ELECTORAL NANDIKADAL: NATIONAL-POPULAR vs. NEO-COMPRADOR
Repost This Article“Prabhakaran, a textbook fascist…” - The Economist (‘Victory for the Tiger Slayer’ Jan 28th, 2010)
“Resistance to imperialism does not of course involve only armed force or bands of guerrillas. It is mainly allied with nationalism and with an aroused sense of aggrieved religious, cultural or existential identity.”- Edward Said (‘The Voyage In: Third World Intellectuals and Metropolitan Cultures’)
It is easy to be wise after the event, so I usually try to be wise before it. In a piece originally entitled ‘Crisis 2010: The post election scenario’ published over a month ago, from Dec 20th 2009 through to the 23rd, in the Sunday Lakbima, Transcurrents, Sri Lanka Guardian and Ada Derana, this is how I saw the Presidential election panning out:
“It is a fairly safe assumption that with the Southern province elections the Rajapakse administration hit its electoral ceiling and the UNP its floor. The ceiling is fairly high, around 65%, and the floor (almost a basement floor, courtesy Mr. Wickremesinghe) pretty low, 25%. It is a safe guess that President Rajapakse had his eyes on Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s “ground record”.
However, he will have to contend with the fact that even without the Fonseka challenge the UPFA with its patriotic platform has peaked and is on a slow parabolic downswing, enabling him at best to beat or reach President Jayawardene’s winning 1982 figure, Premadasa’s 1988 score or CBK’s 1999 result, but not her higher, or one might say, substantially fuller, figure of 1994. That last figure was an anomaly in any case, not generated by her “charisma” or “peace program” …but by default – the Tiger having serially assassinated every viable UNP presidential candidate…
On balance it is exceedingly doubtful that any personality around today can, even as “common candidate”, bridge and exceed the gap of around 30% between the Opposition and President Rajapakse. If the UNP had a viable candidate such as Karu Jayasuriya, then a Fonseka or Sarath Silva “spoiler” third candidacy might have made it a close fight, but even so, President Rajapakse would probably win, in a replay of JRJ’s 1982 or Premadasa’s 1988 victories.” (Sunday Lakbimanews Dec 20, 2009)
The only thing amiss about this projection is that it underestimated the sweeping character of the President’s victory in the Sinhala, and more especially, Sinhala Buddhist heartland, but it was made before the TNA allied with the opposition.
Mahinda Rajapakse gave the lie to the notion that the minorities, especially the Tamil minority held the key to the outcome of the election. Given the demographics on the ground, namely that the Sinhalese constitute an overwhelming majority, Rajapakse proved that winning an overwhelming majority of that overwhelming majority was a viable path to victory, leaving the Tamil voters relatively peripheral to the outcome just as the Tamil majority areas are peripheral to the island. The (geographic) periphery proved to be (politically) peripheral, while the road to power lay through the paddy fields and the provinces of the Sinhala heartland. The Sinhala peasantry which provided the manpower to sustain the war against the Tigers and finally prevail over them, provided the votes needed for a political victory for the incumbent over the Fonseka option chosen ironically by the unreconstructed Tamil nationalists. The foot soldiers who loyally followed Gen Fonseka as Army chief, voted with their families for Mahinda. It is not that they deserted Fonseka but that Fonseka was perceived as deserting the camp of Sinhala nationalism. Rajapakse romanced and won the hearts of the heartland.
The question remains as to how the Opposition’s strategists, Western diplomatic opinion and the overwhelming majority of media pundits got it so very wrong. Not only were they on the wrong side of History and totally oblivious to the sentiments of the vast majority of their fellow citizens, their demonstrated powers of analysis require them to get to the back of the (Poli Sci) class and work it out. A cursory acquaintance with modern history would have told them that no military chief has bested a strong national political leadership in a political struggle in the aftermath of a historic, victorious struggle, be it war or revolution. As I said on Al Jazeera, can anyone recall the name of the Russian general or field marshal who led the successful campaign against the Chechen insurgency? The Russian voter remembers only President Putin, and we in Sri Lanka are experiencing our Putin moment. A Fonseka candidacy could have had a chance only in the context of a military defeat, an economic depression or an incumbent with a wimp factor. Furthermore, an Obama campaign can work only with an Obama candidacy, not grafted onto a John McCain or Ariel Sharon one. A Terminator-type candidate had no chance against a serial smiler with proven machismo and warm if rascally, piratical charm.
The statistical starting point of the opposition strategists and most commentators, not to mention those who sent an array of ‘polls’ by email, was the Presidential election of 2005. We were informed that “the facts were undeniable” when the only thing that was undeniable was the hollowness of pure empiricism as an analytical methodology. It was truly imbecilic to take 2005 as the base line, when that was an entirely different conjuncture. (i) The then President Chandrika Kumaratunga had thrown her not inconsiderable weight behind former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at that election and (ii) the intervening period was taken up with a full-on, victorious war, making the difference between 2005 and 2010 one between distinct historical periods, “pre-war” and “postwar”, or “the Prabhakaran period” and the “post-Prabhakaran period” with their qualitatively different dynamics and altered states of collective consciousness; of national moods.
Election 2010 was held in a period that was post-Prabhakaran but not post-nationalist or post-patriotic. The reckoning that Fonseka’s military record could neutralize that sufficiently, even to the extent of bearing the burden of an alliance with the TNA, the Tiger fellow travelers, ( and Ranil, the Tiger appeaser) proved disastrous. Above all, the Opposition, its western backers/handlers, its Diaspora Tamil allies and local pundits grossly underestimated the patriotism/nationalism and anti-interventionism/anti-imperialism of the Sinhala masses, as well as their democratic aversion to the risk of Bonapartist tyranny.  In Gramscian terms, the vital “national popular” and “national democratic” dimensions were ignored by the opposition’s strategists and ideologues, except in the most superficial sense of fielding a war hero as candidate. The struggle was perceived as being, and to a great extent was in fact, one between a “national popular bloc” identified with MR and a “neo-comprador bloc” identified with the joint Opposition. Those factors, the depth and extent of which were underestimated, were activated not only by the perceived threat to the main political leader who had restored national pride, but by the presence of the pro-Tiger TNA and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s unrepentantly pro-appeasement (CFA) UNP at General Fonseka’s side, the reactivation of the “war crimes” propaganda in the West and certain gratuitous remarks by some Western representatives. The model for Rajapakse’s defeat was supposed to be that of Churchill in 1945, but not only was the born again politician Fonseka no Clement Attlee, Labour leader Attlee did not contest in alliance with Nazi supporter Oswald Mosely and appeaser Neville Chamberlain! Though unaware of its Biblical provenance, “tell me who your friends are and I will tell you who you are” seems to have been the criteria of the Sinhala Buddhist voter.
Is the newly and handsomely re-elected incumbent then secure from challenges? The first challenge is the avoidance of hubristic adventurism. President Jayewardene won a 5/6ths majority at the parliamentary election of 1977 and promptly disenfranchised his main opponent Mrs. Sirima Bandaranaike. He won the Presidential election of 1982 comfortably, but blundered by postponing a parliamentary election and substituting a referendum instead. These two moves, coming in the wake of clear victories, de-legitimized the administration, generating a huge crisis with a bloody denouement. One can only hope that President Rajapakse is not nudged along the same path.
Less apocalyptically, dangers still beckon. If I may quote once more from my article a shade over a month ago:
‘The real problem starts after the elections. Presidents Jayewardene and Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga had dreadfully crisis-tossed second terms, which were terrible experiences for the country and its citizenry. If re-elected, President Rajapakse is likely to have a similar experience, though it may be lesser in intensity because he has, to his undying credit, removed the main motor of development of those earlier crises: Prabhakaran, the Tigers and the war. However, will he be able to overcome the abiding temptation of Sri Lankan presidents (what might be termed the CBK syndrome) to attempt escape from the confines of a rigid constitution?
The most prudent course of action for a President in his or her second term would be to take a leaf from the book of any US President, however popular or powerful, and understand that the corollary of occupying a seat of such great power and influence is that it is limited by two terms. No better recommendation could be given to a Sri Lankan president than to accept these limits of power and (a) to seek to ameliorate the North-South or Sinhala-Tamil question by simply implementing the 13th amendment to the existing Constitution while (b) unblocking the road to meritocracy which is a prerequisite for economic development, by implementing the 17th amendment, rather than to risk a referendum on more venturesome architectural moves.
What is sad is that no Sri Lankan president will accept that Realist advice with equanimity: hence the fiasco of Chandrika’s abortive “Constitutional revolution”. …Though the argument for a total replacement of the Constitution rather than its full implementation or reform, is that the existing one is too authoritarian and/or unsuited to the resolution of the ethnic issue, the real reason-cum-target is the two term limit and the electoral system of proportional representation which act as checks and balances.
The incumbent will be forced to confront the unresolved ethnic issue (despite a reluctance to admit its existence) in the form of the TNA, which has not yet eschewed Tamil Eelam and the Vadukkodai Resolution let alone accepted the sole practicable formula of maximum devolution within a unitary state (the UK model). It may very well pick up Trincomalee at the parliamentary election, approximating the TULF’s sweep in 1977. Its “asking price” will therefore be high; far too high for any government to grant without fear of a Southern backlash.’ (Ibid)
What now, what next? The Sinhalese have voted overwhelmingly one way, the Tamils the other. What this means is that despite developmental successes, the Administration’s stewardship of the North and East and relationship with the ethnic minorities in general has been as stark a political failure as its relationship with the Sinhalese has been a political success. One is the reflection upside down, of the other. Today, the majority of the Tamil–speaking people of the North and east have voted in a single bloc, and barring the Sinhala majority areas, the North and East have psychologically and politically re-merged! The failure to win notably large political support from the Tamils and Muslims in the East, despite the progress of economic development, not only reveals the flaws of that model of development – perceived as ethnocentric – but of the administration’s central and abiding weakness so far: its blind-spot regarding the political and psychological dimensions of the ethno-national question and its insensitivity to the dimension of ethnicity and the management of difference.
The ethnic polarization of the map of Sri Lanka reveals a basic structural weakness of the Lankan state formation. Samir Amin tells us that systems decay precisely at their periphery, and this I believe is true of state formations too. While President Rajapakse has resolved the decades long crisis of state power in that he has restored the state’s territorial borders (which are once again co-extensive with its natural ones) and monopoly of violence, he has not yet resolved the state’s crisis of legitimacy at its periphery. There is no political consensus which cross-cuts ethnicity and runs from North to South, East to West. Thus, the crisis continues.
Sad, troubling, but more affordable in the final analysis for the Sinhalese than the Tamils because the former have the numbers, the big guns, the engines of economic growth, the ideological fuel of assertive nationalism and the historical memory-driven collective political will to maintain or restore coercive control over the North East. This means that the Tamils, having now seen that Sinhala sentiment tends overwhelmingly one way and the incumbent is here to stay another term, have one more chance to negotiate its way into the mainstream or remain an alienated periphery in more senses than one. That last chance or those last chances are at the parliamentary and provincial council election, as well as within a constituent assembly if one is constituted. The Tamils need to become stakeholders of the Rajapakse administration and partners – neither posturing competitors nor pliant clients—of Sinhala nationalism. This entails a double and mutual shift: on the part of triumphant Sinhala nationalism and the re-elected presidency, to greater openness, generosity and accommodation of the Tamil sentiments, and on the part of the Tamils, to leaders from their community with whom the Sinhala nationalist dominated centre is willing and likely to deal with. Here, I can only think of Devananda and perhaps Dharmalingam Siddharthan. Prudence, responsibility and constructive partnership are the need of the hour. If the Tamils vote a Hamas equivalent, the North East could go the Gaza way. Far better they vote an Abbas/Palestinian Authority equivalent.  Any society that could produce Prabhakaran, a “textbook fascist”, “the Pol Pot of South Asia” (John F Burns, New York Times) is a sick society, or was. When the Sinhalese produced an equivalent, Wijeweera (who, however, was never deified as was the ‘Sun God’), it had enough healthy antibodies to destroy him. Tamil society did not. If Tamil society decides to be led and represented by those who do not yet forswear the evil that was Prabharakan and the Tigers, we can only conclude that the sickness has not left its body politic and is possibly endemic. This may render problematic, both the prospect of integration and the perspective of autonomy. The larger polity could find it problematic to fully integrate with or grant autonomy/devolve power to a sub-national formation from which the bacillus of separatism remains politically and ideologically dominant.  Â
Hi Dayan,
“The question remains as to how the Opposition’s strategists, Western diplomatic opinion and the overwhelming majority of media pundits got it so very wrong.”
A more fundamental question is why didn’t you write this article a week ago and educate us *before* the election?
“he has not yet resolved the state’s crisis of legitimacy at its periphery.”
Tamils voting for Fonseka equates to the **Sri Lankan state’s** (vs Mahinda’s) crisis of legitimacy?????
Excellent article that covers many aspects of the what happened with regards to te presidential election. I think the election victory has stunned a lot of pundits out there and the Colombo elite got it wrong, so very wrong. One of the most important things to happen is the defeat of the JVP, TNA, SLMC and Mano Ganesan. Their politics of malice, hate and racism needed to be shown the door and I am glad Sri Lankans came out in force and did exactly that. Minority racism has been defeated at this election and I hope the forthcoming general elections will remove Sinhalese extremist elements from the government.
Hey man, you obviously don’t read the Sunday Island? I tried to educate you lot in an article that appeared on the Op -ed page last weekend, and earlier in a Dec 7th article in the Daily Island’s edit page. Obviously most of you are uneducable. I do hope though that the voter has done a better job than I could.
Wijayapala,
OK, i’m in a generous mood, so here’s a hot tip. If the UNP does not change its leadership within days ( to Karu, Rukman or Sajith) and instead chooses to contest the parliamentary elections under Ranil, the Opposition will do badly enough to encourage defections and bring the ruling coalition dangerously within reach of a two thirds majority. That’s pretty tough to do given the PR system but never underestimate the contempt of the nationalist voter ( and that’s the vast majority) for Ranil’s policy of appeasement and their determination to prevent a Ranilist UNP and TNA tie-up which could form a government. A Karu, Rukman or Sajith led UNP would be free of the taint of collaborationism.
What a foolish artice. Instead of branding Tamils of the NE as being “sick” for having the “bacilus of separatism”, the author should urge the Sinhala majority to do the right thing and give maxium autonomy to the NE. If separatism was inherently evil then the citizens of Eritrea, East Timor, Kosovo and Bangladesh, all nations that came into being because of separatism, are inherently “sick” societies. What Nonsense.
My letter of congratulation on MR victory and why we voted MR instead SF, critics of past and hopes of future of MR govt: http://www.groundviews.org/2010/01/28/dear-mr-president/#comment-13771 and video and comments of post election reactions of govt http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XjAViGGQR5k and video/comment on harassement to SF http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEvOcWqCFGU
There have been many raids after the elections; SF and media. SF’s compalint of raid by STF hasnt even been accepted by police(claims SF). Govt withdrew security of SF which was recommended by SC. Government hanst been able to convince people why these raids tookplace. It seems taking revenge from opponents. If this trend continues government will lose the general election 2010. We need a government that listen to its people. Respect law, people and democracy of Sri Lanka. People will defend the government, If government defends & respects law, people and democracy of the country. We are glad that it wasn’t a Winston Churchill election but…! Long live democracy!
NoEalamInSL
Well, I think there is something sick about demanding 60% of the coastline and 30% of the land area for about 8% of the population.
Dear Dayan,
“I tried to educate you lot in an article that appeared on the Op -ed page last weekend”
You didn’t give an explanation why Mahinda would win the election, more or less a prediction. You just wrote an advertisement for Mahinda while warning us the dangers of a Fonseka victory, giving us the impression that you were biting your nails just as much as the Western Diplomats and NGOs on Jan 26th.
Nice try Dayan!!
“If the UNP does not…”
See, now this is precisely the kind of conditional that won’t qualify as “I told you so” after the General Election. Wouldn’t it be a good thing if Mahinda gets a 2/3rd majority? He could then change the Constitution, as one of your excuses for not offering anything more than 13th Amendment was that the Constitution could not be changed.
Dear Dayan, I urge you to re-read the “Broken Palmyrah” by Rajini Thiranagama. It shows the role that the Tamil population at large played in the creation of the monster called Prabakaran (and the LTTE). I see clear similarities in the creation of a monster called the Rajapaksa Dynasty by the Sinhala population at large. Seems like we never learn from history!!! How sad (:
If the TNA supported MR they would have been sanitinised made patriots just like Pillayan and Karuna.Since they did otherwise they are unpatriotic.
SF didn’t contest on a platform to divide the nation,his ten point proposal for north east was immediate relief for the suffering populace.Hence the overwhelming support for the swan from the minorities.
If one looks at the election verdict in this light,then the question arises which is the sick society?
The one that rejected the immediate suffering PACKAGE calling it unpatriotic or the one that repeatedly over the years rejects every effort and accord peace loving leaders have signed and later abandoned due to pressure from ultra nationalist.
The proof is in the pudding.
When is Dayan going to get out of his infatuation with cronyism and Chechniyan model?
Time and again the minorities have rejected such proposals .That doesn’t mean that all minorities are for separation .Vast majority of the minorities would want peace with honor , dignity ,equal right and degree of devolution where they can manage their own day to day affairs with in a unitary state.
A marriage cannot be based on hegemonic principles,controlling and subjugating the spouse.
Lets us not indulge in acrimonious name calling,learn from our past mistakes and make a better SL for the generations to come.
We have spoiled it for our generation let us not sow the seed of hatred and distrust for the future generations.
No one likes to be in a sinking ship. Many who voted for SF will join the MR bandwagon. Minorities of the country who were fooled by the propaganda of a “close race” will join MR. (As Dayan suggested it is the wise thing to do.) I would not be surprised if the government wins northern and eastern provinces in the general election.
I predict even a greater victory for the government in the general election.
“The foot soldiers who loyally followed Gen Fonseka as Army chief, voted with their families for Mahinda. It is not that they deserted Fonseka but that Fonseka was perceived as deserting the camp of Sinhala nationalism. Rajapakse romanced and won the hearts of the heartland.”
Well now, this presents quite a dilemna, doesn’t it? As bad as Sri Lankan elections are, this one was unique in that the incumbents consisted of TWO die-hard Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists. Forget petite Ranil with his English mannerisms… this election was indeed a “war of the village.” From the outset, one could predict extremely low minority voter turnout. One could also expect extremely strong support for Mahinda given how soon this election followed the war. In fact, the timing alone was enough to guarantee him a victory. Sarath Fonseka had no political experience; there was in fact, nothing for the media to cover in regards to his past, other than his war record. But what does the average civilian know about the military other than whether it is winning or losing (has won/has lost)? In this case, the military won, but Mahinda took credit even for that! In the final analysis, there was nothing unique about Sarath that voters could use to differentiate him from Mahinda. Future promises are only as good as your political record, and Sarath simply did not have one. Aligning with the UNP/TNA might have given some voters the impression that Sarath’s political agenda was in line with the agenda of those parties. This would automatically eliminate the rural Sinhala voter. If I am not mistaken, that is the strategy which SLFP propaganda banked upon: present Sarath asr a traitor. If one leafs through the comments section of popular Sinhalese newsgroups, he will see that this strategy worked. From all of this, one would have been left with very little doubt the election, except for one question: the margin of victory for Mahinda. It was difficult to say whether the traditional UNP bastions would go to Mahinda or SF. Apparently, they went to Mahinda. I would attribute this to the lack of media coverage given to SF. I am not sure even his supporters knew exactly what his position/agenda was (or is).
Dayan,
It is an insightful writeup for the perplexed and disillusioned who are currently licking wounds after the humiliating defeat in 2010 PE. However, I sincerely doubt that they are capable of understanding or willing to read what you are saying. Only the people who are reasonably versed about SL history and in touch with Sinhala hinterland can understand your points.
For the second point you raise that UPFA will have a 2/3 rd majority, I believe that it is wise for UNP to engage in modifying the constitution now so that they can have positive influence than waiting till the election is over. Otherwise, it will be another 1978. Nevertheless, I agree with your note about Ranil vs Rukman, Sajith or Karu. I am strongly for this idea since Ranil should be considered a national security risk due to the possibility of single party politics in to foreseeable future..
Some websites predicted the exact result of this election. It is not rocket science to understand that the “patriotic” vote was still with MR at the election. This is the single most powerful deciding factor.
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2010/01/is-nationalist-vote-divided.html
Hi Dayan…wait till what Mahinda will be called by The Economist. MR is the Manuel Noriega of South Asia…
“Any society that could produce Prabhakaran, a “textbook fascist”, “the Pol Pot of South Asia” (John F Burns, New York Times) is a sick society, or was.”
Might be apt at this point to recall Fanon’s work on the psychic pathologies produced by racial/ethnic oppression, both in the victims as well as the perpetrators. It surely requires one sick society to turn out by the millions to vote for a man who operates government like it was a family affair. Only a seriously sick society votes for a person who stands for nepotism.
“Election 2010 was held in a period that was post-Prabhakaran but not post-nationalist or post-patriotic. ”
No kidding! Could there be at least some glimmer of an understanding here that SL’s problems had little to do with the Tigers? If it had, the end of the war should have brought about a radical difference, no?
“The only thing amiss about this projection is that it underestimated the sweeping character of the President’s victory in the Sinhala, and more especially, Sinhala Buddhist heartland, but it was made before the TNA allied with the opposition.”
You mean you didn’t expect the TNA to ally with the opposition? I did, and I’m no heavy-duty political scientist as you claim to be. Hell, I’m not even Sri Lankan. Perhaps your predictions next time could be grounded in a better feel of the Tamil pulse. Hint: It doesn’t help to dismiss their consciousness as “sick”.
“The Tamils need to become stakeholders of the Rajapakse administration and partners – neither posturing competitors nor pliant clients—of Sinhala nationalism.”
There is another option–leave this God-forsaken country where regard for minority concerns is thought to entail a patronising “generosity”.
As for adopting a viable position that is in-between being “posturing competitors” and “pliant clients”, ever read Zizek on the false consciousness entailed in trying to reconcile opposites? What would such an in-between position be, anyway–pretending to be pliant clients while truly being competitors? Do citizens have to use craftiness and trickery to obtain their rights?
The election was disreputable. Ruling party enormously violated election rules which include mis using govt assets, threatening to Election Officers and stopping their duties, mass scale vote rigging, thuggery , bribery, murdering opposition supporters, and Keeping Opposition leaders in house arrest during counting votes. Election commissioner’s speech after the election confirms them. In other words there should be a question about legitimacy of the election of the President.
My question is -what in god’s name was all opposition camp doing in a hotel. if i was SF, i would have sent Ranil to be at election commissioner office, Hakim to east counting booth and every one else to all counting stations in order to monitor the counting. why did the opposition agree for non-live coverage and why didnt they go to court on it prior to the election? seems they were over-confident?? whats your view on these dayan?
SeeingPastTheSmoke said,
February 1, 2010 @ 12:09 pm
“Any society that could produce Prabhakaran, a “textbook fascist”, “the Pol Pot of South Asia” (John F Burns, New York Times) is a sick society, or was.”
Well well, what a silly little statement. Wasn’t Prabakaran produced by the venom injected by the racists in Tamil Nadu providing not only training, life lines but money as well in the hay days? Which sick society then sustained the text book fascist? None other than the TAMIL DIASPORA which you admit of belonging to. So who’s really sick? Is it not the Tamil diaspora? Financing a blood bath in a country you clearly have no love for? Please stay out of this “god-forsaken” country. Be happy in your “god blessed” country!
Mahinda is a strong committed leader who guarantees stability and that’s what this country needs. He’s our Mahathir or LKY. Life under him would be difficult for the cocooned Colombo lot, but Sri Lanka will become more prosperous, peaceful and stable in his second term. These doom and gloom merchants have absolutely no credibility. They said the war cannot be won, and then that Fonseka would win the election. When will they realise that they do not represent Sri Lanka, and that Sri Lanka does not represent them.
What we need is dignity, development and peace, and your “freedoms” , “rights” and other slogans aren’t as important to us. It’s not that they are bad things, we’re merely too poor and under-developed to afford such luxuries. Your Iranian style twitter revolutions will not work in Sri Lanka. Your condemnation of our government will only make it more popular. Please, just let us be, and Sri Lanka will solve its own problems and will become a better place to live for its citizens.
To us, a new highway or a power plant is more important than the freedom to write against a politician profiting from it. Having the guts to tell Miliband to bugger off is a bigger reason for us to be proud than to get a favourable report in the Times of London. Being able to live without fear of terrorist bombs brings us more relief than does Tissanayagam’s release. If the Colombo comprador class cannot accept the people’s democratic choice, please do exercise your choice to leave.
“Well well, what a silly little statement. Wasn’t Prabakaran produced by the venom injected by the racists in Tamil Nadu providing not only training, life lines but money as well in the hay days?”
No, Prabakaran was produced by pogroms against a helpless community. India fed his need for violence–it didn’t create it. Nice little thing you’ve got going that Tamils as a ‘race’ are racist–no matter whether they come from SL, India or wherever. And your Sinhalese are innocent little lambs.
What’s the difference between Prabhakaran’s penchant for assassinations, and the disappearances and killings of journalists? What’s the difference between Prabhakaran and those who carried out anti-Tamil pogroms? How different is Prabhakaran’s alliance with Tamil Nadu from your country’s alliances with the rogue countries of the world?
Pretty desperate argument that you need to assume I was a Tiger sponsor in order to discredit what I’m saying. But then in your country, that’s how the validity of argument is ascertained, isn’t it–by who is doing the speaking. Not by the strength of the argument itself.
I am certainly happy in my country. It’s not God who blessed us, but the people here are very nice. They believe in equality. Quain’t, ain’t it?
A good article. The election clearly showed that the MR government has a problem with both ethnic and religious minorities. It also clearly showed that the government has the overwhelming support of the Sinhala-Buddhist electorate that make up the majority of the population.
As much as on the surface it may seem that the country is polarized, I think there are many many things on which voters of all stripes can agree on – elimination of corruption, depoliticizing the police/armed forces, disarming the paramilitaries in the north-east, ensuring development projects all over the country are conducted not on the basis of benefiting those close to the government but whats in the best interests of the nation, implementing the 17th amendment or some similar legislation, just to name a few.
Instead of hurling accusations of vote rigging and treachery or seeing conspiracies around every corner and under every stone, our elected representatives should get down to business on an agenda that serves the nation.
If the government is truly interested in nation building, the minority parties should not hesitate to lend their support to the MR regime in areas such as these that are to the benefit of everyone.
The optimist would also hope that with the winds of the Sinhala firmly behind him and with only one term to go, MR doesn’t feel the need to play to the worst elements of the gallery and chooses to reform how our government serves all its citizens in a way that leaves him a lasting legacy as the man who built a united nation.
Hari Narendran, you said:
“As much as on the surface it may seem that the country is polarized, I think there are many many things on which voters of all stripes can agree on – elimination of corruption, depoliticizing the police/armed forces, disarming the paramilitaries in the north-east, ensuring development projects all over the country are conducted not on the basis of benefiting those close to the government but whats in the best interests of the nation, implementing the 17th amendment or some similar legislation, just to name a few.”
I’m afraid I have to disagree with you here. The voting in SL showed that nearly 60% of the people do not really care about the issues you have named. If they did, they would not have voted for Rajapaksa. The corruption, the violence of the regime were not hidden aspects of government–they were in full view. It is also clear that Rajapaksa will not be attempting to meet minority demands. And yet, the people voted for Rajapaksa. What do that nearly 60% want? That’s the question that needs to be answered. It’s not democracy, or transparency in governance.
The task ahead is not so much to ensure representatives serve the interests of the people as it is for the 40% to persuade the nearly 60% that freedom is important, that democracy and transparency DO matter, that lasting peace is to be cherished.
SeeingPastTheSmoke,
What’s the matter with you? Democracy got you stumped, brother man?
SeeingPastTheSmoke,
I think the issue was not one of the majority of Southern voters not caring about corruption, democracy, etc, but one where a) they felt that the government had to be rewarded with another term for the defeat of the LTTE and b) they were not convinced that the opposition had anything really different offer.
And one cannot really blame them. The opposition was a coalition of parties with vastly differing views on everything from economics to the proper solution to the ethnic issues to foreign policy. And its leadership was unable throughout the campaign to credibly and coherently lay out their vision for the country. It was a campaign the largely reacted to issues, real or manufactured, generated by the government and they showed a remarkable inability to counter any of them in a meaningful way. Case in point was the ‘controversy’ over ‘secret agreements’ with the TNA. Clearly the government was playing to the worst fears of the South without consideration of the implications of that on a national unity level. Instead of from the onset being open and clear about what if any arrangements had been made with the TNA, the opposition waffled and succeeded in doing nothing but looking weak and disorganized.
Reading and watching many of the interviews with voters post-election, I was struck by how many of them conceded corruption and bad governance was an issue but at the same time did not think the opposition had any real purpose to its campaign or would really be any different.
Given the government’s conduct in the immediate aftermath of the election, if the opposition approaches the upcoming parliamentary elections in a more structured way with a clear message & purpose, it would not be surprising if we see a 50/50 split like what some expected for the presidential poll.
Whereas globalization has helped most societies in a positive way, it has been unable to reconcile itself with the phenomena of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. In the modern democracy, e.g. that of first-world nations, nationalism has actually succumbed to globalization. For example, the need for cheap labor, or the need for highly skilled labor, or the need that some corporations have to outsource. Thus, the social dynamics, e.g. demographics of these societies have rapidly changed, irrespective of whether or not the citizenry approve – the economic incentive alone provides enough justification. In contrast, Sinhala-Buddhism nationalism has had a largely stabilizing influence on the fabric of Sri Lankan society. By stable, I mean that it has resisted practically every dynamic change that would have led to positive transformation. If you to the rural villages, for example, the lack of modern machinery provides a fascinating case-study. Technology has played a central role in the transformation of every major economic power… yet, where key areas are concerned, it is abruptly missing from the production process in SL. Clearly, the Sri Lankan Government has had very little interest in investing in technology. The anti-globalization dichotomy that is part of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism (let us call it SBN) has fueled this lack of investment. What about education? Advanced education beyond secondary school is beyond the means of most Sri Lankans. And yet, the Government refuses to let the private sector play a bigger role, e.g. privatization of universities. Therefore, we can safely assume that the vast majority of people in SL are only equipped with a 12th grade education. In contrast, globalization, by facilitating the rapid spread and exchange of ideas, as well as providing a labor source, has let higher education become accessible to anyone of any age, at a reasonable cost, in the first-world nations. Of course, it is in politics that SBN has proved to be the biggest obstacle. Resistance to implementing modern political ideas, e.g. federalism, lack of a working constitution, elimination of nepotism, political corruption, the presence of monks in influential political parties – all of these contain within themselves the elements of SBN. Now you ask, how does SBN thrive, how does it go on, despite such glaring omissions in the development of society? Well, that is a rather complex question, but the simplest answer is that nationalism always appeals to the lowest common denominator.
*If you go to the rural villages
In Your Face,
No, democracy doesn’t stump me. I know what it means. Do you?
Hari Narendran,
Yes, the opposition totally screwed up and did not make it easy for the voter to distinguish between the two sides. If the opposition gets its act together for the parliamentary elections, it might get a few stragglers from the other camp, but it won’t be significant enough to make a difference.
But may I register that you yourself were puzzled watching the after-election interviews, that voters conceded corruption and bad governance to the incumbent president, but voted for him anyway. I suspect that the reasons cited, that they didn’t know what the other side stood for, and whether Fonseka and company would mean anything different, are really just excuses to justify their vote. These are not the real reasons why they voted for Rajapaksa. If clean government meant anything to them, they would have voted for the other side, or for one of the minor contenders–simply because there was at least some chance that these guys might do things differently as opposed to the absolute certain knowledge that Rajapaksa promised corruption and tyranny.
Either tyranny and corruption don’t mean anything to them, or it does not mean as much to them as something else. Perhaps they figure that even if there’s corruption, something will trickle down to them with big development projects with China in the works?
What would make the Sri Lankan masses run out into the streets in heavy protest? Perhaps if we answer that question, we’ll know what makes them tick, what made them vote for Rajapaksa. Which ones of these imaginary scenarios would bring them out into the streets:
1. assassination or incarceration of a respected opposition leader or civil society figure by the current regime?
2. Big news of Rajapaksa family’s financial stakes in development projects?
3. Increase in tempo of white van abductions and killings?
4. Government corruption in handling international aid directed at helping people struck by a natural disaster?
5. News that Rajapaksa is planning on implementing the 13th Amendment?
I would be interested in knowing if there are any other issues that would make them come out by the droves.
“What would make the Sri Lankan masses run out into the streets in heavy protest? ”
Maybe the opportunity to loot Tamil shops and burn Tamil homes? Basically anything anti-Tamil will bring them onto the street in great numbers.
Seeing Past the Smoke,
Yep I’ve read Zizek advising against reconciling opposites but he’s talking about capital and labour. I don’t consider the Tamils and the Sinhalese or the North and South as opposites, unlike you obviously do. I prefer Lenin’s distinction between contradictions and antagonisms, or Mao’s elaboration on non-antagonistic contradictions as distinct from antagonistic ones. The contradiction between the North and South ( or Tamils and Sinhalese) is a non antagonistic one, capable of resolution. Try reading Mao’s essays on philosophy, with Zizek’s introduction.
Let me play devil’s advocate. What’s the alternative to reconciliation? The last alternative wound up in Nandikadal and Menik farms.
SeeingPastTheSmoke,
I’d argue tyranny and corruption matter to them in ‘normal’ times – this election happened in anything but a normal time. The crushing defeat of the LTTE was something that meant a lot to the Southern voter. On that single fact alone, MR was always going to be more likely to win the election – the oppositions weak campaign made that a certainty.
Should this gov’t continue with the same governing style for its next term, I would fairly confidently wager that at the next election in 6 years, with sufficient time for the euphoria of the LTTEs defeat to subside, other every day issues will become much more important as a voting factor and we will see a very different result.
Now, part of what has continued to hamper the opposition is the government’s willing to play the race card to taint the opposition as ‘non-patriotic’ and ‘eelamist’ due to the oppositions willingness in words at least to countenance a degree of political structure reform and de-militarization beyond what the government is willing to offer.
While accepting the many faults of many many successive governments on the front of ethnic/national unity, our leadership has also been sorely lacking.
We have for too long allowed the ‘Southern’ parties to define our interests to the Sinhalese people – and in most cases when election time comes around, i’d say mischaracterize our interests fairly effectively.
I think it is time we developed a national message and went beyond speaking just to the Tamil people on Tamil issues alone – framing a clear message of what we see our issues as being, how they are different and how in a lot of cases similar to issues the poor and unconnected among the South face, what reforms we see as necessary to alleviate these issues, and our willingness to do so within one country.
One good thing coming out of this election is talk of the TNA and SLMC forming an alliance. It is a step towards framing the question of the place of the minority communities, not just the Tamils.
The next step would be for them to firmly disavow the concept of Tamil Eelam as a separate country while continuing to advocate political reform and practical solutions for the very real issues their constituents face, contest and win seats in an open parliamentary election in April to gain legitimacy and go South with a message. Learn Sinhalese, address the Sinhalese media, etc.
“What’s the alternative to reconciliation?”
You forgot to mention those really long lines of people, desperate to get visas, gathered outside American and European embassies. Give them the chance to vote for Mahinda or leave the country, what choice do you think they’ll make…
Dayan Jayatilleka,
Zizek was talking about the work of trying to reconcile antithetical opposites as “ideological”, i.e. as that which mystifies our perception of social realities. He was not discussing only the capital and labour situation. I am not arguing that the situation between the North and South cannot be resolved–it can be. Tamil expectations of obtaining equal rights are well within the systemic capacity of a democracy. I was, at the first level, interrogating your suggestion that Tamils need to be partners of Sinhalese nationalism such that they are “neither posturing competitors nor pliant clients”. There is no position between “posturing competitors” and “pliant clients” that is a pure space that doesn’t take in either of those two extremes that you mentioned, i.e. it is pure ideology in the classical definition of false consciousness–and it may involve trickery, Tamils pretending to be one, while covertly being the other. To my mind, citizens shouldn’t need to resort to trickery to obtain their rights, and if they do need to do that, that merely shows that they are, in the final analysis, “pliant clients”, powerless. You expose the nonsense of your own recommendation by asking Tamils to become “partners” of “Sinhala nationalism.” A partnership is about each obtaining its own goals but also helping the others to achieve theirs. So, Tamils are supposed to help Sinhalese grow or at least sustain their own nationalism? And what would happen to their own goals when they do?
But to move to another macro level of meaning, reconciliation entails each party at the opposite end of contradictions GIVING UP something (so that their positions are no longer contradictory). That is the shift that is required. The Tamils, at one end, want a Tamil Eelam; the Sinhalese want a unitary Sinhalese-dominated nation. Reconciliation is possible if the Tamils give up the Eelam demand and settle for a unitary state, and the Sinhalese accept the idea of a unitary state with protected equal rights for minorities. Or there is the federalism option. Your idea of reconciliation is that of the Sinhalese standing where they are, and handing out gifts to Tamils–a Santa Clause kind of gift-giving that entails gratitude from Tamils.
If your position is that the Sinhalese don’t have to budge from their nationalism because they are the majority holding the reins of power, then aren’t we back at square one of the conflict–except you’re trying to disguise it as a reconciliation!
Yes, recalcitrance can lead one to Nandikadal and Menik farms, and that applies to South as well as to North.
As someone from the Tamil diaspora, with family still in Sri Lanka, I find your suggestion that Tamils become partners of Sinhala nationalism extremely offensive.
SeeingPastTheSmoke, far as I am concerned there should be only Sri Lankan nationalism. Sinhalese & Tamil nationalists will die bitter!
Dear Observer,
You have hit the Nail on the Head.
Very incisive two lines