The LLRC Report: A Critical Reading

Photo credit Ada Derana

For quite sometime, ever since the establishment of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), the Government of Sri Lanka has been asking its critics not to pre-judge the work of the LLRC and to await, patiently, the finalization and publication of the Report. The Report has now been published. What do we have here? Is it one that establishes beyond doubt that the Government’s version of the war, or the human rights situation in the country, is correct? If not, where has it gone wrong?

The Report, as any other document, can be read in different ways with different lenses. It attempts to bring together numerous perspectives on issues ranging from the most banal topic – the CFA – to the more critical and controversial issues, such as the conduct of hostilities during the final stages of the war, the Channel 4 video, human rights, and devolution (which will be the issues briefly highlighted here).

Conduct of hostilities: the ‘confused picture’

Perhaps the most controversial is the issue regarding the conduct of hostilities during the last stages of the war. The UNSG-Panel Report stated in its Executive Summary, that the ‘Panel’s determination of credible allegations reveals a very different version of the final stages of the war than that maintained to this day by the Government of Sri Lanka’ (p. ii). Our question is: what does the LLRC Report suggest?

One possible reading of the LLRC Report gives the impression that the LLRC’s aim is to revert to the version maintained by the Government. Para 9.4 of the LLRC-Report states that the LLRC ‘is satisfied’ that the military strategy of the Armed Forces was ‘one that was carefully conceived’, which gave highest importance to the avoidance of ‘civilian casualties or minimizing them.’ The LLRC believes that the civilians in the No-Fire Zones were not deliberately targeted (para 9.6). This remains one of the most significant points highlighted by the media because this issue lies at the heart of the entire debate about whether or not the Armed Forces violated rules of IHL and HR.

In addition, reading the preceding sections of the Report, it appears that great reliance has been placed on the officials who represented the Armed Forces, in arriving at this conclusion. Explanations have been provided by senior Defence officials. At paras 4.36-4.41, senior Air Force officials, for example, effectively point to their own version of how air strikes were conducted. Civilians came before the LLRC – but we find that the string of accounts that follow (from para 4.51-58, and from para 4.61-64, for instance) seem to give the impression that the LTTE was to be blamed for much of what happened. What’s more, former LTTE personnel paint a cruel picture of the LTTE’s own modus operandi (e.g. para 4.84), and doctors who had served in Puthumatthalan and Mullaivaikal state that the LTTE shot people who tried to escape (para 4.85, followed by accounts of a number of detainees who reiterate this). Residents of Killinochchi state that it was the Army which saved them (para 4.97). Also, the Report uses the language of ‘human shields’ – the use of which, in strict international law terms, is also debatable (note, the use of the term ‘human buffers’ by the UNSG-Panel, in its Report, p. 65).

At this moment, one cannot be blamed for getting the impression that the UNSG-Panel and the LLRC are two sides of the same coin. One report is perceived to be a critique of the Government, the other a critique of the LTTE.

But the above, to be sure, is only one part of the story. There is an equally gruesome side to this story, and here the blame does begin to slowly shift from the LTTE to the Armed Forces too (just like the manner in which the UNSG-Panel critiqued the LTTE, after having critiqued the Armed Forces). Also, there is considerable ambiguity about what happened. For instance, civilians have pointed out that the Army did use shells and that there were aerial attacks by the Air Force (para 4.73). There was a lot of shelling according to some, which led to a lot of killing (para 4.74), and that this was not only the fault of the LTTE because both sides were engaged in shelling (para 4.79). There had been continuous shelling in places like Mullaivaikkal, and three widows from Kyts tell that their husbands died due to shelling (para 4.105). All this provides much needed perspective, and in doing so, helps us form a more accurate picture of what really happened.

And there are the poignant stories too. A civilian tells the LLRC that when while moving by sea, and having shouted at the Navy personnel ‘aiya, aiya’ (‘brother, brother’) with white flags, there was sudden shelling which resulted in the death of 8 persons on the spot (para 4.107). It is later explained that some of the firing and killing was done by the Navy (but it is stated that this was a case of mistaken identity for which the Navy had apologized). As regards the PTK hospital, it is clear from some accounts that that the hospital was damaged due to shelling by both sides (para 4.125). Even a Government official admits, quite ambiguously (without blaming any party), that the hospital was shelled on 4 Feb., 2009 (para 4.129); ambiguity which shows why accusations leveled against the Armed Forces, too, cannot be so easily dismissed. What was the situation, for instance, at the makeshift hospital at Puthumatthalan? There were shells falling around the hospital, and both sides ‘were firing shells at each other.’(para 4.133, footnotes omitted).

Also serious are the representations made regarding the abductions and disappearances of LTTE personnel after surrender/arrest. The LLRC admits rather admirably that the account of the Defence authorities should be read along with accounts of civilians which point to such abductions (see the long list of such allegations, from para 4.241-460, and Annex 4.15). This remains a matter of ‘grave concern’ for the LLRC (para 4.318).

The implications are clear. There could well have been cases of killings of such abducted persons, if their whereabouts are still unknown. The sheer force of these allegations seemed to have made the LLRC admit later that there is a duty on the part of the State to hold investigations and prosecute and punish any wrong doers (para 4.286). It is further admitted, as regards the shelling of hospitals that ‘the material placed before the Commission points to a somewhat confused picture as to the precise nature of the events…’ (para 4.288). Furthermore, that many civilians died during the conflict is also clear (para 4.358). Importantly, and correctly, the LLRC has in diplomatic language (!) stated that declaring NFZs may have been laudable, but such unilateral declaration of unverifiable NFZs in close proximity to the battleground was immensely problematic (point iv, at para 4.359).

If then, has the LLRC played the role of the apologist? From the above, it is true that one reading would suggest that this is the case. However, there is also another section which counters that perception to a great extent. In fact, the LLRC confirms much of the doubts some had regarding the final stages of the war. As the LLRC points out: there is a need for an investigation of reported cases concerning civilian deaths (see generally, para 4.360). This is what many said for sometime, this is why an internal investigation of such incidents was necessary. And the Government has waited until the LLRC drove home the point.

Yet, questions remain. Will such investigations be carried out, and if so, how and when? Who will conduct this investigation? Or, as Kishali Pinto Jayawardene queried: “Who will take the responsibility to investigate, prosecute and punish in a context where the primary state organs of the police and the prosecutors are near irreparably politicized and where the judiciary itself is increasingly suffering from public perception relating to its independence from the executive or the lack thereof?’ (‘Weighing the LLRC report in the scales of justice’, The Sunday Times, 18 Dec, 2011).

But here, we also return to our initial question: how distant are we from the Government’s account of the final stages of the war? While we may not be so close to the version presented by the UNSG-Panel, it is somewhat clear from the above account that we are certainly not close to the version presented by the Government either. By admitting that there is a ‘somewhat confused’ picture on certain critical issues concerning the conflict, the message is: the Government needs to be far more serious in addressing the concerns raised by the LLRC as well as other human rights organizations on issues pertaining to accountability.

Channel 4

Another critical issue which the LLRC addresses is the controversy surrounding the Channel-4 video. Thankfully, the LLRC had decided to consider this issue even if no one who appeared before the LLRC had raised the issue in any significant manner (para 4.363). In examining the video, the opinion of Dr. Chatura de Silva had been obtained. The conventional practice within Sri Lanka was to rubbish these allegations by stating that every single footage contained in the video was doctored. But the opinion received does not necessarily say so; i.e. that certain segments seems to have been recorded in a natural environment (para 4.367).

The LLRC goes further to admit then that there is a strong case which both supports and opposes ‘the integrity of the video.’ (para 4.370). At this point, in order to obtain a further opinion, the LLRC then refers the matter to Prof. EA Yfantis, of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, an ‘expert in the field of digital image’ (para 4.372), who provides a negative account of the video which effectively questions the integrity of Channel 4.

Now, had the LLRC concluded its examination here and held Prof. Yfantis’ opinion to be conclusive and final, the LLRC could have reasonably attracted some criticism. Why is that? Because critics can always argue (and there is nothing wrong in this argument) and draw the inference that there was some hidden agenda in going in search of an expert who was based, out of all places, in the University of Nevada – which, interestingly, is from where a member of the LLRC comes!

But the LLRC (to its great fortune!) does not appear to be considering Prof. Yfantis’ account as the final word on the matter. It goes on to recommend that given the nature and the lack of clarity concerning many vital issues concerning the footage, that the Government should ‘initiate an independent investigation into this matter to establish the truth or otherwise of the allegations arising from the video.’(para 4.375). In that sense, the LLRC reiterates what many have stated for quite sometime: ‘Offences if any, of a few cannot be allowed to tarnish the honour of the many who upheld the finest traditions.’(para 4.376 a).

This is a significant conclusion, which can be read in many ways. One reading suggests that this affirms what critics have been pointing out ever since the video was made public. Many rushed to rubbish the video as doctored without engaging in a nuanced critique. Not many wanted to entertain the possibility that some incidents could have happened, for gruesome acts of that nature could indeed take place during a bloody conflict. This then provides the international critics with a fine opportunity to demand further investigations, and rightly so.

Another reading of the LLRC’s conclusion suggests that the LLRC does not for a moment believe that the Government had carried out an independent investigation in this regard. By asking the Government to conduct another investigation, what the LLRC is implying is that the so-called investigation that the Government once conducted (given much publicity, locally) is not reliable. Obviously, had that been reliable, the LLRC need not have concluded the way it has in its Report. Therefore, the position taken by the LLRC is to be welcomed.

The significant challenge of course is to ensure how this recommended ‘independent’ investigation could be carried out in Sri Lanka. Who should participate? Who decides the names of the ‘experts’? Here again, the Government faces a stiff challenge.

Human rights

The LLRC reminds that Sri Lanka has an obligation to protect human rights (due to the constitutional guarantees as well as the international obligations arising from being a party to a number of international conventions). This – the need to ‘re-dedicate ourselves’ to protecting human rights – is an aspect that had been stressed by a number of persons who appeared before the LLRC (para 5.4). The LLRC also tells the Government that the concept is ‘embedded in the core values and ethics espoused by Buddhism and other religions practiced in Sri Lanka.’

The Report adopts a very critical attitude towards human rights violations, including abductions, disappearances, etc., allegedly committed by the Security Forces and other entities. We had examined above what the LLRC stated about the abductions of LTTE personnel after their surrender. There are also accounts of abductions by Security Forces (see for instance, para 5.15), and by unknown parties. Another critical issue highlighted by the LLRC is ‘white-van’ abductions (para 5.2) – a point which was referred to by the UNSG-Panel, when it stated that they were used ‘to instill fear in the population’ (see UNSG-Panel Report, p. 17, para 63).

The LLRC also refers to the ‘disappointing experience’ it had as regards the case of Mr. Razik Pattani (para 5.31). Critical representations had been made concerning political interference in the justice system, criminal investigations and police administration as well (para 5.33).

In pointing out the above, the LLRC has emphasized the duty of the Government to investigate all cases, as well as its responsibility. Also suggested is the enactment of legislation to criminalize enforced disappearances (para 5.46, which has been suggested by many before). Proper investigations need to be undertaken as regards the conduct of certain illegal armed groups, and measures need to be taken to disarm such groups (paras 5.77-78). Also, the LLRC, having highlighted the critical views expressed by the likes of Judge CG Weeramantry, go on to suggest that legislation should be enacted concerning the right to information (see paras 5.154-156). Interestingly, the LLRC goes on to recommend the creation of a Special Commissioner of Investigations to investigate alleged disappearances (para 5.48). It even recommends the implementation of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (Udalagama Commission), the report of which was not made public (para 5.163). This, too, is a significant feature of the LLRC Report.

Importantly, towards the end of the Report, there is acknowledgment of the report tabled in Parliament by TNA’s MP, MA Sumanthiran (at para 8.307). It is well that the LLRC did this, given the serious concerns raised in MP Sumanthiran’s report. The acknowledgment of the Sumanthiran-report makes it imperative for the Government to address those concerns in a clear and structured manner.

The overall picture that emanates from the LLRC’s views about the human rights and the law and order situation in general is a bleak one. This is no surprise. It reaffirms the views held by many critics for a long period of time. Many have pointed out these problems, and in that sense, what we are learning here are not new lessons. Yet, that these issues have been highlighted by the LLRC helps send a stronger message that the Government cannot rest quiescent now.

While human rights organizations would continue with its criticisms, acknowledgment would need to be made of some of critical issues highlighted in the Report. This has happened. As Amnesty International’s Sam Zarifi has acknowledged, the Report does ‘offer some interesting recommendations’ which the Government ‘needs to take seriously’ (‘Rights groups criticize Sri Lanka war report’, AFP, 16 Dec, 2011). The question, of course, is whether the Government is truly committed to do this. The LLRC’s recommendations would come to naught even if the Government decides to create the office of a Special Commissioner of Investigation and then go on to appoint an apologist for that post. The challenge needs to be viewed from a broader perspective, taking into account numerous developments that took place ever since the end of the war, such as the passing of the 18th Amendment. There is, so far, no reason to be optimistic. 

Political solution and devolution

One of the most contentious issues will be that concerning a political solution and the issue of devolution of powers. TNA’s Suresh Premachandran has already attacked the Report: “The Commission has failed to look into the reasons that caused the conflict and has also failed to come up with a framework to the solution. Nothing has been mentioned about devolution of power. No one has been held accountable for the issue.” (‘LLRC Report out what next?’, The Nation, 18 Dec, 2011).

Approaching as he does from the side of the TNA, Premachandran is not entirely wrong here. Questions can often be raised as to what the LLRC is attempting to say. The manner in which the section on devolution is worded appears to be vague. It states that devolution should necessarily be ‘people-centric’ (para 8.216) – which, according to those opposing devolution, would mean that the LLRC is advocating something akin to village-level or grassroots devolution only. The main unit of devolution, according to this view, seems to have shrunk from the Province to the village. The Report talks about promoting a ‘common identity’, that devolution should not privilege or disadvantage any particular ethnic group. Furthermore, the Report points out the importance of empowering Local Government institutions and soon after that, it proceeds to highlight that the shortcomings of the Provincial Council system need to be taken into account! This, to be sure, would give the TNA and many who expected some progressive proposals regarding devolution the screaming abdabs.

However, isn’t a different reading possible too? Firstly, in a country where the simple advocacy of devolution could make you an ‘Eelamist’, the LLRC has clearly discussed the need for devolution, an issue which is of ‘national importance’ (see para 8.213 in particular – and here, Premachandran is wrong if his statement that ‘nothing has been mentioned about devolution’ is to be taken literally). Secondly, in a country where talk about a political settlement and an ethnic problem could be met with the question ‘what political settlement, what ethnic problem?’, the LLRC states that ‘a political settlement based on devolution must address the ethnic problem as well as other serious problems that threaten the democratic institutions.’ (para 8.215, emphasis added). Clearly, there is an acknowledgment of a need for a political settlement and the existence of an ethnic problem. Thirdly, the focus should be, according to the LLRC, empowerment of the people at ‘every level especially in all tiers of Government.’ (para 8.218). If then, the Province is in tact. Fourthly, the LLRC seems to be also emphasizing the ‘critical importance of making visible progress on the devolution issue’ by ‘building on what exists…’ (para 8.225, emphasis added). This could well be interpreted as building on the 13th Amendment too, viz. ‘on what exists’. This interpretation, in turn, could be seriously disturbing for the ‘anti-devolution’ camp.

The LLRC could have been far more pointed in its recommendations concerning devolution. However, as argued sometime ago, it was not the LLRC’s role to come out with absolutely clear recommendations. And even if the LLRC did, it doesn’t mean that the Government would readily agree! Going by the statements made by the Government and its officials, it is quite clear that building upon the present framework, or even the full implementation of the existing framework is an immensely difficult task; unless there is a significant change in the mindset of the Government in the coming New Year.


We all know what Mao reportedly said when asked as to what he thought about the French Revolution: that it was too soon to tell. We may not have many lessons to learn from Mao but that answer, surely, is one we would do well to remember. Similarly, we cannot say much about the LLRC-Report: it is way too soon to tell.

There is nothing startlingly new in the lessons we have to learn from the LLRC. And the release of the Report does not confirm by any means that the Government will implement the recommendations. But on many critical issues, the LLRC has attempted to take on board the allegations, accusations, grievances, concerns and aspirations of many people. The final Report is therefore to be certainly welcomed.

The overall message of the Report seems to move, back and forth, from what the Government said (about the CFA and the ‘humanitarian operation’), to what the critics have pointed out (the confused picture, the mass suffering, the lack of accountability, human rights problems, etc.). This is, perhaps, the Report’s strength. Its contents now need to be widely debated; and one believes it will be taken up at the UN Human Rights Council. But more importantly, and seriously, the recommendations contained in the Report have to be implemented. Less talk and more action is far more desirable.

  • Dr Dayan Jayatilleka

    An excellent assessment! Congratulations!

  • Patriot

    It’s fantastic that the GOSL bowed to international pressure and was forced to make the LLRC report public. It proves once again that non-violent activism does work. With the release of the report, the GOSL can no longer say that a domestic mechanism is ongoing. That mechanism is over, it has handed over it’s report, which has been made public, and it clearly and unambigously abosolves the military of any wrong doing.

    What’s especially noteworthy was the acceptance in the report that the GOSL declared No Fire Zones during the height of the war. It uses the term NFZ repeatedly, and even accepts as fact, that the SLA dropped fliers to civilians requesting them to go into the NFZ, thus making a solemn promise that if they heeded the GOSL’s instructions they would find safety. What’s even more shocking is that the LLRC report also agrees that this solemn promise made to the Tamil civilians was deliberately violated by the GOSL by shelling into the NFZ. Tamil civilians followed the instructions of their government and proceeded into the NFZ as instructed. The remarkable solution implemented by their own government, the GOSL, for this desperate situation, was to deliberately fire into it’s own NFZ, killing many men, women and children for no crime or fault of their own. Therefore, the LLRC report despite is conclusion, is prima facie documentation of a crime against humanity. Extraordinary. Because of the LLRC report, the following are now facts that have complete acceptance both within SL and by the UN, Diaspora groups and the IC at large

    1) The GOSL declared a NFZ (No Fire Zone) and instructed civilians to move to these areas.
    2) The Tamil civilians obeyed the GOSL instructions and proceeded into the NFZ.
    3) The Tamil civilians could not leave the NFZ because the LTTE would not let them.
    4) The GOSL instructed it’s army to fire into the NFZ while Tamil civillians were still present in them.

    Thus, the LLRC report will make it impossible for any country to support the GOSL in international fora. International intervention is now imminent. It is inescapable. Let’s try to make the most of it, and more importantly, hope that the souls of the slaughtered civilians forgive us for our crimes.

    • http://----- M.C.M. Iqbal

      Some of the recommendations of the LLRC with regard to human rights issues highlighted in this article, are nothing new. For instance LLRC recommending the need for the creation of a Special Commissioner of Investigations to investigate alleged disappearances (para 5.48) is something that had already been recommended by the All Island Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances of Persons, as far back as in May, 2000. That Commission emphasized the need for an Independent Human Rights Prosecutor to deal with cases of disappearances of persons (vide pages 16 & 17 of its Report). This recommendation was made by the Commission as it felt then that the Attorney General who was ‘the representative of the State’ dealing with such cases was undesirable, due to ‘a public perception of a conflict of interest’ .

      The LLRC has also suggested that legislation needs to be enacted to criminalize enforced disappearances (para 5.46). The Report of the said Disappearances Commission had already recommended in year 2000 that the causing of a disappearance of a person should be made a cognizable offence by an Act of Parliament ( vide page 24). Yet even the UN Convention on Disappearances of Persons has still not been ratified by the Government of Sri Lanka.

      Lets us hope these and the other recommendations of the LLRC do not suffer the same fate as the recommendations of the Commissions on Disappearances Persons and other such Commissions of the past. The Members of those Commissions were equally eminent persons as those of the LLRC and had put a lot of effort in making their recommendations. If only the recommendations had be taken seriously, many of the disappearances and human rights violations that occurred subsequently may not have been committed with impunity.

    • David Blacker

      Hey, Patriot, why are you cutting and pasting the same comment all over the net? I have also cut and pasted my reply to you:

      Patriot, you missed a couple of points in your 4-point list. It should read:

      1) The GOSL declared a NFZ (No Fire Zone) and instructed civilians to move to these areas.
      2) The Tamil civilians obeyed the GOSL instructions and proceeded into the NFZ.
      3) The LTTE followed the civilians into the NFZ.
      4) The LTTE opened fire on the SL Army from within the NFZ.
      5) The GOSL instructed it’s Army to fire upon the Tigers in the NFZ while Tamil civilians were still present in them.
      6) The Tamil civilians could not leave the NFZ because the LTTE would not let them.

      Let’s have the whole truth, eh? 😉

      • PresiDunce Bean

        @David Blacker

        7)And this was how the tall story about “Zero Casualties” came into existence.
        8)And they all lived happily ever after.
        9)The End. 😀

      • Keynes!

        David Blacker,

        Your reference to the LTTE following the civilians into the NFZ on point 3 is debatable since the NFZs that were declared were the areas in which the LTTE was already present. Let me refresh your memory:

        The declaration of the NFZs was an area denial ploy by the SL military. When they needed to capture an area that was heavily defended and likely to cause heavy casualties to the Army, it was declared an NFZ. Once this was done, the Tigers were forced to withdraw from the area and allow the Army to walk in, or defend it and risk being accused of fighting from within the NFZ and causing civilian casualties. Legally, the NFZs have no standing as they were unilaterally declared by the MoD without the agreement of the Tigers. Safe areas, cease fires, truces, etc must be agreed upon by both warring parties to be legitimate. Therefore, neither attacking the NFZs nor defending them are war crimes per se.

      • David Blacker

        Keynes!!! I see you’ve been reading my articles :) Yes, as I said over a year ago, the NFZs have no legal standing and were probably just an area denial strategy. However, if that is so, no one was afforded any special protection in lieu of being within the NFZ’s perimeter, thereby dissolving Patriots’s points list. You can’t have your cake and eat it too. The civilians were told they would be safe in the NFZ, and they would have been if the Tigers had withdrawn. IHL requires combatants to remove themselves from civilians or prevent civilians getting into proximity of combatants. Pretty much the opposite of what the Tigers did. In fact, they moved further troops and heavy weapons into the NFZ after the civilians had moved there.

      • Keynes!


        Yes, I do read your articles and I’m a great fan of yours. Indeed, I believe your scholarship and wise counsel are second to none.

        In 1919, my namesake JM Keynes referred to European history as a “perpetual prize-fight” in his magnum opus. He deemed the Treaty of Versailles as a Carthaginian Peace. What’s been happening in this island can also be referred to as a perpetual prize-fight that goes back to the time of Elara and Dutugemunu. What Sri Lanka needs today is a worthy successor to JM Keynes, who will have the foresight and humility to admit to mistakes of the past, and extricate this country from the mire on which it has foundered. Takers anyone?

      • Keynes!


        One of your arguments above is a textbook example of a No true Scotsman fallacy. In May 2011, you argued that the NFZ was an area denial ploy by the Army and that the NFZ was declared so when the army “needed to capture an area that was heavily defended and likely to cause heavy casualties to the Army.” This means that the tigers were already in the NFZ. How then could the tigers have “followed the civilians” into the NFZ? Please explain.

        Since you have taken the moral high-ground on NFZs, human shields, terrorism (and what not?), I would like you to consider a different scenario: (a) If the tigers had declared the district of Colombo as a NFZ unilaterally, would your boys have moved out?

        (b) If the army hadn’t moved out and if the tigers had attacked the NFZ(in this case the Colombo!), would that amount to a war crime?

      • David Blacker

        Keynes! I stand by what I said in May, and see no contradiction in what I am saying now. The NFZ was unilaterally declared by the GoSL probably as an area denial ploy. I say “probably” because there’s no way of knowing for sure, but I am of that opinion. And yes, there certainly were Tigers within the NFZ area at the time of declaration. The Tigers then moved additional heavy weapons and more troops into the NFZ after the declaration, directly endangering the civilians who were also moving in or had already done so.

        Now, about your scenario. If the Tigers had declared Colombo an NFZ and the SL military had not withdrawn itself from civilian proximity or not evacuated Colombo of civilians, the SL military would be committing a warcrime by endangering civilians with their presence. If the Tigers had then attacked, the Tigers would not have been committing a crime as long as the attack could be reasonably justified as having a military benefit that was worthy of the risk placed upon the civilians by such an attack.

        This is the law, regardless of whether the combat had taken place within an NFZ or without, since the NFZs had been unilaterally declared and therefore of no legal standing. So in short, it is not the place that matters, but the actions of the combatants that deems said actions criminal or not.

    • Shiva

      This report is a cover up strategy by the Rajapakse regime and people all over the world demand for an independent international war crimes investigation.

      We all know the alleged criminals are in power and the Sinhala Apartheid Buddhist regime has been committing crimes against humanity and now it is the time for accountability and justice.

      • PresiDunce Bean


        Ha…ha…ha… ‘wise counsel’ by David?

        I do however agree whole heartedly when you say, “What Sri Lanka needs today is a worthy successor to JM Keynes, who will have the foresight and humility to admit to mistakes of the past, and extricate this country from the mire on which it has foundered. Takers anyone?”

  • Dr Dayan Jayatilleka

    Folks, whatever your views are about the NFZs, do try not to use the LLRC Report as a human shield. A reading, or re-reading, of the Report would clearly show that the commission repeatedly raises the question as to whether it was a mistake on the part of GoSL/the SL military to declare NFZs. The LLRC implies that the NFZs were declared with good intention. The report’s point is that it provided the opportunity for the Tigers to embed their heavy weapons among the civilians. The clear implication of the report is that the military should not have relented (or been suckered) to the point of proposing the NFZ option and should perhaps have dispensed with it. The report (rightly, in my view) does not question the desirability of the goal of militarily vanquishing the LTTE in that campaign, nor does it think a ceasefire/’humanitarian pause’ or cessation of hostilities was desirable. Least of all does it commend the evacuation option of the Tiger leaders, that some quarters proposed.

  • Poor Citizen

    Mahinda looks really cool in that photo!