Why does humanitarianism often fail to achieve its goals?

‘International responsibility for the alleviation of suffering is one of the most noble of human goals. Nobility of aim does not however confer immunity from sociological analysis or ethical critique’ (De Waal, 1997: 65)

Broadly speaking, humanitarianism refers to an ethic of kindness and sympathy extended universally and impartially to all of humanity. Those who profess these values can arguably be termed humanitarian. In the academic literature, a more precise definition remains problematic as it can be interpreted as humanitarian assistance, humanitarian intervention or a conflation of the two. I will be focusing on humanitarian assistance, which refers to the ways in which helping others is done (Allen and Schomerus, 2008: 45). The fundamental principles espoused by most aid agencies under the name of humanitarianism focus on four key areas: universality, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These are arguably aspirations and powerful critiques have been made against aid agencies as to their ability to fulfil them. Furthermore, it has been argued that the action of aid agencies often leads to perverse outcomes, for example prolonging the war e.g. Biafra (Smillie in De Waal, 1995: 77), or becoming complicit in abuses of human rights e.g. The World Food Program in Ugandan refugee camps (Branch, 2008). In defence of humanitarians, however, they have set themselves very high principles, which will always be impossible to entirely achieve. Some like Zoe Marriage advocate that it would be better for NGOs to commit to limited but doable tasks than to express universalist aims that perpetually founder (Marriage, 2006: 137). This would make it easier to assess agencies. Nevertheless, in acknowledging that humanitarians face huge problems, there is space in the discourse to promote better strategies. Therefore the key way to make humanitarian aid more effective would be to focus not simply on deficits and needs but also on strategies – facilitating the (non-damaging) strategies of disaster victims and counteracting the strategies of those who manipulate disasters for personal or political gain (Keen, 2008: 148). Contemporary humanitarianism must be viewed through an evolving lens and in order to better live up to their principles, aid agencies should acknowledge their limitations, endeavour to be more accountable and learn from past mistakes. In this way, they may avoid complicity in causing the very human suffering that they are committed to resolve (Branch, 2008: 170).

The way I will structure this essay is to critically analyze the principles espoused by aid agencies by considering how these principles are carried out. There is clearly a gap between rhetoric and practice which exposes aid agencies to criticism. Additionally, I will convey how the actions of aid agencies often lead to perverse outcomes. However, it is necessary to take into consideration that on the ground things are always more complex and the costs of inaction could also be very high which does leave humanitarians in a difficult moral dilemma which starkly shows the divergence between humanitarian aspirations and humanitarian realities.

Universality?

This is one of the fundamental tenets of aid agencies which have been questioned by a number of critical authors (Marriage 2006, De Waal 1995). For example, DFID in 1998 claimed that it ‘sought to promote a more universal approach to addressing humanitarian needs wherever they arose. People in need wherever they were – should have equal status and rights to assistance’ (DFID in Marriage, 2006: 15). This was seriously brought into question, for example, in Sierra Leone where aid agencies such as DFID showed a capital city bias. This was due to the differing priorities between principal and beneficiary. Put more starkly, the aid agencies were primarily concerned with their own safety and Freetown was the only evacuation point for foreign workers. This meant that NGOs tended to only provide assistance to those in Freetown as assisting became more difficult outside the city. These practicalities may have been understandable due to the dangers these humanitarians would have faced, but what became very questionable was the way they tried to claim universality by ignoring people informally or by introducing categories that excluded them (Marriage, 2006: 4) in order to stay ‘true’ to their stated objectives. De Waal expands upon this and posits that the demands of fund raising and institutional survival make it imperative not to admit failures (De Waal, 1997: 80). Additionally, concern with organizational growth tends to encourage a concentration of NGO efforts on high profile cases and even those parts of crisis areas that are easily accessible to the media (Keen, 2008:134) further undermining the aspiration of universality to the practical realities of chasing funding. Therefore the dual incentives of humanitarianism and institutional survival are often conflated in order to justify to humanitarians and their backers their strategies, which may in fact not lead to the most humanitarian outcome. This is a legitimate criticism and continued adherence to institutional survival over humanitarian principles is likely to lead to cynicism within the aid industry.

Impartiality and Political Neutrality?

These two principles arguably overlap, with the former entailing the distribution of aid according to need to those on all sides of a conflict, regardless of race, religion or ethnic group; and the latter entailing not taking sides or contributing/strengthening any side of the conflict (Allen and Schomerus, 2008: 182). However, aid is inherently political and to suggest that it is not is simply disingenuous. It is plainly impossible to remain politically impartial and neutral. In remaining silent in order to adhere to these principles, one de facto supports the status quo and can arguably be condemned as ‘complicit in the systematic massacre of a population’ (Kouchner, 1968). The ICRC would likely retort that in order to protect lives it must remain impartial and neutral in order to have continued access to victims. However, following the ICRC’s silence with regard to the Holocaust, this method is clearly problematic. Unfortunately, either action or inaction on behalf of humanitarianism can often have negative implications.

A clear example of the perversion of ‘neutrality’ occurred in Uganda in 1996. Branch argues that humanitarian agencies were directly responsible for enabling the government’s counterinsurgency, in particular its policy of mass forced displacement and internment of a large proportion of the Acholi population. He justifies this by stating that internment camps were only able to be created because humanitarian agencies moved in at their conception to supply them with relief aid and that if they had not, the policy of forced displacement would have been a failure (Branch, 2008: 151-173). Aid agencies, in not speaking out against the government became complicit in its displacement policy. This critique falls into the arguments of aid sustaining wars and propping up governments. However, it is difficult to imagine that had they not intervened the Acholi population would have been better off without aid, as many were coercively driven into camps suggesting that their capacity for exit was clearly not particularly strong. This follows Slim’s reasoning who posits that it is dangerous to withhold a definite good or benefit for the sake of an unknowable future good (Slim in Keen, 2008: 141). Counterfactuals aside, this example shows that the actions of humanitarians can lead to unintended, perverse outcomes, demonstrating that the high aspirations of aid agencies in theory differ from on the ground where moral dilemmas abound in practice.

In addition, the mere presence of relief aid often can perversely lead to the strengthening of rebel forces. This moral dilemma was very clear in the Zairian camps after the Rwandan genocide. For example, emergency aid to Hutu refugees in Zaire was notoriously manipulated by militia fighters who had participated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide…helping the Hutu extremists to recover and rearm. This diversion of relief by warring parties served to undermine the political neutrality of agencies. (Keen, 2008: 126, Allen and Schomerus, 2008: 183). Then, there is the moral dilemma of whether aid should be withheld in order to prevent sustaining killers at the expense of innocent lives within the camps. Aid agencies have been criticised for sustaining war but arguably in this case the blame should lie with the international community. By failing to send a multinational force to separate and disarm the Hutu extremists, aid agencies were put in an impossible position. (Keen, 2008: 127). Such moral complexities show how humanitarian rhetoric can very often in reality not live up to its high aspirations. Arguably the challenge for relief agencies is to determine the proper limits of their moral responsibility for the negative impact of emergency aid and then make all efforts to mitigate against it in their programmes (Slim, 1997: 245).

Independence?

This refers to the independence of agencies from the political or other objectives of donors and governments. This is a very questionable principle as in practice many humanitarian agencies receive funding from donors who want an influence over the strategy undertaken. This may also have the unintended effect of making an NGO a target in a complex emergency as it is perceived as being unduly influenced by governments, rather than independently pursuing its humanitarian mandate. For example, in 2004 Care USA received 75% of its funding from the US government. This put its operations in Iraq at risk due to its close association with the US. This was demonstrated by the abduction of the local director who was later killed (Keen, 2008: 135).

Furthermore, the independence of humanitarian agencies can be undermined in complex emergencies if they are critical of the incumbent government. For example MSF were forced out of Ethiopia when they denounced the Soviet backed Mengistu government for being responsible for the famine. Many donors were wary of supporting humanitarian agencies in Ethiopia due to Cold War politics but once the famine story flooded the media they had little choice but to acquiesce to public pressure. This shows that donors, as well as humanitarian agencies, do not have a carte blanche to act.  However, this support for humanitarian agencies to pursue independent agendas was also problematic with Rieff arguing that guilt stricken donations helped to fund a brutal resettlement program that may have killed up to 100,000 (Rieff, 2005). This links back to the perverse outcomes of aid giving by obscuring the politics behind an emergency and allowing donors to believe there is an easy solution where they are the most important actors (De Waal, 1997: 83).

Conclusion

There is clearly a gap between rhetoric and practice which exposes aid agencies to criticism. The high principles that are espoused are often difficult to fulfil in practice and aid agencies may often mislead in order to stay technically within their publicly stated objectives – a criticism that Marriage specifically levelled at DFID in its Sierra Leone operations. Furthermore, institutional survival often makes it impossible to admit failures, jeopardising future funding. This often allows for unworkable practices to remain for the benefit of the aid agency, trumping the needs of their alleged beneficiaries. Moreover, these principles are very different once on the ground as aid agencies have to contend with moral complexities and whether their action is helping or in fact worsening the situation. Critiques abound centred around arguments of aid sustaining wars and propping up governments. But the reality is often very difficult and the cost of inaction could also be very high. Such moral complexities show how humanitarian rhetoric can very often in reality not live up to its high aspirations. Nevertheless, in order to move forward, humanitarianism must be viewed through an evolving lens. Hence, in order to better live up to their principles, aid agencies must acknowledge their limitations, endeavour to be more accountable and learn from past mistakes. In this way, they may avoid complicity in causing the very human suffering that they are committed to resolve (Branch, 2008: 170).

Felix Baden-Powell read Politics at the University of Edinburgh and is now reading Development Management at LSE.

Bibliography

Allen, Tim and Schomerus, Mareike (2008) ‘Complex Emergencies and Humanitarian Responses’

De Waal, Alex (1997) ‘Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa’ Indiana University Press, Indianapolis

Keen, David (2008) ‘Complex Emergencies’ Polity Press, Cambridge

Kouchner, Bernard (1968)

Marriage, Zoe (2006) ‘Not Breaking the Rules, Not Playing the Game: International Assistance to Countries at War’ Hurst and Co Publishers, London

Rieff, David (2005) ‘Cruel to be Kind?’ in The Guardian< http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jun/24/g8.debtrelief>

Slim, Hugo (1997) ‘Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War’ Disasters, Vol 21, No. 3.

  • justitia

    The title of the article is somewhat misleading. This is a review about aid agencies. It appears that ‘aid’ is given in a selective manner,causing problems.
    But we tend to forget that it is mostly affluent christian majority nations which fund international aid agencies. Most of their citizens set aside a small percent of their income for this purpose. This is what all citizens with means should do, according to the tenets of all religions.
    In sri lanka, we do not hear of super rich aiding their poor fellow citizens though they are described as ‘devout’ members of various religions.
    Even the government’s aid agency – the Samurdhi Department appears to be a failure. Reports say that many of the samurdhi receipients do not deserve it, and that most of those who deserve it, do not get it. Selection appears to be done according to political criteria. Now the samurdhi niyamakas appear to absorb the major portion of the funds given to the department, and are said to have been active participants in the two recent elections, against provisions of the Establishments Code.
    International aid agencies in the former war zones face problems, and any aid agency funded by tamils to aid tamils affected by conflict are/were labelled “LTTE fronts”. This has stymied aid offers from tamils abroad to their fellow sufferers.
    But all lankans abroad do channel funds to their kith and kin.
    The pensions of 24,000 lankan pensioners abroad have been stopped for past six months and more,pending a new scheme. The Director General of Pensions is concerned that most pensioners abroad who drew their pensions to bank accounts in sri lanka hitherto aided their kith and kin. Now these pensions are to be paid abroad, or into a single non transferable bank account in sri lanka from which pensioners can withdraw funds only personally, by travelling to sri lanka for this purpose.
    Now India has offered to build 50,000 houses for IDPs under its direct supervision, but it is reported that this offer has not been approved. The state appears to desire to enable any aid only to its supporters in the war affected regions.
    Many aid agency staff in sri lanka are accused of leading an affluent life style. Such accusers are not aware that personal remuneration and perks are agreed to and signed before work begins – and that what appears luxury to lankans are average life style standards abroad. They are necessarily given new all terrain vehicles to preclude breakdowns within reasonable time periods – but this is also considered a luxury.

  • Tmama

    Dogooders of the Western World should spend moretime to analyse the cause of rise and rise of capitalism devouringall the resourcesof the world by a smaller and maller group ofpeople.

    Poor folks in US have only the Army to provide them withsustenance. Joining the NGO circuits has become a career alternative for the lower middle class in theWest.
    THe self administration of the junkets withWestern salaries, 4 * hotels, houses with Ayahs are very costly. Compare locally run homes for the destitute in Sri Lanka where a matron runs a charitable home for a dozen or two children with less than £ 100 a month.

    Straight gifts to the governmentswithout middle men for urgent needs like mine clearing equipment should be the duty of Western governments. Terrorist monster in Sri Lanka is a Western creation causes dating back to divide andrule policies of the Empire.