The Responsibility to Protect

Photo credit: Sam de Silva

The Neelan Tiruchelvam Lecture delivered by Gareth Evans, the former Foreign Minister of Australia and the current President of the International Crisis Group (ICG), was a lucid and incisive account of recent developments in the international humanitarian and human rights fields and their relevance to Sri Lanka. Titled the “The Limits of State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century” Mr Evans elaborated the thesis of state responsibility towards its citizens and the responsibility of the international community in the instances in which this responsibility was not being met. These ideas were initially developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of which Mr Evans was the co- chair, in its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect released at the end of 2001.

In his lecture, Mr Evans highlighted two “critical conceptual contributions” made by the Commission. The first was a new approach to humanitarian intervention based on the responsibility of states as opposed to the right of states and the second related to new ways of thinking about the concept of sovereignty which saw as its essence the responsibility of states for the protection of citizens as opposed to their control over citizens. Mr Evans pointed out that when the state fails in this responsibility to protect, “ through either incapacity or ill – will, a secondary responsibility to protect falls on the wider international community”. Mr Evans stressed however that the action required is “overwhelmingly preventive: building state capacity, remedying grievances and ensuring the rule of law. But if prevention fails, R2P ( right to protect) requires whatever measures – economic, political, diplomatic, legal, security or in the last resort military – become necessary to stop mass atrocity crimes occurring.”

Mr Evans also noted that the concept of R2P was embraced in the Summit Outcome Document of the UN 60th Anniversary World Summit in September 2005 by over 150 heads of state and government and was invoked in Resolution 1706 of the UN Security Council of 31 August 2006 on Darfur. There have been problems nevertheless, given the resistance of sovereignty conscious governments wedded to the older paradigm of “control” and non – intervention. When they arose in 2005, the support that mattered for R2P, Mr Evans pointed, out came from South Africa and a number of other Sub- Saharan African states, certain Latin American countries and after diplomatic efforts by the then Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, India. Resistance persists and is based on four “misunderstandings” of R2P that Mr Evans went on to clarify.

The first relates to the mistaken notion that it is only about military intervention or that it is simply another name for humanitarian intervention. He stressed that it is preventive, involves the state and with regard to the international community it is about the international community helping states to help themselves. And when prevention fails, response can be made in a number of ways including as a last resort, military force. The second relates to R2P being interpreted as the “protection of everyone from everything”, an over broad interpretation which compounds concerns about intervention, especially of the military kind. He reiterated that it was about large scale killing, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and not the full gamut of issues that come under the umbrella of human security. The third misunderstanding has to do with R2P being about the responding to conflict and human rights abuses generally arousing all the fears of “interventionary over -reach”. The current situation in Iraq as opposed to that which obtained at the time of the 2003 invasion and Burundi were cited as R2P situations. The final misunderstanding identified was that R2P justifies coercive military intervention in every instance where large scale loss of life or large scale ethnic cleansing is occurring or apprehended. Multiple criteria need to be satisfied before coercive military action is resorted to. These must include the seriousness of the threat to civilians, the motivation for intervention, the exhaustion of all other means, proportionality of response and the balance of consequences i.e more good than harm would result from the military intervention.

In respect of Sri Lanka, Mr Evans having outlined the human rights and humanitarian situation stated that:

“All this makes it hard to argue that Sri Lanka is anything but a R2P situation. It may not be one where large scale atrocity crimes – Cambodia- style, Rwanda- style, Srebrenica-style , Kosovo-style are occurring right now, or immediately about to occur, but it is certainly a situation which is capable of deteriorating to that extent. So it is an R2P situation which demands preventive action, by the Sri Lankan government itself, but with the help of the international community, o ensure that further deterioration does not occur.”

Mr Evans went on to sketch the broad outlines of a preventive strategy entailing cooperation between the government and the international community. These include the

1) priority need for effective prosecutions with witness protection and provision of adequate resources to the Commission of Inquiry (COI) as well as full use of the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP).
2) Citing the Nepal example, UN human rights monitoring.
3) Given the government’s sovereign responsibility not to put its own citizens at undue risk, the government “ must resist the temptation to continue its military campaign into the areas of the Northern Province held by the LTTE”. Noting the difficulties of dealing with the LTTE, their armed provocation in 2005 and 6 and the ruthless nature of their rule, he recognized that the government has legitimate security concerns which it cannot ignore. Foreign states who must bear some responsibility for the LTTE being able to sustain itself over the years must along with the rest of the international community, help the government to make it harder for the LTTE to persist with violence.
4) Yet in all probability it is unlikely that the Tigers can be defeated militarily. The only pressure they are ultimately likely to respond to is political. Therefore, political package of constitutional reforms is necessary and no international support should be given for offensive operations in the north until such proposals that moderate Tamils can agree to, are presented by the government. The APRC provides an excellent opportunity for this and the opposition should become active participants in it. The SLFP should also come up with a clear statement that it will not veto a consensus plan that offers extensive devolution at the provincial level.

The Evans lecture is many respects constitutes a lucid and concise statement of the liberal viewpoint on peace and state reform that has been articulated over the years by the “peace” constituency in the country. According to the more hard line elements in the polity who believe they are in the ascendant and determine the public mood, this perspective is discredited and irrelevant. Military victory is necessary and possible. There should be no turning back.

However, cogent and persistent articulation of the Responsibility to Protect will resonate with the public of Sri Lanka. Whatever the current mood, this is a responsibility which in turn cannot and should not be shirked by those who care about this country and who are not afraid of the future.