Are We Back on Square One?
The proximate cause that led me to write this article was a question asked by a friend of mine who earn his daily income by selling sundry items in Kandy pavement. He is known to me for almost 40 years as we were members of the same political party in the 1970s and 1980s. He has been always a careful observer of events that have been taking place in national and international political arena. His question reads like this: “Comrade, it seems that the LTTE will be definitely defeated in the military front soon. Since it has been a military-politico organization, I think it would weaken or even disappear with the military defeat. So don’t you think Sri Lanka’s situation in February 2009 would be similar to its situation in February 2002?” The question puzzled me, so my immediate response was: “what do you mean?” He explained: “In February 2002, you people described the Sri Lankan situation as ‘no war, no peace.’ I think in February 2009, we will be back at the same situation -‘no war, no peace.’” Although I did not have much to say responding to his observation, I found it was quite interesting and insightful. Are we back on square one? I thought that it would be pertinent to jot down my thoughts on this challenging question.
There would be many affinities between February 2002 and February 2009. In December 24, the LTTE declared unilateral ceasefire for a month to which the GoSL positively responded. In February 22, 2002, two contending parties, the GoSL and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement thus systematizing the informal agreement that was operative for two months. Many observers, Sri Lankan and foreign, portrayed this situation by using the phrase, ‘ No War [writ small], No Peace [writ large]‘. This description signified the transitional nature of the outcome of the signing of the CFA, meaning, that although direct military confrontation came to an end, the cause of the conflict remained to be addressed. The causes of conflict are not confined to the so-called root causes of the conflict but included multiplicity of grievances generated by the war situation. In other words, the wide spectrum of conflicting factors included immediate attendance to humanitarian issues to long-term issue of restructuring the Sri Lankan post-colonial state. Hence, the cessation of hostilities between two main contending parties were seen as an opening up of a new space within which deep-rooted and difficult substantive issues could be addressed and the humanitarian contingencies directly attributed to war could be removed. In February 2002, the Eelam War 3 between the GoSL and the LTTE was ended by the Sri Lankan government agreeing to bring in the main contending party, the LTTE, as an equal partner to conflict settlement process. It was anticipated that the two parties with Norwegian mediation and financial contribution by the donor community would be able sit and discuss substantive issues in order to come to an amicable settlement. However, the process failed to bring in expected results.
The situation in February 2009 would be at least at surface level quite similar. It is likely that the Eelam War 4 would be ended by the end of February 2009. So that, as in February, ‘No War [writ small] would be achieved but by different means. In February 2002, the war was ended by recognizing the LTTE as an equal partner in conflict settlement process and accepting that there was a territory controlled by the LTTE. This is consistent with the notion of power symmetry in classical conflict resolution theory. The situation today is however significantly different. The principal contending party is removed from the equation or its importance is substantially marginalized. Hence, this time war would be terminated by the removal of one party with the military victory of the other. However, the causes of conflict would remain unchanged after the end of the military conflict. Although, this result is not the outcome that the classical conflict resolution theory anticipate, the situation that would emerge is somewhat similar to ‘no war, no peace’ situation that existed in the post-CFA period. My situation analysis is summarized in Figure 1.               Â
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FIGURE 1
Comparing post-February 2002 and post-February 2009
|
 Issue |
 Post-February 2002 |
 Post- February 2009 |
| 1.    Relationship between contenders | Making contenders (the GoSL and LTTE) partners of problem-solving | Removing the principal contender (the LTTE) from the equation through military defeat |
| 2.    Direct Military Confrontation | Came to end through an agreement between contenders. | Came to end by defeating one party, the LTTE |
| 3.    Outcome | No war, no peace;
One part of the country was under the LTTE rule. |
No war, no peace
GoSL controls the entire territory. |
| 4.    Causes of conflict | Remain unresolved | Remain unresolved |
| 5.    How to address them? | Through negotiation with third party mediation | Still undecided. Possible mechanisms
(a)Â Â The wining party (the GoSL) deciding the agenda; (b)Â Â The winning party in consultation with friendly Tamil parties setting the agenda; (c)Â Â Â Setting the agenda in consultation with India as a third party; (d)Â Â Both (b) and (c). Â |
Â
The orthodox conflict resolution theory and the policies based on it had failed to unleash processes making shift from ‘negative peace’ to ‘positive peace’. Signs were visible after the third round of talks in Oslo, Norway that the process was not moving ahead. Finally, the peace process collapsed although ceasefire prevailed until August 2006 and the party that signed the CFA was defeated at the Parliamentary election held in April 2004. The signing of the CFA definitely provided a new space, but the lack of political will, strategic action by the contending parties, especially the LTTE, the absence of human right protection attached to the CFA and total neglect of human rights violations by the GoSL, Norwegian government and many EU countries, the resistance of Sinhala extremism had contributed to the failure of the 2001 peace process (see for details, Sumanasiri Liyanage, One Step at a Time: Reflections on the Peace Process in Sri Lanka, Colombo: South Asia Peace Institute, 2008). Â
Emerging scenarios and the way in which armed conflict would be ended soon have once again revealed the flaws of classical conflict resolution theory. It is difficult to argue that the space that would be created in post-February 2009 may be less conducive to addressing the issue of national integration and the associated economic, political, social and cultural grievances of numerically small nations and other ethnic groups. One may even argue that the removal of one extremist character (the LTTE) from the equation may even contribute to widening the space open for other characters. However, post-February 2009 situation may be more complex and the final outcome depends on the interventions of multiple agents representing different points in the ethnic and political landscape. The outcome in my opinion would depend on four variables that can be discussed separately although a degree of interdependence between them may be theorized. The four variables are:
1.    The relative independence and strength of Sinhala exclusive nationalist elements like JVP, NFP, Hela Urumaya and their front organizations;
2.    The relative independence and strength of the Tamil nationalist parties (TNA, TMVP, EPDP, PLOTE, Anandasangaree wing of TULF), Muslim parties and Malayahai Tamil parties;
3.    The strategic and instrumental rational actions of the SLFP in general and Rajapakse family in particular; and
4.    The Indian factor, (Indian elections and Indian international and regional policy priorities, Indian investments in Sri Lanka).
Many conflict resolution experts have already concluded that emerging post-war situation would be detrimental to a democratic solution and to the aspirations of the numerically small nations and ethnic groups as they have envisioned that post-war politics would be dominated Sinhala exclusive nationalist elements. While accepting the fact that Sinhala nationalist feelings would be encouraged by a military victory over the LTTE, I do not want to be a pessimist. There may be a significant section of Sinhala population who would not share Sinhala exclusive nationalism. So I envision if democratic forces in the country can organize themselves on clear social-democratic agenda and try to enter into a democratic front with non-exclusive nationalist parties mentioned above, the situation may be converted into a space that promote and facilitate more constructive outcome. The way in which the ruling party act would depend on the relative strength of and balance between the Sinhala exclusive nationalist forces and the democratic and non-exclusive nationalist forces. The latter would be able to receive the moral support of India whatever the outcome of the Indian elections. Â Â Â
The writer teaches political economy at the University of Peradeniya
e-mail: sumane_l@yahoo.com
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At square one.
There are always a pesimistic some who are a party to the problem, such as above, and then there are some who are an optimistic paty to the solution, such as below;
Post-February 2002
1. Relationship between contenders Making contenders (the GoSL and LTTE) partners of problem-solving or so was the image presented by the militant fascist contender (Col. Karuna).
2. 'Direct' Military Confrontation Came to a TEMPORARY end through an pressure and agreement between a democracy and a fascist militant regime.One cannot rightfully contend as these contenders are a wee extremist minority.
3. Outcome: Temporary No war, no peace due to Tiger obticale to the democratic processes, including elections, Re-armement.
One part of the country was under the LTTE rule.
4. How to address them? Through negotiation with third party arm/cash suppier appointed by the fascist party.
Post- February 2009
1. Removing the principal contender (the LTTE) from the equation through military defeat
2. Came to end by defeating one party, the LTTE
3. GoSL controls the entire territory.
4. Causes of conflict resolved such as happening in th East. Since the cause of the problem is eliminated prgress toward adressing the current needs of all people can now happen for the first time = solved.
Mediation is on-going, still undecided on the finished product, application of the 13th amendment, holding elections as in the East. Possible mechanisms
(a) The wining party (the GoSL) deciding the agenda;
(b) The winning party in consultation with friendly Tamil parties setting the agenda;
(c) Tamil parties being in the winning party.
(d) Setting the agenda in consultation with India as a third party;
(e) Setting the agenda in consultation with all oter interested parties within Sri Lanka and the current realities.
(d) Combination of the above.
thanks, may back to
"Being back at square one" implies a two dimensional plain… Given the number of axises that these issues are dependent on, me thinks this 'game' has to be modeled out on a three (or larger) dimensional "cube"…
Citizen,
You are closer to reality. The conflict is a multi-dimensional evolving organism. It is not a dragon to be slain and be done with it. It is a conflict of incompatible ideas deeply rooted in the psyche of the communities. The war has only entrenched it deeper and with increased complexity. If one is to simplify, one could say it is a spiral with the beginning fading into ancient history and an indeterminate stretch in the 4th dimension – time. Liyanage's friend refered to one point of the spiral of events in time – Februray 2002. Someone else may go down in time and choose July 1983. But both would be right or wrong depending on their asumptions. Was it Herodutus (Sp!) the Greek historian who said that, "We cannot step into the same river twice." So, there is never a "square one" or any point in time where a current situation will be same as that of a point in time before or after. Unless we resolve the ideas in conflict we will perpetually be in the war spiral and never make the transition to the peace spiral. The concept of transition is key, as there is no easy leap to the peace spiral from the war spiral.
Pity ! Isn't it ? We are at square one after sacrifycing so much, after making so much efforts through various means, after involve in so much, after loosing so much, after three decades, back to square one !Dayan as an academic, political thinker / activist, theorist and Sumane as a 'civil society' representative, writer, critic and non activist, both were failed. Dayan and Sumane represent the 'category' but not the 'person'. A 'careful observer of events' though a layman, reminds us that we all are back at squre one ! Let us come to the senses and try to get out of this 'trap'.
If the Tamil Minorities abandon the Thimpu Principles and the unitary constituition is changed so that democratic checks and balances are in place based on provinces (ie. ALL 9 of them)….A along with clear delegation NOT devolution of Authority to ALL PROVINCES equally…as well as changes to the electoral system from proportional to prefeerential ….THEN COUNTRY SHOULD PROSPER……
Brilliant! That sounds simple enough!
Why don't we just do that and let the country prosper then?
Though I disagree with Sumane's methodology and certainly with the identification of 2002 and 2009 — I think the conjunctures are radically different, with the former being an appeasement conjuncture and the latter its reverse– I agree broadly with his political conclusion and recommendation.
At the heart of the Sri Lankan conflict is racism. And the insecurity, envy and hatred that always accompanies racism.
A common explanatory adage for the bitter conflict today is that the Sinhala people suffer from ‘insecurity’; that they see themselves as a unique island people under perpetual threat.
Apparently there are ‘only’ 17 million Sinhalese in the world, in fear of being swamped by the billion Indians across the Palk Straits, especially the 60 million Tamils – because there are ‘already’ 3 million Tamils on the island.
‘Surrounded’ by these ‘others’ in the region, the Sinhalese are reportedly a ‘majority with a minority complex’.
International analysts and diplomats routinely accept this ‘insecurity.’ For example a report by the conflict think tank, International Crisis Group, worries that “the international community has struggled to come to terms with Sinhala nationalism, frequently misunderstanding its nature and legitimacy.”
“Interventions, even including the Norwegian-sponsored 2002 ceasefire, which most Sinhalese ultimately judged as too favourable to the LTTE, have tended to stimulate xenophobic elements in the Sinhala community and help the extreme nationalist parties gain ground,” the ICG patiently spells out.
A BBC survey of the mood on the street in Colombo quotes a middle class Sinhala professional explaining the historic insecurity of the Sinhalese, how they are a minority compared to neighbouring India and how this has fuelled the race ‘tension’ with the Tamils.
Bear in mind that not once has India, the Indian Tamils or, for that matter, the Sri Lankan Tamils, laid claim to the Sinhala territories.
The irrationality of this ‘minority while a majority’ complex struck me when a Dutch colleague expansively informed me, in a recent discussion about identity: “you know, there are almost 17 million of us Dutch.”
Arguably, the ‘just’ 16.57 million Dutch in Holland are very much ‘surrounded’ by over 700 million “others” in Europe, including 82 million Germans who not so long ago invaded and occupied their homeland.
But there is no minority complex, despite a resurgent Germany driving European fortunes. Indeed, Holland is an enthusiastic participant in the European project.
Moreover, The Netherlands is the 25th most densely populated country in the world whereas Sri Lanka is 39th.
Nonetheless, the Dutch do not think of themselves as a ‘small’ nation under threat of being swamped. But apparently, the Sinhalese are a to be seen as a fearful ‘small’ nation under siege.
This alone is not enough for conflict, of course. Having found themselves an enemy without, the Sinhalese have also found an enemy within: the island’s Tamils.
Of course, every nation has its bit of racism. In Europe, for example, far right groups in many states love to hate immigrants (usually, but not exclusively, the dark-skinned kind): “they are taking away our jobs”, “they don’t want to fit in”, “our identity will be lost” and so on. 17% of the French voted for the National Front in 2002.
It shouldn’t be forgotten that the Sinhala people also had their form of ‘immigration angst’: immediately after independence, they enthusiastically supported the stripping of citizenship from a million ‘Indian’ Tamils who had been brought to the island by the British generations earlier to work on the plantations.
What was served by this act of pure racism? What were these people who had been born on the island and knew no other home expected to do? The answer is the war cry of far rightists everywhere: “go back to your country!”
But the deep-seated racism in Sri Lanka is different. For the Tamils of the Northeast are not recent or arriving immigrants and this is not the usual angst of ‘integration’.
Rather, the Tamil people have lived on the island in their own contiguous, distinct, geographical territory for millennia. They lay claim only to the territory they have historically lived in. In fact, the 3 million Tamils constituted a nation with distinct self-governance until invaded and occupied by Colonial powers – who amalgamated them with the Sinhala nation and territory for pure administrative convenience.
read the rest at
http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articlei…