SERENDIPITY AND INGRATITUDE: THE MAHINDA MIRACLE AND JANAKA PERERA’S ASSASSINATION IN RETROSPECT

R.Venugopal

The course of this conflict has seen many unlikely bed-fellows, serendipitous twists of fortune, and actions that led to very unforeseen consequences. When the dust settles and the history of the present is written some day, it will have to record the extraordinary debt that the Rajapakse clan and its retinue bear to their nemesis, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Janaka Perera’s assassination yesterday morning, (presuming it was by the LTTE), is yet another example of the extent to which the ruling clan’s hegemonic grip on power is beholden to the Tigers.

How so? Well, first of all, let it be clear that this is not a conspiracy theory. Despite their reputation for Machiavellian manipulation, it is most unlikely that the Rajapakses are consciously complicit in this latest outrage, although they have nevertheless benefited. Neither is it likely (the cult of martyrdom notwithstanding) that the Tigers could have fully predicted the consequences of their actions, or that they would have wished such terrible ingratitude upon themselves from those that they have done so much for. 

For example, could the Tigers have predicted that the assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005 would have cleared the path for Mahinda Rajapakse as UPFA’s presidential candidate? Perhaps, but who knows? What is known for sure is that the JVP – who provided the manpower for Mahinda’s election campaign – would never have supported Mahinda over Kadirgamar. They lobbied hard for Kadirgamar to be named as prime minister in April 2004, and made their displeasure known when it was Mahinda who won. There is no doubt that if Kadirgamar were alive, he would also have benefited from the support of the incumbent, Chandrika Kumaratunga. With a President Kadirgamar ruling the roost and Chandrika lurking about, the Rajapakses would have been relegated to little-ness and less.

Having thus cleared the path for Rajapakse to become the unopposed UPFA candidate, the contributions of the Tigers towards his ascendancy did not stop there. Given the razor thin margin of his victory, there is no doubt that it was their enforced election boycott of north-east Tamils that won Rajapakse the throne. This is not to resurrect the Tiran Alles-payoff- theory, which has inexplicably faded from the media eye since Alles’s arrest and release last June. Regardless of the truth or untruth of that case, what we know for sure is that the Rajapakses reaped rich benefits from that particularly ignoble episode in mass disenfranchisement.

The history of the Rajapakses in power since then has been one of the most remarkable political success stories in contemporary times. Despite weak electoral arithmetic, dismal international relations, and fickle electoral partners, they have enjoyed the kind of masterful command of the political realm that has no precedent since perhaps the early years of the J.R. Jayewardene presidency. This unusual success bears much to two factors.

The biggest asset that the ruling family possesses is the war. The successful prosecution of the war has placed them in an unassailable electoral position that has neutered the opposition by denying them any space to rally and mobilise. Despite the LTTE’s calculations that the election victory of the JVP/JHU-backed Rajapakse would by default improve their own international standing and perhaps support for a UDI, they forfeited any such benefit through their own actions in that period, which earned them first the anger, and later the fatal indifference of the international community.

The assassination of the sitting foreign minister during a cease-fire in August 2005, the Makkal Padai attacks of November-December 2005, the failed suicide-attack on Sarath Fonseka in April 2006, the attack on the Pearl Cruiser in May 2006, the bewildering walkout of the Tamilselvan entourage from the Oslo talks in June 2006, followed immediately by the Kebithigollewa massacre of 64 civilians – all helped greatly in hastening the collapse of the peace process, and in restoring some measure of international sympathy for the Rajapakses. It not only helped to airbrush out a series of terrible atrocities against Tamil civilians during the first half of 2006, but it actually made the ruling family’s headlong rush to war seem measured, moderate, and restrained.

Secondly, the political survival of the Rajapakse camp depends heavily on the continued malaise at the heart of the opposition UNP. Everyone in the UNP, even the closest allies and friends of Ranil Wickremasinghe will admit privately that there are quite literally no prospects of a UNP victory under his leadership – but they have irrationally been stuck with him for 14 long years. Yet, desperate circumstances give rise to desperate changes, and the UNP might still have shaken themselves out of their torpor in time for the next elections.

And this is where the LTTE has once again provided yeoman service to the Rajapakses. By assassinating a UNP war hero, i.e., a potential future leader and winning contender like Janaka Perera (as with Lucky Algama before), what the LTTE has done, whether by default or design, is to deepen the paralysis within the UNP, keeping them rudderless, weak, and shorn of winnable candidates. This terrible act of vengeance – aimed perhaps at settling the distant historical scores of Eelam Wars II and III – will go down in history as having contributed serendipitously towards the stability and prosperity of the Rajapakses, and thus to their benefit in the prosecution of Eelam War IV.