption that the conflict has to be settled by a grant of concessions from one sector of the nation to another. There can be no ‘grantors’ or ‘grantees’ among ethnic groups in a nation. Once a community is inside, it should automatically be entitled to all privileges of citizenship. These privileges are inbuilt and non-negotiable. What is negotiable is only synchronization of interests.
In the national context, fundamental rights do not depend on numbers. Claims of a community with lesser numbers are identical with those of another with larger numbers, for these claims are acquired by birth and not by force of numbers. Each community should respect the others irrespective of the strength or the weakness of their respective numbers. It is not implied that this ideal standard is universally observed but wherever it was undermined, discord, degeneration and ruin has been the inevitable result.
Vote-catching Tactics
Equality of citizenship was more evident in the pre-independence era. Leaders of all communities fought side by side on an equal footing to wrest power from the colonial masters. In the wake of liberation from colonialism, came government based on franchise and national leaders had to depend on votes for their survival. Communalism became a ready tool of vote-catching and leaders of all communities stooped to it to conquer. Language, history and numbers became the handiest weapons of the rat race.
Despite bitter experiences of the past, Muslim leadership had the sagacity and the vision to keep to a non-collision course, thereby enhancing the prospects of their followers. The dispute between Sinhala and Tamil leaders deteriorated progressively, prompted by extremists on both sides, seemingly despite their own better judgement. The net result of that trend is the war that has raged for the last two and half decades, causing untold hardship, destruction and death to both sides.
No rational mind can tolerate terrorism as a means of resolution. At the same time reason demands that the causes that lead to such travesty be investigated dispassionately and corrective action taken. It is presumed that the on-going APRC is an attempt to address that imperative. The honesty of that attempt has to reflect itself in the speed and productivity of its search, both of which manifestations have been unfortunately, absent so far.
It is also axiomatic that the search has to be made jointly by all stake-holders. In this context, it is regrettable that the most affected party to the conflict is not among those present in the APRC. The Prince of Denmark is shut out of ‘Hamlet’! The possibility that the overt representatives of the most affected are restrained by insidious forces, cannot be ruled out either. Some of those invited to the talks have been playing hide-and-seek to serve their own agendas.
“Absolute power corrupts absolutely”, not only in conventional politics, but also in revolutionary interventions. There is the human tendency to get power-drunk even in that sphere. Such endeavours may have commenced with lofty motives but there comes a stage when their leaders would reject the most pragmatic solution to their problem. That happens after such a leader has been deified and the solution could cost his ‘divinity’.
Grantor-Grantee Syndrome
Be that as it may, the recent declaration that the solution to the ethnic conflict would be announced only after the LTTE has been defeated, raises certain disturbing issues, in addition to the uncertainty when that happy day would arrive. It unwittingly connects the solution with the LTTE and impliedly credits relevance to them. Why was there no solution before the LTTE was born? How could the existence or the predation of that group be conditional to the just aspirations of the Tamils?
More disturbingly, the declaration highlights the ‘Grantor-Grantee Syndrome’ mentioned at the beginning of this exercise. Logically even the head of state cannot be a ‘giver’ of inherent rights. He is only the referee. He has no side. His duty is to see that the ethnic problem is resolved fairly and expeditiously by consensus and announce the result at the earliest opportunity. Such announcement need not await the demise of a party alien to the process of resolution.
The declaration has a humiliating aspect as well. It is tantamount to saying, “You get the bone when you stop barking”. Irrespective of the infradig implications of the promise, it would appear to be unsound strategy pragmatically, for giving the bone to begin with would automatically stop the barking!
Penelope’s Web
It has been often asserted that the LTTE could not be eliminated as long as they retain the sympathy of the Tamils. Even their defeat militarily could not eradicate the threat until they lose their relevance to the Tamil cause. In that sense, announcement of a package of ethnic resolution acceptable to the average Tamil would be more deadly to the LTTE than all the weaponry of the armed forces put together. Such announcement would also put an end to the international rumbling that is embarrassing the on-going war effort of the government.
Let us pray that the Guardian Angels of this Nation grant our leaders the wisdom to complete the Penelope’s Web of the APRC Package without further procrastination and exhibit the product with due expedition. It would be tactical to do so while its possible detractors are still under the spell of Pooneryn.
Similar Posts:]]>“The people now staying at Vattakachi and Tharmapuram areas are requesting to announce these areas as “safe zones” for the civilians. Food and shelter are desperately needed, as people are suffering without anything to eat and nowhere to rest.”
I can visualize the pathetic situation vividly as I personally watched a similar scene in 1996 when refugees marched back to Jaffna from Kilinochchi. Unfortunately, the above revelation has failed to attract sympathetic attention to the miserable plight of the refugees in Vanni today. Instead a barrage of comments has followed on the larger issues of our ethnic conflict defending and condemning positions taken by parties on both sides.
The on-going debate cannot reduce an iota of the present suffering of the refugees. Our indignation over political inequities often takes precedence over our sympathies for those affected by such injustice. Similarly, our appreciation of the spoils of war is also insensitive to the immense human suffering caused to hapless persons caught up in the cross-fire.
The greatest need of the hour is to grant relief to those who are reported as being driven from pillar to post in the battlefields of the Vanni. As a former public servant, I feel strongly also for my successors who are exposed to grave personal danger and deprivation in the performance of their duties amidst the fighting.
I think the root-cause for the pathetic plight of the refugees is the decision to bring them down all the way to areas of government control. The situation was different after ‘Riviresa’ as the return track to Jaffna was continuous, open and secured. The LTTE itself exerted no pressure against the return march. In the present context however, resistance of the LTTE to an exodus from the Vanni, has to be expected.
The returnees of Riviresa had just been to Vanni and had not had time to settle down. Most people in the Vanni now are natives of the district. Others who have migrated from Jaffna have had over ten years to settle down. It is normal human nature that people are reluctant to seek strange territory. Naturally, they may also be scared of moving too far out through the battlefields all the way to Vavunia.
If a Safety Zone can be created as requested by the refugees, as close to their homes as possible in an area mutually agreed to by both sides, it would be easy to concentrate the affected civilians in that area. Public servants also can move in there to help without facing limitless risks themselves. UN and other aid agencies too can operate from the hub of relief activity, without resorting to remote control.
I appeal to the UN, NGOs and INGOs concerned with human rights to take immediate positive steps to negotiate with the Government and the LTTE, to bring about a self-contained and independent Safety Zone as desired by the destitute refugees in Vattakachchi and Tharmapuram. I shall be glad to offer my personal experience and expertise to such a venture, if necessary, at site.
At the going rate, the Vanni refugees’ last resort is likely to be the Indian Ocean, unless those morally responsible for their safety and wellbeing, act forthwith to ensure to them, a safe haven
Somapala Gunadheera.
Similar Posts:]]>Now at last there appears to be a ray of hope arising from the emerging political climate based on the state of the war and the performance of the respective political parties at the recent provincial council elections, not to mention international pressure.
It was reported in the papers recently that the APC had made up its mind to implement the Thirteenth Amendment and was writing to the UNP to ascertain their views on the proposed move. Evidently that would be an added incentive to further delay, through correspondence!
In that context, there is much common sense in the reaction of the JHU to the move, despite their own past predilection to abstain. They said if there was a concrete proposal, summon the APC itself to consider it, without beating about the bush.
There appears to be no reason why the UNP should boycott the APC in the developing context. Their fundamental reason for avoiding the APC was the argument that the Government should table their own proposal before their party participates in the work of the Committee.
Now that the Government has put its own card on the table, the UNP is obliged to attend the APC and participate positively with its deliberations with a view to solving our most vexed national problem, the Ethnic Conflict – a commitment they have unequivocally proclaimed. Besides such a response would be genuine proof of their expressed urge to forge a national consensus.
If the TNA also can make up its mind to attend the APC, the Committee would assume a legitimacy it has never possessed so far but in the realities of the ground situation, it would appear to be unkind to blame them for their absence. Nevertheless their attendance in addition to the UNP would grant the APC a meaning and a clout that would automatically silence the divisive forces that have thrived in the absence of consensus among the major parties.
The essential ingredient is only the attendance of these principal protagonists. Even the UNP may not be satisfied only with the Thirteenth Amendment. There could be no inconsistency in their agreeing to their own creature, may be, subject to a rider for further improvements. On the other hand the TNA can totally disagree and put forward their own proposals. What is important is that they participate. The TNAÂ cannot be unaware that the Thirteenth Amendment is the furthest that their demands have got so far. Why not consolidate at least that position and build on it as the situation clears up?
What is significant is that a consensus reached by a body representative of the vast majority of the people has an inherent legitimacy and a force that could break up the deadlock that has lasted for six decades, even if it is subject to a thousand riders. Political sagacity should convince the TNA that working with the moderate majority, if only to disagree with them, is their best guarantee against road-blocks placed by rabble-rousers, provided of course, they are permitted to do so by their own road-blocks.
If the majority in Parliament agree to the immediate and complete implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment, they would be laying the foundation on which the Edifice of National Harmony could be built. However unattractive that foundation stone may appear, it is the only choice available at present for a start. Only the consensus reached at the APC should include an oath of honour that even the dissentients would not exploit the majority agreement to their own political advantage but give it a fair chance of trial.
It is counter-productive to quarrel about the ultimate shape of the Edifice of National Harmony at this stage. Present constraints may not enable us to visualize its final form; nor do we have at present the men, the material and the environment that the mansion would call for completion. Undoubtedly, they would be produced by the progressively relaxing atmosphere that the developing national consensus should naturally generate.
Our immediate duty should be to lay the foundation stone as fast as possible and introduce proactive policies that would facilitate nation building.
Â
Similar Posts:- Hurry Up and Go Slowly
- Wanted for the Tamils: An Ashroff or a Thondaman
- Dutugemunu in war should remain Dutugemunu in peace
- The pathetic capitulation of the organised Left in Sri Lanka (Updated with statement from Leftist leaders)
- THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NORTH CENTRAL AND SABARAGAMUWA PROVINCIAL COUNCILS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Sixty years later, I do not laugh at the words any more. I see their wisdom particularly in relation to the resolution of our ethnic conflict. They seem to indicate the way to put an end to this cancerous problem.
“Hurry up” implies urgency, commitment and absence of prevarication. The ethnic problem has dragged on for 60 years after independence and there has never been a dedicated commitment to resolve it. Dilly dallying has always been the order of the day. Wisdom demands that all stake-holders assume a genuine sense of immediacy to put an end to the awful dispute.
“Go” is a command to start immediately. On record we have started more than eight decades ago but really we are still where we started, if not even further behind. If commissions, committees, conferences, seminars, debates and draft bills mean anything, our ‘make-believe’ of ‘going’ may be unparalleled in history. Wisdom demands that we start without humbugging.
“Slowly” denotes circumspection, patience, and foresight. We have to see all around us, be patient enough to respect opposite views and be mindful of the consequences of our actions. That is just what we have failed to do all these years. Most of the time we have been bogged down in emotive words like ‘federal’, ‘unitary’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘sole representative’. Words have been the bane of our life.
Upatissa who later became the Chief Disciple of Lord Buddha under the name of ‘Sariputta’, met Rev. Assajee, a Buddhist monk once and inquired from him as to what the Buddha taught. On being told that it was a vast subject, Sariputta-to-be remarked “attheneva me attho. kin kahasi vyanjanan bahun” (I need only the essence. Of what use is a cacophony of words?)
Unfortunately, most of us who hold Arahat Sariputta in utmost reverence do not appear to follow his words of wisdom in practice. If we did we would have made much headway with our ethnic problem by now.
The UNP appears to have seen some wisdom in these words, when they removed the word ‘federal’ from their political vocabulary. Although they have been maligned as deceitful ‘turn-coats’ when they did this, it has to be appreciated that it is the jettisoning of that word that has brought them closer to a consensus. Imaginably and hopefully, the jettisoning does not affect what they want to do for the minorities.
Going slow also implies gradual progress in the correct direction, a ‘step by step’ approach. We have always wanted to take quantum leaps but tarried at the very beginning, due to controversies about the final destination. This reminds one of the nervous driver who does not start his car because he is worried about crossing the Maradana Junction.
Controversy is not a dirty word. It helps in the clarification of issues and the choice of options and brings about equilibrium. In that sense, we have to be thankful to rivals on both sides of the ethnic ‘tug-of-war’. If not for the force of their pull, the rope would have been snatched away to one side or the other long ago.
Political leaders should be astute enough to act at the point the marker on the rope comes to the ‘nadu center’, as the Tamils call it. One occasion it was at the ‘nadu center’ was when the Thirteenth Amendment was passed.
It is foolish to idle because the ideal is not possible. We can only achieve the optimum practicable at any point in time depending on the balance of forces currently operative. In this sense, the President’s declared move to implement the Thirteenth Amendment appears to be a first step in the right direction. May be no party agrees unreservedly to this move. Only it happens to be a move that no one would seriously oppose.
In fact it is a step backwards for we are supposed to have taken it 20 years ago. Nevertheless it would be a step forward in the sense that we have been going backwards since the Amendment. However it is important that the Amendment is implemented in full and in real earnest for it has been since diluted mostly by the greed of politicians in power to expand their ‘empires’ and the misguided priorities of the national budget.
To think that implementing the Thirteenth Amendment is the end of the race would be deceiving oneself for want of a sense of history. The sincerity with which the Amendment is implemented should generate greater trust among the communities which in turn would doubtlessly make the stake-holders more amenable to greater consensus on further progress.
‘Go’ also demands that we move forward on a time frame that would be practicable after the successful implementation of the Amendment. In the light of past experience the next possible optimum move appears to be the adoption of the Draft Constitution of 2000 or an improved version of it made possible by the ‘breaking of the ice’ by the previous move.
Perhaps it is too early in the day to visualize where we ‘go’ after implementing the Thirteenth Amendment on which we are already focused. Besides conjecturing on further moves at this stage faces the danger of initiating another controversy that would hold back even the promised ‘small mercy’. Let us not upset the hornets’ nests within sight of the Sigiri frescos. Our destination is the top of the rock.
Let us get ourselves going now and cross bridges when we come to them. It may well be that none of us living today would come to the last bridge. It would be crossed by our progeny who by then would have developed a mind-set capable of crossing the bridge with ease. They will make decisions on the dictates of their own social and intellectual environment. It is dogmatic and futile to dictate terms to future generations on the strength of existing power bases.
This does not mean that we do not have a role to play. Our obligation is to develop policies that would facilitate the crossing, not to mention the avoidance of false steps that would vitiate the atmosphere and embarrass a final resolution.
It is also important to realize that we do not have the status to dictate to the powers that would preside over the destiny of a future electorate that would carry the baby beyond the reform within our sight. That electorate would be influenced in their choice by the imperatives of their own environment.
Our immediate task then, is to ‘hurry up’ with the Thirteenth Amendment. That happens to be the most pragmatic move immediately possible. Then we must ‘go slowly’, but progressively, step by step, towards a harmonious, integrated and equitable Sri Lanka with honesty of purpose and commitment.
We have also to make way for those coming after us by removing road-blocks and implementing conducive and proactive policies that would facilitate them to progressively make optimum decisions towards the ideal. Even after ten Prabhakarans, Peace will not dawn on us until the system makes it possible for every citizen to share and share alike the bounteous legacy of this land.
Similar Posts:]]>Once I blamed a Tamil friend of mine who is a leading professional, for not taking an active part in the search for a solution to the ethnic impasse. He was despondent and thought it a waste of time to get involved with a problem that no government after independence has had the guts to get to grips with. According to him, all of them have been intimidated by the threat of a highly inflated vociferous minority of demagogues and the moderate Tamils have been silenced by the violent reaction to that lethargy. Reason on both sides has become the prisoner of these forces.
‘If we are genuine and pragmatic in our search,” my friend said, “the solution is simple. Let the Tamils put down their minimum demands clearly and let the Sinhalese decide the maximum they are prepared to go along with. Then let the two sides sit down and hammer out the differences until a consensus is reached.”
The idea looked simple. Coming to think of it, that is what we are supposed to have been doing all the time. But it would appear on hindsight that we have only been going round and round the mulberry bush with the problem, for two main reasons. We never had a clear policy on the modalities of resolution. The second reason which is essentially the cause of the first, is that our leaders never had the wisdom, the sensitivity and the courage to handle the problem with statesmanship. In the alternative, they were exploiting the dispute for their own survival in power.
The latest make-believe is the All Party Representatives Committee without some of the most relevant parties, no less logical than ‘Sinhala only with Tamil also’. Judging by its record of performance, the APRC is destined to drag its feet ad infinitum with even the only recommendation they have made so far, allegedly under dictation, not implemented in full up to now. It is in this scenario, that I say the intelligentsia has a duty to engage themselves in the search for a consensus to the vexed problem of our ethnic conflict, if the Tamils are not to be left at a dead end at the end of the fight.
At the going rate of state procrastination, the international community is very likely to become the final arbiters of the dispute, as has already happened in other theaters of ethnic conflict, sometimes to the detriment of the intended ‘beneficiary’. No self-respecting nation could be happy about such an intervention. The best way to prevent such humiliation is for opinion leaders on both sides to engage themselves in a brave and open debate on the minimum mutually acceptable Peace Package.
It is my belief that coordinating the evolution of a Peace Package calls for an NGO eminently qualified and resourceful enough to handle such a momentous undertaking. Fortunately we already have non-partisan, intellectual institutions dedicated to the resolution of the ethnic conflict. It is earnestly hoped that one of them would rise to the occasion and undertake the venture. I suggest that the effort be coordinated on the following lines;
- Publish a paper indicating what the minimum requirements of the Tamils would be. This could be written by an internationally recognized Tamil with a standing equivalent to that of the Late Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam. The writer may remain anonymous to avoid imaginable risks from both sides.
- The second stage would be extensive publication of support, objections and counter-objections to the Paper.
- Once supporters, advocates and activists on both sides have had their say, a Constitutional Law Expert can sum up the debate short-listing the challenged moot points at the end of the report.
- An Institution with wide experience in statistical analysis of similar questions, then conducts a survey on the responses to the vexed points. It is important that this survey is conducted in Tamil majority areas as well, unlike in the past. The East should present no problem now. Even the North may be roped in by courtesy of the Public Service and a diplomatic approach to the Peace Secretariat of the LTTE. Any objection by the latter would reflect on their honesty of purpose.
- The results of the survey are then referred to an Expert with an international reputation, for formulation of a Draft Package. It would be helpful to ensure that the selected Expert is neither a Tamil nor a Sinhalese. But the selectee should have an abiding interest in the affairs of this country, having his umbilical code with the island still intact.
- The draft Package is then considered at a Workshop. It is important to ensure that this occasion is well attended by representatives of stake-holders, intellectuals and international activists. The Workshop will fine-tune the draft and finalize its text. The experts referred to at A, C and E above would be an ideal Panel of Rapporteurs for this occasion.
- The finalized Package is then presented to the Government for active and prompt consideration and implementation. No government will be able to play hide and seek for long with a package built up with such transparency, debate, investigation and analysis of optimum preferences.
- The Government will then refer the Package to a real 100% APRC. It is possible that some parties would boycott the Committee for ulterior motives. Abstinence has always been a favourite weapon of sabotage among our political parties. But the Government should have the courage to ignore any party that does not have the guts to fight their case before a properly constituted forum. The final recommendations of the genuine APRC will then be implemented without trepidation.
In view of the grave urgency to find a way out of the canker of our ethnic dispute, it is necessary that the process of evolving the Peace Package is implemented on a strict time-frame. Though the ideal should be three months, imaginable problems of the statistical survey may extend it to six.
Armed with a Peace Package filtered through the above process, the President should feel confident to act on it decisively. The international community which appears to be closing in on our ethnic conflict, is unlikely to turn a Nelsonian eye on a Hamlet-like approach to the Package.
In implementing the Peace Package, the President should take the cue from his predecessor as Chairman of SAARC, Manmohan Singh, who only recently pulled out victory from the jaws of defeat with his undaunted action in the teeth of opposition to the Atomic Power agreement with the US. In the ultimate analysis, it is the determination and statesmanship with which the ethnic issue is handled that would decide whether Mahinda Rajapaksa or his challenger, Veluppillai Pirapaharan would live longer in history.
Similar Posts:]]>Apart from anything else, it will create the impression that we were hell bent on the war regardless of its pathetic consequences to human life and rights – an impression that would further erode our standing internationally. On the other hand accepting the offer would infuriate the proponents of ‘fight to a finish’, who appear to be the mainstay of a government in crisis. This dilemma calls for an ingenious response that neither rejects nor accepts the offer.
To ‘cease’ is to ‘stop’ but to ‘hold’ is to ‘pause’. Pausing the on-going battles for a brief period of a month cannot harm the campaign tangibly. On the other hand it would give a much needed respite to the battle-fatigued soldiers. At the same time, the interval would not grant an opportunity to the LTTE to reinforce and replenish as in the case of a ‘cease-fire’. In the meantime aid-agencies and the public service in the Vanni can stretch themselves out to grant relief to those reported to be displaced there.
The pre-condition of downing arms before the cease-fire is logically sound and popularly appealing but practically Utopian. It is a process that calls for complex negotiation and preconditions. What if the talks fail after the surrender of arms? In such a contingency surrendering arms would effectively mean surrendering the talks as well.
The interruption of a hold-fire is bound to be disappointing to those who believe that the forces are on the verge of victory, in opposition to the counter-predictions of international experts on ethnic strife. Even if the experts are proved wrong in our particular case, how many more thousands of our siblings are we going to sacrifice on the Altar of Ares before we see an end to this conflict?
In any case the contribution of the armed forces appears to have served its declared purpose of compelling a negotiated settlement. Exterminating the LTTE would not spell the end of the problem at all. There is no avoiding the ethnic conflict until genuine steps are taken to grant the legitimate aspirations of the Tamils.
The one month hold-fire should be subject to strict conditions applicable to both sides under the watchful eyes of the world community. The minimum conditions aught to be;
1.    Negotiations at the highest level, (not between post-masters!) on a framework for settlement, including core content, negotiators, venue, facilitators, if any, arms disposal and time-frames.
2.    If there is no consensus between parties at the end of the month, the hold-fire will be unilaterally terminated, unless both parties agree to an extension.
The two weeks’ respite offered by the LTTE is clearly inadequate to sort out all these preliminaries. If their offer is genuinely a positive step and not a gimmick to impress the international community, they should agree to use the interval to a fruitful purpose by giving enough time to lay the foundation for a final settlement. Hence the suggestion for a Government response proposing a workable arrangement.
The negotiations will necessitate an informal third party who can act as a facilitator. The person selected should command respect on both sides on account of his views and experience. The name of Martin McGuinness of Sinn Fein vintage, who was recently here, comes to my mind in this connection.
The facilitator should be given unimpeded access to leaders on both sides without intervention of go-betweens. His final report will serve as a permanent credential to the sincerity and commitment to peace, on each side. Only let us not go to sleep after agreeing to the ‘hold-fire’ as we did in the case of the ‘cease-fire’.
Let us give Peace a sporting chance!
Similar Posts:]]>Off and on, I write short stories, never anecdotes. But now I have to oblige Sanjana. He wants stories about our ethnic riots, the one that raged before he was born and the other when he was at school. Therapists say that anecdotes have a healing effect on ethnic wounds.
My experience about the 1983 riot was brief. Then I was the Chairman of the Ceylon Steel Corporation at Athurugiriya. Towards mid-day, I heard that Tigers had invaded Colombo and people were running away helter-skelter. The Aturugiriya Police had blocked the road opposite their station and were in battle array.
Later it transpired that the beginning of the turmoil was the sighting of a Tamil victim of the riot hiding on the roof of a building in the Pettah, reminiscent of the fable in which the entire animal kingdom took to its heels as the story spread that the world was crashing, as reported by a chick on whose back a large leaf had fallen.
Before the actual fact was known however, there was much excitement. The workers went home early and the staff bus was ready to take the officers away. But there was a snag. One of the officers was Tamil and it was considered risky to have him in the bus, as by now Sinhala chauvinism had taken control of the situation and there were mob checks at every junction.
I offered to take the Tamil officer in my vehicle hoping to exploit the status of my car in the area. For solidarity’s sake a few others got in with the man under risk. On the way, we were blocked by a mob armed with clubs and knives at the Hokandara junction. I opened my window. The leader of the mob came up. “Ah, Sir, Chairman!” he said with a bow, “you are all Sinhalese, no sir?”
That was a situation where truth was homicidal. I smiled my sweetest in reply. Besides how could I answer that question with scientific precision, without the help of the best bio-analyst in the world, in the background of our long and checkered history?
My experience in the 1958 riots was far more dangerous. I had just returned from Jaffna after serving my cadetship. I could afford only a part of a house rented by a Tamil. One day there was mayhem up the lane with a mob attacking the Tamils, towards dusk. My landlord who was a leading Communist had gone to his headquarters, leaving his young wife and their son and daughter who were about two to three years.
There was not much time to act before the mob reached our house. I took the son in my hands and the mother took the daughter. Together we got out of the backdoor, crept through a barb wire fence and ran across a coconut property as fast as we could until we came to a cadjan hut. There was an old couple there. They were very sympathetic to the helpless trio in distress and assured me that nothing could happen to them in that out of the way place.
Satisfied with their assurance, I left my charges there and returned home to look to my old parents and young sister. They were alright. The mob had entered the house and the results of their ‘linguistic test’ being negative, they had passed on. Past nine in the night, I brought back my landlord’s wife and children, the man still apparently engrossed in conference with the dynamics of ethnic conflict.
All was quiet now and we retired to bed. I slept in the front room and my parents and sister in the room behind. Around midnight, I was suddenly put up by a sound of crashing glass. It did not take long for me to realize that my front window was being attacked with stones. Some stones were falling inside the room. Before I could get up my mother was physically upon me covering her only son with her body. I struggled out of bed and took my mother to the inner room.
Soon there was the roar of an approaching motorcycle. The stoning ceased suddenly. The cycle stopped in front of our house. I came out to see it was a police officer, a cousin of my landlady. There was a large pistol in his holster. As the officer entered the house, I saw our front door neighbor closing his partly opened window and it dawned on me the attack was his punishment to me for helping the ‘bloody Tamils’. His cowardice was now taking the better of his chauvinism.
Twenty-five years later, the protagonists of this drama keep coming back to my mind now. My Communist landlord died long ago. His bones might be turning in his grave to find that his successors are even now grappling with ethnic rivalry, even around the epicenter of his dogma. The old couple that gave shelter to my charges that night are very likely to be among the departed. The loving kindness they showered on their wards that night was more than enough to open the gates of heaven to them.
My mother is dead now and the mother of the Tamil children is supposed to be living abroad. The two mothers showed that a basic instinct like maternal sacrifice had no ethnic barriers. The two children must be well away in their new salubrious abode. Their childhood memory may be validating what communalists keep preaching to them about the Sinhala desperados. Perhaps they were too young then to realize that their survival had something to do with a different kind of ‘desperado’. As part of the Tamil Diaspora, they may be assuaging with alms, their guilty conscience about leaving behind, their less fortunate, (more patriotic?) blood cousins.
My front door assailant is dead. As a believer in rebirth, I do not rule out the possibility of his being reborn a Tamil to pay penance for what he did to the Tamils in his previous birth. It is even possible that he is among the hundred suicide bombers that are supposed to be in Colombo now, according to our authorities whose statistics are as efficient as their management of the ethnic conflict is deficient.
[Editors note: The author's first submission to Groundviews, Jaffna: Retrospect and Prospect, on his experiences as a civil servant in Jaffna, has been read over a 1,000 times to date and quoted widely on the web. This article was sent in response to an email of mine calling for submissions remembering the anti-Tamil riots of '58 and '83.]
For more articles on July 1983, please click here.
Similar Posts:]]>I started my career in the then Ceylon Civil Service in 1957 as a Cadet in the Jaffna Kachcheri. My thoughts of Jaffna are nostalgic, prompted by the happy life I led among a hospitable, and peace-loving people, nurtured in the best traditions of a noble culture. I always looked forward to returning the ample help and courtesy I received from them in whatever little way I could.
The opportunity came my way unexpectedly, soon after the “Riviresa Operation”. I was suddenly summoned to Temple Trees to see the President immediately. The Lady told me that the Government had a problem in running the civil administration in Jaffna as all the public servants there had left with the population to the Vanni, following the retreating LTTE cadres. A couple of retired army officers were holding the fort and there were no takers to take over the administration.
Trying to allay my presumed apprehensions, the Lady explained that I could run the set up from Colombo and visit Jaffna occasionally. Could I think of the offer and let her know my response soon. I told the President there was no need to think. I was prepared to go immediately. The situation demanded an immediate and hands-on response. I left for Jaffna by the next available plane telling my family I was going to Polonnaruva, for they would not have allowed me to go if I told them the truth.
On arrival, I was shocked and dismayed to see Jaffna turned into a ghost town. It was not the warm and vibrant environment I cherished as a Cadet. The streets were deserted; only a few stray dogs were seen here and there. Visible humanity was limited to members of the armed forces dangerously exposing themselves to unimaginable risks. Nor was I sure that I would reach my destination as I travelled from the Airport.
Old and disabled members of certain families had been left behind. White flags marked the houses in which they lived. Retired army officers were dutifully looking after them. The only government institution functioning was the General Hospital, once the pride of the district, now reduced to a temporary ward attended to by a couple of septuagenarian retired Apothecaries.
I was in Jaffna when “Riviresa II” commenced and the influx started from the Vanni. Over 250,000 persons marched back to Jaffna in a continuous procession of men, women and animals. They were walking for miles and miles, destitute and exhausted. There could have been persons of high achievement among them. Calamity is no respecter of persons. It was a pitiable sight, a people reduced to nomads and refugees in their own land!
I have also stood by in agitated silence when bodies of men in the prime of their youth were brought back from the battlefield to Palaly. I have travelled in planes transporting soldiers with amputated legs holding up their saline bottles in their own hands. It is my direct personal experience of human suffering like this that has prompted me to look at our ethnic conflict beyond the dividing fence.
My first task was to feed the returning hungry masses. In this I was ably assisted by the ex-army officers who maintained a round the clock kitchen at Wembadi. While the returnees rested, the army checked their homesteads for land mines and owners of cleared lands were transported to their homes.
But life had not yet started in Jaffna. Vegetables were hard to come by; an egg sold at twenty five rupees, a tablet of Panedol cost ten rupees. There were no onions in Jaffna! Schools were deserted. The University was closed.
The G.A. had returned with the masses along with his men and I helped him to re-establish the administrative machinery. All this time I was operating from the Army barracks where officers looked after me right royally. But I realized that I had to move with the people if my services were to be effective and meaningful.
I took up residence in an abandoned house in town. There was apprehension that my shift of residence was fraught with danger. Nevertheless I did not face the slightest interruption when I toured the district by day and slept the night in my room with all windows open.
Arrangements were made to get down seed onions from the South by plane. Day old chicks were similarly transported and distributed. All teachers’ transfers out of the district were stopped without exception. Returning doctors were supplemented by Internees from the South. The district was slowly but steadily limping back to normalcy. In the next season Jaffna was sending onions to the South and selling eggs cheaper than in Colombo.
Encouraged by the resurgence, Ministers tried to capitalize on the situation by coming on inspection to the North, until such visits ended abruptly with a suicidal explosion. The only person I had got down from Colombo to help me, a retired SSP lost his life in the attack. He had forgotten my advice that our mission was to grant relief to our siblings in distress, not to get involved in politics.
In retrospect, I see that my survival in Jaffna owed much to the apolitical policy I followed. Once a reporter from Udayan asked me what my own response was to the ongoing conflict. I replied, “I have not come to choose a king for the Tamils. My mission is to see that the king would have living subjects when he finally arrived after the conflict is resolved”.
Convinced by my commitment to the cause and my honesty of purpose the GAs stood by me through thick and thin. They became so close to me that they insisted on my staying with them whenever I was on circuit in their districts. Later I discovered regretfully that one of them had been secretly sharing the store-room with his family, having placed the only comfortable bedroom in the ancient building at my disposal. Other officers who attended my regular Progress Control meetings and accompanied me on circuit developed strong personal attachments to me. Their tireless application to their assignments significantly stepped up the rate of recovery.
Citizens who were able to get through to Colombo made it a point to visit my Colombo office though they had no particular business there. They told my Secretary that they had come to see ‘Nambada Aal’, – ‘Our Man’. Such identification was presumably the natural result of my own genuine sympathy for their lot.
My sights were equally focused on the citizens on the other side of the divide. They were where they were by accident of birth and could not be held responsible for the actions of those who were in power over them. Presumed to be subjects of a unitary State, they were entitled to all the rights and privileges of those across the bunker line. I realized that the discriminatory treatment meted out to them had made them aliens in the country of their birth, even without a unilateral declaration of independence!
For example, their rice ration was brought all the way from Colombo by contractors who were making mints of money on the deal. In the meantime, rice produced in the Vanni had no market. I put an end to this discriminatory anomaly and got the cooperatives in the Vanni to buy and distribute rice locally. Though this step was vehemently resisted by vested interests, it granted relief to the impoverished farmers of the Vanni while conserving State funds.
This decision had been highly appreciated in the Vanni. UN officials who had unrestricted access to the area got wind of the changing climate arising from my attitude and approach to the conflict. In their anxiety to settle the ethnic dispute, they saw in it, an opportunity to bring about rapport between parties to the conflict.
The officials were exited about the emerging possibility and negotiated with the late Thamil Chelvam for a meeting with me in the Vanni, thus far closed to all Sinhala visitors. But Prabhakaran was understandably cautious. He had presumed that I was a political stooge appointed by the President.
Nevertheless I believed that trust in my credentials would grow as I continued to execute my assignment, winning hearts and minds. But that was not to be. I was suddenly called to the South to meet a crisis that had arisen on the collapse of the grandiose plans of the SDA. I still feel confident that placed in a strategic position, I would be able to narrow the gap between the warring parties through negotiation and consensus.
Somapala Gunadheera
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